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PETITIONER: AHMAD UMAR SAEED SHEIKH

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH

DATE OF JUDGMENT:       21/11/1996

BENCH: M.K. MUKHERJEE, S.P. KURDUKAR

ACT:

HEADNOTE:

JUDGMENT:                          O R D E R      The instant  appeal has been filed by the appellant for quashing the  charges that  have framed  against him  by the Designated Judge,  Meerut under  Sections Act and Sections 3 and  4   of  the   Terrorist   and   Disruptive   Activities (Prevention) Act, 198/ ("TADA’ for short)"      Mr. Ramaswamy,  the learned  counsel for the appellant, submitted that  the entire proceedings initiated against the appellant, including  the  charges,  initiated  against  the appellant, including  the charges, were liable to be quashed as the First Information Report, which ultimately culminated in the  impugned  proceedings  against  the  appellant,  was lodged in  utter breach  of Section  20 A (1) of TADA, which provides that  no information  about the commission of an of fence under TADA shall be recorded by the police without the prior approval  of the District Superintendent of Police. To bring home  his contention  he has drawn on attention to the F.I.R. that was recorded on the complaint of a Sub Inspector of Police  for offences  punishable under  Sections 332, 307 and 427  IPC, 7  of  the  Criminal  Law  Amendment  Act  and Sections 3 and 4 of TADA.      After having  given our  anxious consideration  to  the above contention  of Mr.  Ramaswamy we  are unable to accept the same.  it is  of course  true that when the above F.I.R. was recorded not only for of fences under  TADA but also for offences under the Indian Penal Code for commission of which the concerned  police officer  was  competent  to  lodge  an F.I.R. without  such approval.  The absence  of approval  of District Superintendent  of Police as required under Section 20 A  (1)  of  TADA  at  that  stage  only  disentitled  the investigating  agency   to  investigate  into  the  offences relating to TADA but it had a statutory right to investigate into the  other offences alleged in the F.I.R. If the F.I.R. was lodged  only for  commission of  offences under  TADA we might have  persuaded ourselves  to accept the contention of Mr. Ramaswamy,  but there being allegation of other offences therein it  cannot be  said that  the F.I.R.  so far  as  it sought investigation of  these offences was non-est.      There are  certain other  facts which  required  to  be noticed at  this stage.  After the  F.I.R  was  lodged,  the

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investigating agency made a prayer before the Superintendent of Police,  Ghaziabad  on  November  21,  1994  seeking  his approval to  and Sections 3 and 4 of TADA on the ground that during investigation  the involvement  of the  appellant  in commission of  such  offences  was  revealed.  The  approval sought for  was granted  and  thereafter  on  completion  of investigation chargesheet was submitted with the sanction of the concerned  authority as  required under  Section of  the concerned authority  as required  under Section  20 A (2) of TADA. Since  the above  steps  taken  by  the  Investigating Agency are  in conformity  with the  provisions of both sub- sections (1)  & (2)  of Section  20 a  of TADA  the impugned charges are not liable to be quashed on the grounds agitated by Mr. Ramaswamy. As on other point was raised in support of this appeal we dismiss the same.