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PETITIONER: AGHNOO NAGESIA

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: STATE OF BIHAR

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 04/05/1965

BENCH: BACHAWAT, R.S. BENCH: BACHAWAT, R.S. SUBBARAO, K. DAYAL, RAGHUBAR

CITATION:  1966 AIR  119            1966 SCR  (1) 134  CITATOR INFO :  R          1972 SC  66  (13)  F          1972 SC 922  (14)

ACT: Indian  Evidence  Act (1 of 1872), s. 25-Ban  an  confession made to a police officer-Confessional F.I.R. by  accused-Ban whether  applies  to  while statement  or  only  those  part showing actual commission of crime.

HEADNOTE: The appellant was tried for murder.  The principal  evidence against   him  consisted  of  a  first  information   report containing  a full confession of the crime.   The  appellant was  convicted under s. 302 Indian Penal Code by  the  trial court  and the High Court upheld the conviction, By  special leave he appealed to the Supreme Court. The  question  before  the  court  was  whether  the   whole confessional  statement in the first information report  was banned  by s. 25 of the Evidence Act or only those  portions of it were barred which related to the actual commission  of the crime. HELD  :  A confession may consist of severd  parts  and  may reveal not only the actual commission of the crime but  also the  motive, the preparation, the provocation etc.   If  the confession  is  tainted  the taint  attaches  to  the  whole statement of the accused. [140 B-C] If a statement contains an admission of an offence, not only that  admission  but  also  every  other  admission  of   an incriminating fact contained in the statement is part of  he confession.   Little substance and content would be left  in ss.  24, 25 and 26 if proof of admissions  of  incriminating facts in  confessional statement is permitted. [140 D-E, F] The appellant’s first information report was a  confessional statement  to  a police officer and as such no  part  of  it could be admitted into evidence on account of the ban in  s. 25  except  in  so far as the ban was lifted by  s.  27  and except in so far as it identified the appellant is the maker of the report. [143 P-G] Case law considered.

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JUDGMENT: CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal No. 37  of 1965. Appeal  by special leave from the judgment and  order  dated November 9, 1964 of the Patna High Court in Criminal  Appeal No. 200 of 1964 and Death Reference No. 9 of 1964. K.   K. Jain, for the appellant. S.   P. Varma and R. N. Sachthey, for the respondent. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by Bachawat,  J. The appellant was charged under s. 302 of  the Indian Penal Code for murdering his aunt, Ratni, her  daugh- ter.  Chamin, her son-in-law, Somra and Dilu, son of  somra. He 135 was convicted and sentenced to death by the Judicial Commis- sioner of Chotanagpur.  The High Court of Patna accepted the death  reference, confirmed the conviction and sentence  and dismissed  the  appeal  preferred  by  the  appellant.   The appellant now appeals to this Court by special leave. The  prosecution case is that on August 11, 1963  between  7 a.m.  and  8 a.m. the appellant murdered Somra in  a  forest known as Dungijharan Hills and later Chamin in Kesari  Garha field  and  then  Ratni and Dilu in the house  of  Ratni  at village Jamtoli. The  first  information of the offences was  lodged  by  the appellant  himself  at police station Palkot on  August  11, 1963 at 3-15 p.m. The information was reduced to writing  by the officerin-charge, Sub-Inspector H. P. Choudhury, and the appellant  affixed his left thumb-impression on the  report. The  Sub  Inspector  immediately  took  cognizance  of   the offence, and arrested the appellant.  The next day, the  Sub Inspector in the company of the appellant went to the  house of Ratni, where the appellant pointed out the dead bodies of Ratni  and  Dilu and also a place in the  orchard  of  Ratni covered  with  bushes and grass, where he  had  concealed  a tangi.   The  appellant  then took  the  Sub  Inspector  and witnesses  to  Kasiari garha khet and pointed out  the  dead body  of Chamin lying in a ditch covered with Ghanghu.   The appellant  then took the Sub Inspector and the witnesses  to Dungijharan  Hills,  where he pointed out the dead  body  of Somra lying in the slope of the hills to the north.  The Sub Inspector also recovered from the appellant’s house a chadar stained with human blood.  The evidence of P.W. 6 shows that the  appellant  had  gone to the forest on  the  morning  of August 11, 1963. The  medical  evidence discloses incised wounds on  all  the dead  bodies.  The injuries were caused by  a  sharp-cutting weapon such as a tangi.  All the four persons were  brutally murdered. There is no eye-witness to the murders.  The principal evid- ence against the appellant consists of the first information report,  which  contains a full confession of guilt  by  the appellant.   If this report is excluded, the other  evidence on the record is insufficient to convict the appellant.  The principal question in the appeal is whether the statement or any portion of it is admissible in evidence. The first information report reads as follows : "My name  is Aghnu Nagesia. (1) My father’s name is Lodhi Nagesia.  I  am a  resident of Lotwa, Tola Jamtoli, thana  Palkot,  district Ranchi. 136 Today, Sunday, date not known, at about 3 p.m. I having come to the P.S. make statement before you the S.I. of Police (2) that  on account of my Barima (aunt) Mussammat having  given

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away  her property to her daughter and  son-in-law  quarrels and troubles have been occurring among us.  My Barima has no son  and  she is a widow.  Hence on her death  we  shall  be owners of her lands and properties and daughter and  son-in- law  of  Barima  shall have no right  to  them.   She  lives separate  from us, and lives in her house with her  daughter and  son-in-law and I live with my brother separately in  my house.  Our lands are separate from the time of our  father. (3) Today in the morning at about 7-8 a.m. I had -one with a tangi  to  Duni Jharan Pahar to cut shrubs for  fencing.   I found  Somra  sitting  alone there who  was  grazing  cattle there.  (4) Seeing him I got enraged and dealt him  a  tangi blow  on  the fill (calf) of right leg, whereby  he  toppled down  on  the ground.  Thereupon I dealt him  several  Chheo (blows)  on the head and the face, with the result  that  he became  speechless  and died.  At that time there  was  none near  about  on  that Pahar. (5) Thereafter I  came  to  the Kesari Garu field where "Somra’s wife Chamin was weeding out grass in the field. (6) 1 struck her also all on a sudden on the head with the said tangi whereby she dropped down on the ground and died then and there. (7) Thereafter I dragged her to  an adjoining field and laid her in a ditch to the  north of  it and covered her body with Gongu (Pala ke  Chhata)  so that people might not see her.  There was no person then  at that place also. (8) Thereafter I armed with that tangi went to  the  house  of my Barima to kill her.   When  I  reached there,  I found that she was sitting near the  hearth  which was  burning. (9) Reaching there all on a sudden I began  to strike her on the head with tangi whereupon she dropped down dead at that very place. (10) Near her was Somra’s son  aged about 3 -4 years. (11) I also struck him with the tangi.  He also  fell  down and died. (12) I finished the  line  of  my Barima  so that no one could take share in  her  properties. (13) 1 hid the tangi in the jhari of my Barima’s house. (14) Later  on I narrated the occurrence to my  chacha  (father’s brother) Lerha that I killed the aforesaid four persons with tangi.  After sometime (15) I started for the P.S. to  lodge information  and  reaching the P.S. T  make  this  statement before  you. (16) My Barima had all along  been  quarrelling like  a  Murukh (foolish woman) and being vexed, I  did  so. (17)  All  the dead bodies and the tangi would be  lying  in those  places.   I  can point them out. ( 1 8)  This  is  my statement.  I got it read over to me and finding it correct, I affixed my left thumb-impression." 137 We  have divided the statement into 18 parts.  Parts  1,  15 and 18 show that the appellant went to the police station to make  the  report.  Parts 2 and 16 show his motive  for  the murders.   Parts 3, 5, 8 and 10 disclose the  movements  and opportunities  of the appellant before the murders.  Part  8 also discloses his intention.  Parts 4, 6, 9 and 11 disclose that  the  appellant  killed  the  four  persons.   Part  12 discloses  the killing and the motive.  Parts 7, 13  and  17 disclose  concealment  of a dead body and a  tangi  and  his ability  to point out places where the dead bodies  and  the tangi were lying.  Part 14 discloses the previous confession by the appellant.  Broadly speaking, the High Court admitted in  evidence parts 1, 2, 3, 5, 7, 8, 10, 13, 15, 16, 17  and 18. On behalf of the appellant, it is contended that the  entire statement  is a confession made to a police officer  and  is not  provable against the appellant, having regard to S.  25 of  the  Indian  Evidence  Act,  1872.   On  behalf  of  the respondent,  it is contended that S. 25 protects only  those portions of the statement which disclose the killings by the

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appellant and the rest of the statement is not protected  by s. 25. Section  25 of the Evidence Act is one of the provisions  of law  dealing with confessions made by an accused.   The  law relating  to confessions is to be found generally in ss.  24 to 30 of the Evidence Act and ss. 162 and 164 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898.  Sections 17 to 31 of the Evidence Act  are  to  he  found  under  the  heading   "Admissions". Confession  is a species of admission, and is dealt with  in ss.  24  to 30.  A confession or an  admission  is  evidence against  the  maker  of  it,  unless  its  admissibility  is excluded  by  some provision of law.   Section  24  excludes confessions  caused  by  certain  inducements,  threats  and promises.   Section 25 provides : "No confession made  to  a police officer, shall be proved as against a person  accused of  an  offence."  The terms of s.  25  are  imperative.   A confession made to a police officer under any  circumstances is  not  admissible  in evidence against  the  accused.   It covers a confession made when he was free and not in  police custody, as also a confession made before any  investigation has begun.  The expression "accused of any offence" covers a person accused of an offence at the trial whether or not  he was  accused  of the offence when he  made  the  confession. Section   26  prohibits  proof  against  any  person  of   a confession  made by him in the custody of a police  officer, unless it is made in the immediate presence of a Magistrate. The  partial  ban imposed by S. 26 relates to  a  confession made to a person 138 other  than a police officer.  Section 26 does  not  qualify the absolute ban imposed by s. 25 on a confession made to  a police officer.  Section 27 is in the form of a proviso, and partially  lifts the ban imposed by ss. 24, 25 and  26.   It provides  that when any fact is deposed to as discovered  in consequence of information received from a person accused of any offence, in the custody of a police officer, so much  of such information, whether it amounts to a confession or not, as relates distinctly to the fact thereby discovered, may be proved.   Section  162  of the Code  of  Criminal  Procedure forbids  the  use of any statement made by any person  to  a police  officer  in the course of an investigation  for  any purpose  at any enquiry or trial in respect of  the  offence Order investigation, save as mentioned in the proviso and in cases falling under sub-s (2), and it specifically  provides that nothing in it shall be deemed to affect the  provisions of S. 27 of the Evidence Act.  The words of s. 162 are  wide enough  to include a confession made to a police officer  in the  course of an investigation.  A statement or  confession made in the course of an investigation may be recorded by  a Magistrate  under s. 164 of the Code of  Criminal  Procedure subject  to  the safeguards imposed by the  section.   Thus, except  as  provided  by  s.  27  of  the  Evidence  Act,  a confession  by an accused to a police office- is  absolutely protected under s. 25 of the Evidence Act, and if it is made in  the course of an investigation, it is also protected  by s.  162 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, and a  confession to  any other person made by him while in the custody  of  a police  officer is protected by S. 26, unless it is made  in the  immediate presence of a Magistrate.   These  provisions seem  to proceed upon the view that confessions made  by  an accused  to a police officer or made by him while he  is  in the  custody of a police officer are not to be trusted,  and should not be used in evidence against him.  They are  based upon grounds of public policy, and the fullest effect should be given to them.

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Section  154 of the Code of Criminal Procedure provides  for the  recording  of the first information.   The  information report as such is not substantive evidence.  It may be  used to  corroborate the informant under s. 157 of  the  Evidence Act  or  to contradict him under s. 145 of the Act,  if  the informant   is  called  a,,;  a  witness.   If   the   first information is given by the accused himself, the fact of his giving the information is admissible against him as evidence of  his  conduct  under s. 8 of the Evidence  Art.   If  the information   is   a  non-confessional  statement,   it   is admissible  against the accused as an admission under s.  21 of the Evidence 139 Act  and  is  relevant, see Faddi v.  The  State  of  Madhya Pradesh(1) explaining Nisar Ali v. State of U.P. (1) and Dal Singh   v.  King  Emperor(1).   But  a  confessional   first information  report  to  a police  officer  cannot  be  used against the accused in view of S. 25 of the Evidence Act. The Indian Evidence Act does not define "confession".  For a long  time,  the Courts in India adopted the  definition  of "confession" given in Art. 22 of Stephen’s Digest of the Law of Evidence.  According to that definition, a confession  is an  admission  made  at any time by a  person  charged  with crime, stating or suggesting the inference that he committed that  crime.  This definition was discarded by the  Judicial Committee  in Pakala Narayanaswami v. The  King  Emperor(4). Lord Atkin observed :               "....no   statement   that   contains    self-               exculpatory  matter can amount to  confession,               if  the exculpatory statement is of some  fact               which  if  true  would  negative  the  offence               alleged  to  be confessed.  Moreover,  a  con-               fession   must  either  admit  in  terms   the               offence, or at any rate substantially all  the               facts   which  constitute  the  offence.               An admission of a gravely incriminating  fact,               even a conclusively incriminating fact, is not               of  itself  a confession, e.g.,  an  admission               that  the accused is the owner of and  was  in               recent  possession  of the knife  or  revolver               which  caused a death with no  explanation  of               any other man’s possession." These  observations received the approval of this  Court  in Palvin.  der Kaur v. The State of Punjab (5).  In  State  of U.P.  v.  Deoman  Upadhyaya(6),  Shah,  J.  referred  to   a confession  as  a  statement made by  a  person  stating  or suggesting the inference that he has committed a crime. Shortly put, a confession may be defined as an admission  of the  offence  by  a  person charged  with  the  offence.   A statement  which  contains  self-exculpatory  matter  cannot amount  to a confession, if the exculpatory statement is  of some fact which, if true, would negative the offence alleged to  be  confessed.  If an admission of an accused is  to  be used  against  him, the whole of it should  be  tendered  in evidence,  and if part of the admission is  exculpatory  and part inculpatory, the prosecution is not at (1)  Criminal Appeal No. 210 of 1963 decided on January  24, 1964.. (2) A.I.R. 1957 S.C. 366. (3) L.R. 44 I.A. 137. (4) [1939] L.R. 66 I.A. 66, 81. (5) [1953] S.C.R. 94, 104. (6)  [1961] 1 S.C.R. 14, 21. Sup.CI/65-10 140

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liberty  to use in evidence the inculpatory part only.   See Hanumant  v.  State of U.P. (1) and Palvinder  Kaur  v.  The State of Punjab(1).  The accused is entitled to insist  that the entire ,admission including the exculpatory part must be tendered   in  evidence.   But  this  principle  is  of   no assistance to the accused where no part of his statement  is self-exculpatory,  and  the prosecution intends to  use  the whole of the statement against the accused. Now,  a  confession  may consist of several  parts  and  may reveal not only the actual commission of the crime but  also the   motive,   the  preparation,   the   opportunity,   the provocation,   the   weapons  used,   the   intention,   the concealment of the weapon and the subsequent conduct of  the accused.   If the confession is tainted, the taint  attaches to  each  part  of  it.  It is not  permissible  in  law  to separate  one  part and to admit it in evidence  as  a  non- confessional   statement.    Each   part   discloses    some incriminating fact, i.e., some fact which by itself or along with  other admitted or proved facts suggests the  inference that  the accused committed the crime, and though each  part taken  singly may not amount to a confession, each  of  them being  part  of  a confessional statement  partakes  of  the character  of  a  confession.  If a  statement  contains  an admission  of an offence, not only that admission  but  also every other admission of an incriminating fact contained  in the statement is part of the confession. If  proof of the confession is excluded by any provision  of law such as s. 24, s. 25 and s. 26 of the Evidence Act,  the entire confessional statement in all its parts including the admissions  of  minor  incriminating  facts  must  also   be excluded,  unless  proof of it is permitted  by  some  other section such as s. 27 of the Evidence Act.  Little substance and  content would be left in ss. 24, 25 and 26 if proof  of admissions   of  incriminating  facts  in   a   confessional statement is permitted. Sometimes , a single sentence in a statement may not  amount to  a  confession at all.  Take a case of a  person  charged under s. 304-A of the Indian Penal Code and a statement made by him to a police officer that "I was drunk; I was  driving a car at a speed of 80 miles per hour; I could see A on  the road  at a distance of 80 yards; I did not blow the horn;  I made no attempt to stop the car; the car knocked down A." No single  sentence in this statement amounts to a  confession, but the statement read as a whole amounts to a confession of an  offence under s. 304-A of the Indian Penal Code, and  it would not be permissible to (1) [1952] S.C.R. 1091, 1111. (2) [1953] S.C.R. 94,105-106. 141 admit  in  evidence  each  sentence  separately  as  a  non- confessional  statement.  Again, take a case where a  single sentence  in  a  statement amounts to  an  admission  of  an offence.   ’A’  states "I struck ’B’ with a tangi  and  hurt him." In consequence of the injury ’B’ died.  ’A’  committed an  offence and is chargeable under various sections of  the Indian Penal Code.  Unless he brings his case within one  of the  recognised  exceptions,  his statement  amounts  to  an admission  of  an  offence,  but  the  other  parts  of  the statement  such as the motive, the preparation, the  absence of provocation, concealment of the weapon and the subsequent conduct, all throw light upon the gravity of the offence and the  intention and knowledge of the accused,  and  negatives the  right of private defence, accident and  other  possible defenses.  Each and every admission of an incriminating fact contained  in  the  confessional statement is  part  of  the

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confession. If the confession is caused by an inducement, threat or pro- mise as contemplated by s. 24 of the Evidence Act, the whole of  the confession is excluded by s. 24.  Proof of not  only the admission of the offence but also the admission of every other incriminating fact such as the motive, the preparation and  the subsequent conduct is excluded by s. 24.   To  hold that the proof of the admission of other incriminating facts is  not  barred  by  s. 24 is to  rob  the  section  of  its practical utility-and content.  It may be suggested that the bar  of  S. 24 does not apply to the other  admissions,  but though  receivable  in evidence, they are of no  weight,  as they   were  caused  by  inducement,  threat   or   promise. According  to-  this suggestion, the  other  admissions  are relevant but are of no value.  But we think that on a  plain construction  of  s.  24, proof of  all  the  admissions  of incriminating facts contained in a confessional statement is excluded  by the section.  Similarly, ss. 25 and 26 bar  not only  proof of admissions of an offence by an accused  to  a police  officer  or made by him while in the  custody  of  a police   officer  but  also  admissions  contained  in   the confessional statement of all incriminating facts related to the offence. A   little   reflection  will  show  that   the   expression "confession"  in  ss. 24 to 30 refers  to  the  confessional statement  as a whole including not only the  admissions  of the  offence but also all other admissions of  incriminating facts  related to the offence.  Section 27  partially  lifts the  ban imposed by ss. 24. 25 and 26 in respect of so  much of  the  information whether it amounts to a  confession  or not,  as  relates  distinctly  to  the  fact  discovered  in consequence  of the information, if the other conditions  of the section are 142 satisfied.   Section  27  distinctly  contemplates  that  an information  leading  to a discovery may be a  part  of  the confession of the accused and thus, fall within the  purview of  ss.  24,  25  and  26  Section  27  thus  shows  that  a confessional  statement  admitting the offence  may  contain additional information as part of the confession.  Again, s. 30  permits the Court to take into consideration  against  a co-accused  a  confession of another accused  affecting  not only  himself  but the other co-accused.   Section  30  thus shows that matters affecting other persons may from part  of the confession. If the first information report is given by the accused to a police  officer  and amounts to  a  confessional  statement, proof  of  the  confession  is prohibited  by  s.  25.   The confession  includes not only the admission of  the  offence but  all other admissions of incriminating facts related  to the  offence  contained in the confessional  statement.   No part of the confessional statement is receivable in evidence except  to the extent that the ban of s. 25 is lifted by  s. 27. Our attention is not drawn to any decision of this Court  or of  the Privy Council on the question whether apart from  s. 27,  a  confessional first information report  given  by  an accused is receivable in evidence against him.  Decisions of the  High Courts on this point are  hopelessly  conflicting. They  contain  all  shades of  opinion  ranging  from  total exclusion  of  the  confession to  total  inclusion  of  all admissions   of  incriminating  facts  except   the   actual commission  of the crime.  In Harji v. Emperor(1)  and  Noor Muhammad v. Emperor(2), the Lahore High Court held that  the entire  confessional first information report  was  inadmis-

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sible in evidence.  In Emperor v. Harman Kisha (3), the Bom- bay  High  Court held that the  entire  confessional  report dealing  with events on the night of the offence was hit  by s. 25, and it could not be said that portions of it  dealing with  the motive and the opportunity were not parts  of  the confession.   In  King Emperor v.  Kommoju  Brahman(1),  the Patna High Court held that no part of the confessional first information  report was receivable in evidence,  the  entire report formed a single connected story and no part of it had any meaning or significance except in relation to the whole, and it would be wrong to extract parts of the statement  and treat them as relevant.  This case was followed (1) A.I.R. 1918 Lah. 69. (2) (1925) 90 I.C. 148. (3) [1935] I.L.R. 59 Dom. 120. (4) I.L.R. 119401 Patna, 301, 308, 314. 14 3 in  Adimoola Padayachi v. State (1), and the Court  admitted only  the  portion  of the  confessional  first  information report  which  showed  it  was  given  by  the  accused  and investigation had started thereon.  In State of Rajasthan v. Shiv Singh (2)  the Court admitted in evidence the last part of  the  report dealing with the movements  of  the  accused after the commission of the offence, but excluded the  other parts  of the statement including those .relating to  motive and opportunity.  In Legal Remembrancer v. Lalit Mohan Singh Roy(3),  the  Calcutta High Court admitted in  evidence  the narrative of the events prior to the night of the occurrence disclosing  the  motive  of  the  offence.   This  case  was followed  by the Nagpur Court in Bharosa Ramdayal  v.  Empe- ror(4).  In Kartar Singh v. State (5), the Court admitted in evidence the introductory part and the portion narrating the motive  and the opportunity.  In Ram Singh v. The  State(6), the  Rajasthan High Court held that where it is possible  to separate parts of the first information report by an accused from that in which he had made a confession, that part which can  be so separated should be admitted in evidence, and  on this view, admitted a part of the report relating to  motive and  subsequent  conduct including the  statement  that  the accused had left the deceased lying wounded and breathing in the tibari and there was no hope of her surviving and he had come having covered her with a cloth.  In Lachrymose Mundane v. The State of Bihar (7) , the Patna High Court admitted in evidence  portions of the first information report  relating to  the motive, the opportunity and the entire narrative  of events  before and after the crime.  This case was  followed in  the  judgment under appeal.  Some of the  decided  cases took  the  view  that if a part of the  report  is  property severable  from  the  strict  confessional  part,  then  the severable part could be tendered in evidence.  We think that the   separability  test  is  misleading,  and  the   entire confessional  statement is hit by s. 25 and save and  except as  provided  by s. 27 and save and except the  formal  part identifying the accused as the maker of the report, no  part of it could be tendered in evidence. We think, therefore, that save and except parts 1, 15 and 18 identifying  the  appellant  as  the  maker  of  the   first information  report and save and except the portions  coming within  the purview of s. 27, the entire  first  information report must be excluded from evidence. (1)  [1960] M.W.N. -28. (3)  [1922] I.L.R. 49 Cal.  ’167. (5)  A.I.R. 1952 Pepsu 98. (2)  A.I.R. 1962 Rajasthan 3. (4)  A.T.R. 1941 Nag. 86.

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(6)  [1952] I.L.R. 2 Rajasthan 93. (7) A.I.R. 1964 Patna 210. 144 Section  27  applies  only to information  received  from  a person  accused  of an offence in the custody  of  a  police officer.  Now, the Sub Inspector stated that he arrested the appellant after he gave the first information report leading to the discovery.  Prima facie, therefore, the appellant was not  in  the custody of a police officer when  he  gave  the report,   unless  it  can  be  said  that  he  was  the   in constructive  custody.   On the question  whether  a  person directly giving to a police officer information which may be used  as  evidence  against  him  -may  be  deemed  to  have submitted  himself  to  the custody of  the  police  officer within  the meaning of s. 27, there is conflict of  opinion. See the observations of Shah, J. and Subba Rao, J. in  State of  U.P.  v. Deoman Upadhyaya(1).  For the purposes  of  the case, we shall assume that the appellant was  constructively in police custody and therefore the information contained in the first information report leading to the discovery of the dead  bodies and the tangi is admissible in  evidence.   The entire  evidence against the appellant then consists of  the fact  that  the appellant gave information as to  the  place where  the dead bodies were lying and as to the place  where he  concealed the tan,-,’, the discovery of the dead  bodies and  the  tangi  in  consequence  of  the  information,  the discovery  of  a blood-stained chadar from  the  appellant’s house and the fact that he had gone to Dungi Jharan Hills on the  morning  of  August 11, 1963.   This  evidence  is  not sufficient to convict the appellant of the offenses under s.   302 of the Indian Penal Code. In  the  result, the appeal is allowed, the  conviction  and sentence  passed by the Courts below are set aside, and  the appellant is directed to be set at liberty forthwith. Appeal allowed. (1) [1961] 1 S.C. R. 14 at 26, 44. 145