http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 1 of 13  

PETITIONER: ADHUNIK GRAH NIRMAN SAHAKARI SAMITI LTD. ETC.

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: STATE OF RAJASTHAN & ANR.

DATE OF JUDGMENT28/02/1989

BENCH: OZA, G.L. (J) BENCH: OZA, G.L. (J) SAIKIA, K.N. (J)

CITATION:  1989 AIR  867            1989 SCR  (1) 848  1989 SCC  Supl.  (1) 656 JT 1989  Supl.     46  1989 SCALE  (1)511

ACT:     Rajasthan  Land Reforms and Acquisition of  Land  Owners Estate   Act,   1963:   Sections  2(b),   2(d),   2(f)   and 7--’Estate’--What  is--’Land’ situated within boundaries  of Umaid  Bhavan Palace--Held do not fall within definition  of ’estate’.     Rajasthan Urban Property (Restriction of Transfers) Act, 1973: Section 3(2)--Prohibition on transfer of  land--Trans- fer effected after August 16, 1971--Held not void.

HEADNOTE:     After  attainment  of Independence, the  rulers  of  the erstwhile princely States of Rajasthan entered into a  Cove- nant  with  the Government of India  for  integrating  their States  into one. Article 12 of the said  Covenant  provided for the private properties of the rulers of the  Covenanting States, and clause (i) thereof prescribed that the ruler  of each  of the Covenanting States; shall be entitled  to  full ownership, use and enjoyment of all private properties.  The immovable  properties of the rulers were divided into  three categories, Category ’A’, ’B’ and ’C’.     The Maharaja of Jodhpur was one such ruler who integrat- ed  his  State in the Union. Category ’C’  of  the  Covenant listed  the  properties  of the  Maharaja  as  his  absolute property over which he had full rights of disposal, and  the property known as ’Umaid Bhavan Palace’ was included in this category.      The Maharaja who was the signatory to the Covenant died in 1952, and after his death he was succeeded by his son who was a minor at that time. Because the successor was a  minor an  administrator was appointed for the purpose of  adminis- tration of the estate.      In 1964, the Rajasthan Legislative Assembly enacted the Rajasthan Land Reforms and Acquisition of Land Owners Estate Act, 1963 which received the assent of the President on  6th April, 1964. The Act was enacted to provide for the acquisi- tion  of the estates of land owners. Section 7 thereof  pro- vided  for the issuance of a Notification by the State  Gov- ernment  appointing  a  date for the vesting  in  the  State Government 849

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 2 of 13  

of  the estates of all land owners situated anywhere in  the State.  Exercising  powers under the  aforesaid  section,  a Notification  was issued on 11th August, 1964 by  which  the State  Government appointed 1st September, 1964 as the  date of vesting of all the estates of land owners.     The three petitioners in the writ petitions were parties who  had  purchased respective areas of land  for  price  by registered  sale  deeds,  two dated 4.11.71  and  one  dated 5.11.71 from the erstwhile ruler of Jodhpur state.     Notices  under  section  9A of the Act  were  issued  on 19.11.1975  to these parties by the Collector  stating  that the transfers of the lands were null and void and they shall deliver possession before 28th September, 1975 or within  10 days of the receipt of the notice whichever is later to  the Sub-Divisional Officer. This was followed by another  notice on 8th December, 1975 by which possession of the lands  were taken  by  affixing a notice as required by Rule  8  of  the Rajasthan  Land  Reforms  and Acquisition  of  Land  Owners’ Estate Rules 1964.     The petitioners contended in the courts below that their land was not liable to acquisition under the Act and  sought a  direction that the orders and notices be quashed. It  was contended  that  in the definition of ’land’ as  defined  in section  2F, provide for properties which shall not  be  in- cluded  within the definition of ’land’ and as the  property in  the  instant case was excluded from  the  definition  of ’land’  the properties of the petitioners could not  be  ac- quired under section 7 of the Land Reforms Act.     A  Single Judge of the High Court on an  examination  of the  list of Category ’C’ to the Covenant, and the  material on  the  record came to the conclusion that the  lands  fell within  the  property included in the  Schedule  of  private properties in Category ’C’ and therefore it being a  private property included in the Inventory according to the Covenant the  acquisition under the provision of the Act was bad.  It was  further held that the transfer made by the ex-ruler  in favour of the petitioners was not bad.     The trustees of the Major Maharaja Hari Singh Benefit of Defence  Service Personnel and Charitable Trust, the  appel- lants in one of the appeals also filed a Writ petition which came up before the High Court. The High Court relying on its earlier decision allowed the petition and quashed the  noti- fication. 850     Letters  Patent Appeals were filed by the State  Govern- ment  and the Trust and the Division Bench disposed  of  all the  appeals  and came to a different  conclusion  than  the Single Judge’s who decided the writ petitions. The  Division Bench  held that the repeal of the Rajasthan Urban  Property (Restrictions of Transfers) Act, 1973 by the Rajasthan Urban Property  (Restrictions of Transfers) Repeal Act, 1978,  the cloud  that had been cast on the title of the purchases  had been removed.     In the appeals to this Court, it was contended on behalf of the appellants that the Rajasthan Land Reforms and Acqui- sition  of  Land Owners’ Estate Act, 1963 was  brought  into force  in 1964 and that according to the definition  of  ’e- state’,  in  section  2B it could refer to  either  land  or right,  title or interest in land held by a land owner,  and ’land’  was  defined in section 2F which  was  an  inclusive definition,  and that it first refers to land held  for  the purpose  of  agriculture and that the lands in  the  instant case,  were not agricultural lands they do not  fail  within the ambit of the definition of ’land’. It was also contended that  the Division Bench could not come to a different  con-

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 3 of 13  

clusion than that which was reached by the Single Judge.     On  behalf of the State, it was contended that the  suit property  fails  within  the boundary of  the  Umaid  Bhavan Palace  according to the site plan and that it could not  be conclusively held that the properties were not  agricultural lands.     Allowing  the  appeals, and setting aside  the  judgment passed by the Division Bench of the High Court, this Court,     HELD: 1. No action under the provisions of the Rajasthan Land Reforms and Acquisition of Land Owners Estate Act, 1963 could  be  taken against the appellant and  all  notices  or actions taken are thus quashed. [864F-G]     2.  It is clear that the lands in the instant case  will not  fall  within the definition of ’land’ as  described  in sec.  2(g) and therefore it could not vest in the State  not it would be acquired under the provisions of the Act and  in that event these appellants are entitled to hold their lands and  the question whether the lands are agricultural or  not is not very material. [858D-E]     3.  Section 2B clearly talks of land or right, title  or interest  in land held by land owner and land is defined  in Section 2F. It is therefore 851 clear that if this property did not fail within the ambit of the definition of ’land’ it could not be said to be ’estate’ under  Section 2B and therefore could not vest in the  State under Section 7. [861F]     4.  The  lands were within the boundaries of  the  Umaid Bhavan  Palace which is the private property  in  accordance with  the inventory prepared and approved by  Government  of India,  and therefore will not fail within the ambit of  the definition of ’land’ as defined in Section 2F and thus  will not  fail within the ambit of the ’estate’ which could  vest under the provisions of this Section. [863D]     5.  Section  3(2) of the Rajasthan Urban  Property  (Re- strictions  of Transfers) Act, 1973 was enacted  keeping  in view the Rajasthan Urban Property Ceiling Act. Section  3(2) did  not  provide that the transfer will be invalid  but  it only  provided  that in spite of the transfer  the  property will  be deemed to be owned by such person  thereby  meaning the transferor so that when the Ceiling Act is brought  into force the transferor may not take advantage of the  transfer to defeat the provisions of the Ceiling Act. [859C]     6. In fact, after the Ceiling Act was brought into force a  prohibition was again imposed on the transfer and  admit- tedly  the transfers in the instant case are not  after  the Rajasthan Urban Property Ceiling Act 1972 which provided  by section 5 that the transfers made after the commencement  of the Act was null and void. It could not, therefore, be  said that the transfers in the instant case after August 16, 1971 were void. [859G]     (C.A.  No.  1145/87--Naveen Grah Nirman  Sahkari  Samiti Ltd. v. State of Rajasthan was permitted to be withdrawn, as the appellants had chosen to come to this Court when in fact they  were  not  parties in the  judgment  before  the  High Court.). [864G-H]

JUDGMENT:     CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal Nos.  1144-48 of 1987.     From  the  Judgment  and Order dated  29.9.1986  of  the Rajasthan High Court in D.B. Civil Special Appeal Nos. 3, 4, 5 of 1978 and 79 of 198 1 and 354 of 1984.

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 4 of 13  

   Dr.  L.M. Singhvi, G.L. Sanghi, V.M.  Tarkunde,  Dalveer Bhandari,  Ms.  Rachna Joshi, K.N. Toshi,  Lekh  Rai  Mehta, Gopal  Singh, Sushil K. Jain and Sudharshan Atreya  for  the Appellants. 852     G.   Ramaswamy, Additional Solicitor General P.S.  Poti, Badridas  Sharma,  R.C. Maheshwari and Manoj  Jain  for  the Respondents. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by     OZA,  J. These appeals have come to this  Court  against the  judgment  of the Division Bench of the  High  Court  of Rajasthan dated 29.9.86 wherein the learned Judges  disposed of  the  following  appeals by  the  impugned  judgment  and against  this after grant of leave these appeals are  before us:    (1)  The  State of Rajasthan and Anr. v.  Prajapati  Grah Nirman Samiti Ltd., D.B. Civil Special Appeal No. 3 of 1978.    (2) The State of Rajasthan & Anr. v. Adhunik Grah  Nirman Samiti Limited, D.B. Civil Special Appeal No. 4 of 1978.    (3)  The State of Rajasthan and Anr. v. M/s.  Jai  Marwar Company Pvt. Ltd., D.B. Civil Special Appeal No. 5 of 1978.    (4)  Trustees  of Major Maharaja Hari  Singh  Benefit  of Defence  Service Personnel Charitable Trust v. The State  of Rajasthan  and Others, D.B. Civil Special Appeal No.  79  of 1981.    (5) State of Rajasthan and another v. Maharaja Gaj  Singh Ji, D.B. Civil Special Appeal No. 354 of 1984.     Initially the three writ petitions were filed before the High  Court of Rajasthan by i) Prajapati Grah Nirman  Samiti Limited,  ii) Adhunik Grah Nirman Samiti Ltd. and iii)  M/s. Jai  Marwar  Company Private Limited. It  was  alleged  that these  three parties purchased respective areas of land  for price  by  registered sale deeds two dated 4.11.71  and  one dated  5.11.71 from Shri Gaj Singh, the erstwhile  ruler  of the Jodhpur State. These lands form part of Khasra No. 42  1 in  the revenue records. There is yet another adjacent  land which also was in dispute in other matters than these  three which was Khasra No. 426.     Facts which are not in dispute are that after attainment of  independence  on  15th August, 1947 the  rulers  of  the erstwhile  princely  States  of  Banswara,  Bikaner,  Bundi, Dungarpur, Jaipur, Jaisalmer, Jhalawar, Jodhpur, Kishangarh, Kota,  Mewar, Partabgarh, Shahpura and Tonk entered  into  a Covenant with the Government of India 853 integrating  these states into one. Article 12 of  the  said Covenant  provided for the private properties of the  rulers of the Covenanting States. In clause (1) of this article  it was  prescribed  that the ruler of each of  the  Covenanting State  shall  be  entitled to the full  ownership,  use  and enjoyment of all private properties (as distinct from  State properties), belonging to him on the date of his making over the  administration  of the State. In  accordance  with  the aforesaid clause in the Covenant, a list of private  proper- ties  of the ruler of the former State of Jodhpur  was  pre- pared and.it was approved by the Government of India on 24th March,  1949.  In the said list of  private  properties  the immovable  properties  were divided into  three  categories. Category ’A’ consists of properties which were to be regard- ed  as  the family property of the Maharaja of  Jodhpur  and which  will  not be transferred. Category  ’B’  consists  of properties which were to be regarded as family properties of Maharaja  of Jodhpur but which will be disposable by him  if he  and  his heir agree to do so. Category ’C’  consists  of property  which is the absolute property of the Maharaja  of

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 5 of 13  

Jodhpur with full rights of disposal. In the case in hand we are  only concerned with Category ’C’ property and  in  this category Umaid Bhawan Palace alongwith the area as per  plan attached including the Chittar Tank and the Bijolai Tank and buildings was included.     Maharaja  Hanwant  Singh who was the  signatory  to  the Covenant  died in 1952 and after his death he was  succeeded by his son Shir Gaj Singh who was minor at that time. During the minority of Shri Gaj Singh an administrator was appoint- ed  for the purpose of administration of the estate  of  the minor Maharaja.     In  1964 the Rajasthan Legislative Assembly enacted  the Act  which received the ascent of the President of India  on 6.4.1964  and was published in the Rajasthan  Gazette  dated 13.4.1964.  The Act was enacted to provide for the  acquisi- tion  of the estates of landowners. Under Section 7  of  the Act  a provision was made for issuing a notification by  the State  Government appointing a date for the vesting  in  the State  Government of the estates or all landowners  situated anywhere  in  Rajasthan.  In exercise of  the  powers  under Section  7  a notification was issued on 11th  August,  1964 which was published in the Rajasthan Gazette dated 13.8.1964 and  by  this notification the  State  Government  appointed 1.9.1964 as the date of vesting of all the estates of  land- owners situated within the State.     Notice  under Section 9A of the said Act were issued  on 19.11.1975 to the petitioners by Collector, Jodhpur  stating that trans- 854 fers of the aforesaid lands are null and void and they shall deliver  possession before 29.11.1975 or within 10  days  of the  receipt  of the notice whichever is later, to  the  Sub Divisional Officer, Jodhpur. It appears that one more notice dated  8.12.1975 was issued by the Sub  Divisional  Officer, Jodhpur by which he appears to have taken the possession  of the aforesaid lands by affixing a notice as required by Rule 8  of  the Rajasthan Land Reforms and  Acquisition  of  Land Owners Estate Rules, 1964.     The  petitioner’s case before the Court below  was  that this  land is not liable to acquisition under the  said  Act and  therefore they sought a direction that the said  orders and  notices be quashed. It was contended before  the  Court below that in the definition of ’land’ as defined in Section 2F  after sub-clause (d) of this Act provide for  properties which shall not be included in the definition of ’land’  and as  this  property fell within the ambit  of  that  property which  was  excluded from the definition of  ’land’  it  was contended that it could not be acquired under the provisions of  Sec. 7 of the Rajasthan Land Reforms and Acquisition  of Land-owners’ Estate Act.     The learned Judge Justice M.L. Jain, after examining the list of private properties and the material placed on record by both the parties came to the conclusion that these  lands failing within Survey No. 421 which fell within the property included  in the schedule of private properties in  category ’C’  and therefore it being a private property  included  in the inventory prepared according to the Covenant, the acqui- sition under the provisions of this Act was held to be  bad. The learned Judge on the basis of documents also came to the conclusion that on 1.9.64 which was the relevant date  noti- fied  as the date of vesting this property was not  agricul- tural land and was also included in the private property  of the  ruler of Jodhpur shown within the boundary of the  site plan of Umaid Bhawan Palace. Consequently the learned  Judge came  to  the conclusion that the transfer made by  the  ex-

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 6 of 13  

ruler in favour of these petitioners was not bad.     The  learned Judge considering the submissions  came  to the conclusion: "Now, Shri Gaj Singh is an Ex-Ruler and therefore a landown- er.  The Schedule I of the Inventory of his private  proper- ties  also specified the properties which are  his  absolute property with full rights of disposal. Item No. 1(a)  relat- ing to Jodhpur is as follows: 855 (a) Umaid Bhawan Palace as per. plan attached including  the Chittar Tank. A  plan  was attached to the inventory  which  contains  the heading "site plan of Umaid Bhawan Palace. Private  property of  His  Highness and Maharaja Sahib  Sahadir,  Jodhpur,  is shown  in the red." It is admitted that the land in  dispute to  which these writ petitions relate fails within the  area bounded by the red line in the said site plan. It is, there- fore  futile on the part of the State Government to  contend that  the land though covered by the site plan, is not  part of  the  palace  as specified in the  inventory.  The  State maintains  that the Umaid Bhawan Palace has its  own  walled enclosure  and  further a long line of hills  separates  the land  in dispute from the main palace. The learned Dy.  Gov- ernment  Advocate  urged that what the law excludes  is  the palace  and  not all the lands which are shown in  the  site plan.  The Word ’palace’ should be constructed only  to  in- clude the area of the palace which is bounded by walls. I do not see any force in this argument because the definition of land  excludes the palace as specified in the inventory  and the inventory specifies the area of the Umaid Bhawan  Palace as per plan attached and the attached plan includes the land in dispute. I am, therefore unable to give the word "palace" a restricted meaning as convassed by the learned Dy. Govern- ment  Advocate. That being so, the disputed land fails  out- side the estate and has consequently not vested in the State Government." The learned Judge after considering various documents  which were  filed and which were the records of the Government  as regards the nature of the land as to whether it is  agricul- tural land or not came to the conclusion that: "The documents clearly demonstrate that the land in  dispute is not an agricultural and rather it forms part of the Abadi land.  In the revenue records, Khasra Nos. are allotted  not only  to  agricultural plot but they are  also  allotted  to Banjar  land  and to Abadi land as well. The copies  of  the Jamabandi  and  Girdwari filed by the State shows  that  the land  is Padat and does not carry and land revenue.  It  is, therefore,  clear that the land in question being  an  Abadi land is not covered by the provisions of the Act. It appears 856 as  has been contended that the land in order that it  vests in the State Government, should be an agricultural land. The amended  long title of the Act states that it is an  Act  to provide for the acquisition of the Estates of landowners and for other measures of agrarian reforms removal of intermedi- aries  allotment of land to landless person, development  of agriculture. If the acquired land is meant for allotment  to agriculturist then the land must be an agricultural land  as indicated above. The land in question was not an agricultur- al land and if at all it was so at any time in the past,  it long ago ceased to be so at least as early as in 1948,  when according to the private property settlement, it was includ- ed in the Umaid Bhawan Palace premises."     Trustees of Major Maharaja Hari Singh Benefit of Defence Service  Personnel  Charitable Trust also filed  a  petition

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 7 of 13  

before the Rajasthan High Court. This pertains to Survey No. 426  and this came up for heating before Hon’ble  the  Chief Justice of Rajasthan Shri K.D. Sharma who while  considering the matter observed: "At the outset, I may observe that it is not disputed before me  that  Umaid  Bhawan Palace situated in  Jodhpur  is  the absolute property of Maharaja Gaj Singh of Jodhpur, who  has full  rights of disposal thereof. This fact is borne out  by the  inventory  marked  Annexure 1 which  was  prepared  and approved by the Government of India in pursuance of  Article 12  of  the Covenant entered into by late  Maharaja  Hanwant Singh with the Government of India at the time of  accession of  the former Jodhpur State to the Union of India. It  will not be out of place to mention that the term ’land’  defined in  section  2 of the Act as amended by the  amendment  Act, 1975, does not include forts, palaces, buildings and  build- ing  plots specified in the inventory. Hence,  Umaid  Bhawan Palace  of which Maharaja Gaj Singh is the  absolute  owner, does  not fall within the purview of the definition  of  the word  ’land’  given in the section 2 of the Act  as  amended upto date."     In Misc. Petition No. 1872/75 filed by Maharaja Shri Gai Singh  came  up for consideration before Hon’ble  the  Chief Justice  of  Rajasthan Shri Justice Banerjee  and  by  order dated 20.12. 1983 relying on the judgment passed by  Justice M.L. Jain in the case of Prajapati 857 Grah  Nirman Samiti Ltd. v. State of Rajasthan  allowed  the petition of Maharaja Gaj Singh and quashed the notices which were issued.     It  is thereafter that the State Government in the  mat- ters  decided by Justice M.L. Jain and by  Justice  Banerjee and  the trust, in the case decided by Justice  K.D.  Sharma went  up in appeal under Letters Patent and by the  impugned judgment,  the Division Bench disposed of all these  appeals and  hence these appeals have come before us after grant  of leave.     Learned  counsel for the appellants contended that  this Act  i.e.  Rajasthan Land Reforms and Acquisition  of  Land- owners  Estate  Act, 1963 was brought into  force  in  1964. According  to the definition of ’Estate’ it could  refer  to either  land  or right, title or interest in  land  held  by landowner.  The land, according to the learned  counsel,  is defined  in section 2 sub-clause (f). This definition is  an inclusive  definition and it first refers to land  held  for the  purpose of agriculture. Thereafter it has been  further stated  that it does not include forts, palaces,  buildings, building plots specified in the inventory and the  inventory has  also  been defined in Section 2  sub-clause  (g)  which refers  to the inventory of the private properties  made  in pursuance  of the Covenant and finally approved by the  Cen- tral  Government. Learned Counsel for the appellants  mainly raised two questions: i) that as these lands were not  agri- cultural  lands  they do not fall within the ambit  of  this definition  of  ’land’. It was also contended  that  in  any event  as  it fails within the boundaries  of  Umaid  Bhawan Palace which is a property included in the inventory as  the private  property of the rulers of Jodhpur approved  by  the Government of India, this will not fall within the ambit  of the  definition  of ’land’ in Section  2F.  Consequently  it could not be said to be an estate as defined in Sec. 2b  and as  such by application of this Act this could not  vest  in the State Government and in this view it was contended  that the judgment delivered by the Division Bench has omitted  to decide  this  question  and for no reason felt  that  let  a

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 8 of 13  

reference under Section 12 be decided. It was also contended that  the Division Bench could not come to a different  con- clusion then one which was reached by Justice M.L. Jain  and Hon’ble Chief Justice Shri Banerjee.     Learned  counsel  appearing for the State  of  Rajasthan attempted  to contended that this property falls within  the boundary  of the Umaid Bhawan Palace according to  the  site plan  could not be conclusively held as an attempt was  also made  to  suggest that the original plan  should  have  been summoned from the Central Government but the 858 learned counsel could not explain the admissions made at the various stages in these proceedings about the plan which was filed in these petitions and also could not give any  expla- nation  as to why when these proceedings have been going  on since  1975, the State Government could not obtain an  offi- cial copy of the site plan from the Government of India  and produce  it before the High Court. In fact the admission  in the documents and affidavits filed before the High Court and the orders passed by the revenue authorities which have been at length dealt with by the learned counsel and relied  upon by  the  High Court could not be explained  by  the  learned counsel  appearing for the State. Similarly the question  as to  whether this land was agricultural or not also was  dis- puted  by the learned counsel on the basis that the  revenue record  entry  showed that this has been  agricultural  land although  the  record  referred to by the  counsel  for  the appellants  also indicated that this area during  the  State times  was included in the development plan of  the  Jodhpur town.     Counsel  for parties frankly conceded that if the  lands in  dispute fail within the boundaries of the  Umaid  Bhawan Palace  as  shown  in the site plan which was  part  of  the inventory prepared at the time of the Covenant and  approved by  Government of India, it is clear that these  lands  will not  fall  within the definition of ’land’ as  described  in Sec.  2(g) and therefore it could not vest in the State  nor it could be acquired under the provisions of this Act and in that event these appellants are entitled to hold their lands and  the question whether the lands are agricultural or  not is not very material.     Learned  counsel for the respondent State  distinguished the case of Naveen Grah Nirman Samiti on a different footing as they claimed to be the transferees from Jai Marwar Compa- ny Private Limited and this transfer Was at a time when  the transfer was prohibited and that question has not been  gone into  by the High Court as these petitioners have chosen  to come to this Court when in fact they were not parties in the judgment  before  the High Court. Learned  counsel  for  the petitioner  in the petition by Naveen Grah Nirman Samiti  in view  of  the objections raised by learned counsel  for  the respondent State frankly conceded that this petition was not before the High Court and in view of this he submitted  that he may be permitted to withdraw this petition.     Learned counsel for the respondent also raised an objec- tion  about the transfer of these lands in view  of  Section 3(2) of Rajasthan Urban Property (Restrictions of Transfers) Act, 1973. Section 3(2) of 859 this Act provided that after the 16th day of August, 1971 if any person has transferred any urban property owned by  such person  such transfer shall be deemed to be a transfer  made to  defeat  the provisions of this Act and the  property  so transferred shall for the purposes of this Act be deemed  to be owned by such person. On this basis it was contended that

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 9 of 13  

as  the  transfers have been effected by  Maharaj  Shri  Gaj Singh  after  16th August, 1971 they will  be  void  whereas learned  counsel for the appellants contended that this  Act was enacted in contemplation of the Rajasthan Urban Property Ceiling  Act  which  was to be enacted and it  was  for  the purpose  of that Act that Sec. 3(2) of this Act was  enacted to  restrict transfer of urban property but it did  not  de- clare  transfer  to be void but said that in  spite  of  the transfer  the  property will be deemed to be owned  by  such person i.e. transferor. The idea was that while applying the law of ceiling the holder of the property may not defeat the provisions  of  that Act by these transfers  and  ultimately this Act was repealed and the repeal was by Rajasthan  Urban Property  (Restrictions of Transfers) Repeal Act,  1978  and that Act did not protect anyone of these provisions. In fact this  question was raised before the Division Bench and  the learned  Judges of the Division Bench in the impugned  judg- ment observed: "In view of the repeal of 1973 Act the cloud which has  been cast  on the title of the petitioners in the writ  petitions giving  rise to these. appeals by section 3(2) of  the  1973 Act, was removed, and, therefore, we are unable to accept the contention of the learned Government Advocate." It  is apparent that this Section prohibiting transfers  was enacted keeping in view the Act on ceiling in  contemplation and  that is why as indicated earlier Section 3(2)  did  not provide  that the transfer will be invalid but it only  pro- vided  that  in spite of the transfer the property  will  be deemed to be owned by such person thereby meaning the trans- feror so that when the ceiling Act is brought into force the transferor may not take advantage of the transfer to  defeat the provisions of the Ceiling Act. In fact after the Ceiling Act  was brought into force a prohibition was again  imposed on  the transfer and admittedly the transfers with which  we are  concerned  are not after that as it is clear  that  the Rajasthan Urban Property Ceiling Act, 1972 when was  enacted provided  by Section 5 of that Act that the transfers  which were  made  after the commencement of the Act  was  declared null  and void. In fact the learned Judges of  the  Division Bench considered this aspect of the matter and negatived the contention advanced by the learned counsel for the  respond- ents  in the words indicated above and in our  opinion  that conclusion could not be assailed. 860     As  regards  the  question as to whether  the  lands  in dispute  i.e which fail within Khasra Nos. 421 and 426  fall within the purview of the definition of ’land’ as  contained in  Section  2F of the Act is concerned it  is  consistently held  by  the High Court that as the land  fell  within  the exception of Section 2F it would not fail within the defini- tion of ’land’ (Section 2(f) reads: "land"  means and land held or let for purposes of  agricul- ture  or  for purposes ancilliary  thereto  including  waste land,  forest land, land for pasture or sites  of  buildings and other structures occupied by cultivators of land,  agri- cultural labourers and village artisans and includes-- (a)  tanks, lakes, ponds, river and water channels held  for purposes of irrigation. (b) surface of hills, (c) landing grounds or strips, and (d) shikargah but  does not include forts, palace buildings  and  building plots, specified in the inventory." The  last  part  of this provisions "but  does  not  include forts,  palace  buildings, building plots specified  in  the

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 10 of 13  

inventory"  is the relevant portion of the definition  which was considered by the Court below and is the question  which deserves  to  be  considered. The Inventory  has  also  been defined in Section 2(d) which means inventory of the private property of the ruler prepared in pursuance of Article 12 of the  Convenant  and finally approved by  the  Government  of India.     In the High Court in all these petitions the plea raised was  that the inventory of the private property of  the  ex- ruler of the Jodhpur State Maharaj Shri Gaj Singh  contained an  item  of property shown as Umaid Bhawan  Place  and  the boundaries  therein were indicated to be in red in the  site plan  attached  alongwith it. So far as  the  inventory  and inclusion of this property in the .inventory of the  private property is concerned it is not disputed even before us.  In the High Court the site plan and the properties included  in the  red boundary forming part of the property Umaid  Bhawan Palace was also not disputed. All the judgments in the  High Court are based on this admission and appa- 861 rently  the affidavits filed on behalf of the  State  before the  High  Court  clearly and  categorically  admitted  this position and even went to the extent of saying that this was verified and found to be correct and the plan filed with the petition having a red boundary was admitted and therefore it was  not disputed that Khasra Nos. 42 1 and 426 fell  within the boundary of Umaid Bhawan Palace which in accordance with the definition of ’land’ quoted above will be excluded  from the  definition and what is excluded from the definition  of ’land’ in Section 2F could not vest in the State in view  of language of Section 7. Section 7 reads: Acquisition  of  estates-(1)  As soon as may  be  after  the commencement of this Act, the Government may for the purpose of  carrying  out  agrarian reform in  accordance  with  the provisions  of  this Act, by notification  in  the  Official Gazette,appoint  a date for the acquisition  of  landowner’s estates  in  the State and for their vesting  in  the  State Government. (2) The date appointed under this Section in relation to the acquisition of landowners’ estates in the State in this  Act referred to as the date of vesting of such estates." This  talks  of  the vesting of the estate  and  the  estate itself has been defined in Sec. 2B which reads: "estate" means land or right, title or interest in land held by a landowner;" This  clearly talks of land or right, title or  interest  in land  held by landowner and land as already discussed  above is defined in Section 2F it is therefore clear that if  this property did not fall within the ambit of the definition  of land it could not be said to be estate under Section 2B  and therefore could not vest in the State under Section 7.     It  was in this view that counsel for both  the  parties frankly conceded that if this falls within the exception  to the definition of ’land’ provided in Section 2F the  further question  about the land being agricultural or not is of  no consequence.     An  attempt was made by the learned counsel  during  the course of arguments to suggest that it is no doubt true that all through the State Government and on behalf of the  State Government the affidavits that were filed in the High  Court this was admitted that these lands in 862 dispute  fell within the red boundary of the site  plan  and the  site plan is the site plan of the Umaid  Bhawan  Palace which  is included in the inventory of the private  property

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 11 of 13  

of the ruler finally approved by the Government of India. It is also not seriously disputed that there are orders  passed by  some revenue officers in respect of these matters  where it has been held that these lands fell within the red bound- ary which is the correct boundary of Umaid Bhawan Palace  in the  inventory  approved by the Government of India  as  the private properties of the ex-ruler. Only an attempt was made by  Additional Solicitor General who appeared for the  State to  suggest that the Central Government alone may  have  the original  and  therefore  wanted this Court  to  summon  the original  but  learned counsel had no explanation  why  this could  not  be done in all these years to which  he  had  no answer and therefore it is plain that so far as these  facts are concerned the State could not now be permitted to  raise any  objection in respect of the site plan and the  boundary in red of Umaid Bhawan Palace.     After the hearing was concluded an attempt has been made on  behalf of the State and certain papers have  been  filed which pertains to some returns filed in connection with  the assessment  in respect of the building Umaid  Bhawan  Palace which has been described as Hotel Marudhar and on that basis probably a suggestion is made that in this the ex-ruler  has submitted a plan for assessment of the property tax  wherein he  has  not showed this part of the property which  is  the subject  matter  of  the dispute.  Apparently  these  papers pertain  to some proceedings of assessment of property  per- taining  to Marudhar Hotel with which we are  not  concerned and  on that basis it could not be said that what  has  been admitted  all  through as the boundary of the  Umaid  Bhawan Palace is not correct. No reliance could be placed on  these additional papers.     Before  the  High  Court in Writ  Petition  No.  1924/75 Additional  Collector Jodhpur who is also described  as  the Officer  Incharge of the case has filed a counter in  return and in this it is stated: That  the Photostat copy and the true copy of  the  Covenant and the site plan submitted by the petitioner alongwith  the aforesaid application have been got verified to be the  true and  exact  copies  of the original covenant  and  the  plan attached with the inventory of the private properties of the Ex-ruler  of Jodhpur. The duly verified copy of the plan  is being submitted for your perusal." 863 and  the same reply filed by the said  Additional  Collector has  been verified on affidavit by the same officer  who  in his affidavit states: "That  the photostat copy of the convenant as also the  true copy  of the plan referred in the Schedule of the  inventory of  the  private properties of  Ex-ruler.  Ex-ruler  Jodhpur supplied to the respondents have been got verified from  the Chief Engineer P.W.D. B & R Rajasthan, Jaipur and the office of the General Administration Department, Rajasthan,  Secre- tariat, Jaipur." In view of these circumstances therefore so far as the  land in  dispute  i.e. Khasra Nos. 421 and 426 is  concerned  the admission  made by the State and which was also  clear  from various  documents  which have been considered by  the  High Court  in  their judgments in these petitions  clearly  show that  these  lands were within the boundaries of  the  Umaid Bhawan  Palace which is the private property  in  accordance with  the inventory preparted and approved by Government  of India and therefore which will not fall within the ambit  of the  definition of the ’land’ as defined in Section  2F  and thus  will not fall within the ambit of the  ’estate’  which could vest under the provisions of this Section and in  this

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 12 of 13  

view of the matter even without going into the the  question about whether land being agricultural or not the view  taken by  Justice M.L. Jain is the only view which could  be  sus- tained.     Even as regards the question as to whether this land  is agricultural  or  not it will be relevant to  note.  Learned counsel  for the State has relied on some  Khasra,  Girdwari and Jamabandi of Sam vat 2030to 2032 relating to Khasra  No. 421. It is described as Padat and it is contended that  this land  will  be agricultural land as it also  includes  waste land.  Even on the basis of the record on which reliance  is placed  by  the learned counsel for the State that  no  land revenue  is assessed on this land. On the  contrary  counsel for  the appellant referred to a notification  published  in the  Jodhpur Government Gazette dated February 10, 1934  and this  notification  states that the  Development  Department shall  have control over the disposal of land  for  building sites  and  the building regulation shall operate  over  the area within a radius of three miles from the Sojati Gate and it is not disputed that these lands fell within three  miles radius from Sojati Gate. Learned counsel also referred to  a letter  written to Urban Improvement Trust.  The  Settlement Officer is alleged to have stated that the plan was careful- ly perused, checked and tallied with the  corresponding  old settlement record of Samvat 1979 together with the site plan of Umaid 864 Bhawan  Palace which indicates the private property  of  His Highness the Maharaja Sahib Bahadur Jodhpur duly verified on 12.11.1958  by  the then Deputy Secretary,  G.A.D.  and  the Commissioner,  Jodhpur  Division, Jodhpur wherein  the  said land is included in the premises of Umaid Bhawan Palace. The Settlement  Officer  further added that the fact  that  this land  had  never been assessed to rents, that it  never  has been  cultivated  and that it is included within  the  Umaid Bhawan Palace is sufficient to show that it is "abadi  land" within  the meaning and definition under Section 158 of  the Rajasthan Land Revenue Act, 1956. The view expressed by  the Government that this land does not appear to be agricultural land  is fully established and it was on the basis of  these documents that the learned Judge Shri M.L. Jain came to  the conclusion that: "The documents clearly demonstrate that the land in  dispute is not an agricultural and rather it forms part of the Abadi land.  In the revenue records, Khasra Nos. are allotted  not only  to  agricultural plot but they are  also  allotted  to Banjar  land  and to Abadi land as well. The copies  of  the Jamabandi  and  Girdwari filed by the State shows  that  the land  is Padat and does not carry any land revenue.  It  is, therefore,  clear that the land in question being  an  Abadi land is not covered by the provisions of the Act." It is clear that the contention raised by the learned  coun- sel  for  the respondent that this land is  an  agricultural land also cannot be accepted and in view of our  conclusions reached  above  it is clear that the view taken  by  learned Judge Shit M.L. Jain is the only view which could be  taken. Consequently  the appeals filed by the appellants  including Prajapati  Grah  Nirman  Sahakari Samiti Ltd.  v.  State  of Rajasthan  &  Ors. are allowed. The judgment passed  by  the Division Bench of High Court of Rajasthan in the appeals  is set aside and it is held that no action under the provisions of  Rajasthan  Land Reforms and Acquisition  of  Landowners’ Estate  Act, 1963 could be taken against the appellants  and all notices or actions taken are hereby quashed. The  appel- lants  shall  be entitled to costs of these  appeals.  Costs

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 13 of 13  

quantified at Rs. 10,000.     So  far as Civil Appeal No. 1145/87 Naveen  Grah  Nirman Sahkari  Samiti Ltd. v. State of Rajasthan is  concerned  we see  no reason not to permit him to withdraw.  The  petition and appeal is therefore permitted to be withdrawn. N.V.K.                                               Appeals allowed. 864