http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 1 of 10  

PETITIONER: ACHUTANANDA PUROHIT AND ORS.

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: THE STATE OF ORISSA

DATE OF JUDGMENT26/03/1976

BENCH: KRISHNAIYER, V.R. BENCH: KRISHNAIYER, V.R. CHANDRACHUD, Y.V. UNTWALIA, N.L.

CITATION:  1976 AIR 2118            1976 SCR  (3) 919  1976 SCC  (3) 183

ACT:      Orissa  Estates   Abolition  Act,   1951-Secs.   26-27- Constitution of  India Articles 31A-31B-31(2)-31(3)-Agrarian reform-Whether interest  at market  rate or  statutory rate- Calculation of compensation.

HEADNOTE:      The appellant  was the  intermediary in respect of vast forest and  other lands  in the State of Orissa. The estates vested in  the State  in April  1960 by  force of the Orissa Estates  Abolition   Act,  1951.   The  appellant  submitted necessary return  for compensation  as provided  by the Act. The Compensation  Officer passed  an order  adverse  to  the appellant whereupon  the appellant  filed an  appeal to  the Collector which  was rejected.  A second appeal filed before the Board  of Revenue  was  dismissed.  Later  on,  Revision Petitions were  filed in  the High Court. The High Court set aside the  order and  directed remand  to  the  Compensation Officer. Thereafter,  the District  Forest Officer  made his appraisal of  the annual  income and  submitted to the Chief Conservator of  Forests who  altered the  actual  yield  and reduced it  substantially. Both  the State and the appellant filed appeals  to the  Collector  which  were  dismissed.  A second appeal was filed by the appellant before the Board of Revenue without  success. In the Revision Applications filed before the High Court which led to the remand now challenged in the  present appeals  the appellant contended before this Court:           (1)  The interest ought to have been awarded at 12                per cent  as against  the statutory rate of 2                1/2 per  cent from  the date  of the  vesting                till payment.           (2)  Compensation money  should be  so  calculated                that the  purchasing power  of the  amount of                compensation to be paid on the date of actual                payment will  not be less than the purchasing                power on the date of vesting.           (3)  The    slab-system    of    calculation    of                compensation in  the  Act  providing  smaller                multiples for  estates yielding larger income                is unconstitutional.

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 2 of 10  

         (4)  Unlike in  case of  fisheries etc., where the                actual income  is to be included in the gross                assets, in  the case  of forests, the assumed                income and  not the  actual income  is to  be                included.  During   the   agricultural   year                immediately  preceding   the  abolition,  the                petitioners  had  not  actually  derived  any                income from the forests and as such they were                under no  obligation to pay any income tax on                such income.  Therefore, deduction  of income                tax from  the gross  assets  is  illegal  and                unwarranted.           (5)  The compensation  has not  been  computed  in                accordance with the scheme of the Act.           (6)  The date of vesting is the last date by which                the calculation  of compensation  should have                been made  and since  that had  not been done                the Compensation  Officer had  become functus                officio in awarding compensation.      Dismissing the appeals, ^      HELD: 1.  The policy  of the  law of  agrarian  reforms postulates the  extinguishment  of  ancient  privileges  and cornering of land resources and the socio-economic yardstick is different from what applies to ordinary purchases of real estate and  this  is  manifest  in  the  special  provisions contained in  Article 31A  and 31B  of the  Constitution.  A similar principle applies to the award of interest which may sometimes be  notional when feudal interests are puffed out. The 920 dynamic rule of law with a social mission makes a meaningful distinction between  rights steeped  in the  old system  and compensation for  deprivation of  those interests on the one hand and  the ordinary commercial transactions on the other. [923 F-G]      2. It  is more  or less  a world  phenomenon  that  the erosion in  value of  the unit  of currency  has been taking place.  But   this  invisible   devaluation  owing   to  the inflationary spiral  does not affect the quantum of monetary compensation prescribed  by statute. For the purposes of the law, the rupee of long ago is the same as the rupee of today although for  the purposes  of the, market place and cost of living, the housewife’s answer may be different. [924B-C]      3. Article  31(3) read  with  Article  31(2)  bars  any challenge to  the amount  of compensation  on acquisition by the State  subject to  the compliance with the prescriptions in the  said sub  articles on  the ground that the amount so fixed or determined is not adequate. Presidential assent has been accorded  to this  State Act  and so  the ban operates. [924C-D]      4. The  submission  of  the  appellant  proceeds  on  a misreading of  section 27.  In the case of forests it is the assumed and  not the  actual income that forms the basis for calculation of compensation. Similarly an assumed income tax also has to be worked out and deducted. [924F-G]      5. The  scheme of the Act is that the compensation must be calculated  on the basis of appraisal of the annual yield of the  forests on  the date  of vesting firstly by a Forest Officer  and   secondly  by   the   Chief   Conservator   of Forests,screening it  and approving it. In the present case, the Chief Conservator had substituted his appraisement which was  accepted   by  the  statutory  Tribunal.  There  was  a fundamental difference  in the  basis adopted  by the Forest Officer and  the Chief  Conservator of Forests in the matter

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 3 of 10  

of assessing  in the  income of the Forest in question. What the Chief  Conservator did was not to approve wholly or in a modified form  what the  Forest Officer  did but to make his own appraisal  independently and  without reference  to  the report of  the statutory  functionary. This  was  wrong  and contrary to  section 26. This Court is in agreement with the course adopted by the High Court and the reasoning which has prevailed with it. [925C, 927A-B]      6. Before  the date  of vesting the State never can nor does fix  the compensation  through the Compensation Officer in any  of the  agrarian reform  laws and these compensation operations are post-statutory exercises. Therefore, there is no substance in the funtcus officio argument. If the officer had no  jurisdiction the  land would  be gone because of the vesting provision  and no  compensation would be forthcoming for want  of jurisdiction; a consequence the appellant never wants. Technicality  can be frightened away by technicality. [927D-E]      7.  After   remand  the  Forest  Officer  will  do  the appraisement of the annual income, forward his report to the Chief Conservator  of Forests  who will take the said report into consideration and, if necessary, make the modifications therein or  approve it  with such  changes as  he deems fit. Certainly, the  Chief Conservator  cannot be  ignored by the Compensation Officer  nor can  the Chief  Conservator ignore the assessment  made by the Forest Officer and go through an independent exercise.  The take  over of  the forest  of the appellant was  effected as  early as in 1960. The High Court has stated  that a  large part  of the delay has been due to laches committed  from time  to time by the officers charged with the duty to calculate the compensation. It is therefore directed  that   the  proceedings  before  the  Compensation Officer shall  be completed  within six  months from  today. [927F-H, 928A-B]

JUDGMENT:      CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeals Nos. 312 to 314 of 1972.      Appeals by  Special Leave  from the  Judgment and Order dated the  19-3-71 of the Orissa High Court in C.W. Nos. 325 to 327/70.      Appellant No.  1 in  person and  D. N.  Misra  for  the Appellants. 921 Gobind Das and G. S. Chatterjee for the Respondent. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by.      KRISHNA IYER,  J. Three  civil appeals,  stemming  from three revision  petitions to  the High Court of Orissa under the Orissa  Estates Abolition  Act, 1951  (Orissa Act  I  of 1952) (for  short, the  Act) have reached this Court, thanks to special  leave granted to the appellant, who is common in all the  cases.  The  High  Court,  after  deciding  various issues, remanded the cases to the Compensation Officer under the Act,  after over-ruling  most of the contentions pressed before it by the appellant.      Shri   Achutananda    Purohit,   appellant,   was   the intermediary in  respect of  vast forests  and  other  lands comprised in  the estate  of Jujumura  in  the  district  of Sambalpur. This  estate vested in the State on April 1, 1960 by force of the Act and the crucial question agitated before us, consequentially  turns on  the quantum  of  compensation awardable under  Chapter V  of the  Act. The  appellant  has received around  Rs. 3,00,000/-  but much more, according to

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 4 of 10  

him, is due and this controversy can be settled by examining his specific points.      Shri Purohit,  appellant, is  an Advocate by profession and is  83 years  old. He  has argued  in  person  and  with passion.  We   have  listened   with  patience  to  all  his submissions, good, bad and indifferent. If we may anticipate ourselves, none  of the nine submissions has appealed to us, save to  the extent  the High  Court has  upheld. Even so, a minimal narration  of the facts and a brief consideration of each argument  is necessary  and we  proceed to do so. While his arguments  did not  impress us,  we were  touched by his concluding words  that he  had been born and had grown in an adivasi village,  in the  only brahmin  family and,  in  his evening years  of life,  proposed to give a substantial part of the  compensation the  State would  give him  for adivasi welfare. Although  he waxed  sentimentally on  this note, he did not convince us on his contentions. With these prefatory observations, we  proceed to formulate the many points urged and give our findings and reasons, one after the other.      We  are   directly  concerned   with   the   issue   of compensation which  is dealt  with, as  earlier  stated,  in Chapter V  of the  Act. The  Compensation Officer is charged with  fixing   the  quantum  in  the  prescribed  manner.  A compensation assessment  roll containing the gross asset and net income  of each  estate, together  with the compensation payable in  respect of  such estate,  has to  be prepared by him. Of  course,  when  there  is  joint  ownership,  s.  24 stipulates that the compensation shall be determined for the estate as  a whole and not separately for each of the shares therein. Section  26 has great relevance as it lays down the method of  arriving at  the gross  asset and  s. 27 has like significance as  it focuses  on the  manner in which the net income from an estate shall be computed by deducting certain items from  the gross asset of the estate. Section 28 states how the  amount of  compensation is to be determined and the methodology of  payment. There  are a  few other sections in Chapter VI  which deal with payment of compensation. The Act also provides for appeal, second appeal and 922 revision, the  last being  to the High Court and the earlier ones being to the Collector and a Board constituted under s. 22. The  rule-making power is vested in the government under s. 47  and there  is a  routine  ’removal  of  difficulties’ clause contained in s. 50. These furnish in bare outline the provisions with which we are directly concerned.      Against the  background of  law just  projected, we may set out  Shri Purohit’s  points which, if we may say so, are substantially the  same  as  have  been  argued  by  him  in revision before  the High  Court with  partial success.  For convenience of  reference, we  may extract  the statement by the High  Court of  the contentions  urged  before  it  (and repeated before us) by the appellant:      "(1) The  provisions of s. 37(3) read with s. 26(2) (b)      (v) of  the Act  make it clear that the date of vesting      is  the   last  date   by  which   the  calculation  of      compensation  should  have  been  made.  As  admittedly      compensation had  not been  calculated by  the date  of      vesting, the  Compensation Officer  lost his  statutory      jurisdiction to  do so.  It is this Court which, by its      order dated  10-4-1969 in  Civil Revisions 201, 202 and      203  of   1968  conferred   new  jurisdiction   on  the      Compensation Officer  to deal freshly with the case and      therefore notwithstanding  anything  contained  in  the      Act, the compensation has to be calculated according to      the directions given by the Court;

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 5 of 10  

    (2)  The   Court  was  fully  aware  of  the  statutory      provision in  s. 26(2) (b) (v) of the Act, but in spite      of it,  the direction  was that  the Divisional  Forest      Officer should  make the  appraisement.  There  was  no      direction that  this report  of the  D.F.O.  should  be      further  subject   to  the   approval  of   the   Chief      Conservator of  Forests. The  calculation made  by  the      Chief Conservator of Forests therefore has no statutory      force but could be just a piece of evidence. But as the      Court directed  that no  further evidence  on behalf of      the State  should be received, Ext. A/1 is inadmissible      in evidence.      (3) Assuming  that in  spite of  the directions  of the      court the  Compensation Officer  is entitled  to follow      the procedure  laid down  in Section  26(2)(b)(v),  the      expression  ’subject  to  the  approval  of  the  Chief      Conservator  of   Forests’  does   not  refer   to  the      appraisement made  by the  D.F.O.  but  refers  to  his      appointment.      (4) Assuming  that s.  26(2) (b)  (v) would  have  full      force, what  it contemplates  is that  the appraisement      must be  made by  the D.F.O.,  and it is subject to the      approval by  the Chief Conservator of Forests. But what      has happened here is that the Chief Conservator himself      made  the   appraisement  without   referring  to   the      appraisement  made  by  the  D.F.O.  and  as  such  the      appraisement made by the Chief Conservator is invalid.      (5) The  report of  the Chief Conservator of Forests is      also invalid  because of the fact that the appraisement      is made 923 only with  reference to  the area  of the  disputed  forests without taking  into consideration  the  density  of  growth therein;      (6) Unlike  in case of fisheries etc., where the actual      income is  to be  included in  the gross assets, in the      case of  forests, the assumed income and not the actual      income is  to be included. During the agricultural year      immediately preceding  the abolition,  the  petitioners      had not  actually derived  any income  from the forests      and as  such they  were under  no obligation to pay any      income-tax on  such  income.  Therefore,  deduction  of      income-tax  from   the  gross  assets  is  illegal  and      unwarranted.      (7) The  slab-system of  calculation of compensation in      the  Act   providing  smaller   multiples  for  estates      yielding larger income is unconstitutional.      (8) Compensation money should be so calculated that the      purchasing power  of the  amount of  compensation to be      paid on  the date  of actual  payment will  not be less      than its purchasing power on the date of vesting; and      (9) Interest  should be calculated at not less than 12%      per annum from the date of vesting till payment." The meat of the matter, the primary question agitated in the appeal, lopping  off the  fringe issues  of  lesser  import, consists in  the  statutory  methodology  and  functionaries prescribed by  the Act  for quantifying the compensation and the compliance  therewith by  the statutory machinery in the case of  the appellant.  But before examining this essential issue we  may dispose  of the  minor points pressed, so that the deck may be cleared for dealing with what deserves to be dealt with.      Point No. 9, in the catalogue already given, relates to the claim  for 12% interest on the amount of compensation as against the  statutory rate of 2 1/2%. The policy of the law

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 6 of 10  

of agrarian  reform postulates the extinguishment of ancient privileges and  cornering of  land resources, and the socio- economic  yardstick   is  different  from  what  applies  to ordinary purchases  of real  estate and  this is manifest in the special provisions contained in Art. 31A and Art. 31B of the Constitution.  A similar  principle applies to the award of interest  which may  sometimes be  notional  when  feudal interests are  puffed out.  We cannot  import the  notion of prevailing bank  rates in  such situations. The dynamic rule of  law,   with  a   social  mission,   makes  a  meaningful distinction between  rights steeped  in the  old system  and compensation for  deprivation of those interests, on the one hand, and the ordinary commercial transactions or regulation of rights  untinged by  social transformation  urges, on the other. This  gives rationality  to  the  seeming  disparity. Holmes once  commented: ’It  is revolting  to have no better reason for  a rule  of law  than that so it was laid down in the time  of Henry  IV’. Here there is good reason to depart from the  old rule  of  full  compensation  and  it  perhaps legitimates the  reduced rate  of recompense.  Moreover, the High Court has rightly pointed 924 out that  the validity  of s. 37(3) of the Act which fixes a small rate  of interest  on the compensation amount has been upheld by the Supreme Court in Gajapati Narayan’s Case(1).      Point No.  8 has  only to be stated to be rejected. The contention is  that on  the date  of vesting, which was well over two  decades ago, the purchasing power of the rupee was much higher  than its  present value.  It is  more or less a world phenomenon  that the  erosi on in value of the unit of currency  has   been  taking   place,  but   this  invisible devaluation owing to the inflationary spiral does not affect the quantum  of monetary compensation prescribed by statute. For the  purposes of  the law,  the rupee of long ago is the same as the rupee of today, although for the purposes of the market place  and cost-of living, the housewife’s answer may be different. Law is sometimes blind.      The  next   point  in  the  reverse  order  is  equally unsubstantial  and  may  be  disposed  of  right  away.  The appellant  challenges   the  slab   system  of  compensation provided in  the Act  which  awards  smaller  multiples  for estates yielding  larger incomes,  on the score of violation of the  fundamental rights under the Constitution. The short answer is  that Art.  31(3) read  with Art.  31(2) bars  any challenge to  the amount  of compensation  on acquisition by the State  subject to  compliance with  the prescriptions in the said  sub-Articles, on  the ground  that the  amount  so fixed or determined is not adequate. Presidential assent has been accorded  to this  State Act  and so  the ban operates. Moreover, Art.  31A repels the applicability of Arts. 14, 19 and 31  to the  acquisition by the State of any estate or of any rights  therein etc.  This provision directly demolishes the contention of the appellant.      Point  No.   6  in  the  list  of  contentions  earlier reproduced is  also bereft  of force  and we  may make short shrift of  it. The  argument is that for certain reasons the appellant could  not  derive  and  actual  income  from  the forests taken over by the State from him and therefore there was no  income-tax payable  on any  agricultural income from these forests.  The contention is that therefore in arriving at the  next income  the  deduction  of  income-tax  is  not permissible. Here again, the flaw in the submission consists in mis-reading  s. 27 of the Act which expressly states that the net income from an estate shall be computed by deducting from the  gross assets  of such  estate any  sum ’which  was

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 7 of 10  

payable by  the intermediary as income-tax in respect of any income .....  derived from  such  estate  for  the  previous agricultural year’.  No income, therefore no income-tax, and therefore no deduction, is the syllogism of Shri Purohit. He forgets that in the case of forests it is the assumed income and  not   the  actual   income  that  forms  the  basis  of calculation of  compensation. Indeed,  if the  actual income were to be the foundation for computation of compensation on the  premise   that  not  actual  income  has  accrued,  the compensation might  be zero.  On the  other hand,  statutory compensation is  provided for  on  the  formula  of  assumed income in  the previous  year. Similarly, an assumed income- tax also has to be worked out and deducted. If 925 a notional  income on  the assumed  basis can  be  used  for fixing compensation, a notional income-tax can be calculated and deducted.  The confusion  that vitiates  the argument is prompted by  a circular  letter of government regarding non- deductability of income-tax due to the State from the amount of compensation  lying to  the credit  of estateholders.  We have examined  the circular letter and are satisfied that it has no  relevance to  a situation  like the  present and  it deals with  a totally  different matter.  In  short,  s.  27 properly construed,  can not  lend  itself  to  the  meaning imputed to it by the appellant.      The serious question that survives for consideration is covered by  the remaining points which more or less overlap. The  statutory  scheme  of  compensation  for  forest  lands consists of  a machinery  for assessment  of the  net income which is  multiplied on  a sliding  scale and  the method of challenge to  the determination  by the  aggrieved owner  of State. Section 26(2) (b) (v) is relevant here and may be set out:           "26(2) ’gross  asset’ when  used with reference to      an estate  means the  aggregate of the rents, including      all cesses, which were payable in respect of the estate      for the previous agricultural year-           (b)  by   the  raiyats   or  any   other   persons      cultivating the  land other  than the land settled with      the intermediary  or intermidaris under Sub-section (1)      of Section 7 and includes:-           (v) gross  income from  forests calculated  on the      basis of  the appraisement  made of annual yield of the      forests on  the date  of vesting  by a  Forest  Officer      subject to  the approval  of the  Chief Conservator  of      Forests, such  Forest Officer  being not below the rank      of a  Divisional Forest Officer to be appointed in this      behalf by the State Government."      The expression  ’Forest Officer’,  used here,  has been explained in  s. 26. So the first step is for the Government to appoint Forest Officers from out of D.F.Os. in the Forest Department, for  the purposes  of the  Act.  Those  Officers ascertain the  income from  the  forest  concerned  and  the figure so  fixed is  subject to  the approval  of the C.C.F. (Chief Conservator of Forests), presumably the top expert in the department.  The power  to approve  implies the power to disapprove or  modify but  not to  report or  arrive  at  an income de hors the Forest Officer’s Report altogether.      The section is clear that the gross income from forests must be  calculated on  the basis of appraisal of the annual yield on  the date  of vesting  firstly, by a Forest Officer and, secondly, by the Chief Conservator of Forests screening it and  approving it.  Indeed, preliminary  to the appraisal operation, the  intermediary receives  a notice  in Form ’D’ (rule 13)  and he  is expected  to furnish  a return  of the

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 8 of 10  

relevant particulars  and supporting  information to  enable correct appraisement. In the present case, the appellant did submit the  ’D’  return  to  the  Compensation  Officer  and adduced some  evidence to  substantiate it. The Compensation Officer passed an order adverse to the appellant, where upon he filed  an appeal  to the  Collector which was rejected. A Second 926 Appeal followed  before  the  Board  of  Revenue  which  was dismissed. Later,  revision petition  were filed  before the High  Court  and  G.  K.  Misra  J.,  set  aside  the  order disallowing the  inclusion of  the income  from forests  for ascertainment of  compensation and  directed a remand to the Compensation Officer.  The said  order (the relevant portion of which we are concerned) runs thus:           "He would  immediately call  upon  the  Divisional      Forest Officer to make appraisement within three months      from the receipt of the record. The appraisement can be      scientifically done  by looking to the age of the trees      as they  stand now.  It is  open to  the petitioners to      give evidence  that after  the date  of vesting many of      the trees and forest produce have been removed. Besides      the evidence  already on  record would  be  taken  into      consideration. The  Divisional Forest Officer who would      make the appraisement will be examined as a witness for      the Compensation  Officer and  would  be  subjected  to      cross-examination.   No   other   evidence   would   be      permissible as  the State  has not  chosen to  give any      other  evidence.  Under  Rule  13(1-c)  of  the  Orissa      Estates Abolition  Rules, 1952 the compensation officer      may rely  upon such other materials as may otherwise be      ascertained by  him. But  in such  a case the materials      must be  brought to  the notice  of the petitioners who      would  be   entitled  to  cross-examine  the  witnesses      connected therewith  and may  give rebutting  evidence.      The compensation  case is  to be  disposed  of  by  the      compensation officer  within six months from today (10-      4-1969) with intimation to this Court."      Strictly speaking,  the statutory  requirement  is  for initial  appraisal  of  the  annual  income  by  the  Forest Officer.  The  use  of  the  expression  ’Divisional  Forest Officers is erroneous although Forest Officers are appointed from among  Divisional Forest  Officers. Equally  clearly, a slight error  has crept  into the  Judge’s order  because he does not  make any  reference specifically  to the statutory requirement of  approval of the Chief Conservator of Forests of the appraisement made by the Forest Officer.      However, what followed is interesting though erroneous. The District  Forest Officer  (who, incidentally, happens to be a  Forest Officer under the Act, having been appointed as required thereunder) made his appraisal of the annual income and submitted  to the  Chief  Conservator  who  altered  the annual yield  and reduced  it substantially.  But he pointed out that  the Forest  Officer had  omitted  to  include  the income from  kendu leaves  and added  that sum to the income from forests.  Even so,  the total figure was less than what the  Divisional   Forest  Officer   had   recommended.   The Compensation  officer  accepted  the  report  of  the  Chief Conservator and made the statutory calculation on that date. Both the  State and  the  appellant  filed  appeals  to  the Collector which were dismissed. A second appeal was filed by the appellant  before the  Board of Revenue without success. Then followed  three revision  petitions to  the High  Court which led  to the  order of remand now attacked before us in the present appeals.

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 9 of 10  

927      From this  narrative, what  follows is  that the  Chief Conservator  had  substituted  his  appraisement  which  was accepted by  the statutory  tribunal. Indeed,  there  was  a fundamental difference  in the  basis adopted  by the Forest Officer and the Chief Conservator in the matter of assessing the income  of the  forests in question. We need not go into this detail except for the purpose of noticing that what the Chief Conservator  did was  not to  approve wholly  or in  a modified form  what the  Forest Officer  did but to make his own appraisal  independently and  without reference  to  the report  of  the  statutory  functionary,  viz.,  the  Forest Officer. This  was wrong  and contrary  to  s.  26,  as  was contended by the appellant and in a way accepted by the High Court.      We are in agreement with the course adopted by the High Court and  the reasoning  which has  prevailed with  it. The direction given  by the learned Judge in the remand order is correct although  it may  require  a  little  clarification. Having heard the appellant at some length, we see no flaw in the High  Court’s order  on this aspect of the matter. It is astonishing that  anyone should  urge, as the appellant did, that the  date of  vesting is  the last  date by  which  the calculation of  compensation should have been made and since that had  not been done, the Compensation Officer had become functus officio in awarding compensation. Before the date of vesting the  State never can, nor does, fix the compensation through the  Compensation officer  in any  of  the  agrarian reform  laws,   and  these   compensation   operations   are poststatutory exercises.  Therefore there is no substance in the  functus   officio  argument.  If  the  officer  had  no jurisdiction, the  land would be gone because of the vesting provision and  no compensation would be forthcoming for want of jurisdiction-a  consequence the  appellant  never  wants. Technicality can  be frightened away by technicality. Nor is it  right  to  contend,  as  the  appellant  did,  that  the Compensation Officer’s jurisdiction was created by the order of remand  by the  High Court.  No, it  was created  by  the statute and canalised by the order of remand.      It follows  that, after  the present second remand, the re-appraisal of  the annual net income cannot be done solely by the  Forest Officer  without securing the approval of the Chief Conservator.  Nor can the Compensation Officer by-pass the Chief  Conservator on  the misunderstood strength of the High Court’s first order of remand. The true legal drill is- and this  holds good  after the second remand order-that the Forest officer  will  do  the  appraisement  of  the  annual income, forward  his report  to  the  Chief  Conservator  of Forests who  will take  the said  report into  consideration and, if  necessary, make modifications therein or approve it with such  changes as  he deems  fit.  Certainly  the  Chief Conservator cannot  be ignored  by the  Compensation Officer nor can  the Chief Conservator ignore the assessment made by the Forest  Officer and  go through an independent exercise. The integrated  process has already been explained by us and will be  followed in  the proceedings to ensue on remand. We may make it clear that now that a Forest officer has made an appraisement, the  Chief Conservator  of Forests  will apply his mind  to it  and approve  it as  a whole  or  with  such modifications as  he thinks  necessary and forward it to the Compensation Officer.  This will,  among other  things, save time. Thereafter,  the  appropriate  statutory  course  will follow. Substantially, this 928 is what has been done by the learned Judge when allowing the

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 10 of 10  

revisions and  remitting the  case back  to the Compensation Officer.      The take-over  of the  forests  of  the  appellant  was effected as  early as  1960 and 16 years have passed without the intermediary being out of the litigative woods. The High Court has  stated that  a large  part of  the delay has been ’due to  laches committed  from time to time by the Officers who have  been  charged  with  the  duty  to  calculate  the compensation. It  is again  due to mistakes committed by the authorities concerned that the matter is being remitted back to the  Compensation Officer  for disposal’.  The  force  of these  observations   constrains  us   to  direct  that  the proceedings  before   the  Compensation   Officer  shall  be completed within  six months from today. In this context, it is perhaps  not irrelevant to remember that the appellant, a freedom-fighter, is an 83-year-old man and, at this stage of his life, the State should show commisseration not merely in quickly disposing  of the  proceedings but also in not being cantankerous  in   awarding  and   disbursing  the   balance compensation. With  these  directions  and  observations  we affirm the  orders under  appeal but,  while dismissing  the appeals, direct  the parties  to bear  their costs  in  this Court. P.H.P.                                    Appeals dismissed. 929