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PETITIONER: ACHARAYA MAHARAJSHRI NARANDRAPRASADJI ANANDPRASADJI  MAHARAJ

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: THE STATE OF GUJARAT & ORS.

DATE OF JUDGMENT03/10/1974

BENCH: GOSWAMI, P.K. BENCH: GOSWAMI, P.K. RAY, A.N. (CJ) BEG, M. HAMEEDULLAH ALAGIRISWAMI, A. SARKARIA, RANJIT SINGH

CITATION:  1974 AIR 2098            1975 SCR  (2) 317  1975 SCC  (1)  11  CITATOR INFO :  R          1981 SC1576  (3)

ACT: Constitution  of  India, 1950-Article 26,  31  (2)-Right  to compulsorily     acquire,     property     of      religious denomination--Scope of right under Article 26(c). Constitution  of India, 1950-Article 31 A-Gujarat  Devasthan Inams  Abolition Act, 1969-If entitled to the protection  of Article 31A.

HEADNOTE: The  Gujarat  Legislature enacted  Gujarat  Devasthan  Inams Abolition  Act,  1969.  Section 5 of the  Act  provides  for abolition  of  certain Devasthan Inams together  with  their incidents  and  makes Devasthan lands liable to  payment  of land  revenue.   Section 8 vests all  public  roads,  lanes, tracks, bridges, ditches, dikes and fences etc., situated in Devasthan lands in Government and further provides that  all rights  held by an Inamdar in such property would be  deemed to  have been extinguished.  Section 9 of the  Act  provides for compensation in the form of cash annuity.  By Section 31 certain  exemptions  granted to the Devasthan lands  by  the Bombay  Tenancy & Agricultural Lands Act, 1948  and  Gujarat Agricultural Lands Ceiling Act 1960 have been deleted. It  was  contended by the appellants that the  Act  violated Article   26(c)  of  the  Constitution  since  it   deprived religious denominations of their ownership of property; that in addition to fulfilling the requirements of Article  31(2) the  Act  had to fulfil the requirements  of  Article  26(c) also;  that  the  Act was not saved  by  the  provisions  of Article  3 1 A since the operation of Article 26(c)  is  not included  in the former Article and that Section 31  of  the Act  is  violative of Article 26(c) since  the  compensation available to religious denominations is grossly inadequate. Held:Article  26  guarantees the right to  own  and  acquire movable  and  immovable  property  for  managing   religious affairs.  This right cannot take away the right of the State to  compulsorily  acquire property in  accordance  with  the provisions of Article 31(2).  If the acquisition of property

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of a religious denomination by the State can be proved to be such  as to destroy or completely negative its right to  own or  acquire  movable  and immovable property  for  even  the survival of a religious institution the question may have to be  examined  in  a  different  light.-  However,  such   an allegation  is  not made in the present appeals.   When  the property  is  acquired by the State in accordance  with  the provisions  of Article 31(2) and the acquisition  cannot  be assailed on any valid ground, the right to own that property vanishes  as that right is transferred to the State.   There is no conflict between Article 26 and Article 31.  The court also  negatived  the contention of the appellants  that  the decision  in Khaja Mian Wakf Estate [1971] 2 S.C.R. 790  has been  over-ruled by the Bank Nationalisation case  [1970]  3 S.C.R. 530. [327 C-E] The  Act is passed in furtherance of agrarian reform and  is fairly protected under the saving provision of Article  31A. The right Conferred under Article 26(c) is not absolute  and unqualified right.  No rights in an organised society can be absolute.   Where in a free play of social forces it is  not possible  to bring about a voluntary harmony, the State  has to  step  in to set right the  imbalance  between  competing interests  and  there  the  Directive  Principles-of   State Policy, although not enforceable in courts, have a  definite and  Positive role introducing an obligation upon the  State under  Article 37 in making laws to regulate the conduct  of men and their affairs.  In doing so a distinction will  have to  be made between those laws which directly  infringe  the freedom of religion and others, although indirectly, affect- ing  some  secular activities or religious  institutions  or bodies.   The  core of religion is not  interfered  with  in providing for amenities for sufferers of any kind.  The 318 Act  does  not violate the rights guaranteed  under  Article 26(c).  The Act does not make any inroad in such a way as to affect  directly  the substance of the  right  conferred  by Article  26(c).  One fundamental right of a person may  have to  co-exist  in  harmony  with  the  exercise  of   another fundamental  right  by others and also with  reasonable  and valid  exercise  of power by the State in the light  of  the Directive Principles in the interest of social welfare as  a whole.   The  Courts  duty is to strike  a  balance  between conflicting claims of different interests. [328 F-H; 329B] Commissioner,  Hindu  Religious  Endowments,Madras  v.  Shri Lakhsmindra  Thirtha  Swamiar  of Sri  Shirur  Mutt,  [1954] S.C.R. 1005/1028-1029, referred to. Objection on the score of inadequacy of compensation  cannot be agitated against a legislation which relates to  agrarian reform  and,  therefore,  protected  by  Article  31A.   The objection on the score of violation of Article 14, 19 and 31 is not entertainable. [329.F-E] ARGUMENTS For the appellants: 1.   The impugned Act (The Gujarat Devasthan Inams Abolition Act, 1939) violates Article 26(c) of the Constitution  which confers  on  every religious  denomination  the  fundamental right  "to own and acquire movable and immovable  property", ,subject  only to "public order, morality and health".   The impugned  Act aims at agrarian reform but is  not  concerned with  public order, morality and health.  Since it  deprives religious  denominations of their ownership of property,  it transgresses Article 26(c) and. is invalid. 2.Article  31-A  provides that legislation covered  by  that Article  cannot  be  ,deemed to be void  on  the  ground  of inconsistency  with  Articles  14, 19  and  21.   Since  the

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impugned  act  is  inconsistent with  Articles  26(c)  whose operation is not excluded by Article 31A, it is not saved by the provisions of the latter. 3.The  Court  below was wrong in holding that  the  question whether  the impugned Act contravenes Article 26(c)  depends on  whether  the  Act is in conformity  with  the  Directive Principles  embodied in Part-IV of the Constitution.  It  is well established by decisions of this Hon’ble Court that the Directive  Principles cannot over-ride  fundamental  rights. Where a fundamental right has been expressly made subject to certain reasonable restrictions, then the relevant Directive Principle would be taken into consideration by the court  in deciding  whether  in  a  particular  case  the  restriction imposed is reasonable or not. But  where  a  fundamental right is in  absolute  terms,  it cannot  be  Subject to restrictions in  the  general  public interest. Since fundamental right in Article 26(c) is subject only  to public  order,  morality and health,  only  those  Directive Principles which relate to public order, morality and health would  be  relevant  in  construing  whether  a   particular legislation is violative of Article 26(c). 4.   While   the   fundamental  rights   in   the   American Constitution have been stated in general terms, those in our Constitution have been concretely defined.  The ,Court below was  in  error  in relying on  American  decisions  for  its conclusion  that the fundamental rights in our  Constitution are subject to the Directive Principles in Part-IV  thereof- American  decisions are not useful in deciding the scope  of our fundamental rights. 5.   The  impugned  Act in so far as it  is  concerned  with compulsory acquisition of Property, fulfils the requirements of Article 31(2).  It has, however, to fulfil it,  ,addition the requirements of Article 26(c) also.  It was held in  the Bank  Nationalisation Case [1970] (3) SCR 530 that the  work "law"  in Article 31(2) means a valid law, i. e.  law  which does not violate any other fundamental right.  The  impugned Act  must  accordingly be consistent not only  with  Article 31(2) but also Article 26(c).  Observations to the  contrary effect in Khajimian Wakf Estate etc. v. State of Madras  and Anr.  [1971](2) SCR page 790(at page 797)  are  inconsistent with  the ratio of the Bank Nationalisation case, which  was decided  by  a  larger Bench, and are,  it  is  respectfully submitted, not good law.  319 6.The  court  below  was  not  right  in  holding  that  the substance  of the right under Article 26(c) is not  affected if  the property of religious denominations is  compulsorily acquired  by  providing for a  reasonable  pensation.   This view,  it is submitted, is not correct,  because  compulsory acquisition  of  property  ’limits the  right  of  ownership guaranteed by Article 26(c).  The observations in The  State of Bihar Versus Maharajadhiraja Sir Kameshwar Singh of  Dar- bhanga and others [1952] SCR 839 relied upon the Court below are not relevant, as the Bihar Act in question was  included in the IXth Schedule of the Constitution and was beyond  the challenge based on any fundamental right.  Section 31 of the Bombay  Tenancy  and  Agricultural Lands Act  1948  and  the Gujarat Agricultural Land Ceiling Act 1960 applicable to the agricultural lands of religious denominations.  It cannot be disputed  that  the  compensation  available  to   religious denominations for the lands covered by these Acts is grossly inadequate.   Section 31 of the impugned Act is,  therefore, violative  of  Article 26 (c) of the Constitution  of  India even supposing that the rest of the Act is valid.

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For the Respondents: 1.The rights conferred on the religious denominations  under Article 26(c) and (d)of   the  Constitution   of   India enables them to own and acquire properties and to administer them   according   to  law.   In  the  submission   of   the respondents, these rights under Article 26(c) and (d) do not however  derogate  the  power of the State  to  acquire  the properties  under  Article 31 of the Constitution.   It  was further  submitted that Article 26(c) and (d) must  be  read together  with the result the right of the State to  acquire property would not be affected, merely because the  property is owned by a religious denomination. 2.It was submitted that the right under Article 26(c) is not unbounded  or absolute.  The same is subject  to  reasonable regulation. 3.What is reasonable regulation must depend on the nature of the fundamental right sought to be regulated the purpose for which   it   is  conferred  and  the  general   pattern   of Constitutional  rights and obligation.  It must also  depend on  the Directive Principles enumerated in Part IV  and  the socioeconomic structure envisaged by the Constitution. 4.That in the event of conflict between the individual right and the legislation implementing socioeconomic policies laid down  in  Part  IV, greater weight should be  given  to  the policy enumerated in the Directive Principles. 5.That the socioeconomic policy sought to be  implemented through  the  legislation  made in  pursuance  of  Directive Principles  would  be  rejoiner as "public  purpose"  or  as intended  to promote "public interest" and as  a  reasonable restriction on the fundamental rights.  The two being  parts of  one scheme and "complementary and supplementary to  each other." 6.Any law under which property was compulsorily  acquired for a public purpose, the law satisfied the requirements  of Art.  31(2) and 31(2A), it should be presumed that  such  an acquisition  would  amount to reasonable regulation  on  the exercise  of  the fundamental right to  hold  the  Property, empowered in the interest of general public.

JUDGMENT: CIVIL  APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeals  Nos  746-748, 756,  760,  778, 800, 802, 826, 789, 790, 798, 799,  1035  & 1303 of 1971. Appeals from the Judgment & Order dated the 31st August/1st/ 2nd/  and 3rd September, 1970 of the Gujarat High  Court  in Special Civil Applns.  Nos. 60, 168, 169, 173, 63, 87,  154, 869, 167, 123, 337, 606, 119 and 604 of 1970 respectively. V.   M.  Tarkunde (In CA.  No. 746/71) P. C. Bhahtari,  C.S. Rao, B.Dadachanji,  O. C. Mathur and.Ravinder Narain  for the appellants, (In Case.  Nos. 746-748, 754, 760 & 826/71). 320 Vimal  Dave and Kalidas Mehta, for the appellants.  (In  CAs Nos. 778, 798-799/71). P.   C. Kapur for the appellants (In C. No. 802/71). R.   M. Mehta and S. K. Dholkia for the appellants ’(In  CAS Nos.800 & 1303/71).  I. N. Shroff and H. S. Parihar, for the appellants (In  CAs Nos. 789-790/71). C.C.  Patel,  Ambrish  Kumar and M. V.  Goswami  for  the appellants (In CAs Nos. 1035/71). S.T.  Desai,  R.  H. Dhebar and M.  N.  Shroff,  for  the respondents.(In all the appeals). The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

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Goswami, J. These appeals are by certificate granted by  the High  Court  of  Gujarat.  Since a common  question  of  law arises  for  consideration  in all  these  appeals  and  the learned counsel in all the appeals adopted the arguments  of Mr.  Tarkunde,  the learned counsel for  the  appellant  (in Civil Appeal No. 746 of 1971) the facts of that appeal alone need  be  stated  and  this judgment  will  govern  all  the appeals. The  appellant is the Managing Trustee of the Trust  of  the Temples of Laxminarayan Deo of Vadtal and is the Acharya  of the Gadi of the Swaminarayan Sampraday at Vadtal which is  a public  trust registered under the Bombay Public Trust  Act. Under the scheme of the Trust the appellant is authorised to look  after the management of the properties of  the  Trust. It  is  not disputed that the Swaminarayan  Sampraday  is  a religious  denomination which believes in Lord  Krishna  and Radha.   The Institution holds Devasthan Inam lands and  the appellant  challenges  the constitutional  validity  of  the Gujarat  Devasthan  Inams Abolition Act,  1969  (hereinafter referred to as the Act). The Act came into force on November 15, 1969 and it  extends to  the Bombay area of the State of Gujarat.   The  preamble shows that it is an Act "to abolish inams held by  religious or charitable institution in the Bombay area of the State of Gujarat  and  to  provide  for  matters  consequential   and incidental thereto". Section  2  contains  the  definitions.   By  section   2(6) "Devasthan  inam’  means an inam consisting of  a  grant  or recognition as a grant-               (a)   of  a village, portion of a  village  or               land, whether such grant  be-               (i)  of  soil with or without  exemption  from               payment of               land revenue or                (ii)  of assignment of the whole of the  land               revenue   of  the  village,  portion  of   the               village, or as the case may be, land, or of  a               share of such land revenue, or                321               (iii)  of  total  or  partial  exemption  from               payment of land               revenue in respect of any land, or               (b)of  cash allowance or allowance in  kind               by   whatever  name  called,  by  the   ruling               authority  for the time being for a  religious               or charitable institution and entered as  such               in the alienation register kept under  section               53 of the Code or in any other revenue  record               or  public  record maintained  in  respect  of               alienations   or  determined  as  such  by   a               decision  under  section  5  of  the   Gujarat               Surviving  Alienations  Abolition  Act,   1963               (Gujarat XXXIII of 1963) but does not include-               "                *           *         *         * By section 2(7) " ’Devasthan land, means a village,  portion of a village or land held under a Devasthan inam". By section 2(9) " inferior holder’ means a person who is  in possession  of a Devasthan land whether by  inheritance,  or succession  or  valid  transfer under  the  tenancy  law  or otherwise and who, being liable to pay assessment in cash or kind  hold  such land, whether on payment of  assessment  or not". By  section  2  (10) " Inamdar’ means in  the  religious  or charitable  institution for which a Devasthan inam is  held,

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whether  such  inam  is actually  entered  in  the  relevant revenue  record  in the name of such institution or  of  any person   in  charge  of  such  institution  or  having   the management thereof". By  section  2(12)  "  ,religious  institution’  means   any institution belonging to any religion". By  section 2(14) " unauthorised holder’ means a  person  in possession of a Devasthan land under any kind of  alienation thereof  which is null and void under the law applicable  to such land immediately before the appointed day". Section 5 provides for "abolition of certain Devasthan inams together  with  their incidents and ’Devasthan lands  to  be liable to payment of land revenue-Notwithstanding any  usage or  custom, settlement, grant, agreement, sanad or order  or anything contained in any decree or order of a court or  any law,  for the time being applicable to any  Devasthan  inam, with effect on and from the appointed,day-               (a)all Devasthan inams except in so far  as               they  consist of a grant or recognition  as  a               grant  of cash allowance or allowance in  kind               shall be and are hereby abolished;               (b)save  as expressly provided by or  under               this   Act  all  rights   legally   subsisting               immediately  before  the  said  day,  in   the               Devasthan  inams  so abolished and  all  other               incidents  of  such  inams shall  be  and  are               hereby extinguished; and               (c)subject to the other provisions of  this               Act,  all  Devasthan lands shall  be  and  are               hereby made liable to the payment of land               322               revenue  in accordance with the provisions  of               the  Code and the rules made  thereunder,  and               accordingly the provisions therein relating to               unalienated land shall apply to all  Devasthan               lands".               Sections 6 and 7 say also be quoted               6."Occupancy   rights   in   respect    of               Devasthan  land.-In  the case of  a  Devasthan               land,  the  person deemed to be  the  occupant               primarily  liable to the State Government  for               payment  of  land revenue in respect  of  such               land in accordance with the provisions of  the               Code and the rules made thereunder shall be-               (a)where such land is in possession of  the               inamdar  and had been cultivated on behalf  of               the  inamdar immediately before the  appointed               day, the inamdar,               (b)where such land is in the possession  of               an  authorised holder or an  inferior  holder,               such authorised holder or inferior holder,  as               the case may be, and               (c)where  such land is in possession  of  a               person  other  than  the  inamdar,  authorised               holder,   unauthorised  holder   or   inferior               holder, the inamdar".               7."Eviction  of  unauthorised  holder  and               regrant  of Devasthan land to him  in  cretain               circumstances   and  disposal  of   land               not regranted.-                (1)  Where  any  Devasthan  land  is  in  the               possession of an unauthorised holder, it shall               be resumed and such unauthorised holder  shall               be   summarily  evicted  there  from  by   the               Collector in accordance with the provisions of

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             the Code :               Provided  that  where  in  the  case  of   any               unauthorised holder the State Government is of               opinion that in view of the investment by such               holder  in the development of the land  or  in               the  non-agricultural  use  of  the  land   or               otherwise,  the eviction of such  holder  from               the  land will involve undue hardship to  him,               the State Government may direct the  Collector               to regrant the land to such holder on  payment               of  such amount and subject to such terms  and               conditions   as  the  State   Government   may               determine and the Collector shall regrant  the               land to such holder accordingly.               (2)Devasthan  land which is  not  regranted               under  subsection (1) shall be disposed of  in               accordance with the provisions of the Code and               the  rules made thereunder applicable  to  the               disposal of unoccupied unalienated land". Section 8 vests all public roads, lanes and tracks, bridges, ditches, dikes and fences, etc. and various things mentioned therein  situated in Devasthan lands in Government  and  all rights held by an inamdar  323 in  such property shall be deemed to have been  extinguished and  it  shall be lawful for the Collector, subject  to  the general  or  special  orders of  the  State  Government,  to dispose  of  them  as he deems fit, subject  always  to  the rights  of  way  and  other  rights  of  the  public  or  of individuals legally subsisting.               Section 9 reads as follows               "Compensation in form of cash annuity,-In  the               case  of a Devasthan inam not consisting of  a               grant  or  recognition  as  a  grant  of  cash               allowance or allowance in kind, there shall be               paid  to the inamdar as compensation  for  the               abolition of all his rights in Devasthan inam,               in the form of an annuity in perpetuity--               (a)a  sum of money equal to an  average  of               the  full assessment lawfully leviable on  all               the  lands  comprised in such  inam  during  a               period  of three years  immediately  preceding               the  appointed day, if the grant consisted  of               grant  of soil with or without exemption  from               payment of land revenue.               (b)a  sum of money equal to an  average  of               the amount of land revenue or, as the case may               be, the share in such land revenue received or               due  to the inamdar during a period  of  three               years immediately preceding the appointed day,               if  the grant consisted of assignment of  land               revenue or a share in such land revenue.               Section 10 provides for the method of awarding               compensation to inamdar.               Section 11 may be set out               "     Method  of  awarding  compensation   for               abortion  etc.  of rights of other  person  in               property.-               (1)If  any  person  is  aggrieved  by   the               provisions   of   this  Act   as   abolishing,               extinguishing  or modifying any of his  rights               to   or   interest   in,   property   and   if               compensation      for     such      abolition,               extinguishment  or modification has  not  been               provided  for in the other provisions of  this

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             Act,  such person may apply to  the  Collector               for compensation.                (2)  The  application under  sub-section  (1)               shall   be  made  to  the  Collector  in   the               prescribed   form   within   the    prescribed               period.The  Collector shall, after  holding  a               formal   inquiry in  the  manner  provided  by               the  Code,  make  an  award  determining   the               compensation  in the manner and  according  to               the  method provided for in subsection (1)  of               section   23  and  section  24  of  the   Land               Acquisition Act, 1894 (1 of 1894).               (3)Nothing  in this section  shall  entitle               any person to compensation on the ground  that               any   Devasthan  land  which  was  wholly   or               partially exempt from payment of land  revenue               has               -M255SupCI/75               324               been  under  the provisions of this  Act  made               subject  to the payment of full assessment  in               accordance with the provisions of the Code".               By section 12, "Provisions of Land Acquisition               Act, applicable to awards-               (1)Every award made under section II  shall               be in the form prescribed in section 26 of the               Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (1 of 1894) and the               provisions  of the said Act, shall, so far  as               may be, apply to the making of such award".               x                     x                      x               x               Section   13  provides  for   appeal   against               Collector’s  award  to  the  Gujarat   Revenue               Tribunal. Section  19  makes actions taken or things done  after  18th March,  1968, but before the appointed day, in  relation  to ’Devasthan  lands so as to affect the rights of  the  tenant from such land or to evict the tenant therefrom, void.               By  section 31, the following Acts  have  been               amended               1.Inter-alia,   a  new  section   88E   is               inserted    in   the   Bombay   Tenancy    and               Agricultural Lands Act, 1948 and the same  may               be quoted :               88E.   "Cessor  of  exemption  in  respect  of               certain public trust lands-               (1)Notwithstanding  anything  contained  in               section  88B,  with  effect on  and  from  the               specified date lands which are the property of               an  institution for public  religious  worship               shall   cease  to  be  exempted   from   those               provisions of the Act except sections 31 to  3               ID  (both  inclusive)  from  which  they  were               exempted    under   section   88B   and    all               certificates  granted  under that  section  in               respect of such lands shall stand revoked.               (2)Where  any  such land ceases  to  be  so               exempted, then in               the  case  of tenancy  subsisting  immediately               before the specified date thetenant shall be               deemed  to  have  purchased the  land  on  the               specified  date and the provisions of  section               32 to 32R (both inclusive) shall so far as may               be applicable, apply".               x                     x                      x

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             x               2.Similarly under section 3 of the Gujarat               Agricultural  Lands  Act,  1960,  after   sub-               section  (2)  a new-sub-section (3)  has  been               inserted which reads as under :               "(3)  The  Devasthan lands  which  immediately               before  the  date of the commencement  of  the               Gujarat  Devasthan Inams Abolition  Act,  1969               (Gujarat  16  of  1969)  were  exempted  under               clause  (d)  of  sub-section  (1)  shall  with               effect  on and from the said date cease to  be               exempted lands" 325 From the foregoing provisions of the Act set out above it is clear  that  the Act is passed in  furtherance  of  agrarian reforms and that is not disputed before us. According   to  the  appellant  as  a  consequence  of   the enforcement  of the Act his rights in respect of 729  bighas of  Devasthan inam lands will be extinguished.   Action  was also  taken under the Bombay Land Revenue Code in  order  to effect changes in the record of rights imposing liability to land  revenue  in view of the abolition of  Devasthan  Inams under  the Act.  Some other notices under the Act have  also been  served  on the appellant to hand over  his  record  as inamdar.   That led to the application under article 226  of the Constitution in the High Court challenging the  validity of   the  Act  without  success.   Hence  this   appeal   by certificate. Mr.  Tarkunde,  learned counsel, whose arguments  have  been adopted  by  the appellants in all other appeals  before  us makes the following submissions : (1)The  Act  violates Articles 26(c) of  the  Constitution since it deprives religious denomination of their  ownership of property.               (2)Tile  Act in so far as it  is  concerned               with   compulsory  acquisition   of   property               fulfils- the requirements of Article 31(2). it               has,  however,  to  fulfil  in  addition   the               requirements  of  Article 26(c) also.   It  is               submitted   that  the  observations   to   the               contrary  in  Khajamian Wakf Estates  etc.  v.               State  of  Madras & Anr.(1)  are  inconsistent               with  the  ratio of the  Bank  Nationalisation               case  [Rustom  Cavasjee  Cooper  v.  Union  of               India(2)] which was decided by a larger Bench.               He   further  submits  that   the   compulsory               acquisition  of property limits the  substance               of  the  right  of  ownership  guaranteed   by               Article 26(c).               (3)The  Act is not saved by the  provisions               of Article 31A since the operation of  Article               26(c)   is  not  excluded  under  the   former               Article.               (4)At  any  rate section 31 of the  Act  is               violative   of   Article   26(c)   since   the               compensation     available    to     religious               denominations  for  the lands covered  by  the               Bombay  Tenancy  and Agricultural  Lands  Act,               1948 and the Gujarat Agricultural Lands  Ceil-               ing Act, 1960 is grossly inadequate. Mr. S. T. ’Desai, learned counsel for the respondent on  the other  hand submits that there is nothing in  Article  26(c) and  (d)  to debar the State from acquiring  the  properties owned by the religious denominations under Article 31(2)  of the  Constitution.  Secondly, he submits that the  right  of

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property embodies in Article 26(c) is not an absolute  right but  is subject to reasonable regulation by the  State.   He further submits that the reasonable regulation must  depend, in  a large measure, on the Directive Principles  enumerated in Part IV of the Constitution (1) [1971] 2 S.C.R. 790. (2) [1970] 3 S.C.R. 530. 326 and   the   socioeconomic   structure   envisaged   by   the Constitution.  Thirdly, he sub.-nits that if under any law a property is compulsorily acquired for public purpose and the law  satisfies  the requirements of Article 31 A  the  Court should  readily  permit  the  imposition  of  a   reasonable restriction on the exercise of the right to hold property in the interest of the general public. With  regard  to  the first objection  the  learned  counsel submits   that  the  Act  violates  Article  26(c)  of   the Constitution  which offers to every  religious  denomination the  fundamental  right  "to own  and  acquire  movable  and immovable property" subject only to "public order,  morality and  health".   He  submits that the Act  aims  at  agrarian reform but is not concerned with "public order, morality and health".  Since it deprives religious denominations of their ownership of property, it transgresses Article 26(c) and  is invalid.  He also draws our attention to Article 25(1) which has  subjected the rights therein not only to public  order, morality  and health, but also to "the other  provisions  of Part III".  Ho, therefore, submits that the right guaranteed under Article 26(c) is Rot subject to "the other pro visions of Part III" and therefore, there cart be no acquisition  of property under Article 31 of the Constitution. Articles 25 to 28 in Part III of the Constitution are placed under  a sub-title "Right to Freedom of Religion"  and  deal with matters in the background of that freedom.  It is  true that  Article 25 is made subject to "public order,  morality and health" and also "to the other provisions of this  Part" while Article 26 is only subject to "public order,  morality and health".  Insertion of the expression "the other  provi- sions of this Part" in Article 25 is understandable when  we find  the particular rights which are taken care of in  this Article, namely, the right to freedom of conscience and  the right  freely to profess, practice and  propagate  religion. Bearing  in  mind the overlapping nature  of  the  sensitive rights, in Article 19(1) (a) with reference to citizens  and in Article 25(1) with reference to- all persons the founders of  the  Constitution left no room for  doubt  in  expressly subjecting  Article  25(1) to the other provisions  of  Part III.  Not only so sub-Article 2 of Article 25 provides  that ".nothing in this Article shall affect the operation of  any existing  law  or  prevent the State  from  making  any  law regulating or restricting any economic, financial, political or  other  secular  activity which may  be  associated  with religious practice".  The same considerations are,  however, not exactly necessary while dealing with "freedom to  manage religious  affairs" which is the rubric of Article  26.   We may now read Article 26 :               Freedom to 26.   "Subject  to  public   order,               morality and health               manage     every religious denomination or any               section               religious  thereof shall have the right-               affairs.               (a)to  establish and maintain  institutions               for religious and charitable purposes;               (b)to manage its own affairs in matters  of

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             religion;                                    327               (c)to  own and acquire movable  and  immovable               property; and               (d)to  administer such property in  accordance               with law". While Article 25, as stated earlier, confers the  particular rights  on all persons, Article 26 is confined to  religious denominations or any section thereof.  Article 19(1) confers the  various  rights specified therein from (a)  to  (g)  on citizens.  A religious denomination or a section thereof  as such is not a citizen.  In that sense the fields of the  two Articles  may  be to sonic extent  different.   Again  while Article  26(c)  refers  to the right  "to  own  and  acquire movable  and immovable property", Article  19(1)(f)  confers the  right  on  citizens "to acquire, hold  and  dispose  of property".  We are not required to consider in this case why the  same expression is not used in the said two clauses  of the  two  Articles.   One. thing  is,  however,  clear  that Article 26 guarantees intervals the right to own and acquire movable  and  immovable  property  for  managing   religious affairs.  This right, however, cannot take away the right of the  State  to compulsorily acquire property  in  accordance with  the  provisions of Article 31(2).  If,  on  the  other hand, acquisition of property of a religious denomination by the  State  can-  be  proved to be such  as  to  destroy  or completely negative its right to own and acquire movable and immovable  property  for even the survival  of  a  religious institution  the  question  may have to  be  examined  in  a different light.  That kind of a factual position,  however, is  not  taken in these appeals before us.   When,  however, property is acquired by the State in accordance with law and with  the  provisions of Article 31(2) and  the  acquisition cannot  be assailed on any valid ground open to  the  person concerned,  be it a religious institution, the right to  own that  property vanishes as that right is transferred to  the State.  Thereafter there is no question of any right to  own the  particular property subject to public  order,  morality and health and Article 26 will in the circumstances be of no relevance.   This  being  the legal position,  there  is  no conflict between Article 26 and Article 31. In   Khajamian   Wakf  Estates’  case  (at   page   797)   a Constitutional  Bench  of this Court  dealing  with  Article 26(c) and (d) observed as follows :               "It  was  next  urged that  by  acquiring  the               properties     belonging     to      religious               denominations  the legislature  violated  Art.               26(c)  and  (d) which provide  that  religious               denominations shall have the right to own  and               acquire  movable  and immovable  property  and               administer  such property in  accordance  with               law.   These provisions do not take  away  the               right   of  the  State  to  acquire   property               belonging  to religious denominations.   Those               denominations  can own acquire properties  and               administer them in accordance with law.   That               does not mean that the property owned by  them               cannot   be   acquired.   As   a   result   of               acquisition  they cease to own that  property.               Thereafter  their  right  to  administer  that               property ceases because it is no longer  their               property.  Art. 26 does not interfere with the               right of the State to acquire property." 328 It is submitted by Mr. Tarkunde that the above  observations

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of  this  Court  are  inconsistent with  the  ratio  of  the decision  in Rustom Cavasjee Cooper’s case, popularly  known as  the  Bank Nationalisation case, which was decided  by  a larger Bench.  It is difficult to accept the submission that the  views  expressed in Khajamian Wakf  Estates’  case  are contrary to Rustom Cavasjee Cooper’s case.  Apart from  that this Bench cannot pass upon the correctness or otherwise  of the  views  expressed  in  Khajaraian  Wakf  Estate’s  case. Besides,  we do not even think that the submission is  well- founded even to merit reconsideration of the Khajamian  Wakf Estates’ case. The  learned  counsel  also  strenuously  relied  upon   the following  passage  in  the  Commissioner,  Hindu  Religious Endowments,  Madras v. Shri Lakshmindra Thiratha Swamiar  of Sri Shirur Mutt.(1)               "Under  article 26(b), therefore, a  religious               denomination  or organisation enjoys  complete               autonomy in the matter of deciding as to  what               rites  and ceremonies are essential  according               to the tenets of the religion they hold and no               outside  authority  has  any  jurisdiction  to               interfere   with   their  decision   in   such               matters .... A law which takes away the  right               of   administration  from  the  hands   of   a               religious denomination altogether and vests it               in  any  other  authority would  amount  to  a               violation of the right guaranteed under clause               (d) of article 26." We do not think that the above opinion of the Court in  that case is of any assistance to the appellants.  The first  and the   second  submissions  of  the  learned   counsel   are, therefore, of no avail. When  we  look at the object of the Act and of  the  various provisions  enacted in furtherance of agrarian  reform,  the Act  is  squarely protected under the  saving  provision  of Article 31A.  But it is then submitted that Article 31A does not provide against the vice of contravention of Article  26 while  Articles  14, 19 and 31 are  expressly  mentioned  in Article  3 1 A. The question, therefore, arises whether  the right  under  Article 26(c) is an absolute  and  unqualified right  to the extent that no agrarian reform can touch  upon the lands owned by the religious de. nominations.  No rights in an organised society can be absolute.  Enjoyment of one’s rights must be consistent with the enjoyment of rights  also by others.  Where in a free play of social forces it is  not possible  to bring about a voluntary harmony, the State  has to  step  in to set right the  imbalance  between  competing interests  and  there  the  Directive  Principles  of  State Policy, although not enforceable in courts, have a  definite and  positive role introducing an obligation upon the  State under  Article 37 in making laws to regulate the conduct  of men and their affairs.  In doing so, a distinction will have to  be made between those laws which directly  infringe  the freedom   of  religion  and  others,  although   indirectly, affecting some secular activities or religious  institutions or  bodies.   For example if a  religious  institution  owns large areas of land far exceeding the coiling under relevant laws and indulges in activities detrimental to the  interest of the agricultural (1)  [1954] S.C.R. 1005,1028-1029. 329 tenants,  who  are at their mercy, freedom  of  religion  or freedom  to manage religious affairs cannot be pleaded as  a shield  against regulatory remedial measures adopted by  the State  to  put a stop to exploitation and  unrest  in  other

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quarters in the interest of general social welfare. The core of religion is not interfered with in providing for amenities for sufferers of any kind.  We take the view  that the  Act  and its provisions do no violence  to  the  rights guaranteed  under Article 26(c).  In the view we have  taken it is also not necessary to mention Article 26 in Article  3 1  A  and  its  omission  therein  is  not  at  all  of  any consequence. Right guaranteed under Article 26(c) not being absolute  and unqualified is consistent with reasonable replacements  made by  the State provided the substance of the freedom is  riot affected.  The Act does not make any inroad in such a way as to  affect  directly  the  substance  of  that  freedom.   A particular fundamental right cannot exist in isolation in  a watertight  compartment.  One fundamental right of a  person may have to co-exist in harmony with the exercise of another fundamental  right  by others and also with  reasonable  and valid  exercise  of power by the State in the light  of  the Directive Principles in the interests of social welfare as a whole.   The  Court’s duty is to strike  a  balance  between competing claims of different interests. So far as the fourth submission is concerned, the  objection is on the score of adequacy of compensation which cannot  be agitated  against a legislation which admittedly relates  to agrarian  reform  and  is, therefore, under  the  canopy  of protection of Article 31A of the Constitution and  objection on  the score of violation of Articles 14, 19 and 31 is  not entertainable.  Hence this submission also fails. in the result all the appeals arc dismissed with costs. P.H.P. Appeals dismissed 330