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PETITIONER: ABDUL HUSEIN TAYABALI & ORS.

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: STATE OF GUJARAT & ORS.

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 20/09/1967

BENCH: SHELAT, J.M. BENCH: SHELAT, J.M. SHAH, J.C. SIKRI, S.M.

CITATION:  1968 AIR  432            1968 SCR  (1) 597  CITATOR INFO :  F          1976 SC1697  (20,21,25,27)  F          1977 SC 497  (7)  D          1985 SC 736  (16)

ACT: Land  Acquisition  Act,  1894, ss. 3(c), 4,  5A  and  6-Land Acquisition (Companies) Rules r. 4-Special Land  Acquisition Officers  authorised  by  general  notification  to  perform functions  of  collector under the  Act-Inquiry  and  Report under r. 4 by Officer on land required by company-Whether he was  ’specially  appointed’  within the  meaning  of  r.  4- Therefore whether subsequent notifications under- ss. 4  and 6  valid Appellants given opportunity to represent  against acquisition  in s. 5A inquiry-Whether entitled to a  further opportunity before issue of s. 6 notification.

HEADNOTE: On   October  1,  1963,  the  State  Government   issued   a notification  under section 3(c), authorising one M who  was then  the  Special  Land  Acquisition  Officer,  Baroda,  to perform  the functions of a Collector and also directed  him to  hold an enquiry under the Land  Acquisition  (Companies) Rules  on  the application of the third  respondent  company requesting  the government to acquire the appellant’s  land. In supersession of that notification, the Government  issued another  notification  on October 11, 1963  authorising  all Special  Land Acquisition Officers to perform the  functions of  the  Collector under the Act within the  area  of  their respective jurisdiction.  After M had made an enquiry  under Rule   4,   the  respondent  State   Government   issued   a notification  under Section 4 of the Land  Acquisition  Act, 1894, on August 28. 1964 in respect of the appellant’s  land which  was stated to be required for the establishment of  a factory  by the third respondent company.  Objections  filed by  the appellants in an -enquiry under s. 5A were  rejected and  the State Government thereafter issued  a  notification under  s. 6 on October 18, 1965.  The appellants  challenged the notification by writ petitions but these were, dismissed by the High Court. In  the appeal to this Court, it was contended on behalf  of the  appellants, inter alia. (i) that M was only  a  Special

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Land  Acquisition Officer and not the Collector  within  the meaning of Rule 4; in any event the notification of  October 11,  1963 did not "specially" appoint him but was a  general notification  authorising all the Special  Land  Acquisition Officers in the State appointed not only before the date  of s.  4 notification but also those who would be appointed  in future,. furthermore, the notification did not "appoint" but simply  authorised  him  to perform  the  functions  of  the Collector, the State Goverrunent had not given any direction to  him to make a report as required by .Rule  4;  therefore the enquiry held by him under that Rule and the ,report made was  invailed and consequently no notification either  under s.  4  or s. 6 could be validly issued; (ii) that the  s.  6 notification  was issued without complying with Part VII  of the  Act  and  without  the  valid  consent  of  the   State Government as required by s. 39; (iii) that the  acquisition was  made mala fide and without application of mind  to  the relevant  facts: (iv) that the acquisition did  not  involve any  public purpose: and (v) that the State  Government  was bound  to  give  an  opportunity  of  being  heard  to   the appellants before taking a decision under s. 5A particularly when the report made by M was against the acquisition, 598 HELD: Dismissing the appeal. (i)  No  objection  to the appointment of M to  perform  the functions  of  the  Collector  under  s.  3(c)  or  to   his competence  to make the enquiry and the report under Rule  4 or their legality can be validly made.  It follows that  the consent   given  by  the  State  Government  in   initiating acquisition  proceedings was validly given and was in  comp- liance  with the provisions of Part VII of the Act  and  the State   Government   could  validly   issue   the   impugned notifications. [604G] There being nothing repugnant in the subject or context, the word  "Collector"  must, by virtue of s. 20 of  the  General Clauses’ Act, 1897, have the same meaning in the Rules as in s.  3(c)  of  the Act which includes  an  officer  specially appointed to perform the functions of the Collector. [602H] The  words "specially appointed" simply mean that as  a  Sp. L.A.  Officer  is  not a Collector and  cannot  perform  the functions  of  a  Collector  under the Act.  he  has  to  be "specially  appointed",  i.e.  appointed  for  the  specific purpose of performing those functions.  The word "specially" has therefore reference to the special purpose of appointing and is not used to convey the sense of a special as  against a  general appointment.  Furthermore, s. 15 of  the  General Clauses  Act provides that where a Central Act  empowers  an authority to appoint a Person to Perform a certain  function such  power can be exercised either by name or by virtue  of office. [603C-F] In  the context of s. 3(c) when an officer is authorised  to perform the functions of the Collector, it means that he  is appointed  to  perform  those  functions.   The  distinction between the two is without a difference. [604B] There  is no force in the contention that the enquiry  under rule 4 has to be held after the notification under s. 4  and not before.  There is nothing in rule 4 or any other rule to warrant such a proposition. (ii)  On the facts, the appellants had failed  to  establish their  allegation  either  as  to mala  fides  or  the  non- application of mind by the State Government. (iii)  There  is no force in the contention  that  when  the appellant’s   lands   were  already  being  used   for   the manufacture  of  a building, material and that  was  also  a public  purpose, the legislature could not have intended  to

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empower   the  Government  to  destroy  that   purpose   and substitute in its place another Public purpose. [606D] Arora Case, [1962] Supp, 2’S.C.R. 149: referred to. (iv)  It is not disputed that during the s. 5A  enquiry  the appellants  were  heard and their objections were  taken  on record.   The record of the enquiry is required under s.  5A to be sent to the Government so as to enable the  Government -to decide whether the acquisition is necessary for a public purpose or for a company.  The Government thus had before it not  only the opinion of M but also all that the  appellants had  to  say  by  way of  objections  against  the  proposed acquisition.   The appellants therefore had an  opportunity, of  being heard.  Neither s. 5A nor any other  provision  of the Act lays down that a second opportunity has to be  given before  the issuance of the Section 6  notification.  [606F- 607A]

JUDGMENT: CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeals Nos. 369 to  375 of 1967. 599 Appeals  from the judgment and order dated October 15,  1966 of the Gujarat High Court in Special Civil Applications Nos. 1475, 1479, and 1480 of 1965, and 119, 120, 12.2 and 125  of 1966 respectively. G.L. Sanghi and Ravinder Narain, for the appellants (in  all the appeals). Bishan Narain, R. H. Dhebar and S. P. Nayar, for respondents Nos. 1 and 2 (in all the appeals). Arun H.  Mehta and I.N. Shroff, for respondent No. 3 (in all the appeals). The Judgment of the Court was delivered by Shelat, J. These appeals by certificate are directed against the  judgment  of the High Court of Gujarat  dismissing  the writ  petitions  filed by the appellants  for  quashing  the notifications  dated  August 28, 1964 and October  18,  1965 respectively  issued  under  sections 4 and 6  of  the  Land Acquisition Act,1 of 1894. The  appellants  are  the owners of the  lands  in  question situate  at  Ranoli, District Baroda.   The  3rd  respondent Company  also  owns  about 140 acres of  land  in  the  same village.  The appellant’s lands are either situate  adjacent to and between the Company’s lands and the railway lines  or are  enclaves surrounded by lands belonging to the  Company. On July 22, 1961 the State Government issued a  notification under  sec. 4 of the Act to the effect that the  appellants’ said  lands  were or were likely to be needed for  a  public purpose,, viz., for a fertilizer factory.  That notification was withdrawn on September 11, 1961 as the lands were stated to be unsuitable for such a factory.  The Government however issued  the very next day a fresh notification under sec.  4 in  respect of the same lands, this time for the purpose  of the  3rd  respondent  Company.   Some  of  these  appellants thereupon  filed  writ petitions challenging  its  validity. While  these  petitions were pending before the  High  Court this  Court delivered its decision in what is known  as  the first  Arora Case(1).  To get over the difficulties  arising from  that  decision,  first  an  Ordinance  and  then   the Amendment Act XXXI of 1962, were passed.  The Amendment  Act was brought into force from July 20, 1962 with retrospective effect.  The Central Government thereafter made Rules  under sec.  55 of the Act called the Land Acquisition  (Companies) Rules which were brought into force from June 22, 1963.   On

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July 24, 1963 the State Government withdrew the notification dated September 12, 1961 whereupon the writ petitions  filed by  the appellants challenging the said  notifications  were withdrawn.   In the meantime one D.K. Master, who  was  then the  Special  Land Acquisition Officer, Baroda,  started  an inquiry  under Rule 4 of the said Rules.  On August  28,1964 the State Government issued a notification under (1) [1962] Supp. 2 S.C.R. 149:A.I.R. 1962 S.C. 764. 600 sec.  4 stating that the appellants’ said lands were  needed or  were  likely  to be needed for the  establishment  of  a factory of the 3rd respondent Company.  The appellants filed their objections in the inquiry then held under sec. 5A  but they   were  rejected.   On  October  18,  1965  the   State Government  issued  sec. 6 notification declaring  that  the said lands were needed for the factory of the 3rd respondent Company  which it was stated was taking steps  or  en,gaging itself for manufacture of optical bleaching agents, interme- diate dye-stuffs etc., which according to the Government was for a public purpose. The  appellants  thereupon filed writ petitions  from  which these appeals arise challenging the two notifications  dated August  28,  1964 and October 18, 1965  respectively.   When these   writ  petitions  came  on  for  hearing  the   State Government  produced a notification dated October  11,  1963 authorising  the  Special Land Acquisition Officers  of  the State  to perform the functions of the Collector under  sec. 3(c).   On  certain contentions having been  raised  on  the basis  of  this notification, the High Court  adjourned  the hearing  to  enable  the State  Government  to  explain  the circumstances   and  the  reasons  for  issuing   the   said notification.   On August 25, 1966 the said Master  filed  a further  affidavit clarifying the Government’s position  and the circumstances in which he performed the functions of the Collector under sec. 3(c). Before the High Court the appellants contended that the pro- cedure  laid down in the said Land  Acquisition  (Companies) Rules  was  not  followed, that the purpose  for  which  the acquisition  was being made was not a public purpose  within the meaning of sec. 40(1)(a), that the acquisition was  made mala  fide  and in colourable exercise of  power,  that  the State  Government had not applied its mind to the  facts  of the  case  and lastly that the inquiry under sec. 5A  was  a quasi-judicial  inquiry  and that as an  opportunity  to  be heard was not given to the appellants the proceedings  under sec.   5A  violated  natural  justice.   Counsel,   however, conceded   that   the   inquiry   under   section   5A   was administrative but contended that the appellants were  still entitled to be heard before the State Government formed  its satisfaction  that the lands were required for the  Company. The High Court rejected all these contentions and  dismissed the writ petitions.  Hence these appeals. Counsel  for  the appellants formulated the  following  five pro,positions   on  which  he  impugned  the  High   Court’s judgment: (1)that  the  inquiry under Rule 4 of the  Land  Acquisition (Companies)  Rules and the consequent report made by  Master to  the  Government were invalid; therefore there  being  no valid  report  under  Rule  4  read  with  section  40,   no notification  either under s.4 ,,or sec. 6 could be  validly issued; 601 (2)  that  sec. 6 notification was issued without  complying with Part VII of the Act and without a valid consent of  the State  Government  as required by sec. 39 and  therefore  no

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notification either under sec. 4 or sec. 6 could be lawfully issued; (3)  that the acquisition was made mala fide and without ap- plication of mind to the relevant facts; (4)  that  the  acquisition  did  not  involve  any   public purpose; and (5)  that  the State Government was bound to give an  oppor- tunity  of  being  heard to  the  appellants  before  taking decision under sec. 5A, particularly when the report of  the said Master was against the acquisition. We  shall consider these propositions in the order in  which they were urged. As regards propositions 1 and 2. the argument was that  Mas- ter  was only a Sp.  L.A. officer but was not the  Collector within the meaning of Rule 4 and therefore the inquiry  held by  him  under  that Rule and  the  report  made  consequent thereto  were  invalid; that even if Master can be  held  to have  been  authorised  to  perform  the  functions  of  the Collector  he  was not "specially appointed"  as  Collector; that the State Government had not given any direction to him to  make  a  report  as required by  Rule  4  and  that  the notification  dated October 11, 1963 did not  "appoint"  but simply  authorised  him  to perform  the  functions  of  the Collector. It is not in dispute that as required by the said Rules  the State Government had apponited a Land Acquisition  Committee before  it  issued  the  notification  under  sec.  4.   The affidavit  of  Master establishes that he worked  as  a  Sp. L.A.  officer  at Baroda from December 6, 1961 to  April  29 1965.  On February 11, 1963 he was appointed to officiate as Special  Land  Acquisition Officer, Baroda.  On  October  1. 1963  the  Government wrote a letter to him  forwarding  the application  dated September 11, 1963 of the 3rd  respondent Company  requesting the Government to acquire the  lands  in question  and directing him to hold an inquiry according  to the said Rules and to make a report.  The letter also stated that  be  was  being authorised separately  to  perform  the functions of the Collector and that on such authorisation he would be competent to make the inquiry.  On the same day,the Government issued a notification under sec. 3(c) authorising him  to perform the function of the Collector within  Baroda District.   But  on October 11, 1963 the  Government  issued another notification superseding the notification of October 1,  1963  and  authorising  all  Special  Land   Acquisition Officers  in  the  State to perform  the  functions  of  the Collector under the Act within the area of their  respective jurisdiction.   On October 10, 1963 Master had  addressed  a letter to the 602 Company to supply information for his inquiry under Rule  4. On  October 22, 1963 he issued notices to 27 owners  of  the lands  proposed to be acquired but only 10 of them  appeared before  him and he recorded their statements on October  31, 1963.  There is thus no doubt that Master was instructed  by the  State Government to hold an inquiry and to  submit  his report. Rule  4 requires the Collector to make an inquiry  regarding the  matters stated therein, such matters inter  alia  being that  the land requested by the Company for  acquisition  is not excessive, that the Company has made efforts and offered reasonable.  price to buy the land from the owners, that  if the  land happens to be good agricultural land, there is  no other  alternative land suitable for the  Company’s  purpose and  the approximate amount of compensation which  would  be payable  if  the lands were acquired.  The  Collector  after

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making  such  inquiry  has  to  submit  his  report  to  the Government.   The  Government then forwards it to  the  Land Acquisition  Committee and the Committee has to  advise  the Government.   Rule 4 prohibits the Government  from  issuing notification  under  section 6 unless it has  consulted  the Committee and considered the said report as also the  report made  under  section  5A and unless an  agreement  with  the Company under section 41 has been executed. The  contention was that though Master held the inquiry  and made  the report he had functioned not as the Collector  but in  his  capacity as the Special Land  Acquisition  Officer, Baroda, and therefore the notification under sec. 4 and s. 6 were  invalid.  The argument was, firstly, that Rule 4  does not  define "collector" and therefore- the word  "collector" must  mean the Collector of the District and secondly,  that even if Master was appointed as the Collector as defined  by sec.  3(c) his appointment as Collector was not valid as  he was not specially appointed to perform the functions of  the Collector.  It was said that the notification dated  October 11,  1963  did  not "specially" appoint  Master  but  was  a general  notification authorising not only, Master  but  all the Special Land Acquisition Officers in the State appointed not  only  before the date of sec. 4 notification  but  also those who would be appointed in future.  In our view,  these contentions  cannot  be  upheld.   Section  3(c)  defines  a Collector  to  mean Collector of the District  and  includes Deputy  Commissioner and any officer specially appointed  by the Government to perform the functions of a Collector under the  Act.  Section 20 of the General Clauses Act, X of  1897 provides that where a Central Act empowers making rules, the expressions   used  in  such  rules,  if  made   after   the commencement  of that Act shall have the same meaning as  in the  Central Act, unless there is anything repugnant in  the subject  or context.  There being nothing repugnant  in  the subject or context, the word "collector" must have the  same meaning  in  the  rules as in sec. 3(c)  which  includes  an officer specially appointed to perform the functions of  the Collector.  If therefore Master can be said to have. 608 been  specially  appointed to perform the functions  of  the Collector Linder the Act no challenge can be entertained  as to his competence to     make  the  inquiry and  the  report under Rule 4 of the said Rules.    Sanghi conceded that  the notification dated October 1, 1963 did  "specially"  appoint Master  as  the Collector.  Baroda but argued that  as  that notification   was  superseded  it  would  not   avail   the respondents and therefore the question was whether the noti- fication  dated  October  11,  1963  can  be  said  to  have specially  appointed  Master as Collector.  He  argued  that since  that  notification  appointed all  the  Special  Land Acquisition  Officers  to  perform  the  functions  of   the Collector  within  their respective areas  the  appointments made  thereunder  must  be  regarded  as  general  and   not appointments specially made and therefore it cannot be  said that  Master or any one of them was specially  appointed  as required  by  sec. 3(c).  The  argument  therefore  resolves itself  to what is the true meaning of the words  "specially appointed".   In our view, those words simply mean  that  as such  an officer is not a Collector and cannot  perform  the functions  of  a  Collector  under the Act,  he  has  to  be "specially  appointed", that is’ appointed for the  specific purpose of performing those functions.  The word "specially’ has   therefore   reference  to  the  special   purpose   of appointment and is not used to convey the sense of a special as against a general appointment.  The word "specially" thus

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connotes  the  appointment  of an  officer  or  officers  to perform functions which ordinarily a Collector would perform under the Act.  It qualifies the word "appointed" and  means no  more than that he is appointed specially to perform  the functions entrusted by the Act to the Collector.  It is  the appointment therefore which is special and not the  person.- from amongst several such officers.  Besides, sec. 15 of the General  Clauses  Act  provides that  where  a  Central  Act empowers  an  authority  to appoint a person  to  perform  a certain function, such power can be exercised either by name or  by  virtue  of  office.  There  would  therefore  be  no objection if the appointment is made of an officer by virtue of  his office and not by his name.  Therefore even  if  the meaning  of  the word "specially" were to be that  which  is canvassed  by  Mr. Sanghi the Government could  have  issued separate  notifications for each of the Sp.   L.A.  officers authorising  them individually to perform the  functions  of the Collector within their respective area of  jurisdiction. Instead of doing that, if one notification were to be issued authorising  each of them to perform those  functions  there could be no valid objection.  Such a notification would have the same force as a separate notification in respect of each individual  Sp.   L.A. officer.  Such a  notification  Would mean  that  the  Government thereby  appoints  each  of  the existing Sp.  L. A. officers to perform the functions of the Collector  within, their respective areas.  It is true  that the  notification also declares that such of the  Sp.   L.A. officers  as may be appointed in future are also  authorised to preform the Collector’s functions.  That only means  that whenever a person would be appointed as a Sp.  L.A. 604   officer for a particular area, the notification  would  in effect  invest  him at the same time with the  authority  to perform the Collector’s functions.  The appointment of  each of  these officers therefore must be held to be special  and not general. But Mr. Sanghi argued that even so the notification did  not "appoint"  Master but merely authorised him to  perform  the Collector’s  functions.   In our View.  the  distinction  is without  difference.   In the context of sec. 3(c)  when  an officer  is  authorised  to perform  the  functions  of  the Collector  it  means that he is appointed to  perfore  those functions.  The clause does not contemplate a separate or an additional post.  What it means is that some officer who  is already  in the Government employment is authorised to  work as  a Collector for the purposes of the Act.  In this  sense whether  he  is  appointed  or  authorised  to  perform  the Collector’s  functions he would be complying with the  terms of that clause. It was then urgued that the inquiry under Rule 4 is a quasi- judicial inquiry and therefore it was incumbent on Master to give an opportunity to the appellants to be heard.  The Rule however provides that the officer conducting the inquiry has to  hear the Company before making his report.   Whether  he has also to hear tile owners of the land or not need not- be decided in these appeals as Master had in fact given such an opportunity  to the appellants by serving them with  notices and  recorded  the statements of such of them who  cared  to appear  before  him.  There is therefore no  merit  in  that contention.  Next it was urged that the inquiry under Rule 4 has to be held after the notification under sec. 4 is issued and not before and therefore the inquiry held by Master  was no-,  valid.   We do not find anything in Rule 4 or  in  any other Rule to warrant such a proposition.  The inquiry,  the report  to be made consequent upon such  inquiry.  obtaining

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the opinion of the Land Acquisition Committee, all these are intended  to  enable the Government to come to  a  tentative conclusion  that the lands in question are or are likely  to be needed for a public purpose and to issue thereafter  sec. 4   notification.   In  our  view,  no  objection   to   the appointment  of  Master  to perform  the  functions  of  the Collector  under sec. 3(c) or to his competence to make  the inquiry and the report under Rule 4 or their legality can be validly made It follows that the consent given by the  State Government   for  initiating  acquisition  proceedings   was validly  given and was in compliance with the provisions  of Part  VII of the Act and the State Government could  validly issue  the  impugned notifications.  This  disposes  of  Mr. Sanghi’s propositions 1 and 2. The third proposition is that the State Government exercised the  power under the Act mala fide and without applying  its mind to the facts of the case.  Paragraph 10 of the petition containing  the  plea as to mala fides is in  general  terms without any particulars.  Even such of the allegations  that are  to be found there arc more against the  3rd  respondent Company than against the State Government.  These are  based on the fact that the Company had                             605 sufficient land of its own and the acquisition was therefore being made so that the Company may acquire the  neighbouring lands without utilising its own lands.  It is true that  the Company  owns. 140 acres of land.  But as the  affidavit  of the Company’s officer shows out of these 140 acres 48  acres are ravine lands, unfit as factory sites.  According to  the Company,  those lands however will be utilised  for  housing accommodation for its 700 workmen and for amenities for them such as play grounds, a sports club. a recreation centre and a  co-operative consumer society.  Forty acres out  of,  the rest  of  the land have already been used  for  constructing some: of the factories’ warehouses and godowns.  As  regards the  balance: of 60 acres, they do not form a compact  block and   contain  in  them  small  pockets  belonging  to   the appellants.   The  Company’s  case  was  that  unless  these pockets  are acquired and these 60 acres are made, into  one compact lot it would not be possible to use them as  factory site.   These lands are, besides, divided by a Nal which  if filled  Lip  would block access to  the  appellant’s  lands. Unless the enclaves are acquired. the said Nal which divides the Company’s lands car,not be filled up.  A portion of  the lands  in  question is also necessary for an  approach  road leading  to the proposed railway siding.  Some of  the  land will  have  to be kept open as otherwise the  noxious  fumes omitted  by  the factories would prove detrimental  to  the: health of the neighbours. The  documents produced by Master reveal that the  inquiry,. held  by  him ",as on the question whether the  Company  was trying  to  acquire  excessive land.  It  is  therefore  not possible that the Government failed to apply its mind having had Master’s report before it as also the report under  sec. 5A as regards the extent of land needed by the Company.   It was however arzueed though somewhat vaguely that the Company would  not  require  as much, as 40 acres  for  housing  its workmen and also that the Company has its own land near  the railway  lines  which  can well be  used  for  the  proposed railway siding.  No effort however was made to show that the Company would not really need 40 acres for housing purposes. As regards the proposed railway siding also there is no data to show that the Company’s land near the railway lines would be  suitable  for  constructing such  railway  siding.   The appellant’s  lands  appear  to be near  the  existing  goods

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platform.  It may be that the Government found on the  basis of the reports before it that the appellants’ lands near the goods platform would be more suitable for the railway siding than the Company’s land near the railway lines. Mr. Sanghi then contended that the fact that the  Government had  been trying to acquire these lands since 1962  and  has been  issuing  one  notification  after  another  shows  the exercise of the, power to acquire was mala fide.  No 1  such inference can be drawn from such a fact only.  The fact,  on the  other  hand, that the Government  cancelled  its  first notification on the ground that these- 606 lands  were  not suitable for a fertiliser factory  gives  a clear indication that it had applied its mind and  relatives the  allegation  of  mala  fide  exercise  of  power.    The correspondence which the Company produced during the hearing of  the petitions shows that as soon as the decision in  the first  Arora  Case(1)  was  given  the  Government  at  once cancelled  the  notification  in  spite  ’of  the  Company’s request to continue it.  This negatives any suspicion as  to collusion  between the Company and the acquiring  authority. It is true that Master’s opinion was adverse to  acquisition but the Government was not bound to accept it.  However, the fact  that a responsible officer of the Government  gave  an adverse opinion is yet another indication that he was acting independently without being influenced by the Government  or the  Company.   In  our  view,  the  appellants  failed   to establish  their  allegation either as to mala fide  or  the non-application of mind by the State Government.  The  third proposition of Mr. Sanghi therefore must fail. As  regards proposition No. 4, the only argument  urged  was that  when a particular land is being already used for  one public  purpose, in this case the manufacture of "sagol",  a building material made from lime, the legislature could  not have  intended  to empower the Government  to  destroy  that purpose and substitute in its place another public  purpose. We  need  only  say that a similar  argument  was  urged  in Somavanti’s Case (2 ) and rejected by this Court. The  last proposition of Mr. Sanghi was that even though  an inquiry  under s. 5A may be an administrative  inquiry,  the State  Government  was bound to give an  opportunity  to  be heard   to  the  appellants  after  receiving   the   report thereunder and before making up its mind for the purpose  of issuing  sec.6  notification.   It is not  in  dispute  that during  sec. 5A inquiry the appellants were heard and  their objections  were  taken  on  record.   Under  sec.  5A,  the Collector has to hear the objections of the owner. take them on  r ecord  and then submit his report to  the  Government. The section also requires him to send along with his  report the  entire  record of his inquiry which would  include  the objections.  The report has merely recommendatory value  and is  not  binding  on  the Government.   The  record  has  to accompany  the  report as it is for the Government  to  form independently its satisfaction.  Both are sent to enable the Government to form its satisfaction that the acquisition  is necessary  for a public purpose or for the Company.   It  is then that sec. 6 notification which declares that particular land  is needed for either of the two purposes  is  issued. The  Government thus bad before it not only the  opinion  of Master  but also all that the appellants had to say by  way of   objections  against  the  proposed  acquisition.    The appellants therefore had an opportunity of (1) [1962] Supp. 2 S.C.R. 149, (2) [1963] 2 S.C.R. 774. 607

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being heard.  Neither sec. 5A nor any other provision of the Act  lays  down that a second opportunity has  to  be  given before  the  issuance  of  section  6  notification.    This contention also therefore cannot be sustained. These were all the contentions urged before us.  As none  of them  can be upheld the appeals have to be  dismissed.   The appellants  will pay to the respondents the costs  of  these appeals. (One hearing fee). R.K.P.S.             Appeals dismissed. 608