http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 1 of 10  

PETITIONER: SRI ABANI KANTA RAY

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: STATE OF ORISSA & ORS.

DATE OF JUDGMENT13/10/1995

BENCH: VERMA, JAGDISH SARAN (J) BENCH: VERMA, JAGDISH SARAN (J) VENKATASWAMI K. (J)

CITATION:  1995 SCC  Supl.  (4) 169 JT 1995 (7)   467  1995 SCALE  (6)41

ACT:

HEADNOTE:

JUDGMENT:                           JUDGMENT J.S. VERMA, J. :      Leave granted.      This appeal  by special leave is by the Chairman of the Orissa Administrative  Tribunal to  expunge certain  remarks made against  him in  the Order  dated 26.8.1993 in Original Application No. 102(C) of 1992 (O.A. 866/1992) by a Division Bench comprising  of  S.K.  Misra,  Vice-Chairman  and  U.N. Mallik,  Member   (Administrative)  of  the  Tribunal.  That application was made by respondent No. 3 Dandanirodha Mishra for cancellation  of his  transfer. The  transfer order  was quashed by  the Division  Bench of  the Tribunal.  In making that order,  strong adverse  comments were  made against the appellant as Chairman of the Tribunal.      The background  is of  some  significance.  After  some controversy, a  Bench of  the Orissa Administrative Tribunal was created at Cuttack but its functioning led to litigation and therein  the making of an order even by this Court about its functioning.  However, some grievance persisted in those favouring creation  of the  Cuttack  Bench  and  a  contempt petition  was   filed  by  an  advocate  against  the  Chief Secretary to  Government of  Orissa, Ramakanta  Rath and the Chairman of  the Tribunal,  A.K. Ray. That contempt petition (Org. Crl.  Misc. Case  No. 73  of 1992)  was decided  by an order dated  8.5.1992. Reference  to this  order of the High Court is made because of its reference in the impugned order of the Tribunal.      Respondent No. 3 D.N. Mishra was posted at the relevant time as  Additional  Secretary  to  the  Revenue  Divisional Commissioner, Central Division at Cuttack and in addition he held the charge of Additional Registrar of the Cuttack Bench of the  Tribunal. Apparently,  the appellant  as Chairman of the Tribunal  was not satisfied with the performance of D.N. Mishra as  the Additional  Registrar of  the  Tribunal.  The appellant wrote a confidential letter dated 10.4.1992 to the

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 2 of 10  

Chief  Secretary  R.K.  Rath  recommending  that  any  other officer  may  be  deputed  to  function  as  the  Additional Registrar. In that letter, the appellant had stated that the functioning  of   the  Cuttack   Bench   of   the   Tribunal wasunsatisfactory and  could not  improve because respondent No. 3  D.N. Mishra was not interested in doing this work and was only  creating confusion  and problems in spite of being explained everything  by him  as well  as the registrar. The letter further  stated that the attitutde of D.N. Mishra was obstructive and,  therefore, urgent  action was necessary in compliance with  the High Court’s direction confirmed by the Supreme Court. The appellant concluded the letter by stating as under :-      ".....  Sri   D.N.  Misra  seems  to  be      determined to  undo our  effort to  hold      circuit at  Cuttack. You  may take  such      action as  you think  fit  against  this      officer. But  I  may  also  suggest  the      Secretary to  R.D.C. (Central  Division)      or any  other  Officer  to  function  as      Additional  Registrar,  which  we  shall      notify immediately." This letter  was written  by  the  appellant  to  the  Chief Secretary on  1.4.1992 and  thereafter the contempt petition was finally heard in the High Court on 20.4.1992 and decided by order  dated 8.5.1992. The High Court, in its order dated 8.5.1992, stated as under :-      "..... This  apart, some  affidavits  of      the practising Advocates have been filed      stating that  after the  notification of      23.3.1992 had been issued, they had gone      several   times    to   the   Additional      Secretary for  filing new  cases, but he      had refused  to accept  because of which      they were compelled to file new cases at      Bhubaneswar. Almost  all the  members of      the Bar  who were present on the date of      hearing on  20.4.1992 (it  may be stated      that quite  a large  number  of  members      were  so   present)  had   also  made  a      statement that  though filing  is  being      willy-nilly accepted  since a  few days,      the  case   record  is   transferred  to      Bhubaneswar for  registration and  after      it is numbered there, it can be taken up      in  the   next  circuit   Bench  of  the      Tribunal to  be held at Cuttack. So, for      urgent matters, a counsel has invariably      to go  to Bhubaneswar  to obtain interim      order. ....."      The High  Court then  rejected the  stand of respondent No. 1,  the  Chief  Secretary  as  an  eye  wash  The  order proceeded to  hold that the Chief Secretary had violated the orders of  the High Court which were affirmed by the Supreme Court. However,  the High Court considered it appropriate to grant a  further  opportunity  to  the  Chief  Secretary  to implement  its   order   relating   to   establishment   and functioning of  a permanent Bench at Cuttack. The High Court did not  hold anything  against the Chairman of the Tribunal who was  the 2nd  respondent in  the contempt  petition. The High Court  actually  recorded  its  satisfaction  with  the action taken  by the  Chairman of the Tribunal and concluded as under:      "...... Secondly,  we do  hope that  the      Registry at  Cuttack functions properly.

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 3 of 10  

    We may  also state  that we  have  noted      with satisfaction  the statement made in      the affidavit  filed on  30.4.1992  that      remedial measures  in this regard, after      knowing about  the  coplaints  from  his      Advocates, have  already been  taken  by      the Chairman."      There is thus nothing in the High Court’s order against the Chairman  of the  Tribunal, the  appellant, and  in fact there is  a record  of its satisfaction with the steps taken by the  Chairman to ensure proper functioning of the cuttack Bench in  accordance with  its directions.  It  is  in  this background the  order dated  11.5.1992 was made by the State Government  transferring   D.N.  Mishra   to  the   post  of Additional  District  Magistrate,  Koraput,  which  had  the effect  of   his  ceasing  to  function  as  the  Additional Registrar of the Cuttack Bench of the Tribunal.      Respondent No.  3 challenged  his transfer  order dated 11.5.1992 by  an application made to the Tribunal. There was no allegation  of any kind, much less of mala fides, against the Chairman of the Tribunal, in the application so made. On 15.5.1992, a Division Bench comprising of S.K.. Misra, Vice- Chairman and U.N. Mallik, Member (Administrative) granted ex parte stay  of the  transfer order  of D.N.  Mishra  as  the Additional Registrar  of the  Cuttack Bench  in spite of the above background.  On 29.5.1992,  the State Government filed an application  in that  proceeding for vacating the interim stay order  stating therein  the facts  and circumstances in which D.N.  Mishra had been transferred to facilitate proper functioning of  the Cuttack  Bench  of  the  Tribunal.  D.N. Mishra then  made an  application to  implead the appellant- Chairman of  the Tribunal  as a party in that proceeding and made allegation  of personal  malice against  him because of the letter  dated 10.4.1992,  he had  writ-ten to  the Chief Secretary for relieving D.N. Mishra of the responsibility of functioning as the Additional Registrar of the Tribunal. The State Government’s  application came before the appellant as Chairman of  the Tribunal  because of  the vacation  of  the Tribunal. The  appellant then  transferred the  matter to I. Roy, Member  (Judicial) by order dated 29.5.1992 with a note refuting the  allegation of  malice made  by D.N. Mishra and Stating that  his request  to the  Chief Secretary to change Mishra from the post of Additional Registrar was occa-Sioned by the  fact that  his  improper  functioning  re-sulted  in inconvenience to the lawyers of Cuttack who had a legitimate grievance against  the improper  functioning of the Registry at the  Cuttack Bench. The appellant stated in the note that as Chairman of the Tribunal, it was his duty to see that the Circuit Bench  at Cuttack functions properly and, therefore, he had  to adopt  such a  course. The Member (Judicial) then directed the  matter to  be placed  before the  Chairman for listing it  before a Division Bench of which he did not wish to be a member. The appellant as Chairman then made an order on 29.6.1992  constituting a  Division Bench  of  the  Vice- chairman and  Member (Admn.) to hear the matter. This is how the matter came to be heard by the Vice-Chairman S.K. Mishra and Member  (Administrative) U.N.  Mallik who  have made the order dated  26.8.1993 in which strong critical comments and adverse remarks  have been  made against  the  appellant  as Chairman of  the Tribunal  while quashing the transfer order of D.N. Mishra.      We are  informed that  D.N. Mishra  has thereafter been transferred  by   the  Government   and  he   is  no  longer functioning as the Additional Registrar of the Cuttack Bench of the  Tribunal. The  quashing of the transfer order is not

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 4 of 10  

challenged in  this appeal.  The only  question  is  of  the legality and  propriety of the critical comments and adverse remarks made  against the  appellant in  the impugned  order dated 26.8.1993.      The  background  in  which  the  transfer  order  dated 11.5.1992 was  issued by  the Government posting D.N. Mishra as Additional  District Magistrate. Koraput resulting in his ceasing to  function as  Additional Registrar of the Cuttack Bench of  the Tribunal  is sufficient  to indicate  that the transfer of  D.N. Mishra  was made in public interest and it was to ensure proper functioning of the Cuttack Bench of the Tribunal.  The   attitude  of   D.N.  Mishra  as  Additional Registrar  of  the  Cuttack  Bench  had  led  to  legitimate grievance in  the Bar requiring the Chairman of the Tribunal to take  prompt steps for proper functioning of the Registry at the  Cuttack Bench of which D.N. Mishra was Incharge. The resentment of  the Bar  escalated to  a contempt  proceeding before the  High Court  alleging violation  of  the  court’s order for  establishment of  the Cuttack  Bench and ensuring its proper  functioning. Even  the Chairman  of the Tribunal was impleaded therein as a respondent and he escaped therein because of the High Court’s conclusion that the Chairman had properly discharged  his responsibilities  to ensure  proper functioning of the Cuttack Bench and for that purpose he had also written  to the  Chief Secretary  on 10.4.1992 to shift D.N. Mishra  who was  making the functioning of the Registry difficult. In  fact, notice of the contempt petition against the appellant was discharged only because of this favourable conclusion reached  by the  High Court  in  respect  of  the appellant. This  alone is  sufficient to indicate total lack of  justification   for  any  adverse  command  against  the appellant.      It is  settled that  a transfer which is an incident of service is not to be interfered with by the courts unless it is shown to be clearly arbitrary or vitiated by malafides or infraction of  any professed norm or principle governing the transfer [See N.K. Singh vs. Union of India and Others, 1994 (6) SCC  98]. The transfer of D.N. Mishra in this background being clearly  in public  interest, there was no permissible ground available  to the  Tribunal for  quashing it.  We are constrained to  observe  that  the  Division  Bench  of  the Tribunal which  made  the  impugned  order  dated  26.8.1993 quashing the transfer of D.N. Mishra on the ground of malice of the  appellant as  the Chairman  of the  Tribunal did  so against  the   material  on  record  and  the  facts  beyond controversy which  borders on  judicial impropriety.  It may also be  noted that  such comments  were  made  against  the Chairman without  even a  notice to  him and as state in the order itself  after treasting the application for impleading the Chairman to be deemed rejected.      We are  distressed at  the tenor  of the impugned order which lacks  judicial propriety and sobriety at many places. We may  quote some portions of that order which compel us to make this  observation. Some  of the extracts from the order of U.N. Mallik, Member (Administrative) are as under :      "..... The  Chairman of the Tribunal who      had practically  nothing to  do  in  the      matter   with    regard   to   providing      infrastructure for smooth functioning of      the Bench,  had no  reason to join hands      with Chief  Secretary and  though  there      was no  notice to  the Chairman  by  the      Hon’ble  High   Court  in  the  contempt      matter, he  volunteered  himself  to  be      dragged into  the litigation and through

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 5 of 10  

    a common  lawyer both  Respondent-2  and      the Chairman of the Tribunal filed their      affidavits  stating   to  have  provided      already all  facilities to  the Registry      at Cuttack  The Hon’ble  High Court  did      not  believe  the  plea  taken  by  both      Respondent-2 and  the  Chairman  of  the      Tribunal and  strongly commented upon it      to be  an ’eye  wash’ and  ’travesty  of      truth’ We are in absolute agreement with      judgment of  the Orissa  High  Court  in      this regard. ....."      ’Now we  come to the litigation stage in      the present  case. Even  during pendency      of this  litigation a judicial restraint      which was  expected  from  any  judicial      officer as  was given  a complete go-by.      Whether the  petitioner had  any case or      not. Whether  he would have succeeded or      failed in  the litigation  is a complete      different   position   altogether.   The      amount of  haste, anxiety  and  interest      shown by the Chairman of the Tribunal to      hear and  dispose  of  this  case  in  a      vacation Bench  without the  case  being      listed speaks  volumes by itself. We are      not  able   to  appreciate  the  initial      action before  the  transfer  order  was      issued in  respect of  the applicant and      the subsequent action during pendency of      the litigation  by a  responsible person      discharging judicial  function like  the      Chairman of the Tribunal. .....      Judged the  conduct of  the Chairman  in      the light  of the  observations  of  the      Apex  Court.   I  find   that   he   had      completely   transferred   the   minimum      judicial norm and constraints required.      In the  premises,  for  the  discussions      made in the foregoing paragraphs we have      absolutely no  hesitation to  hold  that      the  impugned   order  of   transfer  is      arbitrary and  actuated by  mala fids of      Respondent-2 for  which  the  order  has      become unsustainable  and  untenable  in      law. Accordingly,  we quash the order of      transfer  relating   to  the  applicant,      ....."      Thereafter, in a separate order, the Vice Chairman S.K. Mishra expressed  his agreement  with the  conclusion of the Member  (Administrative)   and  after   observing  that  the application for  impleading the  Chairman was  deemed to  be rejected, proceeded to say as under :      "In the  Judgment of  the Hon’ble Member      (Administrative) though mention has been      made in  regard to the application filed      by  the  applicant  for  impleading  the      Chairman of  this Tribunal  as a  party-      respondent, it  must be  assumed to have      been rejected since without the Chairman      being made  a party  the case  has  been      disposed of.  I think  I should  mention      here that  rightly  the  prayer  of  the      applicant in  that regard  has not  been      allowed, since  the Chairman  in View of

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 6 of 10  

    what is  stated above does not appear to      be  a   necessary   or   proper   party,      ..........      This proceeding which I would term to be      an unfortunate one so far as the dignity      of  the   Tribunal  is   concerned  gave      occasion for  discussion on  the conduct      of the  Chairman The Chairman on account      of his  own indiscretion  landed himself      in the  present situation.  Had he  been      discreet, he would not have landed would      not become  relevant for  discussion for      arriving at  the conclusion in regard to      mala  fide  alleged  against  the  Chief      Secretary. The  sequence of events which      are relied  upon  by  the  applicant  to      substantiate the allegation of mala fide      made against  the Chief  Secretary which      brought about  the impugned the Chairman      of the tribunal came to the picture.      ......... I  am also  baffled as to what      for  the   Chairman  of   this  Tribunal      against whom  no notice  of contempt had      been issued  chose to  appear before the      High Court alongwith the Chief Secretary      through common  lawyer. It  is suggested      that he  did so  only to  bail  out  the      Chief   Secretary   from   a   difficult      situation. This suggestion appears to be      quite reasonable  and acceptable.  .....      Unfortunately, for  the Chairman of this      Tribunal and  the Chief Secretary of the      State Government,  adverse comments were      made by  the High  Court and it was said      that the  aforesaid plea advanced before      the wash.  ..... Applicant’s  assertions      in this  regard appear  to be reasonable      and true.  Events, prior and subsequent,      to issuance  of the  impugned  order  of      transfer in  respect  of  the  applicant      bear out such an inference.      I express  my extreme  unhappiness to be      in a  situation like  this and associate      myself with  the  observations  made  in      regard to the actions of the Chairman of      this  Tribunal  which  became  necessary      while dealing  with  the  allegation  of      mala fide  advanced  against  the  Chief      Secretary, which  again became necessary      for disposal of the present proceeding."      A bare perusal of the High Court’s order dated 8.5.1992 referred  earlier,   the  letter   dated  10.4.1992  of  the appellant to  the Chief Secretary and the proceedings of the case before the Tribunal containing the note dated 29.5.1992 of the  Chairman transferring the matter to be heard by some one else  in the  Tribunal and  later the order constituting the Division  Bench comprising of S.K. Mishra, Vice-Chairman and U.N.  Mallik, Member (Administrative) to hear the matter finally  leaves   no  doubt   that  in   making  the   above observations against  the appellant,  the Division  Bench of the Tribunal has completely misread the unambiguous language of these  documents to  make the  wholly unwarranted adverse remarks against  the appellant  without even  notice to  him Appearance of  the appellant  before the  High Court  in the contempt petition was on account of he being responsible for

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 7 of 10  

the proper  functioning of  the Registry  which is under the control  of   the  Chairman   of  the   Tribunal  since  the functioning of  the Registry  at the  Cuttack Bench of which D.N. Mishra  was incharge  was the  subject matter  of  that contempt petition.  The Division  Bench appears to have been totally oblivious  to the  responsibility of the Chairman of the Tribunal  in this behalf. Just as the responsibility for the proper  functioning of  the Registry and control over it in the  High Court  is of  the Chief Justice alone by virtue of Article  229 and  that in  the Supreme Court of the Chief Justice of India So virtue of Article 146, so also it is the Chairman  of   an  Administrative   Tribunal  who   has  the responsibility for proper functioning of the Registry and he alone exercises  direct control over it In such a situation, the appellant  as Chairman  of the  Tribunal had  a duty  to explain to the High Court the actual position with regard to the functioning  of the  Registry at  the Cuttack  Bench  to enable the  High  Court  to  decide  properly  the  contempt petition moved  by the  members of  the Bar  This  has  been unfairly described  by the Division Bench of the Tribunal as undue zeal  of the  chairman what we have said is sufficient to  indicate   the  illegality   and  impropriety   of   the observations made  by the  Division Bench  of  the  Tribunal against the  appellant as  Chairman of  the Tribunal This is sufficient to  indicate that it is the duty of this Court to exchange these unwarranted remarks made unfairly against the appellant We  are informed that the appellant as well as the Vice-Chairman and  Member (Administrative)  who  constituted the Division  Bench of the Tribunal have all by new retired. It is, therefore, not necessary to discuss these remarks nay further.      Before parting with this case, We consider it necessary to refer  to the  observations in  some earlier decisions of this Court  in  similar  context  indicating  the  need  for sobriety and  restraining in  making  adverse  and  critical comments. In  Niranjan Patnaik  vs. Sashibhusan  Kar & Anr., 1986 (2)  SCR 47.  in a  similar contex,  after referring to earlier authorities, it was stated as under:      "It  is,  therefore,  settled  law  that      harsh or  disparaging remarks are not to      be made  against persons and authorities      whose conduct  comes into  consideration      before courts of law unless it is really      necessary for  the decision of the case,      as   an   integral   part   thereof   to      animadvert on  that conduct We hold that      the adverse  remarks  made  against  the      appellant  were  neither  justified  nor      called for."                               (at page 483)      In State of Madhya Pradesh & Ors. vs. Nandlal Jaiswal & Ors., 1987  (1) SCR  1, one  of the questions raised was the propriety of  certain  observations  and  some  disappearing remarks made  by a  learned Judge  of the  High Court in his separate  concurring  opinion  in  a  matter  decided  by  a Division Bench While holdings that those disparaging remarks were  unwarranted,   this   Court   expressed   its   strong disapproval of the same as follows:      "Before  we   part  with  this  we  must      express our  strong disapproval  of  the      observations made  by B.M.  Lal,  J.  in      paragraphs 1,  9, 17,  18, 19  and 34 of      his concurring opinion The learned Judge      made sweeping  observations  attributing      mala fides,  corruption  and  under-hand

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 8 of 10  

    dealing to  the State  Government. These      observations are  in our  opinion not at      all justified by the record. ....."                               (at page 62)           " .....  What the learned Judge has      said is based entirely on conjecture and      suspicion  judicial   disposition  of  a      case. .....                               (at page 63)           "We may  observe in conclusion that      Judges should not use strong and carping      language while  criticizing the  conduct      of parties or their witnesses. They must      act  with   sobriety,   moderation   and      restraint They must have the humility to      recognize that  they are  not infallible      and any harsh and disparaging strictures      passed by  them against any party may be      mistaken and unjustified and if so, they      may do  considerable harm  and  mischief      and result  in injustice.  here, in  the      present case,  the observations made and      strictures passed  by B.M.  Lal, J. were      totally unjustified  and unwarranted and      they ought not to have been made."                          (at page 66)      Again this Court in A.M. Mathur vs. Pramod Kumar Gupta, 1990 (2)  SCR 1100, reiterated this position while expunging the diappearing  remarks made  against an  advocate who  was also  the   former  Advocate  General  of  the  State  while dismissing a review petition. These disparaging remarks were also contained  only in the separate concurring order of one of the  learned Judges  of the division Bench. Incidentally, this matter  was the  aftermath of  Nandlal Jaiswal  (supra) which made  it worse While expunging the disparaging remarks made by  the learned  Judge in  a separate concurring order, this Court stated as under :           "It may  be noted  that C.P. Sen, J      dismissed the  review  petition  on  the      ground  of  maintainability,  limitation      and locus  standing of  the  petitioner.      Thereafter the  application was filed to      pass strictures against the appellant in      the light  of Vidhan  Sabha proceedings.      B.M. Lal,  J. seems  to have  acceded to      that request.  No doubt  each  Judge  is      independent to  form an  opinion of  his      own in  deciding ses  or in any phase of      the decisional  function, But  the facts      of  the   present  case     against  the      background of  the  views  expressed  by      this  Court   apropos  to   the  earlier      strictures against  the Government clear      he was in his mind, not to criticise the      appellant  The   evidence  of  even  the      appearances of bitterns. so important in      a  judge   required  him   not  to  cast      aspersing on the professional conduct of      the appellant."                               (at page 116)           "Judicial restraint  and discipline      are  as   necessary   to   the   orderly      administration of justice as they are to      the effectiveness  of the army. The duty      of restraint,  this humility of function

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 9 of 10  

    should  be   a  constant  theme  of  our      judges. This  quality in decision making      is  as  much  necessary  for  judges  to      command  respect   as  to   protect  the      independence of  the judiciary  Judicial      restraint in this regard might better be      called  judicial   respect:   that   is,      respect by  the  judiciary.  Respect  to      those who  come before the Court as well      to other  co-ordinate  branches  of  the      state. the  Executive  and  Legislature.      There must be mutual respect. When these      qualities fail  or  when  litigants  and      public believe that the judge has failed      in these qualities, it will neither good      for  the  judge  nor  for  the  judicial      process.           The Judges  Branch  is  a  seat  of      power Not  only do  judges have power to      make binding  decisions, their decisions      legitimate the  use of  power  by  other      officials. The  Judges have the absolute      and unchallenged  control of  the  Court      domain, But  they  cannot  misuse  their      authority   by   intemperate   comments,      undignified banter or scathing criticism      of counsel,  parties  or  witnesses.  We      concede that  the Court has the inherent      power  to   act  freely   upon  its  own      conviction on  any matter  coming before      it for adjudication, but it is a general      principle of  the highest  importance to      the  proper  administration  of  justice      that derogatory  remarks ought not to be      made  against   persons  or  authorities      whose conduct  comes into  consideration      unless it  is absolutely  necessary  for      the decision  of the  case to animadvert      on  their   conduct.   (See   (i)   R.K.      Lakshmanan v.  A.K. Srinivasan, [1976] 1      SCR 204  and (ii)  Niranjan  Patnaik  v.      Sashibhushan Kar,  [1986] 2  SCC 567  at      576)."                               (at page 117)           "We therefore, allow the appeal and      expunge all  the remarks  made  by  B.M.      Lal, J.  against the  appellant  in  the      impugned order."                               (at page 118)      What we  have said  above is  nothing new and is only a reiteration of  the established  norms of judicial propriety and restraint  expected from  everyone discharging  judicial functions. Use of intemperate language or making disparaging remarks against  any one  unless that be the requirement for deciding the  case, is inconsistent with judicial behaviour. written words in judicial orders form permanent record which make it  even more  necessary to  practise self-restraint in exercise of  judicial power  while making written orders. It is helpful  to recall  this facet  to remind  ourselves  and avoid pitfalls  arising even  from provocation at times. The Division Bench  of the  Tribunal overlooked  this aspect and misread the  documents in  the  record  including  the  High Court’s judgment  to make  disparaging remarks  against  the appellant as  Chairman of  the  Tribunal  based  on  a  non- existing foundation.  All the  disparaging  remarks  in  the

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 10 of 10  

impugned  order   against  the   appellant  are,  therefore, expunged. This  being the  limited  scope  of  this  appeal, nothing else  needs consideration.  The appeal  is  allowed, accordingly.