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PETITIONER: A SECRETARY, REGIONAL TRANSPORT AUTHORITY,BANGALORE AND ANOT

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: D.P. SHARMA AND OTHERS

DATE OF JUDGMENT12/12/1988

BENCH: DUTT, M.M. (J) BENCH: DUTT, M.M. (J) NATRAJAN, S. (J)

CITATION:  1989 AIR  509            1988 SCR  Supl. (3)1038  1989 SCC  Supl.  (1) 407 JT 1988 (4)   686  1988 SCALE  (2)1521  CITATOR INFO :  RF         1990 SC2072  (37)

ACT:     Motor  Vehicles  Act 1939: Sections 62, 63 and  63  (6)- ‘Special   permit’  grant  of--Whether   permissible   after Karnataka Contract Carriages Acquisition Act 1976 came  into force. %     Karnataka  Contract Carriages (Acquisition )  Act  1976: Section  3 9g), 3 (m), 14 and 20  (3)-‘Contract  Carriages’- Special   Permit’-Issuance  of--Under  section   63(6)-Motor Vehicles  Act, 1939- Pemissibility of.     Words and Phrases--‘Has been’--Meaning of:

HEADNOTE:     Respondent No. 1, the owner of a public service vehicle, made an application to the Regional Transport Authority  for the  grant of a ‘special permit’ under section 63(6) of  the Motor  vehicles Act, 1939. The Regional Transport  Authority rejected  the  said  application  on  the  ground  that  the provisions    of   the    Karnataka    Contract    Carriages (Acquisition) Act, 1976 prohibited the grant of such permit.     Aggrieved by the aforesaid order of refusal,  respondent No.  1 filed a writ petition in the High Court and a  Single Judge of the High Court allowed  writ petition and  directed the Regional Transport Authority to consider the application of responded No.1 for the grant of a special permit.     The   Regional  Transport  Authority  preferred  a  writ appeal. The Division Bench of the High Court taking the view that the intention of the legislature was that only a public service  vehicle in relation to which a special permit  held been issued when the 1976 Act  came into force and which was not  operating as a stage carriage should be acquired,  held that a public service vehicle in relation to which a special permit  had  not been issued when the Act  came  into  force would  not come within the definition of ‘contract  carriage under section 3(g) of the Act and the prohibition  contained in  section  20  of the Act against the  grant  of  contract carriage  permit  would not extend to the grant  of  special                                                   PG NO 1038                                                   PG NO 1039

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permit  under  sub-section  6 of section  63  of  the  Motor Vehicles Act. The Division Bench dismissed the appeal.     The  Regional  Transport Authority appealed  by  special leave  to  this  Court. On the question  whether  after  the coming  into  force  of  the  Karnataka  Contract  Carriages (Acquisition)  Act,  1976, a special  permit  under  section 63(6)  of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 can be granted  under the Act.     Allowing the appeals,     HELD:  1.  Section  14 read with Section  20(3)  of  the Karnataka Contract Carriages (Acquisition) Act, 1976 confers a monopoly on the Karnataka State Road Transport Corporation to run vehicles as contract carriages. [1050A]     2. Section 14 read with section 20(3) of the Act clearly prohibits the grant of renewal of any permit for the running of any contract carriage. [1049C]     3.  The High Court was not therefore right in  its  view that a public service vehicle in relation to which a special permit  had  not been issued when the Act came  into  force, would not come within the definition of ‘contract  carriage’ in  section (g) and the prohibition contained in Section  20 of  the  Act against the grant of contract  carriage  permit cannot extend to grant of special permit under Section 63(6) of the Motor Vehicles Act. [1050B-C]     4. Under clauses (i) and (ii) of Section 3(g) of the Act if  a  special  permit under Section 63(6)  or  a  temporary permit under Section 62(1) or sub-section ( I-C) of  Section 68-F of the Motor Vehicles Act has been issued, it will came within the purview of the definition of ‘contract carriage’. [1046C-D]     5.  If  a special permit under Section  62(1)  or  under Section  63(6)  of the Motor Vehicles Act was  in  force  on January  30,  1976 in respect of a stage  carriage,  such  a stage carriage will not be a ‘contract carriage’ within  the meaning of Section 3(g) of the Act. [1046 D]     6.  Whether  the expression ‘has been’  occurring  in  a provision  of  a statute denotes transaction  prior  to  the enactment of the statute in question or a transaction  after the  coming into force of the statute will depend  upon  the intention  of  the  Legislature  to  be  gathered  from  the provision  in which the said expression occurs or  from  the other provisions of the statute. [1046H; 1047A]                                                   PG NO 1040     In  the instant case, the words ‘has  been’  contemplate the  issuance of a special permit or a temporary  permit  as preferred to in clauses (i) and (ii) of Section 3(g) of  the Act  after  the enactment of the  Act which is   clear  from exclusion clause (ii) of Section 3(g) which excludes a stage carriage  from  the definition of  ‘contract  carriage’,  if special  permits issued under section 62(1) or Section 63(6) of the Motor Vehicles Act were in force on January 30, 1976. [1049F]     7.  The words ‘contract carriage’ occurring  in  Section 3(m)  must   be  read  in the light  of  the  definition  as contained  in  section  3(g)  of the Act.  So  read,  it  is manifest that section 14 read with section 20(3) of the  Act clearly  bars the making of any application for a permit  or for  renewal  of  an existing permit for the  running  of  a vehicle,   whether a contract carriage or a stage  carriage, as  a  contract  carriage. [1049D-E]     State  of Karnataka v. Shri Ranganatha  Reddy. [1978]  1 SC  641  and  Athlumney  Ex pate Wilson,  [1898]  2  QB  547 referred to.

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JUDGMENT:     CIVIL  APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal Nos.  337-38 of 1982.     From  the Judgments and order date 5.7.80 and   3.2.1981 of  the Karnataka High Court in W.P. No. 543/1976 and  1217 of 1981 respectively .     R.N. Narasimamurthy. Attorney General and P.R. Ramasesh for  the Appellants.     G.L.  Sanghi,  A.K. Sen H.B. Datar.  K.R.  Nagaraja.  N. Ganpathy, K.R. NambiaI, R.P. Ranga Swamy, R.B. Datar and Ms. c.K. Sucharita for the Respondents .     R.S. Hegde for the impleded party.     The Judgment of the Court was delivered by.     DUTT, J. These appeals by special leave preferred at the instance  of  the Secretary, Regional  Transport  Authority, Bangalore, and the State of Karnataka, are directed  against the  judgment  of the Division Bench of the  Karnataka  High                                                   PG NO 1041 Court dismissing the appeal preferred by the appellants  and affirming that of the learned Single Judge of the High Court whereby  the Rule issued on the writ petition filed  by  the respondent No. 1 D.P. Sharma was made absolute.     The  respondent  No.  1, who is the owner  of  a  public service vehicle, made an application on October 10, 1976  to the Regional Transport Authority for the grant of a  special permit  under  sub-section  (6) of section 63 of  the  Motor Vehicles  Act  for  the period from  November  15,  1976  to November 22, 1976. The Regional Transport Authority rejected the  said application on the ground that the  provisions  of the  Karnataka Contract Carriages (Acquisition)  Act,  1976, hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act’, prohibit the grant  of such  permits. The respondent No. 1 being aggrieved  by  the refusal  by  the  Regional Transport Authority  to  grant  a special  permit filed a writ petition in  the High Court.  A learned  Single  Judge of the High Court allowed   the  writ petition  and directed the Regional Transport  Authority  to consider  the  application of the respondent No. I  for  the grant of special permit.     Against  the judgment of the learned Single  Judge,  the appellants preferred a writ appeal to the Division Bench  of the  High Court. The Bench took the view that the  intention of the Legislature was that only a public service vehicle in relation to which a special permit had been issued when  the Act came into force and which was not operating  as a  stage carriage should be acquired. Accordingly, it was held that a public service vehicle in relation to which a special permit had  not  been issued when the Act came into force would not come  within   the definition of ‘contract  carriage’  under section  3(g)  of the Act and the prohibition  contained  in section 28 of the Act against the grant of contract carriage permit would not extend to the grant of special permit under sub-section (6) of section 63 of the Motor Vehicles  Act. In that  view of the matter, the Division Bench  dismissed  the appeal preferred by the appellants.     The  only  point that is involved in  these  appeals  is whether  after  the coming into force of the Act, a  special permit under section 63(6)  of the Motor Vehicles Act can be granted under the Act.     The  Act is to provide for the acquisition  of  contract carriages   and   for  matters  incidental,   ancillary   or subservient  thereto. The preamble provides, inter  alia  as follows:                                                   PG NO 1042     ’Whereas contract carriages and certain other categories

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of  public service vehicles are being operated in the  State in  a  manner highly detrimental and prejudicial  to  public interest;     And Whereas with a view lo prevent such misuse and  also to   provide   better  facilities  for  the   transport   of passengers  by road and to give effect to the policy of  the State towards securing that the ownership and control of the resources  of  the community are so distributed as  best  to subserve  the  common  good and that the  operation  of  the economic  system  does not result in  the  concentration  of wealth and means of production to the common detriment;     And Whereas for the aforesaid purposes it is  considered necessary  to  provide  for  the  acquisition  of   contract carriages  and  certain other categories of  public  service vehicles in the State and for matters incidential. ancillary or subservient thereto;     It  is  apparent from the preamble of the Act  that  the primary   object  of  the Act  is  acquisition  of  contract carriages  with  a  view to preventing misuse  and  also  to provide better facilities for the transport of bassengers by road  Besides the prearmble. we may refer to  the  Statement of Objects and Reasons for the Act which will show the  back ground  for  the  enactment of the  Act.  The  Statement  of objects and Reasons for the Act is as follows:     "A  large  number  of  contract  carriages  were   being operated  in the StaLe to the detriment of  public  interest and  were  also functioning stealthily as  stage  carriages. This  had  to be  prevented. Article 39(b) and  (c)  enjoins upon  the . State to see that the ownership and  control  of the  material resources of the community are so  distributed as  best to subserve the common good and that the  operation of the economic system does not result in the  concentration of wealth to the common detriment.     In view of the aforesaid it was considered necessary  to acquire the contract carriages run by private operators     Accordingly the Karnataka Contract Carriages                                                   PG NO 1043     (Acquisition) Ordinance, 1976 was promulgated. The  Bill "seeks to replace the Ordinance."     The  constitutional validity of the Act  was  challenged before  this Court and a Constitution Bench of Seven  Judges in  State of karnataka v. Shri Ranganatha Reddy,   [1978]  I SCR  641 upheld the validity of the Act. In considering  the question of validity of the Act, this Court  referred to the Statement  of  Objects and Reasons for the Act  and  on  the basis  of various affidavits filed on behalf of  the  State, observed  that  the operators were  misusing  their  permits granted  to them as contract carriage permits, and  that  in many cases the vehicles here used as stage carriages picking up  and  dropping passengers in the way.  Accordingly.   the Legislature  thought  that  to prevent such  misuse  and  to provide   for better facilities to transport passengers  and to  the  general  public, it was necessary  to  acquire  the vehicles  permits  and all right title and interest  of  the contract carriage operators etc.     Keeping  in  view  the  objects  and  reasons  for   the enactment of the Act, we have to consider whether after  the coming  into force of the Act, it is permissible to grant  a special  permit  under section 68(6) of the  Motor  Vehicles Act. But before we do that we may refer to the Scheme of the Act.     We  have  already referred to the preamble  to  the  Act providing   for the acquisition of contract  carriages.  The Act shall be deemed to  have come into force on January  30, 1976 as provided in sub-section (3) of section 1 of the Act.

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Section 2 contains a declaration that the Act is for  giving effect  to  the  policy of the State  towards  securing  the principles specified in clauses (b) and (c) of Article 39 of the   Constitution of India and the acquisition therefor  of the  contract  carriages and other property referred  to  in section 4 of the Act. Section 3 is the  definition  section. Clause  (g)  of  section  3 is  an  extended  definition  of contract  carriage’  as given in section 3(2) of  the  Motor Vehicles Act. and we shall presently refer to and deal  with the definition in detail. Clause (h. of section 3 of the Act defines  ’contract carriage operator’. Under clause  (m)  of section  3  of the Act, ’permit’ means  the  permit  granted under  the  Motor  Vehicles Act, authorising the  use  of  a vehicle   as a contract carriage. Section 4 is  the  vesting provision of contract carriages etc. Section 6 provides  for the  determination  of  the amount for the  vesting  of  the acquired  property  under section 4 of the Act.  Section  14 bars  the  issuance  of a fresh permit  or  renewal  of  the existing   permit for the running of any contract  carriage. Sub-section  (l) of section 20 provides inter alia that  all contract carriage permits granted  or renewed in respect  of                                                   PG NO 1044 any vehicle, other than a vehicle acquired under the Act  or belonging to the Karnataka State Road Transport  Corporation or  referred  to  in  section 24 of  the  Act,  shall  stand cancelled.  Sub-section (3) of Section 20 provides that  "no officer  or  authority  shall  invite  any  application   or entertain  any  such application of persons other  than  the Corporation  for the grant of permit for the running of  any contract carriage".     It  has been already noticed that the Act  provides  for acquisition  of  contract  carriages.  The  words  ’contract carriage’  have been defined in section 3(R) of the  Act  as follows:     3(g). ’contract carriage’ shall have the same meaning as in  clause(3)  of section 2 of the Motor  Vehicles  Act  and includes-     (i)  a  public service vehicle in relation  to  which  a special  permit  has been issued under  sub-section  (6)  of section 63 of the Motor Vehicles Act:     (ii)  a  public service vehicle in relation to  which  a temporary  permit has been issued under sub-section  (l)  of section  62 or sub-section (lC) of section 68F of the  Motor Vehicles Act;     (iii)  a  public  service  vehicle  without  a  contract carriage permit but which is specified as contract  carriage in the concerned certificate of registration;     (iv)  any  right in or over such  vehicles  or  moveable property, but does not include,     (i) a tourist vehicle in relation to which a permit  has been issued under sub-section (7) of section 63 of the Motor Vehicles Act;     (ii) a vehicle operating as a stage carriage in relation to  which  on  the 30th day of  January,  1976  a  temporary contract  carriage permit or a special permit  issued  under sub-section ( l) of section 62 or sub-section (6) of section 63 respectively of the Motor Vehicles Act, is in force;    (iii) a motor cab;"                                                   PG NO 1045     Under  section 3(g), the ’contract carriage’  shall,  in the first place, have the same meaning as in section 2(3) of the Motor Vehicles Act, which provides as follows:     "2(3).  ’contract carriage’ means a motor vehicle  which carries a passenger or passengers for hire or reward under a contract expressed or implied for the use of the vehicle  as

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a whole at or for a fixed or agreed rate or sum--     (i) on a time basis whether or not with reference to any route or distance. or     (ii)  from  one  point to another, and  in  either  case without stopping to pick up,     or  set  down  along the line of  route  passengers  not included   in  the  contract,  and  includes  a  motor   cab notwithstanding that the passengers may pay separate fares;"     In  the  second place, section 3(g)  gives  an  extended meaning to ’contract carriage’. Under the extended  meaning, ’contract carriage’ will include a public service vehicle in relation  to  which a special permit has been  issued  under section  (6) of section 63 of the Motor Vehicles Act  or  in relation  to which a temporary permit has been issued  under sub-section (l) of section 62 or sub-section (IC) of section 68F  of  the Motor Vehicles Act. It also includes  a  public service vehicle without a contract carriage permit but which is   specified  as  contract  carriage  in   the   concerned certificate of registration. We are not referring to clauses (iv) and (v) of the extended definition, as the same are not relevant for our purpose.     A  ’public service vehicle’ has been defined in  section 2(25) of the Motor Vehicles Act as meaning any motor vehicle used  or adapted to be used for the carriage  of  passengers for  hire  or  reward, and includes a  motor  cab,  contract carriage, and stage carriage. Thus, it is apparent from  the definition  of ’public service vehicle’ that it  includes  a contract  carriage  and  a stage  carriage  as  well.  Under clauses (i) and (ii) of section 3(g) of the Act if a special permit  under  section  63(6) or a  temporary  permit  under section  62(1)  or sub-section (lC) of section  68F  of  the Motor Vehicles Act has been issued, it will come within  the purview  of the definition of contract carriage’.  In  other words, if a ’contract carriage’ or a ’stage carriage’ within the  meaning  of the Motor Vehicles Act has  been  issued  a special  permit  or a temporary permit, as  referred  to  in                                                   PG NO 1046 clauses  (i)  and  (ii)  of  section  3(g).  such  ’contract carriage’  or ’stage carriage’ will be a  contract  carriage within the meaning of section 3(g) of the Act.     Now we may refer to the latter part of the definition of ’contract  carriage’  under section 3(g) of  the  Act  which excludes  certain vehicles  from the definition of  contract carriage’.  The exclusion that has been provided  in  clause (ii)  is  important  for our purpose. It  excludes  a  stage carriage  in respect of which a temporary contract  carriage permit under section 62(1) or a special permit under section 63(6) of the Motor Vehicles Act is in force on January  3(), 1976,  that is, the date on which the Act is deemed to  have come into force. Under clauses (i) and (ii) of section  3(g) of the Act, which form a part of the extended definition  of ’contract  carriage’, a public service vehicle, that  is  to say,  a contract carriage or a stage carriage in respect  of which  a special permit under section 63(6) or  a  temporary permit  under section 62(1) or section 68F(lC) of the  Motor Vehicles  Act has been issued, will come within the  meaning of ’contract carriage’ under the Act. On the other hand,  if a special permit under section 62(1) or under section  63(6) of  the Motor Vehicles Act was in force on January 30,  1976 in  respect of a stage carriage, such a stage carriage  will not  be a ’contract carriage’ within the meaning of  section 3(g) of the Act.     The High Court seems to think that if any special permit had  not  been granted to a public service vehicle when  the Act came into force, such a vehicle will not come within the

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meaning  of  the  definition of  ’contract  carriage’  under section 3(g). This view of the High Court is not correct. In clauses  (i) and (ii) of section 3(g), the  expression  ’has been issued’ occurs. It is submitted by the learned Advocate General  of  Karnataka that in view of the  expression  ’has been issued’, clauses  (i) and (ii) contemplate the issuance of  a special permit or a temporary permit after the  coming into force of the Act. It does not include the issuance of a special  permit or a temporary permit earlier than the  date of the commencement of the Act. The learned Advocate General has  placed reliance on an English decision in re  Athlumne, Ex  parte Wilson, [1898] 2 QB 547. In that case,  the  words ’where a date has  been proved under the principal Act’ came to be construed and it was observed "But this form of  words is  often used to refer, not to a past time  which  preceded the  enactment,  but  to  a  time  which  is  made  past  by anticipation a time which will have become a past time  only when  the event occurs on which the statute is to  operate." In our opinion, whether the expression ’has been’  occurring in  a provision of a statute  denotes transaction  prior  to the  enactment of the statute in question or  a  transaction                                                   PG NO 1047 after the coming into force of the statute will depend  upon the  intention  of the Legislature to be gathered  from  the provision  in which the said expression occurs or  from  the other provisions of the statute.     In  the instant case, the words ’has  been’  contemplate the  issuance of a special permit or a temporary  permit  as referred  to in clauses (i) and (ii) of section 3(g) of  the Act  after the enactment of the Act which is clear from  the exclusion clause (ii) of section 3(g) which excludes a stage carriage  from  the definition of  ’contract  carriage’,  if special permits issued under section 62(1) or section  h.(6) of the Motor Vehicles Act were in force on January 30, 1976. It is difficult to interpret clauses (i) and (ii) of section 3(g) as contemplating the issuance of a temporary permit  or a  special permit. as referred to therein before the  coming into  force  of the Act. Merely because of the  use  of  the words has been in clauses (i) and (ii) of section 3(g), such an  interpretation is not possible to be made,  particularly in  view  of  the  legislative  intent  apparent  from   the exclusion  clause (ii), namely. that the  Legislature  only. excluded  a stage carriage in respect of which a   temporary contract  carriage or a special permit issued under  section 62(1)  or  63(6) of the Motor Vehicles Act was in  force  on January 30, 1976.     It  has,  however, been urged by Mr. A  K.  Sen  learned counsel appearing on behalf of the  respondent No. 1. that a stage carriage  vehicle in respect of which a special permit has been granted, is excluded form the operation of the Act. counsel   submits  that  the  Act  only   contemplates   the acquisition  of a contract carriage within the   meaning  of the Motor  vehicles Act and not a stage carriage in  respect of  which  a  special permit was or has  been   granted.  In support  of his contention, the learned counsel  has  placed strong reliance on  the definition of the word permit  under section  3(m)  of the Act, as meaning  the  permit   granted under  the  Motor  Vehicles Act, authorising the  use  of  a vehicle as a contract  carriage. It is submitted by him that the  contract carriage under the  Motor Vehicles Act. It  is urged  by the learned Counsel that the word permit  used  in the   different  provisions of the act will  have  the  same meaning of the word as defined in  section 3(m), that is  to say, the permit granted under the Motor Vehicles Act for the use  of a vehicle as a contract carriage.

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  In  section  3(h) ’contract carriage operator’  has  been defined as follows:                                                   PG NO 1048     "3(h).  ’contract carriage operator’ means  an  operator holding  one or more contract carriage permit  and  includes any  person  in  whose  name a  public  service  vehicle  is registered  and is specified as a contract carriage  in  the certificate or registration of such vehicle ;"     According  to the learned Counsel, the word ’permit’  in section  3(h) refers only to permit granted in respect of  a contract carriage under the Motor Vehicles Act. Section 4 is the  vesting provision of contract carriages. Clause (a)  of sub-section ( 1) of section 4 provides as follows:     "4 Vesting of contract carriages, etc.--(1) On and  from such  date  as may be specified by the State  Government  in this  behalf  by  notification in respect  of  any  contract carriage operator,     (a)  every contract carriage owned or operated  by  such contract  carriage  operator along with the  permit  or  the certificate of registration or both as the case may be shall vest  in  the  State Government  absolutely  free  from  all encumbrances;"     Counsel  submits  that the word Permit’  in  clause  (a) refers  to  a permit granted to a vehicle for the use  of  a contract  carriage  under the Motor Vehicles Act.  In  other words,  the sum and substance of the argument of Mr. Sen  is that the word ’permit’ in section .(m) relates to the permit granted  to  a vehicle for the use as  a  contract  carriage under  the Motor Vehicles Act and the definition  with  this interpretation  should  be  applied  to  the  word   Permit’ occurring  in the different provisions of the Act  including section  3(h)  and  should  also  be  applied  to  the  word occuring  in section 14 of the Act. Section 14  provides  as follows:     "14  Fresh  permit  or renewal of  the  existing  permit barred.--Except otherwise provided in this Act     (1) no person shall on or after the commencement of this Act  apply for any permit or fresh permit or for renewal  of an existing permit for the running of any contract  carriage in the State; and     (2) every application for the grant of a permit or fresh permit  Or  for the renewal of the existing permit  and  all                                                   PG NO 1049 appeals or revisions arising therefrom relating thereto made or preferred before the commencement of this Act and pending in  any  court or with any officer,  authority  or  Tribunal constituted under the Motor Vehicles Act shall abate. "     It  is  submitted that only the grant or  renewal  of  a permit  in   respect  of a ’contract  carriage’  within  the meaning  of  the  Motor Vehicles  Act  is  prohibited  under section 14 of the Act, and such prohibition does not  relate to a stage carriage for the running of the same as; contract carriage.     We   are  unable  to  accept  the  contention.  If   the interpretation as given by Mr. Sen of the definition of  the word ’permit’, under section 3(m) of the Act is accepted, it will  make the definition of the words  ’contract  carriage’ under  section 3(g) of the Act meaningless and nugatory  and also  set  at  naught the object of the Act  and  the  clear intention of the Legislature to acquire a stage carriage  as well  in  respect of which a special permit or  a  temporary permit,  as  referred to in clauses (i) or (ii)  of  section 3(g),  has  been  granted. The  words   ’contract  carriage’ occurring  in section 3(m) must, in our opinion, be read  in the light of the definition as contained in section 3(g)  of

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the  Act. So read, it is manifest that section 14 read  with section  20(3)  of the Act clearly bars the  making  of  any application  for a permit or fresh permit or for renewal of an  existing permit for the running of a vehicle, whether  a contract  carriage  Or  a  stage  carriage.  as  a  contract carriage.     It  is  not disputed before use that the  Act  does  not contemplate  the vesting of stage carriage  simpliciter  But section  14  read  with section 20(3) of  the  Act  clearly, prohibits the grant or renewal of any permit for the running of  any contract carriage.  A stage carriage in  respect  of which  d  temporary contract carriage permit  or  a  special permit under section 62(1) or section 63(6) respectively  of the  Motor Vehicles Act was in force on January  3t)  1’)76, has  been  excluded from the definition obtaining  a  permit under  the Motor Vehicles Act. But whether a special  permit was  granted in respect of a stage carriage or not, no  such                                                   PG NO 1050 permit can be granted in respect of a stage carriage for the running  of  it  as a contract  carriage.  In  other  words, section  14  read with section 20(3) of the  Act  confers  a monopoly  on the Karnataka State Road Transport  Corporation to run vehicles as contract carriages.     The High Court is not, therefore, right in its view that a  public  service vehicle in relation to  which  a  special permit  had  not been issued when the Act came  into  force, would not come within the  definition of ’contract carriage’ in section 3(g) and the prohibition  contained in section 20 of  the  Act against the grant of contract  carriage  permit cannot extend to grant of special permit under section 63(6) of the Motor Vehicles Act.     But before we conclude, we may observe that but for  the object  of the Act as stated above, it would have been  very difficult  for us to interpret the provisions of the Act  in view of bad drafting of the same.     Be  that  as it may, for the  reasons  aforesaid,  these appeals  are allowed and the judgment of the High  Court  is set  aside. The writ petition filed by the respondent No.  1 in  the High Court is dismissed. There will, however, be  no order as to costs.     N.V.K.                                  Appeals allowed.