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CASE NO.: Writ Petition (civil)  2350 of 1997

PETITIONER: A. Ramaswamy Dikshitulu & Ors.

RESPONDENT: Government of Andhra Pradesh & Ors.

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 05/05/2004

BENCH: CJI & P. VENKATARAMA REDDI.

JUDGMENT: JUDGMENT

[WITH Review Petition (C) 2375/1997  in T.C. (C) No.     170/1988  and  Review   Petition   (C)  No.  D18695/1997 in W.P.  (C) No. 696/1997]   

IN

 TRANSFER CASE (CIVIL) NO. 168 OF 1988

RAJENDRA BABU,  CJI.  :

       The State of Andhra Pradesh enacted the  Andhra Pradesh Charitable & Hindu Religious  Institutions & Endowments Act, 1987 [hereinafter  referred to as ’the Act’]  providing for abolition of  all rights whether hereditary, contractual or  otherwise of any person who is an Archaka or a  Mirasidar or a Mathadhipati or any other office  holder of office in any religious institution.  The  provisions of the Act were challenged in the writ  petitions filed before the Andhra Pradesh High  Court and under Article 32 of the Constitution  before this Court on several grounds, including  that the said provisions are violative of Articles 25  and 26 of the Constitution as interfering with the  Right to Freedom of Religion.  Some of the writ  petitions filed before the High Court were  transferred to this Court.  On 19.3.1996 this Court  disposed of these matters by upholding the  validity of the Act.  Apart from rejecting the  challenge to the enactment, this Court gave  certain directions to the State Government to  frame a scheme pursuant to which further orders  were passed by this Court.  

       The basic point raised in these review  petitions is that this Court has in several decisions  explained the scope of the said provisions and it  has been held therein that religious practices or  performances of acts in pursuance of the religious  belief are as much a part of religion as faith or  belief in a particular doctrine; that thus, if the  tenets of a particular religion requires  performance of certain rites and ceremonies to be  performed at certain times and in a particular

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manner, these cannot be treated as secular  activities; that  the protection under Articles 25  and 26 is not confined to matters of doctrine or  belief but they extend to acts done in pursuance  of religion and therefore contain a guarantee for  rituals and observances, ceremonies and modes of  worship which are an integral part of religion; that  what constitutes an essential part of a religion has  to be decided by the court with reference to the  doctrine of a particular religion and includes  practices which are regarded by the community as  a part of its religion; that a religious denomination  enjoys complete autonomy in the matter of  deciding as to what rites and ceremonies are  essential according to the tenets of the religion  they hold and no outside authority has any  jurisdiction to interfere with their decision in such  matters; that the protection is only permissible  where the practices is a religious one or the affairs  are affairs in matters of religion; that to determine  whether a particular practice is a matter of religion  may be a difficult task because religious and  secular practices are intricately mixed up; that the  task of disengaging the secular from the religious  may not be easy but it must nevertheless be  attempted in dealing with claims of protection  under Articles 25 and 26 and the proper test to be  applied to determine whether a particular practice  is an integral part of the religion, is to ascertain  whether it is regarded as such by the community  following the religion or not; that this Court has  been cautious to observe that certain practices will  be treated as part of religion only if they are  regarded by the said religion as its essential and  integral part and otherwise,  even purely secular  practices which are not essential or integral to the  religion will be clothed a religious form to claim  protection under these provisions.           The contentions raised by the petitioners are  based on the decisions  of this Court in  Commissioner, HRE  v.  L.T. Swamiar,  AIR  1954 SC 282;  Venkatramana Devaru  v.  State  of Mysore,  AIR 1958 SC 255, and  Tilkayat Shri  Gonvindlalji Maharaj  v.  State of Rajasthan,   AIR 1963 SC 1638; and the decision of the Privy  Council in Thiruvenkata Ramanuja Pedda  Jiyyangarlu Valu   vs.  Prathivathi  Bhayankaram Venkatacharlu & Ors.,  AIR  1947 Privy Council 53.  The learned Senior  counsel for the petitioners strenuously contended  that the decision sought to be reviewed goes  counter to the principles of religious freedom and  practices expanded in the said cases.   The ratio in  Seshammal vs.   Tamilnadu,  ILR 35 Mad 631,  case has been misunderstood by this Court,  according to the learned counsel.  

It is also urged that some of the observations  in the judgment under review are self  contradictory and that the whole approach is  influenced by the basic assumption that religion  should be equated to ’Dharma’, while this Court  enunciated the principles as to what is protected  under Articles 25 and 26 of the Constitution.

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       We have given our anxious consideration to  the various contentions put forth before us.    Considering the nature of the contentions urged,  the scope and extent of the same,  we think,   these are fit cases for consideration by a larger  Bench and we refer accordingly.