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PETITIONER: A.K. ROY & ANR.

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: STATE OF PUNJAB & ORS.

DATE OF JUDGMENT29/09/1986

BENCH: SEN, A.P. (J) BENCH: SEN, A.P. (J) RAY, B.C. (J)

CITATION:  1986 AIR 2160            1986 SCR  (3) 961  1986 SCC  (4) 326        JT 1986   566  1986 SCALE  (2)566

ACT:      Prevention of  Food Adulteration  Act, 1954:  ss. 20(1) and  24(2)(e)/  Prevention  of  Food  Adulteration  (Punjab) Rules, 1958:  r. 3- Prosecution for an offence under the Act - Sub-delegation of power-Validity of.      Interpretation  of   Statutes-Use  of  negative  words- Whether makes the provision absolute.      Administrative Law      Statute-Rules framed  thereunder  -  sub-delegation  of power-Extent of.

HEADNOTE:      Section 20(1)  of the  Prevention of  Food Adulteration Act, 1954  dealing with  cognizance and  trial  of  offences provides that  no prosecution  for an offence under that Act shall be  instituted except  by, or with the written consent o’ he Central Government or the State Government or a person authorised in  this behalf,  by general or special order, by the Central  or State Government. Section 24(1) empowers the State Government  to frame  rules for  the purpose of giving effect to  the provisions  of the  Act, while  s. 24(2)  (e) states that such rules may provide for the delegation of the powers and  functions conferred  by this  Act on  the  State Government or  the Food (Health) Authority to subordinate or local authorities.      Rule 3  of the Prevention of Food Adulteration (Punjab) Rules, 1958  framed by  the State  Government empowered  the State Government  to delegate  its powers  to  appoint  Food Inspectors, to  authorise a person to institute prosecutions for  an   offence  under  the  Act  and  such  other  powers exercisable by  it under  the Act  as may be specified m the order of the Food (Health) Authority of the State. 962      In pursuance of the provisions of r. 3 of the Rules the State Government  issued a  Notification dated  October  10, 1968  purporting   to  delegate  its  powers  and  functions conferred by  s. 20(1)  of the Act to institute prosecutions for  an   offence  under  the  Act,  to  the  Food  (Health) Authority. In  terms of  that Notification the Food (Health) Authority issued  a Notification  dated  September  7,  1972 authorising  the   Food  Inspector,   Faridkot   to   launch

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prosecutions under s. 20(1) for an offence under the Act.      On February  1, 1985 the Food Inspector, Faridkot filed a complaint  against the  appellants for having committed an offence punishable  under s.  16(1) (a)  (ii) of the Act for alleged violation of rr. 24, 28, 29 and 32 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Rules, 1955.      During the  course of  the proceedings,  the appellants raised an  objection that  r. 3  of the  Prevention of  Food Adulteration (Punjab)  Rules, 1958 framed under s. 24(2) (e) read with  s. 20(1)  of the  Act was  ultra vires  the State Government. Alternatively it was urged that by virtue of the authority derived  under r.3  the  Food  (Health)  Authority alone had  the power to institute prosecution for an offence under the  Act and, therefore, he could not sub-delegate his powers to  launch the  prosecution to  the Food Inspector by the Notification  dated September  7, 1972. This preliminary objection was rejected by the Magistrate and he proceeded to frame charges  against the  appellants. They thereupon moved the High  Court  under  s.  482  of  the  Code  of  Criminal Procedure, 1973  for quashing  of the aforesaid order taking cognizance of  the offence  and consequent  framing  of  the charge, but the High Court dismissed the petition in limine.      On the  question whether  the Food  Inspector, Faridkot was competent  to lodge  a complaint  against the appellants under s.  20(1) of  the Act  by virtue  of the delegation of powers by  the Food  (Health) Authority,  Punjab  under  the Notification dated  September 7, 1972 issued by him under r. 3 of  the Prevention  of Food  Adulteration (Punjab)  Rules, 1958.      Allowing the appeal by special leave, the Court, ^      HELD 1. The notification dated September 7, 1972 issued by the  Food (Health)  Authority is  ultra  vires  the  Food (Health) Authority  insofar as  he purported to delegate his powers to  institute prosecutions  for an  offence under the Act under s. 20(1) to the Food Inspector, 963 Faridkot. The  latter was, therefore, not competent to lodge the complaint against the appellants. [972B-C]      2.1 Where  a power  is given to do a certain thing in a certain way  the thing  must be  done in  that way or not at all. Other  modes of  performance are necessarily forbidden. The intention of the Legislature in enacting s. 20(1) was to confer power on the authority specified therein, which power had  to   be  exercised  in  the  manner  provided  and  not otherwise. [970E-F]      2.2 The  use of the negative words in s. 20(1) that ’no prosecution for  an offence  under this  Act. .  . shall  be instituted except by, or with the written consent of plainly make  the  requirements  of  the  section  imperative.  They inhibit insufficient  of prosecutions  for an  offence under the Act except where it is done by the Central Government or the State  Government or  a person authorised in that behalf by the  Central Government or the State Government, or where the prosecution  is instituted  with the  written consent of any of  the four  specified  categories  of  authorities  or persons. If  either of  these two  conditions is  satisfied, there would  be sufficient  authority for the institution of such a  prosecution for  an offence  under the  Act.  [970C; 969G-H; 970A-B]      Craies on Statute Law, 6th edn., p. 263 referred to.      3. The  use of  the expression  ’in this  behalf’ in s. 20(1) shows that the delegation of such power by the Central Government or  the State  Government by  general or  special order must  be  for  a  specific  purpose,  to  authorise  a

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designated person  to institute  such prosecutions  on their behalf. The  terms of  the section  do not postulate further delegation of  powers by  the person authorised. He can only give his  consent in  writing when  he is  satisfied that  a prima facie  case exists  in the  facts of a particular case and  records   his  reasons   for  the   launching  of  such prosecution in public interest. [966E; 971A-B]      4.1. Rules  framed pursuant  to a  power conferred by a statute cannot proceed or go against the specific provisions of the  statute. The  maxim delegatus  non  potest  delegare merely  indicates  that  sub-delegation  of  powers  is  not normally allowable  but the  Legislature can  always provide for it.  The provision  contained in s. 24(2) (e) of the Act enables the  State Government to frame a rule for delegation of powers  and functions  under the  Act but it clearly does not envisage any sub-delegation. [971C,D] 964      4.2. Rule  3 of  the Prevention  of  Food  Adulteration (Punjab) Rules, 1958 must, therefore, he read subject to the provisions contained  in s.  20(l) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act,  1954. It cannot be construed to authorise sub-delegation of  powers by  the Food  (Health)  Authority, Punjab to the Food Inspector. So construed, it means that in the instant case, the Food (Health) Authority was the person authorised by the State Government to initiate prosecutions. [971G-H; 972A]      4.3 It  was open to the State Government to have issued a notification  under s.  20(1) conferring  authority on the Food Inspector  to launch  prosecutions for an offence under the Act,  as is  the practice  in  other  States.  The  Food Inspector having  been authorised  by the Director of Health Service and  not the  State Government,  he was not a person who had  been authorised  by any  general or  special  order issued by  the Central  Government or the State Governments. [969G-H]      State of  Bombay v. Parshottam Kanaiyalal, [1961] 1 SCR 458 &  The Corporation  of Calcutta  v. Md. Omer Ali & Anr., [1976] 4 SCC 527 referred to.

JUDGMENT:      CRIMINAL APPELLATE  JURISDICTION: Criminal  Appeal  No. 400 of 1986      From the  Judgment and  order dated  12.2.1986  of  the Punjab and  Haryana High  Court in Crl. Misc. Petn. No. 202- M/86.      Dr. Y.S.  Chitale, Ravinder Narain, D.N. Misra and P.K. Ram for the Appellants.      H.K. Puri and R.S. Sodhi for the Respondents.      The Judgment of the Court was delivered by      SEN, J.  This appeal  by special leave directed against the judgment  and order  of the  Punjab & Haryana High Court dated  February   12,  1986   raises  a   question  of  some importance. The  question is  whether  the  Food  Inspector, Faridkot was  competent to  lodge a  complaint  against  the appellants under  s. 20(1)  of the  Act for commission of an offence punishable under s. 16(1) (a) (ii) of the Prevention of Food  Adulteration Act,  1954 (for  short ’the  Act’)  by virtue of  the delegation  of powers  by the  Food  (Health) Authority, Punjab under notification dated September 7, 1972 purported to  have been  issued by  him under  r. 3  of  the Prevention of Food Adulteration (Punjab) Rules, 1958. 965      Put  very  shortly,  the  essential  facts  are  these.

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Appellant No.  2, Messrs  Food  Specialities  Limited  is  a company incorporated  under the  Companies Act, 1956 engaged in the  business of  manufacturing and selling various well- known articles  of food including New Maggi 2 minute noodles with sweet  sour taste-maker  while appellant No. 1 A.K. Roy is the  Manager,  Quality  Controller  of  the  Company.  On December 14,  1984 at  about 3.30  p.m. the  Food Inspector, Faridkot purchased  a sample  of New  Maggi Noodles from the shop of  a general  merchant for  purposes of  analysis  The Public Analyst  by his  report dated January 17, 1985 opined that the  said article of food contains carmosine and sunset yellow acid  coal tar dye instead of caramel as described on the label  and was  therefore both  adulterated as  well  as misbranded. He  further opined that the label of the article of food  did not  comply with the requirements of rr. 24 and 32 of  the  Prevention  of  Food  Adulteration  Rules,  1955 regarding the  addition of  extraneous colouring  matter. On February 1,  1985  the  Food  Inspector,  Faridkot  filed  a complaint against  the  general  merchant  as  well  as  the appellants for  having committed an offence punishable under s. 16(1)  (a) (ii)  of the  Act for alleged violation of rr. 24, 28,  29 and  32 of  the Prevention  of Food Adulteration Rules, 1955  by virtue  of the  delegation of  powers by the Food (Health) Authority under notification dated October 10, 1968 purported  to have been issued by him under r. 3 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration (Punjab) Rules, 1958.      During the  course of  the proceedings,  the appellants raised an objection inter alia that r. 3 of the Rules framed by the  State Government  in purported  exercise  of  powers under s.  24(2) read  with s.  20(1) of  the Act,  was ultra vires the  State Government  and alternatively  by virtue of the authority derived under r. 3 of the said Rules, the Food (Health)  Authority   alone  had   the  power   to  initiate prosecutions for  an offence  under the Act and therefore he could not  legally by the impugned notification sub-delegate his powers to launch the prosecutions to the Food Inspector. The learned  Sub-Divisional Judicial Magistrate by his order dated December  4, 1985  rejected the  preliminary objection raised as  to the  power of the Food Inspector to launch the prosecution under s. 20(1) read with s. 9 of the Act, on the ground that the State Government having delegated its powers to the  Food (Health)  Authority by  framing  r.3  under  s. 24(2)(e)  of  the  Act,  the  Food  (Health)  Authority  was competent to  issue the  impugned notification and therefore the complaint was validly lodged. The learned Sub-Divisional Judicial  Magistrate  further  proceeded  to  frame  charges against the  appellants  for  having  committed  an  offence punishable 966 under  s.  16(1)  (a)  (ii)  of  the  Act.  Thereafter,  the appellants moved  the High Court by petition under s. 482 of the Code  of  Criminal  Procedure,  1973  for  quashing  the impugned order passed by the learned Sub-Divisional Judicial Magistrate  taking   cognizance  of   the  offence  and  the consequent framing  of the charge by him. High Court did not go into the question and dismissed the petition in limine,      It is  argued on  behalf of  the appellants  that as  a matter of construction the first part of s. 20(1) of the Act makes it clear that a prosecution for offences under the Act not being an offence under s. 14   or   s.   14A,   can   be instituted only by one of the following authorities, namely: (i) the  Central Government or the State Government, or (ii) with the  written consent  of the  Central Government or the State Government,  or (iii)  a  person  authorised  in  this behalf  by  a  general  or  special  order  by  the  Central

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Government or the State Government, or (iv) with the written consent of  a person  so authorised.  It is  urged that  the opening words  of s.  20(1) ’No  prosecution for  an offence under this Act ... shall be instituted except by’ being of a negative character,  the requirements  of  the  section  are imperative and  that a discretionary power must, in general, by  exercised   by  the  authority  to  which  it  has  been committed. Emphasis  is placed on the words ’in this behalf’ in the  - second  part of  s.  20(1)  of  the  Act  for  the submission  that  the  delegation  of  powers  to  launch  a prosecution  by   the  Central   Government  or   the  State Government, by  general or  special order,  must  be  for  a specific purpose  in  that  behalf  viz.  to  authorise  the institution  of   prosecutions  under   the  Act.   It   was accordingly submitted  that r. 3 of the Punjab Rules enables the Food  (Health) Authority  to sub-delegate  his power ’to authorise the  launching of  a prosecution  for  an  offence under the  Act’ to  the Food  Inspector, was ultra vires the State Government  and could not be sustained on the terms of s. 24(2)  (e) i.e. the general power of the State Government under s. 24(2) (e) of delegation of its powers and functions under the Act.      In reply,  the  learned  counsel  for  the  respondents contends that  r.3 is  in the  nature of  a general order in terms of  s. 20(1)  of  the  Act  and  therefore  the  State Government has  not only  delegated its  powers ’to launch a prosecution for  an offence under the Act’ under s. 20(1) to the Food  (Health) Authority  i.e. the  Director  of  Health Services, Punjab  but also under the said rule provision has been  made  for  further  sub-delegation  of  his  power  to authorise the  launching of  prosecutions under s . 20(1) to the Food Inspectors.      In order  to appreciate the contentions it is necessary to refer to 967 the relevant  provisions. Sub-s.  (1) of  s. 20  of the  Act which is material for our purposes, provides as follows:           "20(1).  Cognizance   and  trial   of  offences-No           prosecution for  an offence  under this  Act,  not           being an  offence under  section 14 or section 14A           shall be instituted except by, or with the written           consent of  the Central  Government or  the  State           Government or  a person authorised in this behalf,           by  general  or  special  order,  by  the  Central           Government or the State Government." Sub-s. (1) of s. 24 of the Act empowers the State Government to frame  rules after  consultation with  the Committee  and subject to  the condition  of previous  publication, for the purpose of  giving effect  to the  provisions of the Act not falling within  the purview  of s.  23. Sub-s.  (2)  thereof provides that  in particular  and without  prejudice to  the generality of  the foregoing power, the State Government may make  rules   for  the  purpose  of  giving  effect  to  the provisions of  the Act  in matters  not falling  within  the purview of s. 23. S. 24(2) (e) of the Act provides:           "24(2). In  particular, and  without prejudice  to           the generality  of the foregoing power, such rules           may-                (e) provide  for the delegation of the powers                and functions  conferred by  this Act  on the                State  Government   or  the   Food   (Health)                Authority to  subordinate authorities  or  to                local authorities. " In exercise of the powers under s. 24(2) (e) of the Act, the Punjab Government framed the Prevention of Food Adulteration

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(Punjab) Rules, 1958. R. 3 of the Rules reads as under:           "Rule 3-Power of Food (Health) Authority-The State           Government may,  by an  order in  writing delegate           its  powers   to  appoint   Food  Inspectors,   to           authorise a  person to  institute prosecutions for           an offence  under the  Act and  such other  powers           exercisable  by   it  under  the  Act  as  may  be           specified  in  the  order  of  the  Food  (Health)           Authority of the State of Punjab"      In accordance  with r. 3, the State Government issued a notification dated  October 10,  1968 purporting to delegate its powers  and functions  conferred by  s. 20(1) of the Act viz. to initiate prosecutions 968 for  an   offence  under  the  Act,  to  the  Food  (Health) Authority, to the effect:           "In pursuance  of the  provisions of rule 3 of the           Prevention of  Food Adulteration  (Punjab)  Rules,           1958,  the   President  of  India  is  pleased  to           delegate to the Food (Health) Authority its powers           of  appointment   of  Food  Inspectors  -  and  to           authorise  institution   of  prosecution   for  an           offence under  the Prevention of Food Adulteration           Act, 1954. " In terms  of the  aforesaid notification,  the Food (Health) Authority issued  a notification  dated  September  7,  1972 authorising  the   Food  Inspector,   Faridkot   to   launch prosecution under  s. 20(1) for an offence under the Act, in these terms:           "No. IV-I-Pb-72/7518- 2(i)                In  exercise   of  the  powers  conferred  by           Section 9  of the  Prevention of Food Adulteration           Act, 1954 (Act No. 37 of 1954) read with Rule 8 of           the Prevention of Food Adulteration Rules 1955 and           the  powers   delegated  vide   Punjab  Government           Notification  No.  5575-HB/L-68/29659  dated  10th           October,  1968,   Shri  Jagrup   Singh  is  hereby           appointed as Government Food Inspector for all the           local areas in the District, in which the official           is posted as Government Food Inspector.                In exercise of powers conferred by Section 20           of the  Prevention of  Food Adulteration Act, 1954           (Act No.  37 of  1954) read with Punjab Government           Notification No.5575  2HBI 1/68/29659  dated  10th           October,  1968   the  Director,  Health  Services,           Punjab also  authorises the  above mentioned  Food           Inspector to  institute  prosecution  against  the           persons committing  offences under  the  said  Act           within the limits of local areas."      In this  appeal, two  main questions arise, namely: (i) Whether r. 3 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration (Punjab) Rules, 1958  framed under  s. 24(2)  (e) of  the  Act  being contrary to the legislative mandate contained in s. 20(1) of the Act,  was ultra vires the State Government and therefore the impugned  notification issued  by the  State  Government dated October  10, 1968  purporting to  delegate its  powers under s.  20(1) to  the  Food  (Health)  Authority  viz.  to authorise the institution 969 of prosecutions  for an offence under the Act, was liable to be  struck   down.  Consequently,   whether   the   impugned notification dated  September 7,  1972 issued  by  the  Food (Health) Authority  authorising the Food Inspector, Faridkot to institute  such prosecutions  was illegal, bad in law and void ab initio. (ii) Even if r. 3 of the said Rules could be

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regarded as  a general  order issued by the State Government in terms  r of  s. 20(1)  of the  Act authorising  the  Food (Health) Authority  to launch  prosecutions for  an  offence under the Act by the framing of a rule under s. 24(2) (e) of the Act, whether the Food (Health) Authority by the impugned notification dated  September 7,  1972 could,  in his  turn, sub-delegate his powers to the Food Inspector, Faridkot. The ultimate question  is whether  the terms  of s. 20(1) of the Act do  not  postulate  further  delegation  by  the  person authorised to  institute prosecutions  for an  offence under the Act;  he can  only give  his  written  consent  to  such prosecution.      It is common ground that the prosecution in the instant case has  not been  launched either  by or  with the written consent of  the Central  Government or the State Government. It therefore becomes necessary to ascertain whether the Food Inspector,  Faridkot   was  duly   authorised  to  launch  a prosecution. The Food Inspector had been conferred powers of the State  Government under  s. 20(l)  of the  Act  viz.  to initiate prosecutions  for an  offence under the Act, by the Food  (Health)   Authority  i.e.   the  Director  of  Health Services. A  mere perusal of the impugned notification dated September 7,1972  makes it manifest that it was the Director of Health  Services and  not the  State Government  who  had authorised the  Food Inspector to launch prosecutions for an offence under  the Act.  It is therefore clear that the Food Inspector is  not a  person who  has been  authorised by any general or special order issued by the Central Government or the State Government. There would be no problem if the State Government were  to issue  a notification  under s. 20(l) of the Act conferring authority on the Food Inspector, Faridkot under s.  20(l) to  launch prosecutions for an offence under the Act as is the practice in the other States.      A careful  analysis of  the language of s. 20(l) of the Act  clearly   shows  that   it  inhibits   institution   of prosecutions  for   an  offence  under  the  Act  except  on fulfillment of  one or  the other  or  the  two  conditions. Either the  prosecutions must  be instituted  by the Central Government or the State Government or a person authorised in that  behalf   by  the   Central  Government  or  the  State Government, or the prosecutions 970 should be  instituted with the written consent of any of the four specified  categories of  authorities  or  persons.  If either of  these two conditions is satisfied, there would be sufficient  authority   for  the   institution  of   such  a prosecution for  an offence  under the  Act.  The  provision contained in  s. 20(1)  of the  Act does not contemplate the institution of  a prosecution by any person other than those designated. The  terms of  s. 20 (1) do not envisage further delegation of  powers by  the person authorised, except that such prosecution  may be instituted with the written consent of the  Central Government  or the  State Government  or the person authorised. The use of the negative words in s. 20(1) "No prosecution  for an  offence under  this Act .. shall be instituted except by or with the written consent of" plainly make  the  requirements  of  the  section  imperative.  That conclusion of  ours must  necessarily follow  from the well- known rule of construction of inference to be drawn from the negative language  used in  a statute  stated by  Craies  on Statute Law, 6th edn., p. 263 in his own terse language:           "If the  requirements of a statute which prescribe           the manner  in which  something is  to be done are           expressed in negative language, that is to say, if           the statute enacts that it shall be done in such a

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         manner and  in no  other manner,  it has been laid           down that  those requirements  are  in  all  cases           absolute, and  that neglect to attend to them will           invalidate the whole proceeding." Where a  power is  given to  do a certain thing in a certain way, the thing must be done in that way or not at all. Other modes  of   performance  are   necessarily  forbidden.   The intention of  the Legislature  in enacting  s. 20(1)  was to confer a  power on  the authorities  specified therein which power had  to be  exercised in  the manner  provided and not otherwise.      The first  part of  s. 20(1)  of the  Act lays down the manner of  launching prosecutions  for an  offence under the Act, not  being an offence under s. 14 or s. 14A. The second part provides  for  delegation  of  powers  by  the  Central Government  or   the  State   Government.  It  enables  that prosecutions for  an offence  under  the  Act  can  also  be instituted  with   the  written   consent  of   the  Central Government or the State Government or by a person authorised in that  behalf, by a general or special order issued by the Central Government or the State 3 Government. The use of the words ’in this behalf’ in s. 20(1) of the Act shows that the delegation of such power by the Central Government or 971 the State Government by general or special order must be for a specific  purpose, to  authorise a  designated  person  to institute such prosecutions on their behalf. The terms of s. 20( 1) of the Act do not postulate further delegation by the person so  authorised; he  can  only  give  his  consent  in writing when  he is satisfied that a prima facie case exists in the  facts of  a particular  case and records his reasons for  the   launching  of  such  prosecution  in  the  public interest.      In the  case of statutory powers the important question is whether on a true construction of the Act, it is intended that a  power conferred  upon A  may  be  exercised  on  A’s authority by  B. The  maxim delegatus  non  potest  delegare merely indicates that this is not normally allowable but the Legislature can always provide for sub-delegation of powers. The provision  contained in  ss. 24(2) (e) enables the State Government to  frame a  rule for  delegation of  powers  and functions under the Act but it clearly does not envisage any sub-delegation. That apart, a rule framed under s. 24(2) (e) can only  provide for  delegation  of  minor  administrative functions e.g. appointment of Food Inspectors, Food (Health) Authority etc.  In the case of important executive functions like the  one contained  in s. 20(1) of the Act to authorise launching of prosecutions for an offence under the Act which is in  the nature of a safeguard, the Courts may be disposed to construe  general  powers  of  delegation  restrictively. Keeping in  view the  language of  s. 20(1) and 24(2) (e) of the Act,  r. 3  of the  Punjab Rules  can be treated to be a general order  issued by  the State  Government to authorise the Food  (Health) Authority  i.e. the  Director  of  Health Services to  institute prosecutions for an offence under the Act. Unfortunately,  the draftsmen  of r.  3  more  or  less employed the  language of  s. 20(1) of the Act. If r. 3 were to be  literally interpreted,  the words  "to authorise  the launching of  prosecutions" may lead to the consequence that the Food (Health) Authority who had been delegated the power of the  State Government under s. 20(1) of the Act could, in his turn,  sub-delegate his  powers to  the Food  Inspector. Such a  consequence is not envisaged by s. 20(1) of the Act. It is  well-settled that  rules framed  pursuant to  a power conferred by  a statute  cannot proceed  or go  against  the

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specific provisions of the statute. It must therefore follow as a logical consequence that r. 3 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration (Punjab)  Rules, 1958  must be  read subject to the provisions  contained in  s. 20(1)  of the Prevention of Food Adulteration  Act, 1954  and  cannot  be  construed  to authorise sub-delegation  of powers  by  the  Food  (Health) Authority, Punjab  to the  Food Inspector,  Faridkot. If  so construed, as  it must, it would mean that the Food (Health) Authority was the 972 person  authorised  by  the  State  Government  to  initiate prosecutions. It  was also permissible for the Food (Health) Authority being  the person authorised under s. 20(1) of the Act to  give his written consent for the institution of such prosecutions by the Food Inspector, Faridkot as laid down by this Court  in State  of Bombay  v.  Parshottam  Kanaiyalal, [1961] 1 SCR 458 and The Corporation of Calcutta v. Md. Omer Ali & Anr., [1976] 4 SCC 527.      In  the   premises,  the  impugned  notification  dated September 7, 1972 issued by the Food (Health) Authority must be declared  as ultra  vires  the  Food  (Health)  Authority insofar as the purported to delegate his powers to institute prosecutions for  an offence under the Act under s. 20(1) to the Food  Inspector, Faridkot.  It must  accordingly  follow that the Food Inspector, Faridkot was not competent to lodge the complaint against the appellants for having committed an offence punishable under s. 16(1) (a) (ii) read with s. 9 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954.      In the  result, the appeal must succeed and is allowed. The judgment  and order passed by the High Court and that of the Sub Divisional Judicial Magistrate, Moga are set aside. P.S.S.                                       Appeal allowed. 973