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PETITIONER: A.K. KAUL & ANR

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: UNION OF INDIA & ANR

DATE OF JUDGMENT19/04/1995

BENCH: AGRAWAL, S.C. (J) BENCH: AGRAWAL, S.C. (J) FAIZAN UDDIN (J)

CITATION:  1995 AIR 1403            1995 SCC  (4)  73  JT 1995 (4)     1        1995 SCALE  (2)755

ACT:

HEADNOTE:

JUDGMENT: S.C. AGRAWAL, J.: 1.   Leave granted. 2.   The   appellants  were  employed  as   Deputy   Central Intelligence  Officers  in the Intelligence  Bureau  in  the Ministry  of  Home Affairs of the Government of  India.   On July  23,  1979, the employees of  the  Intelligence  Bureau formed  an  Association  called  "the  Intelligence   Bureau employees Association" (IBEA) for the purpose of ventilating their grievances.  Appellants, A.K.Kaul and Verghese Joseph, were  elected  as  the  General  Secretaries  of  IBEA   and appellant, B.B. Raval, was elected as the President.  On May 3,  1980,  the  Joint Director of  the  Intelligence  Bureau issued,  a Circular Memorandum declaring that the  formation of the IBEA was in violation of the Civil Services (Conduct) Rules and that those who take part in the activities of  the IBEA  will  attract  disciplinary  action.   Writ  petitions (Civil) Nos.  1117-1119 were filed in this Court challenging the said circular.  This Court, on July 21, 1980, issued  an order for issue of rule nisi on the said writ petitions  and also  passed  an  interim order directing  that  during  the pendency of the 7 writ petitions in this Court no disciplinary action shall be taken  against any member of the IBEA for reasons  mentioned in  the circular.  On December 26, 1980, orders were  passed dismissing  the  appellants from service.   One  such  order regarding  the dismissal of appellant, A.K. Kaul, is in  the following terms :               "Shri A.K. Kaul,                Deputy    Central    Intelligence    Officer,               Intelligence Bureau,               New Delhi.                Whereas  the  President  is  satisfied  under               sub-clause (c) of the proviso to clause(2)   of               Article  311 of the Constitution that  in  the

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             interest  of the security of the State  it  is               not  expedient to hold an inquiry in the  case               of Shri A. K. Kaul.               And whereas the President is satisfied that on               the  basis of the information  available,  the               activities  of Shri A.K. Kaul are such  as  to               warrant his dismissal from service.               Accordingly,  the President  hereby  dismisses               Shri  A.K.  Kaul from service  with  immediate               effect.               (By order and in the name of President                                    Sd/-                          (R. Mahadevan)                          Under Secretary to the Govt. of                          India Ministry of Home Affairs." 3.  The orders for dismissal of appellants, Verghese  Joseph and B.B. Raval are in the same terms.  The appellants  filed separate  writ petitions (Nos. 205-207/81 1) in  this  Court under  Article 32 of the Constitution to challenge the  said orders of dismissal.  After the constitution of the  Central Administrative  Tribunal under the Administrative  Tribunals Act,  1985, (hereinafter referred to as ’the Tribunal’)  the said  writ  petitions were transferred to the  Tribunal  for adjudication and they were registered as T.A. Nos. 1,2 and 3 of 1992. 4.   Before  the  Tribunal  the case  put  for-ward  by  the appellants  was  that they have been picked and  chosen  for punitive  action for dismissal from service for  the  reason that  they were important members of the IBEA, being  office bearers  as General Secretaries and the President, and  that the  real  motive  to pass the orders of  dismissal  was  to penalise  them  for  the  active  part  they  had  taken  in ventilating  the  grievances of the  employees  through  the IBEA.   The  appellants  also  pleaded  that  they  had   an excellent record of service and that they had not  conducted themselves in such manner as to warrant their dismissal from service.   It  was submitted that they  were  recipients  of commendation  certificates,  appreciation letters  and  cash awards  from  time  to  time.  It was  also  stated  in  the applications  that  they  had  not  acted  contrary  to  the interest  of  national  security  at  any  time.   The  said applications  were contested by the respondents who  pleaded that  the  orders  of  dismissal  had  been  passed  by  the President  on being satisfied on the basis of  the  material available that the activities of the appellants were such as to  warrant their dismissal from service by dispensing  with the  requirements of Article 311(2) of the  Constitution  in the interest of security of the State.  It was also  pleaded on  behalf  of  the  respondents that  the  details  of  the material  on  the basis of which the satisfaction  had  been reached  cannot  be disclosed without  detriment  to  public interest.   It  was  denied  that  the  authorities  of  the Intelligence Bureau have a hostile attitude towards IBEA and it was stated that punitive action was taken on merits of 8 each  case  and  not because of  the  participation  of  the appellants  in  the  activities of  the  IBEA.   During  the pendency  of the applications before the.  Tribunal the  ap- pellants  moved Misc.  Petitions Nos. 1897/ 92 in T.A.  Nos. 1  and 2/92 and Miscellaneous Petition No. 732/92  in  T.A.- No.   3/92  whereby  they  prayed  for  directions  to   the respondents  to  produce the records specified in  the  said applications  for inspection of the Tribunal and/or  by  the appellants  and their counsel.  The said  applications  were opposed  by the respondents who claimed  privilege  invoking

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Article  74(2) of the Constitution and Sections 123 and  124 of  the Evidence Act and for that purpose affidavit  of  Mr. Madhav  Godbole, Secretary to the Government of India,  Min- istry   of  Home  Affairs,  New  Delhi  (the  Head  of   the Department)   was  filed  before  the   Tribunal.    Without prejudice  to the said claim of privilege,  the  respondents had,  however, stated that they had no objection  whatsoever to  the  said  documents relating to the  dismissal  of  the appellants  and those portions of documents that  relate  to the said dismissal orders being produced for perusal of  the Tribunal in order to satisfy it that the claim of  privilege against disclosure of the said official records is bona fide and genuine. 5.   By judgment dated December 18, 1993 the Tribunal, after perusing  the  records that were placed for perusal  of  the Tribunal,  upheld the claim of privilege and dismissed  ,the applications  filed  by the appellants  for  inspection  and production  of  the  documents.  On the basis  of  the  said records  the  Tribunal has further found that  the  material considered by the President relate to the activities of  the appellants which would prejudicially affect the security  of the  State  and  that  the  materials  relied  upon  or  the satisfaction  of the President have nothing to do  with  the appellants’  activities  in  relation  to  the  IBEA.    The Tribunal has held that there is no substance in the case  of the  appellants  that the orders of the dismissal  were  not bona  fide  and  they  have been  passed  to  victimise  the appellants for promoting and participating in the activities of  the  IBEA.   The  Tribunal was  of  the  view  that  the satisfaction  had been arrived at after application of  mind to the relevant materials without taking into  consideration irrelevant factors and that the impugned orders of dismissal from  service  dated December 26, 1980 arc  not  liable  for interference.    The  Tribunal,  therefore,  dismissed   the applications of the appellants.  Hence these appeals. 6.On  behalf  of the appellants it has been urged  that  the exercise of power under clause (c) of the second proviso  to Article  3 11(2) of the Constitution is subject to  judicial review and that an order passed under the said provisions is open  to challenge before the courts on the ground that  the satisfaction of the President or the Governor is vitiated by malafides  or  is  based on  considerations  which  have  no relevance to the interest of the security of the State.   In this connection, Shri Sorabjee has submitted that in a  case where  the  employee assails the action  taken  against  him under Article 311(2)(c) it is obligatory on the part of  the concerned Government to place before the court the  relevant material on the basis of which the action was taken and such material can only be withheld from the court in cases  where the  claim of privilege is found to be justified  under  the provisions  of  Sections 123 and 124 of  the  Evidence  Act. Shri  Sorabjee  has urged that the said claim  of  privilege does not extend to the disclosure of the nature of 9 the   activities   on  the  basis  of  which   the   alleged satisfaction has been arrived at and the privilege can  only relate to the material which has been relied upon in support of the said activities. 7.   The learned Additional Solicitor General, appearing for the respondents, has, however, submitted that an order under clause  (c)  of  second proviso to  Article  311(2)  of  the Constitution  is  to  be  passed by  the  President  or  the Governor  on the basis of his subjective satisfaction.   The material  which  forms the basis for arriving  at  the  said satisfaction is not required to be disclosed both in view of

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Article  74(2) as well as under Sections 123 and 124 of  the Evidence Act.  The learned Additional Solicitor General has, in this context, pointed out that while under clause (b)  of the second proviso to Article 311(2) the competent authority is  required to record in writing the reason for its  satis- faction  that  it is not reasonably practicable to  hold  an inquiry,  there  is no such requirement  for  recording  the reason in clause (c) and, therefore, there is no requirement to disclose the reasons for arriving at the satisfaction for taking action under clause (c) of second proviso to  Article 311(2). 8.   Article   311(2),  as  amended  by   the   Constitution (Fifteenth Amendment) Act, 1963, provides as follows :               "(2)  No  such  persons  aforesaid  shall   be               dismissed or removed or reduced in rank except               after an inquiry in which he has been informed               of  the  charges  against  him  and  given   a               reasonable  opportunity  of  being  heard   in               respect of those charges :               Provided that where it is proposed after  such               inquiry  to impose upon him any such  penalty,               such  penalty may be imposed on the  basis  of               the  evidence adduced during such inquiry  and               it shall not be necessary to give such  person               any  opportunity of making  representation  on               the penalty proposed               Provided  further that this clause  shall  not               apply -               (a)   where  a person is dismissed or  removed               or  reduced in rank on the ground  of  conduct               which has led to his conviction on a  criminal               charge; or               (b)   when the authority empowered to  dismiss               or remove a person or to reduce him in rank is               satisfied that for some reason, to be recorded               by that authority in writing it is not practi-               cable to hold such inquiry; or               (c)   where the President or Governor, as  the               case may be, is satisfied that in the interest               of  the  security  of  the  State  it  is  not               expedient to hold such inquiry.  " 9.   The  provision  of  the  second  proviso  came  up  for consideration before the Constitution Bench of this Court in Union  of India & Anr. v. Tulsiram Patel & Ors., 1985  Supp. (2)  SCR  13 1, Madon, J., speaking for  the  majority,  has observed  that clause (2) of Article 311 gives  a  constitu- tional mandate to the principles of natural justice and audi alteram pattern rule by providing that a person employed  in a  civil  capacity under the Union or a State shall  not  be dismissed  or removed from service or reduced in rank  until after  an  inquiry  in which he has  been  informed  of  the charges  against  him  and  has  been  given  a   reasonable opportunity  of being heard in respect of those charges  and that this safeguard provided for a government, servant by 10 clause  (2) of Article 311(2) is, however, taken  away  when the second proviso to that clause becomes applicable.  (Page 202).   The  Court has also pointed out that  the  paramount thing to bear in mind is that the second proviso will  apply only where the conduct of a government servant is such as he deserves  the punishment of dismissal, removal or  reduction in  rank  and that before denying a government  servant  his constitutional right to an inquiry, the first  consideration would  be  whether the conduct of the  concerned  government servant  is  such  as justifies the  penalty  of  dismissal,

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removal  or  reduction in rank and once that  conclusion  is reached  and the condition specified in the relevant  clause of  the  second proviso is satisfied, that  proviso  becomes applicable and the government servant is not entitled to  an inquiry. (Pages 204-205).  While dealing with clause (c)  of the second proviso to Article 311(2) it has been stated :               "The  question under clause (c),  however,  is               not whether the security of the State has been               affected  or not, for the expression  used  in               clause (c) is "in the interest of the security               of  the State".  The interest of the  security               of the state may be affected by actual acts or               even the likelihood of such acts taking place.               Further, what is required under clause (c)  is               not  the satisfaction of the President or  the               Governor,  as  the  case  may  be,  that   the               interest  of the security of the State  is  or               will be affected but his satisfaction that  in               the interest of the security of the State,  it               is  not  expedient  to  hold  an  inquiry   as               contemplated  by  Article  311(2).   The  sat-               isfaction  of the President or Governor  must,               therefore,  be with respect to the  expediency               or  inexpediency of holding an inquiry in  the               interest of the security of the State.  "  (p.               277)               "The satisfaction so reached by the  President               or   the  Governor  must  necessarily   be   a               subjective satisfaction.  Expediency  involves               matters   of  policy.   Satisfaction  may   be               arrived  at as a result of secret  information               received  by the Government about the  brewing               danger to the interest or the security of  the               State  and like matters.  There may  be  other               factors   which   may  be   required   to   be               considered,  weighed and balanced in order  to               reach   the  requisite  satisfaction   whether               holding an inquiry would be expedient or  not.                             If the requisite satisfaction has been reached               as a result of secret information received  by               the Government, making, known such information               may  very  often result in disclosure  of  the               source  of such information.  Once known,  the               particular  source from which the  information               was received would no more be available to the               Government.  The reasons for the  satisfaction               reached by the President or the Governor under               clause  (c) cannot, therefore, be required  to               be recorded in the order of dismissal, removal               or  reduction  in rank nor can  they  be  made               public." (p. 278) 10.The  learned Judge did not consider it necessary to  deal with the contention that the power of judicial review is not excluded  where  the satisfaction of the  President  or  the Governor  has been reached mala fide or is based  on  wholly extraneous or irrelevant grounds and that in such a case, in law  there would be no satisfaction of the President or  the Governor  at  all for the reason that in the  matters  under consideration before this court all the materials, including the  advice tendered by the Council of Ministers,  had  been produced  and they clearly showed that the  satisfaction  of the  Governor was neither reached malafide nor was it  based on any extraneous or irrelevant ground. (Page 279).  In  the light  of  the  provisions contained in  Article  74(2)  and Article 163(3) it was submitted before

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11 the  Court  that  leaving  aside the  advice  given  by  the Ministers  to the President or the Governor, the  Government is  bound to disclose at least the materials upon which  the advice  of Council of Ministers was based so that the  court can examine whether the satisfaction of the President or the Governor, as the case may be, was arrived at mala fide or is based  on  wholly extraneous or irrelevant grounds  so  that such satisfaction would in law amount to no satisfaction  at all and that if the Government does not voluntarily disclose such  materials it can be compelled by the Court to  do  so. Dealing with the said submission it was observed :               "Whether  this  should be done  or  not  would               depend upon whether the documents in  question               fall within the class of privileged  documents               and  whether in respect of them privilege  has               been   properly   claimed  or  not.    It   is               unnecessary  to  examine  this  question   any               further because in the cases under clause  (c)               before  us  though  at  first  privilege   was               claimed,  at the hearing privilege was  waived               and the materials as also the advice given  by               the  Ministers  to  the  Governor  of   Madhya               Pradesh who has passed the impugned orders  in               those cases were disclosed." (p. 280) 11.It  would  thus  appear that in  Tulsiram  Patel  (supra) though   the  question  whether  the  satisfaction  of   the President  or the Governor under Article 311(2) is  amenable to  judicial  review and the Government can be  required  to disclose the materials upon which the advice of the  Council of Ministers was based so as to enable the court to exercise the power of judicial review has been left open, the  Court, after considering the said material, has recorded the  find- ing  that  the  satisfaction of  the  Governor  was  neither recorded  malafide  nor was it based on  any  extraneous  or irrelevant ground. 12.It is, therefore, necessary to deal with this question in the instant case., We may, in this context, point out that a distinction  has  to  be made between  judicial  review  and justiciability  of  a  particular  action.   In  a   written constitution  the  powers  of  the  various  organs  of  the State,are  limited  by the provisions of  the  Constitution. The  extent  of those limitations on the powers  has  to  be determined  on an interpretation of the relevant  provisions of  the  Constitution.  Since the task of  interpreting  the provisions   of  the  Constitution  is  entrusted   to   the Judiciary, it is vested with the power to test the  validity of  an  action  of every  authority  functioning  under  the Constitution on the touch stone of the constitution in order to ensure that the authority exercising the power  conferred by  the  constitution does not  transgress  the  limitations placed by the Constitutions on exercise of that power.  This power  of  judicial  review is,  therefore,  implicit  in  a written  constitution  and unless expressly  excluded  by  a provision of the Constitution, the power of judicial  review is  available in respect of exercise of powers under any  of the provisions of the Constitution.  Justiciability  relates to  a  particular field falling within the  purview  of  the power of judicial review.  On account of want of  judicially manageable  standards,  there may be matters which  are  not susceptible to the judicial process.  In other words, during the  course of exercise of the power of judicial  review  it may be found that there are certain aspects of the  exercise of that power which are not susceptible to judicial  process on  account of want of judicially manageable  standards  and

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are, therefore, not justiciable. 13.  In the Slate of Rajasthan & Ors. v. 12 Union  of  India  Etc.  Etc., (1978) 1 SCR  1,  one  of  the questions failing for consideration was whether satisfaction of  the President in the matter of exercise of the power  to make  a Proclamation conferred under Article 356(1)  of  the Constitution  is  amenable  to  judicial  review.   At   the relevant  time  when the impugned  Proclamations  were  made there was an express provision in clause (5) of Article  356 which  prescribed  that "the satisfaction of  the  President mentioned  in clause (1) shall be final and  conclusive  and shall  not  be questioned in any Court on  any  ground."  In spite of such an express provision P.N. Bhagwati J. (as  the learned  Chief  Justice then was) speaking for  himself  and A.C.  Gupta J., has held that "if the satisfaction  is  mala fides  or  is  based  on  wholly  extraneous  or  irrelevant grounds,  the Court would have the jurisdiction  to  examine it,  because in that case there would be no satisfaction  of the  President in regard to the matter which he is  required to  be satisfied." (p.82). Other learned Judges,  with  some variance, have adopted a similar approach.  Beg CJ. has held that  if it is revealed "that a constitutionally or  legally prohibited or extraneous or collateral purpose is sought  to be  achieved  by  a proclamation under Article  356  of  the Constitution,  this Court will not shirk its duty to act  in the  manner  in which the law may then oblige  it  to  act." (p.46).  Chandrachud J. (as the learned Chief  Justice  then was) has observed that if reasons given are wholly  extrane- ous  to the formation of the satisfaction, the  Proclamation would  be  open to the attack that it is vitiated  by  legal mala  fides."  (p.60). Goswami J. has held  that  the  Court "would  not refuse to consider when there may be  sufficient materials  to establish that the Proclamation under  Article 356(1)  is tainted with mala fides."(p.92).Untwalia  J.  has said  that the Court is not powerless to interfere  with  an order  that  is ultra vires, wholly illegal or  passed  mala fide.  (p. 95).  Fazal Ali J. has held that "on the  reasons given by the President in his order if the Courts find  that they  are absolutely extraneous and irrelevant and based  on personal  and  illegal  considerations the  Courts  are  not powerless  to  strike down the order on the ground  of  mala fide if proved." (p. 120). 14.  Clause   (5)  of  Article  356  was  deleted   by   the Constitution  (Forty Fourth Amendment) Act, 1978.   In  S.R. Bommai (supra) Sawant J. after noticing the observations  in A.K.  Roy v. Union of India 1982 (2) SCR 272,  has  observed that after deletion of clause (5) the judicial review of the Proclamation issued under Article 356 has become wider  than indicated  in  the State of Rajasthan  (supra).   Similarly, Jeevan  Reddy J. has said : "Surely the deletion  of  clause (5)  has  not  restricted  the  scope  of  judicial  review. Indeed,  it  has removed the cloud cast on the  said  power. The  Court should, if anything, be more inclined to  examine the   constitutionality  of  the  Proclamation  after   such deletion." (p. 255) 15.  In  S.R. Bommai (supra) differing views were  expressed by  the  learned  Judges  on the scope  and  extent  of  the judicial  review and justiciability of the action  taken  by the  President in exercise of power conferred under  Article 356(1).   Sawant J., speaking for himself and  Kuldip  Singh J., had held that material on the basis of which the  advice is given by the Council of Ministers and the President forms his  satisfaction has to be scrutinised by Court within  the acknowledged   parameters   of   judicial   review,    viz.,

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illegality,   irrationality  and  mala  fides.   (p.   112). Referring to the ex- 13 pression  "if  the President .... is satisfied"  in  Article 356(1) the learned Judge has said :               "Hence, it is not the personal whim wish, view               or opinion or the ipse dixit of the  President               dehors the material but a legitimate inference               drawn  from  the material  placed  before  him               which  is relevant for the purpose.  In  other               words, the President has to be convinced of or               has  to have sufficient proof  of  information               with regard to or has to be free from doubt or               uncertainly  about the state of  things  indi-               cating  that  the situation  in  question  has               arisen.  Although, therefore, the  sufficiency               or   otherwise  of  the  material  cannot   be               questioned  the legitimacy of inference  drawn               from  such  material  is  certainly  open   to                             judicial review.  " (p. 103) 16.  According to the learned Judge, "Many of the parameters of judicial review developed in the field of  administrative law are not antithetical to the field of constitutional  law and  they  can equally apply to the domain  covered  by  the constitutional  law." (p.94). The learned Judge has  applied the  tests laid down by this Court in Barium Chemicals  Ltd. v. Company Law Board. 1966 Supp.  SCR. 311. 17.  Jeevan  Reddy  J., speaking for himself and one  of  us (Agrawal  J.), did not, however, give such a wide  scope  to the  power of judicial review in respect of  a  proclamation made under Article 356 (1).  After pointing out that  Barium Chemicals  (supra)  is  a  decision  concerning   subjective satisfaction  of  an  authority created by  a  statute,  the learned Judge has held that the principles enshrined in that case  "cannot  ipso  facto be extended to  the  exercise  of constitutional  power under Article 35 of  the  Constitution and  that  "having regard to the fact that this  is  a  high Constitutional  functionary  in the Nation, it  may  not  be appropriate  to  adopt the tests applicable in the  case  of action taken by statutory or administrative authorities nor, at  any rate, in their entirety." (p.267). He  preferred  to adopt the formulation that "if a Proclamation is found to be mala  fide or is found to be based wholly on  extraneous  or irrelevant  grounds,  it  is  liable  to  be  struck  down." (p.268).  The  teamed  Judge has  observed:  "The  truth  or correctness  of  the material cannot be  questioned  by  the court nor will it go into the adequacy of the material.   It will  also  not  substitute  its opinion  for  that  of  the President.  Even if some of the material on which the action is  taken is found to be irrelevant, the court  would  still not  interfere  so long as there is some  relevant  material sustaining  the action.  The ground of mala fides  takes  in inter alia situations-where the Proclamation is found to  be a clear case of abuse of power, or what is sometimes  called fraud  on  power   cases where this  power  is  invoked  for achieving  oblique ends." (p. 268).  The learned  Judge  has further stated: "The court will not lightly presume abuse or misuse.   The  court  would, as it  should,  tread  wearily, making  allowance  for the fact that the President  and  the Union  Council  of  Ministers are the  best  judges  of  the situation, that they alone are in possession of  information and  material  sensitive in nature sometimes  and  that  the Constitution has trusted their judgment in the matter.   But all this does not mean that the President and Union  Council of  Ministers are the final arbiters in the matter  or  that

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their opinion is conclusive." (pp.268 269).  Pandian J.  has expressed his agreement with the judgment of Jeevan Reddy J. 18.  Ahmadi  J.  (as the learned Chief  Justice  then  was), while expressing his agree- 14 ment  with  the  view expressed in the  State  of  Rajasthan (supra)  has held that a proclamation issued  under  Article 356(1) of the Constitution can be challenged on the  limited ground  that the action is mala fide or ultra vires  Article 356  itself and has held that the test laid down  in  Barium Chemicals (supra) and subsequent decisions for adjudging the validity  of administrative action can have  no  application for testing the satisfaction of the President under  Article 356. (p.82) 19.  Verma J., speaking for himself and Yogeshwar Dayal  J., has taken the same view.  The learned Judge has held  though the  Proclamation under Article 356 is subject  to  judicial review the area of justiciability is narrow.  While  holding that  the  test  for  adjudging  the  validity  of  an   ad- ministrative  action  and  the  grounds  of  its  invalidity indicated  in Barium Chemicals "(Supra) and other  cases  of that  category have no application for testing  and  invali- dating a Proclamation issued under Article 356, the  learned Judge  has  said that the grounds of  invalidity  are  those mentioned in State of Rajasthan (supra). (p. 85) 20.  K.  Ramaswamy J. has held: "The decision can be  tested on the ground of legal mala fides, or high irrationality  in the  exercise  of  the  discretion  to  issue   Presidential Proclamation  and  the  traditions  parameters  of  judicial review,  therefore  cannot  be  extended  to  the  area   of exceptional  and extraordinary power exercise under  Article 356".  The learned Judge has also held that the "doctrine of proportionality  cannot be extended to the  power  exercised under Article 356." (p. 209) 21.  It would thus appear that in S.R Bommai (supra)  though all the learned Judges have held that the exercise of  power under  Article 356 (1) is subject to judicial review but  in the  matter  of justiciability of the  satisfaction  of  the President, the view of the majority (Pandian, Ahmadi, Verma, Agrawal,  Yogeshwar Dayal and Jeevan Reddy JJ.) is that  the principles evolved in Barium Chemicals (supra) for adjudging the   validity  of  an  action  based  on   the   subjective satisfaction of the authority created by statute do not,  in their  entirety, apply to the exercise of  a  constitutional power  under Article 356.  On the basis of the  judgment  of Jeevan Reddy J., which takes a narrower view than that taken by  Sawant J., it can be said that the view of the  majority (Pandian,  Kuldip  Singh, Sawant, Agrawal and  Jeevan  Reddy JJ.) is that :               (i)   the satisfaction of the President  while               making  Proclamation under Article  356(1)  is               justiciable;               (ii)  it  would  be open to challenge  on  the               ground of mala fides or being based wholly  on               extraneous and/or irrelevant grounds;               (iii)even  if some of the materials  on  which               the action is taken is found to be irrelevant,               the court would still not interfere so long as               there is some relevant material sustaining the               action;               (iv)  the truth or correctness of the material               cannot be questioned by the Court nor will  it               go  into the adequacy of the material  and  it               will also not substitute its opinion for  that               of the President;

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             (v)   the  ground of mala fide takes in  inter               alia  situations  where  the  proclamation  is               found to be a clear case of abuse of power  or               what is sometimes called fraud on power;               15               (vi)  the court will not lightly presume abuse               or misuse of power and will make allowance for               the  fact  that the President  and  the  Union               Council of Ministers are the best judge of the               situation and that they are also in possession               of  information  and  material  and  that  the               Constitution has trusted their judgment in the               matter; and               (vii) this  does not mean that  the  President               and  the  Council of Ministers arc  the  final               arbiters  in the matter or that their  opinion               is conclusive. 22.As  to the bar to an inquiry by the court  imposed  under Article  74(2) of the Constitution, all the Judges  in  S.R. Bommai  (supra)  have held that the said bar  under  Article 74(2)  is confined to the advice tendered by the Council  of Ministers  to  the President and it does not extend  to  the material on the basis of which the advice was tendered  and, therefore, Articles 74(2) does not bar the production of the material on which the advice of the Council of Ministers  is based.   This  is, however, subject to the  right  to  claim privilege against the production of the said material  under Section 123 of the Evidence Act. 23.Is there anything in the provisions of clause (c) of  the second proviso to Article 311 (2) which compels a  departure fro  the  principles  laid  down  in  S.R.  Bommai   (supra) governing   justiciability  of  the  satisfaction   of   the President  in the matter of exercise of power under  Article 356?  We have not been able to discern any reason for making a  departure.   As  compared the clause (c)  of  the  second proviso  to Article 311 (2), which deals with an  individual employee,  the power conferred by Article 356, resulting  in displacement  of  the  elected government  of  a  State  and imposition  of  President’s rule in the State,  is  of  much greater  significance a. effecting large number of  persons. We  may, in this context, refer to clause (b) of the  second proviso  to Article 311 (2) whereunder it is permissible  to dispense  with  the requirements of Article 311 (2)  if  the authority  empowered  to dismiss or remove a  person  or  to reduce him in rank is satisfied that for some reason, to  be recorded by that authority in writing, it is not  reasonably practicable to hold such inquiry.  Clause (3) of Article 311 makes the said decision of the authority final.  In spite of the  said provision attaching finality to the decision  this Court, in Tulsiram Patel (supra), has held :               "The  finality given by clause (3) of  Article               311  to the disciplinary authority’s  decision               that it was not reasonably practicable to hold               the  inquiry  is not binding upon  the  court.               The court will also examine the charge of mala               fides, if any, made in the writ petition.   In               examining  the relevancy of the  reasons,  the               court   will  consider  the  situation   which               according  to the disciplinary authority  made               it  come  to the conclusion that  it  was  not               reasonably  practicable to hold  the  inquiry.               If  the court finds that the reasons  are  ir-               relevant,  then  the recording of  its  satis-                             faction  by the disciplinary  authority  would               be,  an  abuse of power conferred upon  it  by

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             clause (b) and would take the case out of  the               purview of that clause and the impugned  order               of penalty would stand invalidated." (p.274) 24.Clause  (b)  differs from clause (c) in as much as  under clause (b) the competent authority is required to record  in writing  the  reasons for its satisfaction and there  is  no such  requirement  in clause (c).  This difference,  in  our opinion,  does  not  mean  that  the  satisfaction  of   the President or the Governor under clause (c) is immune from 16 judicial review and is not justiciable.  It only means  that the  provisions  contained in clause (c) are  more  akin  to those  contained  in  Article 356(1)  which  also  does  not contain  any  requirement  to record  the  reasons  for  the satisfaction  of the President.  Since the  satisfaction  of the  President in the matter of making a proclamation  under Article 356(1) is justiciable within the limits indicated in S.R. Bommai (supra) the satisfaction of the President or the Governor,  which forms the basis for passing an order  under clause  (c)  of the second proviso to Article 311  (2),  can also be justiciable within the same limits. 25.Under clause (c) of the second proviso to Article  311(2) the  President or the Governor has to satisfy himself  about the expediency in the interests of the security of the State to hold an enquiry as prescribed under Article 311 (2).  Are the  considerations involving the interests of the  security of the State of such a nature as to exclude the satisfaction arrived  at by the President or the Governor in  respect  of the  matters  from the field of justiciability?  We  do  not think  so.   Article 19(2) of the Constitution  permits  the State to impose, by law, reasonable restrictions in the  in- terests of the security of the State on the exercise of  the right to freedom of speech and expression conferred by  sub- clause (a) of clause (1) of Article 19.  The validity of the law  imposing such restrictions under Article 19(2) is  open to  judicial review on the ground that the restrictions  are not  reasonable  or  they are not in the  interests  of  the security of the State.  The Court is required to  adjudicate on  the  question whether a particular  restriction  on  the right  to freedom of speech and expression is reasonable  in the  interests  of the security of the State  and  for  that purpose the Court takes into consideration the interests  of the  security of the State and the need of the  restrictions for protecting those interests.  If the Courts are competent to  adjudicate  on matters relating to the security  of  the State in respect of restrictions on the right to freedom  of speech and expression under Article 19 (2) there appears  to be  no reason why the Courts should not be competent  to  go into the question whether the satisfaction of the  President or  the Governor for passing an order under Article 311  (2) (c)  is  based  on considerations having a  bearing  on  the interests of the security of the State.  While examining the validity  of  a law imposing restrictions on  the  right  to freedom  of speech and expression this Court has  emphasised the  distinction between security of the State  and  mainte- nance of public order and has observed that only serious and aggravated forms of public order which are calculated to en- danger the security of the State would fall within the ambit of  clause (2) of Article 19. (See : Romesh Thappar  v.  The State  of  Madras,  1950 SCR 594, at p. 601).   So  also  in Tulsiram  Patel  (supra)  the  Court  has  pointed  out  the distinction between the expressions ’security of the State’, ’public  order’  and  ’law and order’ and  has  stated  that situations  which affect public order are graver than  those which  affect  law  and order and  situations  which  affect

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security  of  the State are graver than those  which  affect public   order.   The  President  or  the   Governor   while exercising  the power under Article 311 (2) (c) has to  bear in mind this distinction between situations which affect the security of the State and the situations which affect public order  or law and order and for the purpose of  arriving  at his  satisfaction for the purpose of passing an order  under Article  311 (2) (c) the President or the Governor can  take into 17 consideration only those circumstances which have a  bearing on  the  interests of the security of the State and  not  on situations  having  a  bearing on law and  order  or  public order.   The satisfaction of the President or  the  Governor would be vitiated if it is based on circumstances having  no bearing  on the security of the State.  If an  order  passed under  Article 311(2) (c) is assailed before a court of  law on the ground that the satisfaction of the President or  the Governor is not based on circumstances which have a  bearing on the security of the State the Court can examine the  cir- cumstances on which the satisfaction of the President or the Governor   is   based  and  if  it  finds  that   the   said circumstances  have no bearing on the security of the  State the court can hold that the satisfaction of the President or the Governor which is required for passing such an order has been   vitiated   by   wholly   extraneous   or   irrelevant considerations. 26.  It  would be useful, in this context, to take  note  of the  decision  of  the House of Lords in  Council  of  Civil Service Unions v. Minister for the Civil Services, 1985  (1) AC 374, which related to the Government Communications  Head Quarters (GCHQ).  The main functions of GCHQ were to  ensure the security of military and official communications and  to provide  the government with signals intelligence which  in- volved  the  handling  of secret information  vital  to  the national  security.  Since 1947 staff employed at  GCHQ  had been  permitted to belong to national trade unions and  most had  done  so.   There was a  well-established  practice  of consultation  between  the official and  trade  union  sides about  important alterations in the terms and conditions  of service of the staff.  On December 22, 1983 the Minister for the  Civil  Service gave an instruction  for  the  immediate variation  of  the terms and conditions of  service  of  the staff with the effect that they would no longer be permitted to  belong  to  national trade unions.  There  had  been  no consultation with the trade unions or with the staff at GCHQ prior  to  the issuing of that instruction.   The  said  in- struction   was  challenged  by  a  trade  union   and   six individuals   who  sought  judicial  review  of   the   said instruction.   Immunity from judicial review was claimed  on the  ground  that the said instruction had  been  issued  in exercise  of the prerogative power of the Crown.  The  House of  Lords  held that executive action was  not  immune  from judicial  review  merely  because  it  was  carried  out  in pursuance  of  the  power  derived  from  a  common  law  or prerogative, rather than a statutory source, and a  minister acting  under a prerogative power might, depending upon  its subject  matter, be under the same duty to act fairly as  in the  case of action under a statutory power.  On  behalf  of the Minister it was submitted that prior consultation  would involve a real risk that it would occasion the very kind  of disruption that was threat to national security and which it was intended to avoid.  While recognising that the  decision on  whether the requirements of national  security  outweigh the  duty  of fairness in any particular case,  is  for  the

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Government  and  not for the courts, Lord  Fraser  of  Tully belton said               "But  if  the decision is  successfully  chal-               lenged on the ground that it has been  reached               by   a  process  which  is  unfair  then   the               Government  is under an obligation to  produce               evidence that the decision was, in fact, based               on grounds of national security," (p. 402) According to Lord Scarman 18               "The point of principle in the appeal is as to               the  duty  of the court  when  in  proceedings               properly  brought before it a question  arises               as  to  what is required in  the  interest  of               national security.  The question may arise  in               ordinary litigation between private persons as               to  their private rights and obligations:  and               it  can arise as in this case  in  proceedings               for judicial review of a decision by a  public               authority."               "But, however it arises, it is a matter to  be               considered  by the court in the  circumstances               and  context of the case.  Though  there,  are               limits dictated by law and common sense  which               the  court  must observe in dealing  with  the               question  the  court does  ’not  abdicate  its               judicial functions.  If the question arises as               a matter of fact, the court requires  evidence               to  be given.  If it arises as a factor to  be               considered  in  reviewing the  exercise  of  a               discretionary  power, evidence is also  needed               so  that  the court may determine  whether  it               should intervene to correct excess or abuse of               the power," [p. 404] 27.      Similarly Lord Roskill has said:               "The   courts  have  long   shown   themselves               sensitive  to the assertion by  the  executive               that considerations of national security  must               preclude    judicial   investigation   of    a               particular individual grievance.  But even  in               that  field the courts will not act on a  mere               assertion that questions of national  security               were involved.  Evidence is required that  the               decision  under challenge was in fact  founded               on those grounds.  ’Mat that principle  exists               is 1 beyond doubt.?’ [p. 420] 28.On  the  basis of the evidence that was adduced  in  that case  it  was held that the evidence  established  that  the minister  had  considered, with reason, that  prior  consul- tation  about her instruction would have involved a risk  of precipitating  disruption at GCHQ and  revealing  vulnerable areas of operation, and, accordingly, she had shown that her decision  had  in  fact  been  based  on  considerations  of national   security   that  out  weighed   the   applicants’ legitimate expectation of prior consultation. 29.  In Bakshi Sardari Lal (Dead) through LRs     Ors.    v. Union of India & Anr., 1987 (4)    SCC  114, in a  challenge to  orders  of  dismissal passed under  clause  (c)  of  the second.  proviso  to  Article 311 (2) it  was  contended  on behalf  of the appellants that the High Court was  wrong  in holding  that the sufficiency of satisfaction of the  Presi- dent  was  not  justiciable.  While dealing  with  the  said contention,  the court, after referring to the  decision  in Tulsiram Patel (supra), has observed :               "The  record  of the case produced  before  us

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             clearly  indicates  that the reason  has  been               recorded though not communicated.  That  would               satisfy,  the  requirements  of  the  law   as               indicated in Tulsiram Patel Case . The plea of               mala  fides as had been contended  before  the               High  Court and causally reiterated before  us               arises out of the fact that typed orders dated               June  3, 1971, were already on record  in  the               file  when the papers were placed  before  the               President;  such a contention is  without  any               substance." [p. 121] 30.This  would show that the court did go into the  question whether  the impugned orders were vitiated by  mala,  fides. As noticed earlier in Tulsiram Patel (supra) also the Court, while dealing with the Madhya Pradesh Police Forces matters, did  examine  the question whether the  impugned  orders  of dismissal  passed under Article 311(2)(c) were  vitiated  by mala fides or were based on irrelevant consid- 19 erations  and after considering all the materials that  were produced before the Court by the State Government, the Court recorded the finding that the facts leave no doubt that  the situation  was  such  that  prompt  and  urgent  action  was necessary  and  the holding of inquiry into the  conduct  of each of the petitioners would not have been expedient in the interests of the security of the State. 31.We  are, therefore, of the opinion that an  order  passed under clause (c) of the second proviso to Article 311 (2) is subject to judicial review and its validity can be  examined by  the  court on the ground that the  satisfaction  of  the President  or the Governor is vitiated by mala fides  or  is based on wholly extraneous or irrelevant grounds within  the limits laid down in S.R Bommai (supra). 32.In order that the Court is able to exercise this power of judicial  review  effectively  it must  have  the  necessary material before it to determine whether the satisfaction  of the  President or the Governor as the case may be, has  been arrived at in accordance with the law and is not vitiated by mala fides or extraneous or irrelevant factors.  This brings us  to the question whether the Government is  obligated  to place  such material before the Court.  It is no doubt  true that unlike clause (b) of the second proviso to Article  311 (2)  which requires the authority to record in  writing  the reason  for  its  satisfaction that  it  is  not  reasonably practicable  to hold such inquiry clause (c) of  the  second proviso does not prescribe for the recording of reasons  for the satisfaction.  But the absence of such a requirement  to record  reason for the satisfaction does not  dispense  with the  obligation on the part of the concerned  Government  to satisfy  the court or the Tribunal if an order passed  under clause (c) of the second proviso to Article 311 (2) is chal- lenged  before such court or tribunal that the  satisfaction was arrived at after taking into account relevant facts  and circumstances and was not vitiated by mala fides and was not based  on extraneous or irrelevant considerations.   In  the absence  of the said circumstances being placed  before  the court  or the Tribunal it may be possible for the  concerned employee  to  establish his case that the  satisfaction  was vitiated  by  mala  fides  or was  based  on  extraneous  or irrelevant considerations.  While exercising the power under Article  311 (2) (c) the President or the Governor  acts  in accordance  with  the  advice tendered  by  the  Council  of Ministers. (See : Samsher Singh v. State of Punjab, 1975 (1) SCR 814).  Article 74(2) and Article 163 (3) which  preclude the court from inquiring into the question whether any,  and

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if  so,  what advice was tendered by the  Ministers  to  the President or the Governor enable the concerned Government to withhold from the court the advice that was tendered by  the Ministers  to the President or the Governor.  But,  as  laid down  in  S.R. Bommai (supra), the said  provisions  do  not permit the Government to withhold production in the Court of the material on which the advice of the Ministers was based. This  is, however, subject to the claim of  privilege  under Sections  123  and 124 of the Evidence Act in respect  of  a particular document or record.  The said claim of  privilege will  have to be considered by the court or tribunal on  its own  merit.  But the upholding of such claim  for  privilege would not stand in the way of the concerned Government being required  to  disclose the nature of the activities  of  the employee on the basis of which 20 the  satisfaction  of  the President  or  the  Governor  was arrived at for the purpose of passing an order under  clause (c)  of  the second proviso to Article 311 (2) so  that  the court or tribunal may be able to determine whether the  said activities  could be regarded as having a  reasonable  nexus with  the  interest of the security of the  State.   In  the absence of any indication about the nature of the activities it  would  not  be possible for the  court  or  tribunal  to determine  whether  the satisfaction was arrived at  on  the basis of relevant considerations.  The nature of  activities in  which  employee  is said to have  indulged  in  must  be distinguished  from the material which supports  his  having indulged  in  such activities.  The non-disclosure  of  such material  would be permissible if the claim of privilege  is upheld.  The said claim of privilege would not extend to the disclosure  of  the nature of the  activities  because  such disclosure  would not involve disclosure of any  information connecting  the employee with such activities or the  source of such information. 33.In  our opinion, therefore, in a case where the  validity of an order passed under clause (c) of the second proviso to Article  111(2) is assailed before a court or a Tribunal  it is open to the court or the Tribunal to examine whether  the satisfaction of the President or the Governor is vitiated by mala  fides or is based on wholly extraneous  or  irrelevant grounds  and for that purpose the Government is  obliged  to place before the court or tribunal the relevant material  on the  basis of which the satisfaction was arrived at  subject to  a claim of privilege under Sections 123 and 124  of  the Evidence Act to withhold production of a particular document or record.  Even in cases where such a privilege is  claimed the  Government concerned must disclose before the Court  or tribunal  the  nature of the activities in  which  the  Gov- ernment employee is said to have indulged in. 34.In the present case the appellants had sought  production and inspection of the following documents:               (a)   The  records  and files  containing  the               "information"  on  the  basis  of  which   the               President was "satisfied " for the purpose  of               exercising his powers under clause (c) of  the               second proviso to Article 311 (2).               (b)   The  records  and files  containing  the               description of "activities of the  petitioners               which   warranted   their   ’dismissal’   from               service".               (c)   The  records  and files  containing  the               details  of  "misconduct"  attributed  to  the               petitioners,  as  covered  in  CCS   (Conduct)               Rules, 1965.

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             (d)   A  copy of the charge of misconduct  and               the statement of allegation in support thereof               framed by the Competent Authority against  the               petitioners  before coming to  the  conclusion               that  "it is not expedient to hold an  inquiry               in the case of Shri B.B. Raval (petitioners)."               (e)   A  copy of the original order passed  by               the  President  of  India  under  Article  311               (2)(c)   on  the  basis  of  which   Shri   R.               Mahadevan,  Under Secretary to the  Government               of India, Ministry of Honic Affairs issued the               impugned  order dated 26th December, 1980  "By               order and in the name of the               21               President".               (f)   A  copy  of the order of  delegation  of               powers  of the President of India  authorising               Shri   R.   Mahadevan,  Under   Secretary   to               authenticate  the order of the  President  and               issue the same in his name.               (g)   Records  and  files containing  the  de-               liberations,  recommendations and findings  of               the  Committee  of Advisors (as  envisaged  in                             O.M.  dated  26th  July,  1980)  advising   th e               President  of India to exercise  powers  under               Article 311 (2)(c) of the Constitution.               (h)   Copies  of  any  other  records,  files,               notification  or recommendations  relevant  to               the  issue  of the impugned  order,  that  the               Hon’ble Tribunal may direct the respondents to               produce  for  rendering  full  and   effective               assistance  to  the Hon’ble  Tribunal  in  the               interest  of justice and for  adjudication  of               this case. 35.  Dr.  Madhav Godbole in his affidavit claimed  privilege under Article 74(2) as well as under Sections 123 and 124 of the Evidence Act.  The Tribunal after referring the decision of  this Court in S.P. Gupta & Ors., etc. etc. v.  Union  of India & Ors. etc. etc., 1982 (2) SCR 365, has observed  that the  following  classes  of  documents  are  protected  from disclosure :               "(i)  Cabinet minutes, minutes of  discussions               between  heads  of  departments,  high   level               inter-departmental     communications      and               dispatches from ambassadors abroad.               (ii)  Papers  brought into existence  for  the               purpose of preparing a submission to cabinet.               (iii) Documents which relate to the framing of               the Government policy at a high level.               (iv)  Notes and minutes made by the respective               officers  on the relevant  files,  information               expressed or reports made and gist of official               decisions reached.               (v)   Documents  concerned  with  policymaking               within  departments including minutes and  the               like  by junior officials  and  correspondence               with outside bodies." 36.The Tribunal, after examining the records produced before it,  has observed that the records contain cabinet  minutes, papers  brought into existence for the purpose of  preparing submission  to  the cabinet, notes made  by  the  respective officers,  information  expressed and the gist  of  official decisions.   Having regard to the fact that  the  appellants were  working in a highly sensitive  Organisation  entrusted

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with the delicate job of gathering, collecting and analysing intelligence necessary to maintain the unity, integrity  and sovereignty  of the country and that secrecy is the  essence of  the organisation and exposure may tend to  demolish  the organisation and aggravate the hazards in gathering informa- tion  and  dry  up the sources that  provide  essential  and sensitive information needed to protect public interest, the Tribunal has held that it will not be in public interest  to permit  disclosure  of such documents.   The  Tribunal  has, therefore,  upheld the claim of privilege.  We do  not  find any ground to take a different view in the matter. 37.After looking into the records the Tribunal has  recorded the  finding that the materials considered by the  President relate  to  the  activities of the  appellants  which  would prejudicially affect the security of 22 the  State  and  that  the materials  relied  upon  for  the satisfaction  of the President have nothing to do  with  the activities  of the appellants in relation to IBEA  and  that the impugned orders have not been passed in violation of the interim  order passed by this Court in W.P. O Nos.  1119  of 1980 and that there is no substance in the appellants’  case that the orders of dismissal are not bona fide and had  been passed  to  victimise  the  appellants  for  promoting   and participating  in  the  activities  of  IBEA.   The  learned Additional Solicitor General has submitted that the Tribunal has not committed any error in adopting this course and  has placed  reliance on the decision of this Court in  Jamaat-e- Islamdi Hind v. Union of India, 1995 (1) SCC 428. 38.In Jamaat-e-Islamdi Hind (supra) a notification had  been issued  by  the Government of India under Section 3  of  the Unlawful  Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967  declaring  that the  Jamaat-e-Islami Hind was an unlawful Association.   The said  notification  was  referred for  adjudication  to  the Tribunal  constituted  under  the  said  Act.   Before   the Tribunal   the  only  material  produced  by   the   Central Government  was  a  resume prepared on  the  basis  of  some intelligence reports and the affidavits of two officers  who spoke only on the basis of the records and not from personal knowledge.   The  Tribunal held that  there  was  sufficient cause  for  declaring  the Association to  be  unlawful  and confirmed  the notification.  On behalf of the appellant  it was  urged  that the only material produced at  the  inquiry does  not  constitute legal evidence for the purpose  in  as much  as  it  was, at best, hearsay  and  that  too  without disclosing  the  source from which it emanates  to  give  an opportunity to the appellant to effectively rebut the  same. On  the  other  hand, on behalf of  the  respondent  it  was submitted that the requirement of natural justice in such  a situation  was satisfied by mere disclosure  of  information without  disclosing  the source of  the  information.   This Court, while holding that the minimum requirement of natural justice  must  be satisfied to make the  adjudication  mean- ingful,  observed  that  the  said  requirement  of  natural justice  in  a  case  of this kind had  to  be  tailored  to safeguard public interest which must always out-weigh  every lesser interest.  It was said:               "It is obvious that the unlawful activities of               an association may quite often be  clandestine               in  nature  and,  therefore,  the  source   of               evidence   of  the  unlawful  activities   may               require  continued confidentiality  in  public               interest.  In such a situation, disclosure  of               the  source of such information, and, may  be,               also full particulars thereof, is likely to be

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             against the public interest. .......  However,               the nondisclosure of sensitive information and               evidence  to the association and  its  office-               bearers, whenever justified in pubic interest.               does not necessarily imply its  non-disclosure               to the Tribunal as well." [p.447] 39.These observations in Jamaat-e-Islamdi Hind (supra)  lend support to the view that in a case where the material is  of such a nature that it requires continued confidentiality  in public  interest  it would be permissible for the  court  or tribunal  to  look into the same while permitting  the  non- disclosure  to  the  other party to  the  adjudication.   It cannot, therefore, be said that the Tribunal, in the present case,  was  in  error in looking into  the  record  for  the purpose  of  determining whether the satisfaction  has  been vitiated for any of the reasons mentioned by the appellants. 40.  The learned counsel for the appellants 23 have  invited  our attention to the averments  contained  in C.M.  No. 8494 of 1980 filed on behalf of the respondent  in W.P.  No. 1117-19 of 1980 in this Court in support of  their submission  that the impugned orders of dismissal have  been passed on the basis of the activities referred to in para  6 of  the  said  application.   This  submission  has  to  be, rejected  in  view of the finding recorded by  the  Tribunal that the materials considered by the President relate to the activities  of  the  appellants  which  would  prejudicially affect the security of the State and that the said materials have  nothing to do with the activities of the appellant  in relation to IBEA. 41.  Having  regard  to the facts and circumstances  of  the case we are unable to hold that the impugned orders for  the dismissal of the appellants are vitiated by malafides or are based  on wholly extraneous or irrelevant grounds and we  do not  find any ground to interfere with the decision  of  the Tribunal.   The appeals are, therefore, dismissed.   But  in the circumstances without any order as to costs. 27