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PETITIONER: A. C. JOSE

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: SIVAN PILLAI & ORS.

DATE OF JUDGMENT05/03/1984

BENCH: FAZALALI, SYED MURTAZA BENCH: FAZALALI, SYED MURTAZA VARADARAJAN, A. (J) MISRA RANGNATH

CITATION:  1984 AIR  921            1984 SCR  (3)  74  1984 SCC  (2) 656        1984 SCALE  (1)454  CITATOR INFO :  R          1986 SC 111  (16)

ACT:      Constitution of India 1950, Articles 324, 327 and 329.      The Representation of the People Act 1951, Section 59.      The Conduct  of Election Rules 1961. Rule 49 Elections- Voting-Casting of  ballots by  use of  ’electronic’ machine- Whether valid and legal.      Words and Phrases: "Ballot"-Meaning of.

HEADNOTE:      The  first   respondent  was   elected  to   the  State Legislative Assembly.  Voting in the Constituency was by the conventional method  provided in  the  Conduct  of  Election Rules 1961.  the  votes  cast  manually;  and  also  by  the mechanical process, viz., the use of ’electronic’ machines.      The appellant  challenged the  election  of  the  first respondent. The trial court upheld the validity of voting by machines  and  held  that  the  first  respondent  was  duly elected.      In appeal  to this Court, it was contended on behalf of the appellant  that voting  by mechanical  process  was  not permissible either  under the  Representation of  the People Act 1951, or under the Conduct of Election Rules 1961.      Allowing the appeal, ^      HELD: 1. The order of the Election Commission directing casting of  ballots by  machines  in  some  of  the  polling stations, was  without jurisdiction  and could not have been resorted to. [90G]      2. When  the Representation  of the People Act 1951 and the Conduct  of Election Rules 1961, prescribed a particular method of  voting the  Commission could-not  innovate a  new method and  contend that  use of  the mechanical process was not covered by the existing law and, therefore, did not come in conflict with the law in the field. The Act and the Rules completely  excluded   the  mechanical   process  which,  if resorted to,  would defeat  in a large measure the mandatory requirements of the Rules. [86G, 88F] 75      3. (a)  When there  is no  Parliamentary legislation or

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rule made under the said legislation, the Commission is free to pass  any orders  in respect of the Conduct of elections. [86 H]      (b) Where  there is  an Act and there are express Rules made thereunder,  it is  not open to the Commission is over- ride the  Act  or  the  Rules  and  pass  orders  in  direct disobedience to  the mandate  contained in  the Act  or  the Rules. The  Powers of the Commission are meant to supplement rather than supplant the law (both statute and Rules) in the matter of superintendence, direction and Control as provided by Article 324. [87A-B]      (c)  Where  the  Act  or  the  Rules  are  silent,  the Commission has  no doubt plenary powers under Article 324 to give any  direction in  respect of  the conduct of election. [87C]      (d) Where  a particular  direction by the Commission is submitted to the government for approval, as required by the Rules, it  is not  open to  the Commission  to go ahead with implementation of  it at  its own  sweet will  even  if  the approval of the Government is not given. [87D]      4. It  is a  well-settled  rule  of  interpretation  of statutes that  words, phrases  or  sentences  of  a  statute should ordinarily  be understood in their natural, ordinary, popular and  grammatical sense  unless such  a  construction leads to absurdity. [88G]      5. Legislatures  must be  deemed to  be  aware  of  the modern tendencies  in various  democratic countries  of  the world where the mechanical system has been introduced and if despite the  plain meaning of the word ’ballot’ they did not choose to  extend the  definition given as far back as 1950, it may  be safely  presumed that  Parliament intended to use the word  ’ballot’ in  its popular  rather than  a technical sense. [89G]      6. The  word ’ballot’  has been  derived from  the word ’ballot’ which  existed at a time when there was no question of any  system of  voting by  machine. Even in 1951 when the Act was  passed or the Rules were made, the system of voting by machine  was not  in vogue  in  this  country.  In  these circumstances the  word ’ballot’  in its  strict sense would not include voting by the use of voting machines. [89F]      Sadiq Ali  & Anr.  v. Election  Commission of  India  & Ors.,[1972] 2  S.C.R. 318; Mohinder Singh Gill & Anr. v. The Chief Election  Commissioner, New  Delhi &  Ors.,  [1978]  2 S.C.R.  272  and  N  P:  Ponnuswami  v.  Returning  Officer, Namakkal Constituency  & Ors.,  [1952] S.C.R.  218; referred to.

JUDGMENT:      CIVIL APPELLATE  JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 3839 of 1982.      From the  Judgment and  order dated  the 12th  October, 1982 of  the Kerala High Court in Election Petition No. 1 of 1982.      K.K. Venugopal, G. Vishwanatha Iyer and E.M.S. Anam for the Appellant. 76      Ram Jethamalani,  M.M. Abdul  Khader, Dileep Pillai and M.A. Firoz for Respondent No. 1.      K.G. Bhagat, Addls, Sol. General and Miss A. Subhashini for Union.      S.S. Ray,  A.K Sen  and  Miss  A.  Subhashini  for  the Election Commissioner.      Ram  Jethamalani  and  Miss  Rani  Jethmalani  for  the

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Intervener.      The Judgment of the Court was delivered by      FAZAL ALI,  J. This  election appeal  has been filed by the appellant,  who was  a candidate for election to "No. 70 Parur Assembly  Constituency" in Kerala but was not elected. Six candidates contested the said election which was held on May 19,  1982, out  of  whom  the  first  respondent  (Sivan Pillai), who  was a  candidate of  the  Communist  Party  of India, and the appellant were the two principal contestants. The result  of the  election was announced on May 20,1982 in which the  first  respondent  was  declared  elected  having secured 30450  votes as  against 30327  votes secured by the appellant. Thus, the first respondent secured 123 more votes than the  appellant. Of  the 30450  votes, 11268  were  cast manually, according  to the  conventional method provided in the Conduct  of Election  Rules,  1961  (for  short,  to  be referred to as the ’Rules’) made under the Representation of the People  Act, 1951  (hereinafter to be referred to as the ’Act’), and  19182 votes  were cast  by means  of electronic machines  (for   short,  to   be  referred   to  as  ’voting machines’). This  was done  in pursuance  of  the  direction issued by the Election Commission of India (for facility, to be  referred   to  as  the  ’Commission’)  by  virtue  of  a notification published in the Kerala Gazette on 13.5.82. The said notification was purported to have been made under Art. 324 of  the Constitution of India, and has been extracted on pages 3 to 5 of the judgment of the High Court and it is not necessary for  us to  repeat the  same having  regard to the point of law that we have to decide in the instant case.      It  may   be  mentioned   that  prior  to  issuing  the notification the  commission had  sought the sanction of the Government of  India which was however refused. As mentioned above, the votes 77 by the  mechanical process  were cast  in 50  out of  the 85 polling stations.      The trial  Court  upheld  the  validity  of  voting  by machine and held that the respondent was duly elected to the Assembly seat. Hence, this appeal by the appellant.      Art. 324  of the  Constitution gives full powers to the Commission in  matters  of  Superintendence,  direction  and control of  the preparation  of electoral rolls and also for the  conduct  of  elections  to  the  Parliament  and  State Legislatures. It  was argued  that the  Commission  being  a creature of  the Constitution  itself,  its  plenary  powers flowing directly  from Art.  324 will  prevail over  any Act passed by  the Parliament or Rules made thereunder. In order to buttress  this argument, it was contended that the manner of voting  was a matter coming within the ambit of Arts. 324 and 327  which empowered  the Parliament  to  make  laws  in respect of  matters relating  to or  in connection  with the elections to  the Parliament  or the  State Legislatures and would be  deemed to  be subsidiary to the power contained in Art. 324 and if there was any conflict between a law enacted by the  Parliament and  the powers  given to  the Commission regarding regulating  the conduct of elections to Parliament that law  must yield  to Art. 324, otherwise the very object of Art.  324 would  be defeated.  Notice was  given by  this Court both  to the  Union of  India as  also the  Commission though in  terms of  s. 82 of the Act they are not necessary parties and were not before the High Court.      This is  a very  attractive argument  but on  a  closer scrutiny and  deeper deliberation  on  this  aspect  of  the matter, it is not possible to read into Art. 324 such a wide and uncanalised  power, which is entrusted to the Commission

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as Mr.  Jethmalani would  have us  believe. Part  XV of  the Constitution contains  Arts. 324  to 328 which relate to the manner in  which elections  are to  be held,  the rights  of persons who  are entitled  to vote, preparation of electoral rolls, delimitation  of constituencies,  etc., but  this  is merely the  storehouse of the powers and the actual exercise of these  powers is  left to  Parliament under  Arts. 325 to 329. In  other words,  Art. 324  has to  be read  in harmony with, and not in isolation of Arts. 326 to 329. Art. 324 may be extracted thus:           "324. Superintendence,  direction and  control  of      elections to be vested in an Election Commission. 78           (1) The  superintendence, direction and control of      the preparation  of the  electoral rolls  for, and  the      conduct of  all elections  to  Parliament  and  to  the      Legislature of  every State  and of  elections  to  the      offices of President and Vice-President held under this      Constitution shall  be vested in a Commission (referred      to in this Constitution as the Election Commission).           (2) The  Election Commission  shall consist of the      Chief Election  Commissioner and  such number  of other      Election Commissioners,  if any,  as the  President may      from time  to time fix and the appointment of the Chief      Election Commissioner  and other Election Commissioners      shall, subject  to the  provisions of  any law  made in      that behalf by Parliament, be made by the President.           (3) When  any other  Election Commissioner  is  so      appointed the  Chief Election Commissioner shall act as      the Chairman of the Election Commission.           (4) Before  each general  election to the House of      the People  and to  the Legislative  Assembly  of  each      State,  and  before  the  first  general  election  and      thereafter  before   each  biennial   election  to  the      Legislative Council  of each State having such Council,      the President  may also appoint after consultation with      the Election  Commission such Regional Commissioners as      he  may  consider  necessary  to  assist  the  Election      Commission  in   the  performance   of  the   functions      conferred on the Commission by clause (1).           (5) Subject  to the  provisions of any law made by      Parliament, the  conditions of  service and  tenure  of      office of  the Election  Commissioners and the Regional      Commissioners shall  be such  as the  President may  by      rule determine:           Provided  that  the  Chief  Election  Commissioner      shall not  be removed  from his  office except  in like      manner and  on the  like grounds  as  a  Judge  of  the      Supreme Court  and the  conditions of  service  of  the      Chief Election  Commissioner shall not be varied to his      disadvantage after his appointment.           Provided   further   that   any   other   Election      Commissioner or  a Regional  Commissioner shall  not be      removed from 79      office  except  on  the  recommendation  of  the  Chief      Election Commissioner.           (6) The  President, or  the Governor  of a  State,      shall when  so requested  by the  Election  Commission,      make available  to the  Election  Commission  or  to  a      Regional Commissioner  such staff  as may  be necessary      for the  discharge of  the functions  conferred on  the      Election Commission by clause (1)."      While interpreting  a constitutional  provision we must remember the memorable words of Chief Justice Marshall:

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         "We must  never forget that it is the Constitution      which we are expounding."      Another golden  rule laid  down by  this Court  on  the interpretation of  statutes is  that we  should so interpret the language  of a  Statute as  to suppress the mischief and advance the  object. It is true that Art. 324 does authorise the  Commission   to  exercise  powers  of  superintendence, direction and  control of preparation of electoral rolls and the  conduct   of  elections   to   Parliament   and   State legislatures  but   then  the   Article  has   to  be   read harmoniously with  the Articles  that follow  and the powers that are given to the Legislatures under entry No. 72 in the Union List and entry No. 37 of the State List of the Seventh Schedule to  the Constitution. The Commission in the garb of passing orders  for  regulating  the  conduct  of  elections cannot take  upon itself a purely legislative activity which has been  reserved under the scheme of the Constitution only to Parliament  and the  State legislatures.  By no standards can it be said that the Commission is a third Chamber in the legislative process  within the  scheme of the Constitution. Merely being a creature of the Constitution will not give it plenary and  absolute power to legislate as it likes without reference to the law enacted by the legislatures.      It was  further argued that this power was necessary in order to make the Commission an independent body and in this connection our  attention was  drawn  to  a  speech  of  Dr. Ambedkar in  the Constituent  Assembly when  the question of making the Election Commission an independent body was being debated, At  page 905, Constituent Assembly Debates (Vol.8), Dr. Ambedkar observed thus: 80           "But  the  House  affirmed  without  any  kind  of      dissent that  in the interests of purity and freedom of      elections to  the legislative  bodies, it  was  of  the      utmost importance  that they  should be  freed from any      kind of  interference from the executive of the day. In      pursuance of  the decision  of the  House, the Drafting      Committee removed  this question  from the  category of      Fundamental Rights  and  put  it  in  a  separate  part      containing Articles  289, 290  and so on, Therefore, so      far as  the fundamental  question is concerned that the      election machinery should be outside the control of the      executive Government,  there has  been no dispute. What      article 289  does is  to carry  out that  part  of  the      decision of  the Constituent Assembly. It transfers the      superintendence,   direction   and   control   of   the      preparation of the electoral rolls and of all elections      to Parliament  and the Legislatures of States to a body      outside  the   executive  to  be  called  the  Election      Commission."      These observations  merely show  that the  intention of the founding  fathers of  our Constitution  was to  make the Commission a  separate and  independent  body  so  that  the election  machinery  may  be  outside  the  control  of  the executive Government.  What Dr. Ambedkar, or for that matter the founding fathers, intended was that the superintendence, direction and  control of the preparation of electoral rolls and of  all elections  to Parliament  and State Legislatures should be  left to  the Election Commission. This object has been fully  carried out  by the  provisions in  Arts. 324 to 329. Neither  the  observations  of  Dr.  Ambedkar  nor  the provisions of  the Constitution  could ever have intended to make the  Commission an  apex body  in  respect  of  matters relating to  elections, conferring  on it legislative powers ignoring the Parliament altogether.

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    Mr. Asoke  Sen, appearing  for the Commission, speaking in the  same strain  as Mr.  Jethmalani, contended that Art. 324 was a Code in itself and was couched in a very plain and simple language  which admits  of no  ambiguity and,  if  so construed,  it  gives  full  powers  and  authority  to  the Commission to  give any  direction in  connection  with  the conduct of  elections. It was further submitted that if this interpretation is  not given  then Arts.  325 to  329  would amount to  defeating the  very object which was sought to be achieved by  Art. 324.  Supporting argument  was built up by Mr. Sen  by heavily  relying upon  the opening words in Art. 327 to 81 the effect: "subject to the provisions of this Constitution" and absence  of any  such rider in Art. 324. For the reasons which we  will give  hereafter, it is not possible for us to accept the  somewhat far-fetched  argument  of  the  learned counsel.      Reliance was  placed on  a decision  of this  Court  in Sadiq Ali  and Anr. v. Election Commission of India and Ors. where the Court observed thus:           "Art. 324  of the Constitution provides inter alia      that the  superintendence, direction and control of the      preparation of  electoral rolls  for and the conduct of      all elections  to Parliament and Legislative Assemblies      of the  States and  all elections  to  the  offices  of      President   and    Vice-President   held    under   the      Constitution shall be vested in the Commission           Without  prejudice   to  the   generality  of  the      foregoing power, sub-section (2) enumerates some of the      matters for  which provision  may be made in the rules.      Sub-section (3)  requires that  the rules framed should      be laid  before each  House of  Parliament. Conduct  of      Election Rules,  1961 were  thereafter  framed  by  the      Central Government. Rules 5 of those Rules requires the      Commission to specify the symbols that may be chosen by      candidates at  elections in  Parliamentary and Assembly      elections and  the restrictions  to which  that  choice      shall be subject. Rule 10 makes provision for allotment      of  symbols   to  the   contesting  candidates  by  the      Returning  officer   subject  to   general  or  special      directions issued by the Commission."      The first part of the above observations merely repeats the language  of Art.  324 but the second part clearly shows that the  power under  Art. 324  is conditioned by the Rules made by  the Central  Government  for  the  conduct  of  all elections. These  observations, therefore,  do not appear to us to  be of  any assistance  to  the  stand  taken  by  the appellant.      Reliance was  also placed on the following observations in the said case:           "Question then  arises as  to what  is the binding      nature of  the decision  given by  the Commission under      paragraph 15  In this  respect, it  has to  be borne in      mind that  the Commission  only decides the question as      to whether any of the 82      rival sections  or groups  of  a  recognised  political      party, each  of whom  claims to  be that party, is that      party. The  claim made  in this respect is only for the      purpose of  symbols in connection with the elections to      the Parliament  and State Legislatures and the decision      of the  Commission pertains  to this  limited  matter."      (Emphasis ours)      These observations  also do  not advance the matter any

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further because  it was  clearly held that the claim made in respect of  symbols pertained  only to  the  limited  matter which was  being considered by the Commission. The following observations of  this Court  in that  case completely clinch the issue against the appellant:           "It would  follow from  what  has  been  discussed      earlier in  this judgment  that the Symbols order makes      detailed provisions  for the  reservation,  choice  and      allotment of  symbols and  the recognition of political      parties in  connection therewith.  That the  Commission      should specify  symbols for  elections in Parliamentary      and  assembly   constituencies  has   also  been   made      obligatory by rule 5 of Conduct of Election Rules."                                          (Emphasis supplied)      Thus, it is manifestly apparent from this decision that the rule-making  power of the Commission under the Act, with respect to  symbols, would  have to  prevail over  any order that it  may pass and the words "conduct of elections" would not make the Commission a purely legislative body.      Another case  on which  great reliance  was placed  is: Mohinder  Singh   Gill  and   Anr.  v.  The  Chief  Election Commissioner, New  Delhi and  Ors. In this case, it was held that an  order passed  by a statutory functionary on certain specific grounds cannot be supplemented by external evidence like affidavits  or otherwise.  This case  also nowhere lays down  that  the  Commission  possesses  plenary  powers-both executive  and   legislative-in  the  guise  of  conduct  of elections. One  of the main questions posed by Krishna Iyer, J speaking for the Court, was as follows:           "Can the  Election Commission,  clothed  with  the      comprehensive  functions   under  Article  324  of  the      Constitution, cancel  the whole  poll of a constituency      after it has been 83      held, but  before the  formal declaration of the result      has  been   made,  and  direct  a  fresh  poll  without      reference to  the guidelines  under ss. 58 and 64(a) of      the Act,  or other  legal prescription  or  legislative      backing.  If   such  plenary   power  exists,   is   it      exercisable on the basis of his inscrutable ’subjective      satisfaction’  or   only  on   a  reviewable  objective      assessment  reached   on  the  basis  of  circumstances      vitiating a  free and  fair election and warranting the      stoppage of declaration of the result and directions of      a fresh  poll not merely of particular polling stations      but of the total constituency?"      The learned Judge while answering the question observed thus:           "Article 324,  which we have set out earlier, is a      plenary provision  vesting the whole responsibility for      national  and   State  elections  and,  therefore,  the      necessary powers to discharge that function. It is true      that Art.  324 has  to be  read in  the  light  of  the      constitutional scheme  and the  1950 Act  and the  1951      Act. Sri  Rao is right to the extent he insists that if      competent  legislation  is  enacted  as  visualized  in      Article 327  the Commission  cannot make  himself  free      from the  enacted prescriptions.  And the  supremacy of      valid law  over the Commission argues itself. No one is      an imperium  in imperio in our constitutional order. It      is reasonable to hold that the Commissioner cannot defy      the law  armed by Art. 324. Likewise, his functions are      subject to  the norms  of fairness  and he  cannot  act      arbitrarily. Unchecked  power is  alien to our system..      Article 324,  in  our  view,  operates  in  areas  left

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    unoccupied    by     legislation    and    the    words      ’superintendence, direction  and control’  as  well  as      ’conduct’ of all elections’ are the broadest terms."                                              (Emphasis ours)      The observations,  extracted above,  furnish a complete answer to  the arguments of Mr. Jethmalani and Mr. Asoke Sen as it has been clearly held that Art. 324 would operate only in areas  left unoccupied by legislation, even if the widest possible connotation  is given  to the language of Art. 324. While summarizing  the  propositions,  the  Court  made  the following observations:.           "Two limitations at least are laid on its plenary 84      character  in   the  exercise  thereof.  Firstly,  when      Parliament or  any State Legislature has made valid law      relating  to  or  in  connection  with  elections,  the      Commission  shall   act  in  conformity  with,  not  in      violation of  such provision  but  where  such  law  is      silent Art.  324 is a reservoir of power to act for the      avowed purpose  of, not divorced from pushing forward a      free and  fair election  with expedition. Secondly, the      Commission shall be responsible to the rule of law, act      bona fide  and be  amenable to  the  norms  of  natural      justice in  so far  as conformance  to such  canons can      reasonably and  realistically  be  required  of  it  as      fairplay-in-action in  a most  important  area  of  the      constitutional order, viz., elections."                                              (Emphasis ours)      This is  actually the  main  spirit  and  gist  of  the decision which  appears to  have been  relied  upon  by  the appellant but  which does  not at  all support his stand. In the aforesaid  case, there did not appear to be any conflict between the  order passed  by the  Commission and the Act or the Rules. The question at issue in the instant case did not really arise  in the  form and  shape as  has been presented before us.  On the other hand, the matter seems to have been fully settled  by an  earlier decision of this Court in N.P. Ponnuswami v.  Returning officer,  Namakkal Constituency and ors. where  Fazal Ali,  J. (as  he then  was) while making a very pointed and crisp approach, scientifically analysed the position thus:           "Broadly speaking,  before an  election  machinery      can  be   brought  into   operation,  there  are  three      requisites which require to be attended to, namely, (1)      there  should  be  a  set  of  laws  and  rules  making      provisions with  respect to all matters relating to, or      in connection with, elections, and it should be decided      as to  how these  laws and  rules are  to be  made; (2)      there should  be an  executive charged with the duty of      securing the  due conduct  of elections;  and (3) there      should be  a judicial  tribunal to  deal with  disputes      arising  out   of  or  in  connection  with  elections.      Articles 327  and 328  deal with  the  first  of  these      requisites, Art.  324 with  the second  and article 329      with the  third requisite.  The other  two articles  in      Part XV, viz., articles 325 and 326, deal with two 85      matters of  principle to which the Constitution-framers      have   attached    much   importance.   They   are:-(1)      prohibition against  discrimination in  the preparation      of, or  eligibility for  inclusion  in,  the  electoral      rolls, on  grounds of  religion race, caste, sex or any      of them;  and  (2)  adult  suffrage.  Part  XV  of  the      Constitution is  really a  code in itself providing the      entire ground-work  for enacting  appropriate laws  and

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    setting  up  suitable  machinery  for  the  conduct  of      elections."      We fully  endorse and  follow the above observations of the Constitution Bench which lay down the correct law on the subject and  we have  nothing further to add to the approach made by  this Court  in the  case referred  to above. On the other hand,  our view  that Arts.  324 to  329  have  to  be construed harmoniously flows as a logical corollary from the ratio in Ponnuswami’s case.      The pointed  an pungent  observations extracted  above, really amount  to a  Bible of the election law as culled out from an interpretation of the provisions of Arts. 324 to 329 of the Constitution, and were referred to with approval even in Mohinder Singh Gill’s case (supra). During the last three decades  this   case  has  neither  been  distinguished  nor dissented from  and still  holds  the  field  and  with  due respect, very  rightly. No  other  case  ever  made  such  a dynamic and  clear approach  to the  problem, perhaps due to the fact  that no such occasion arose because the Commission has always  been following the provisions of the Act and the Rules and  had never  attempted to arrogate to itself powers which were  not meant to belong to it. Indeed, if we were to accept the  contention of  the respondents  it would convert the Commission  into an  absolute despot  in  the  field  of election so  as to  give directions  regarding the  mode and manner of  elections by  passing the  provisions of the Act, and the  Rules purporting  to exercise powers under cover of Art, 324. If the Commission is armed with such unlimited and arbitrary powers  and if  it ever  happens that  the persons manning the  commission shares  or is wedded to a particular ideology,  he   could  by  giving  odd  directions  cause  a political havoc  or bring  about  a  constitutional  crisis, setting  at   naught  the   integrity  and  independence  of electoral process,  so important  and indispensable  to  the democratic system.      Further, such  an absolute  and uncanalised power given to the  Commission without  providing any  guidelines  would itself destroy the basic structure of the Rule of Law. It is manifest 86 that such  a disastrous  consequence could  never have  been contemplated  by   the  Constitution  makers,  for  such  an interpretation,  as   suggested  by   the  counsel  for  the respondent, would  be far  from attaining the goal of purity and sanctity  of  the  electoral  process.  Hence,  we  must construe Arts.  324 to  329 as  an integral part of the same scheme collaborating rather than colliding with one another. Moreover, a  perusal of  Arts. 324  to 329 would reveal that the legislative  powers in  respect of  matters relating  to Parliament or the State Legislatures vests in Parliament and in no other body. The Commission would come into the picture only if  no provision  has been made by Parliament in regard to the  elections to  the Parliament  or State Legislatures. Furthermore,  the   power  under   Art.  324   relating   to superintendence, direction  and control was actually vesting of merely  all the  executive powers and not the legislative powers. In  other words, the legislative power of Parliament or of  the legislature of a State being made subject to Art. 324 only means that no law made by Parliament under Art. 327 or by  a State  legislature under  Art. 328 can take away or deprive the  Commission of  the executive power in regard to matters entrusted to it, viz. superintendence, direction and control of elections. The right to file an election petition directly flows  from Art.  329 and cannot be affected in any manner by  the exercise of executive power by the Commission

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under Art. 324.      In view  of the  above, it  is not  necessary for us to consider a  number of  other  authorities  that  were  cited before us as they do not appear to be directly on point.      It is  pertinent to  indicate that  the High Court fell into an  obvious fallacy  by acceptance of the position that the direction  of the  Commission was intended to operate in an uncovered field. When the Act and the Rules, prescribed a particular  method  of  voting,  the  Commission  could  not innovate a new method and contend that use of the mechanical process was  not covered by the existing law and, therefore, did not come in conflict with the law in the field.      To sum  up, therefore,  the  legal  and  constitutional position is as follows:      (a)  When there is no Parliamentary legislation or rule           made under the said legislation, the Commission is           free to  pass any orders in respect of the conduct           of elections. 87      (b)   where there  is an  Act and  express  Rules  made           thereunder it  is not  open to  the Commission  to           override the  Act or  the Rules and pass orders in           direct disobedience  to the  mandate contained  in           the Act  or the  Rules. In other words, the powers           of the  Commission are  meant to supplement rather           than supplant  the law (both statute and Rules) in           the  matter   of  superintendence,  direction  and           control as provided by Art. 324,      (c)   where the  Act  or  the  Rules  are  silent,  the           Commission has  no doubt plenary powers under Art.           324 to  give  any  direction  in  respect  of  the           conduct of election, and      (d)   where a particular direction by the Commission is           submitted  to  the  government  for  approval,  as           required by  the Rules,  it is  not  open  to  the           Commission to  go ahead  with implementation of it           at its  own sweet will even if the approval of the           Government is not given.      Apart  from   the  arguments   referred  to  above,  an alternative argument put forward before us was that even the Rules framed  under the Act authorise the Commission to give direction to  hold voting by the use of a voting machine and this is  covered by  s. 59  of the  Act and  Rule 49  of the Rules. This  argument merits  serious consideration.  In the instant case,  the main  grievance of  appellant is that the voting by  mechanical process  was  not  permissible  either under the  Act or  under the  Rules. Reliance  was, however, placed by the appellant on s.59 of the Act which runs thus:           "59. Manner of voting at elections-           At every  election where  a poll  is  taken  votes      shall be  given by  ballot in  such manner  as  may  be      prescribed, and no votes shall be received by proxy."      It is obvious that s. 59 uses the words "ballot in such manner as  may be prescribed", which means prescribed by the Rules made  under the  Act. A  reference to s. 61 of the Act would show that Parliament intended use of ballot paper only for casting of votes. This takes us to rule 49, the relevant part of which may be extracted thus:           "49.  Voting   by  ballot   at  notified   polling      stations-           (1) Notwithstanding any thing contained in the 88      preceding  provisions   of  this   Part,  the  Election      Commission  may,   by  notification  published  in  the      official Gazette  at least  15 days before the date, or

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    the first  of the  dates,  of  poll  appointed  for  an      election, direct  that the  method of  voting by ballot      shall be  followed in  that election  at  such  polling      stations as may be specified in the notification."      It was  submitted that  having regard to the modern and changing conditions of the society a dynamic approach should be made  to the  interpretation of  the aforesaid  two legal requirements. The matter does not rest here: something could be said  for the view that the word ’ballot’ includes voting by machines. Section 59 proceeds to explain its intention in setting  up  the  mode,  manner  and  method  of  voting  by prescribing express  rules as  to how  the voting  should be done. In  this connection,  reference may be made to Rule 22 which relates  to the form of ballot paper and its contents. Rule 23  requires the  Returning officer  to record  on  the counterfoil of the ballot paper the electoral roll number of the elector  as entered  in the marked copy of the electoral roll. Rule  27 refers to the return of ballot paper after an elector has  recorded his vote or made his declaration. Rule 30, which  prescribes the  contents  of  ballot  papers,  is completely contrary  to the  concept of  ballot by  machine. Similarly, Rules  33, 38,  39  and  40  seem  to  be  wholly inconsistent with  the mechanical  process but seem to adopt the conventional method. As we have already indicated, these Rules are  binding on  the Commission  and it  cannot by  an executive fiat  either override  them or act contrary to the statutory provisions of the Rules.      On a  proper and detailed analysis of these Rules it is clear that  the Act by framing the Rules completely excluded the mechanical  process which,  if resorted to, would defeat in a large measure the mandatory requirements of the Rules.      It is a well settled rule of interpretation of statutes that  words,   phrase  or  sentences  of  a  statute  should ordinarily be understood in their natural, ordinary, popular and grammatical  sense unless  such a  construction leads to absurdity. Mr.  Jethmalani argued  that the word ’ballot’ is wide  enough   to  include   the  mechanical   process  and, therefore, the  direction of  the Commission  falls squarely within the  four corners of both s. 59 and Rule 49. Reliance was placed  on the  dictionary meaning  of the word ’ballot’ which has  been defined  in Black’s  Law Dictionary  (Fourth Edn.) at page 182 thus: 89           "means act  of voting, usually in secret, by balls      or by written or printed tickets or slips of paper; the      system of  voting by balls or tickets, or by any device      for casting or recording votes, as by voting machine."      In Stroud’s  Judicial dictionary (Third Edn.), however, ’ballot’ means  "votes recorded-all  ballot papers  put into the  ballot   boxes  by  the  electors  (p.  3239)".  Stroud therefore, does not subscribe to the view of casting of vote through a voting machine and we agree with this view because casting of  votes by  machine is a mechanical process, which has come into existence long after the Act was passed and is not generally invoked in most of the democratic countries of the world.      Concise Oxford  dictionary defines  the  word  ’ballot’ thus:      "(usu. secret) voting, small ball, ticket or paper used      in voting; votes so recorded; lot-drawing."      In Webster’s  Third New  International Dictionary (Vol. 1) at page 168 ’ballot’ is defined thus:      "to obtain  a vote  from (a body of voters) (the men on      the proposal), to select by ballot or by the drawing of      lots."

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    It may  be mentioned  here that  the word  ’ballot’ has been derived  from the word ’ballot’ which existed at a time when there  was no question of any system of voting machine. Even in 1951 when the Act was passed or the Rules were made, the system  of voting  by machine  was not  in vogue in this country.  In   these  circumstances,   therefore,   we   are constrained to  hold that  the word  ’ballot’ in  its strict sense  would  not  include  voting  by  the  use  of  voting machines. Legislatures  must be  deemed to  be aware  of the modern tendencies  in various  democratic countries  of  the world where the mechanical system has been introduced and if despite the  plain meaning of the word ’ballot’ they did not choose to  extend the  definition given as far back as 1950, it may  be safely  presumed that  the Parliament intended to use the word ’ballot’ in its popular rather than a technical sense. Our  view finds  a good  deal  of  support  from  the circumstance that  even  though  the  system  of  voting  by mechanical process  was  submitted  to  the  Government  for approval yet the same was declined which shows that the rule making authority  was not  prepared to  switch over  to  the system of 90 voting by  machines, perhaps  on account of the legal bar as indicated by us.      It is  rather unfortunate that the Union of India which is a  party to  this case, has taken a very neutral stand by neither supporting  nor opposing  the direction given by the Commission.      Having regard to these circumstances, therefore, we are clearly of  the opinion  that according  to the  law  as  it stands at  present, the  order of  the Commission  directing casting of  ballot  by  machines  in  some  of  the  polling stations, as  indicated above,  was without jurisdiction and could not have been resorted to.      It was  further pointed  out by the respondent that the process  of   voting  by  machines  is  very  useful  as  it eliminates a  number of  drawbacks and expedites, to a great extent, the  declaration of  the result  of the  election by eliminating the process of counting of votes from the ballot boxes. On  the other  hand, the  appellant has pointed out a number of  defects, some  of them  being of  a vital nature, which would  defeat the  electoral  process.  We  would  now indicate some of the apparent defects which were pointed out to us  by the  counsel for  the  appellant  after  giving  a demonstration of the voting machine before us:           "The absence  of a  provision for  identifying the      candidate for whom a void vote has been cast-           (a)  by impersonating a dead voter,           (b)  by impersonating an absentee voter,           (c)  by the genuine voter who tenders a vote after                a vote  has been  cast  in  his  name  by  an                impersonator (R. 42),           (d)  where a  vote is  void having been cast after                closing time (R. 43)           (e)  where the  voter has  cast votes in more than                one  booth   in  the  same  constituency  [s.                62(2)],           (f)  where the  voter has  cast two  votes in  two                constituencies [s. 63(3)],           (g)  where the  voter is  disqualified under s. 16                of the Act [s. 62(4)], 91           (h)  where an elector marks a ballot paper wrongly                for a  candidate, he loses the right to get a                fresh  ballot  paper  for  casting  his  vote

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              correctly (R.41).      The provisions  of S.  100(1)(d) and  more so S. 101(a)      and (b)  under which  by excluding  the void  votes  or      votes cast  as a  result of corrupt practices any other      candidate can  be declared  duly elected  as  the  true      representative of the constituency."      On the  other hand,  a number of advantages which could be obtained by using the mechanical process were pointed out by the  respondent, the  sum and substance of which was that despite  some   defects  the   electoral  process  would  be expeditious and would cut out a number of delays or mistakes committed at various stages. The fact, however, remains that if the  mechanical  process  is  adopted,  full  and  proper training will have to be given to the voters which will take quite  some  time.  However,  we  refrain  from  making  any comments on  either the  defects  or  advantages  of  voting machines because  it would  be for  the Legislature  and the Government, if  it revises  its decision  at one time or the other, to  give legal sanction to the direction given by the Commission. For these reasons, it is not necessary for us to go into  the very  detailed notes  of arguments submitted by the parties in respect of this aspect of the matter.      Lastly,  it   was  argued   by  the   counsel  for  the respondents  that  the  appellant  would  be  estopped  from challenging the mechanical process because he did not oppose the introduction  of this process although he was present in the meeting  personally or  through his agent. This argument is wholly  untenable  because  when  we  are  considering  a constitutional  or  statutory  provision  there  can  be  no estoppel against  a statute and whether or not the appellant agreed or  participated in the meeting which was held before introduction of  the voting  machines, if  such a process is not permissible  or authorised  by law he cannot be estopped from challenging the same .      For the  reasons given  above, we allow the appeal, set aside the  election of the respondent with respect to the 50 polling stations  where the voting machines were used and we direct a repoll to be held in these 50 polling stations. We, however, do  not touch  or disturb  the results of the votes secured in  the other  34 polling stations which was done in accordance with law, viz., 92 the use  of ballot  papers. After  the repoll, the result of the election  would be  announced afresh  after taking  into account  the   votes  already  secured  by  the  candidates, including the Respondent. We make no order as to costs.      In course  of argument,  Mr.  Sen  for  the  Commission informed us that at eleven elections held under the Act, the mechanical device  was used  and in  nine, no  challenge has been raised.  It follows  that our  judgment will not affect those nine elections in any manner. N.V.K.                                       Appeal allowed. 93