REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO.     486              OF 2009 (Arising out of SLP (C) No. 1160 of 2005)

Yunus (Baboobhai) A Hamid Padvekar …Appellant

Versus

State of Maharashtra  Through its Secretary and Ors. …Respondents

J U D G M E N T

Dr. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J.

1. Leave granted.  

2. Challenge in this appeal is to the order passed by a Division Bench of

the Bombay High Court dismissing the Writ Petition filed by the appellant

on the ground that it was highly belated. It also noted that the appellant had

received compensation in respect of the land which was acquired.

3. Background facts in a nutshell are as follows:

In the year 1971 Maharashtra Industrial Development Corporation (in

short  ‘MIDC’) acquired about  1250 acres  of  agricultural  land situated  at

four villages in Ratnagiri district of Maharashtra. Thirty eight acres of land

belonging to the appellant were acquired. It is the stand of the appellant that

out of the acquired area, about 50% was under paddy cultivation and 25%

was under cultivation  of  mango crops.  In the appellant’s  land about  175

mango  trees  were  there.  In  the  year  1973,  the  Revenue  and  Forest

Department of the Maharashtra Government passed a resolution inter-alia

deciding to take steps in respect of surplus acquired land which remained

unutilized for a period of three years from the date of taking over possession

for resumption of such lands in accordance with the applicable rules and

orders. In 1974, a Writ Petition was filed by the appellant challenging the

Notification for acquisition and an arrangement was worked out in which 20

acres of appellant’s  land out  of 38 acres were released.   The lands were

acquired for a Govt.  company-Balco for setting up a manufacturing unit.

Since Balco did not set up any unit, license issued to it was cancelled. In the

year  1982,  appellant  claims  to  have  made  representations  alongwith

similarly situated land owners  for  restoration of  the  acquired  land to  the

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original  owners.  In  the  year  1983,  compensation  was  paid  to  686  land

owners. In 1984, again the appellant made a representation to the Collector

of  Ratnagiri  for  release  of  the  land.  On  20.7.1989  a  Committee  was

appointed by the Legislative Assembly for consideration of the proposal for

handing  back  the  acquired  land  to  the  original  owners.   Certain

recommendations were made by the said Committee. On 20.8.1992 the land

acquired for Balco was allotted to another industrial group. Subsequently,

the  State  Government  asked  the  industrial  group  not  to  continue  the

construction  activities  in  view  of  pendency  of  cases.  On  12.11.2002,

representations were again made to hand back the land not utilized. It was

the specific  stand  of  the  appellant  that  in  view of  Section  39(2a)  of  the

Maharashtra Industrial Development Act, 1961 (in short the ‘Act’) the land

should  be  restored.  The  High  Court  dismissed  the  writ  petition  on  the

ground that it was highly belated.  

4. In support of the appeal, learned counsel for the appellant stated that

the appellant was all through representing to the authorities and because of

the recommendations by the Committee, the appellant waited for some time

and  ultimately  when  no  worthwhile  action  was  taken,  he  filed  the  writ

petition.  

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5. Learned counsel for the respondent on the other hand supported the

judgment of the High Court.  

6. It  is  pointed  out  that  the  recommendations  made  in  terms  of  the

resolution were not accepted by the Government. It was decided that since

definite  policy  has  been  formulated  the  land  is  to  be  utilized  for  the

industrial  development,  the  same  cannot  be  surrendered  to  the  original

owners  for  cultivation  purposes.  It  is  also  pointed  out  that  the  so  called

representations do not in any way assist the appellant to explain the long

delay in filing the writ petition.     

7. It is also pointed out that Section 39(2a) is applicable only in respect

of  the  undeveloped  land,  and in  the  instant  case  the  land  in  question  is

developed land.  

8. Delay or laches is one of the factors which is to be borne in mind by

the High Courts when they exercise their discretionary powers under Article

226 of the Constitution of India, 1950 (in short the ‘Constitution’). In an

appropriate  case  the  High  Court  may  refuse  to  invoke  its  extraordinary

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powers if there is such negligence or omission on the part of the applicant to

assert  his  right  as  taken in  conjunction with the  lapse of  time and other

circumstances,  causes  prejudice  to  the  opposite  party.  Even  where

fundamental right is involved the matter is still within the discretion of the

Court as pointed out in  Durga Prasad v.  Chief Controller of Imports  and

Exports (AIR 1970 SC 769). Of course, the discretion has to be exercised

judicially and reasonably.

9. What  was  stated  in  this  regard  by Sir  Barnes  Peacock  in  Lindsay

Petroleum Company v.  Prosper Armstrong Hurde etc. (1874) 5 PC 221 at

page  239  was approved by this  Court  in   Moon  Mills  Ltd.  v.  Industrial

Courts (AIR 1967 SC 1450) and  Maharashtra State Transport Corporation

v.  Balwant  Regular  Motor  Service (AIR 1969 SC 329),  Sir  Barnes   had

stated:

“Now the doctrine of laches in Courts of Equity is not an arbitrary  or  technical  doctrine.  Where  it  would  be practically  unjust  to  give  a  remedy either  because  the party has, by his conduct done that which might fairly be regarded as equivalent to a waiver of it, or where by his conduct and neglect he has though perhaps not waiving that  remedy,  yet  put  the  other  party  in  a  situation  in which  it  would  not  be  reasonable  to  place  him if  the remedy were afterwards to be asserted, in either of these cases, lapse of time and delay are most material. But in every  case,  if  an  argument  against  relief,  which otherwise  would  be  just,  if  founded  upon  mere  delay,

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that delay of course not amounting to a bar by any statute of limitation, the validity of that defence must be tried upon  principles  substantially  equitable.  Two circumstances  always  important  in  such  cases  are,  the length of the delay and the nature of the acts done during the interval which might affect either party and cause a balance of justice or injustice in taking the one course or the other, so far as relates to the remedy.”

10. It  would  be  appropriate  to  note  certain  decisions  of  this  Court  in

which  this  aspect  has  been dealt  with  in  relation  with  Article  32  of  the

Constitution. It is apparent that what has been stated as regards that Article

would  apply,  a  fortiori,  to  Article  226.  It  was  observed  in  R.N Bose v.

Union  of  India (AIR  1970  SC  470)  that  no  relief  can  be  given  to  the

petitioner who without  any reasonable  explanation approaches this  Court

under Article 32 after inordinate delay. It was stated that though Article 32

is  itself  a  guaranteed  right,  it  does  not  follow from this  that  it  was  the

intention  of  the  Constitution  makers  that  this  Court  should  disregard  all

principles and grant relief in petitions filed after inordinate delay.  

11. It was stated in State of M.P. v. Nandlal (AIR 1987 SC 251) that the

High Court in exercise of its discretion does not ordinarily assist the tardy

and the indolent or the acquiescent and the lethargic. If there is inordinate

delay  on  the  part  of  the  petitioner  and  such  delay  is  not  satisfactorily

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explained,  the  High  Court  may  decline  to  intervene  and  grant  relief  in

exercise of its writ jurisdiction. It was stated that this rule is premised on a

number  of  factors.  The  High  Court  does  not  ordinarily  permit  a  belated

resort to the extraordinary remedy because it  is likely to cause confusion

and public inconvenience and bring in its trail new injustices, and if writ

jurisdiction is exercised after unreasonable delay, it may have the effect of

inflicting not only hardship and inconvenience but also injustice on third

parties.  It  was  pointed  out  that  when  writ  jurisdiction  is  invoked,

unexplained  delay  coupled  with  the  creation  of  third  party  rights  in  the

meantime is an important factor which also weighs with the High Court in

deciding whether or not to exercise such jurisdiction.

12. In view of the aforesaid position we are not inclined to interfere in

this appeal which is dismissed accordingly.  

……………………………….J. (Dr. ARIJIT PASAYAT)

…………………………….…J. (ASOK KUMAR GANGULY)

New Delhi, January 28, 2009

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