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PETITIONER: YEDIDA CHAKRADHARARAO (DEAD) THROUGH HISL.RS. & ORS. ETC.

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH & ORS. ETC.

DATE OF JUDGMENT29/03/1990

BENCH: KANIA, M.H. BENCH: KANIA, M.H. MUKHARJI, SABYASACHI (CJ) RAY, B.C. (J) SAIKIA, K.N. (J) AGRAWAL, S.C. (J)

CITATION:  1990 SCR  (2) 220        1990 SCC  (2) 523  JT 1990 (2)     1        1990 SCALE  (1)628

ACT:     Andhra  Pradesh  Land Reforms (Ceiling  on  Agricultural Holdings)  Act.  1973: S. 3(i)--Land  sold  under  agreement performance  of  agreement by delivery  of  possession--Such land   whether  could  be  included  in  the   holdings   of owner/vendor as well as purchaser.

HEADNOTE:     Sub-section  (i)  of  s. 3 of the  Andhra  Pradesh  Land Reforms (Ceiling on Agricultural Holdings) Act, 1973 defines the expression "holding" as meaning the entire land held  by a person as an owner, a limited owner, usufructuary  mortga- gee, a tenant and as one who is in possession by virtue of a mortgage by conditional sale or through part performance  of a  contract  of sale. The Explanation  thereto  states  that where  the same land is held by one person in  one  capacity and by another person in any other capacity such land  shall be included in the holding of both such persons.     The  appellants/petitioners had  alienated  agricultural lands  under agreements of sale and the possession of  these lands  was delivered in part performance of the said  agree- ments but no conveyance of the said lands had been  executed till  the relevant date. A question arose whether such  land could  be  excluded  from the holding  of  the  owner-vendor within  the meaning of the Act. The Land  Reforms  Appellate Tribunal found that the vendees alone were in possession and enjoyment of the respective lands and, therefore, the appel- lants  could not be said to be holding the said  lands.  The High Court held that the lands covered by the agreements  of sale  have to be included in the holdings of the  appellants as well.     In  these appeals and special leave petitions  filed  by them  it  was contended that use of the word ’held’  in  the definition  in  s.  3(i) indicates that the  person  who  is supposed to hold the land must necessarily be the person  in possession  of the said land and hence where, in  part  per- formance  of  an  agreement of sale or under  a  lease,  the purchaser or lessee has been put in possession of any  land, the owner of the said land cannot any longer be regarded  as

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holding the same, and that although the 221 Explanation to sub-s.(i) of s.3 was very widely worded,  its meaning  could not be so extended as to cover a  case  where the owner of the land had parted with the possession thereof under an agreement creating a right, legal or equitable,  in the land concerned. Dismissing the appeals and the special leave petitions,  the Court,     HELD:  1.  The Andhra Pradesh Land Reforms  (Ceiling  on Agricultural  Holdings)  Act, 1973 is a  piece  of  agrarian legislation enacted with a view to achieve a more  equitable distribution  of  land for common good and with  a  view  to subserve  the  objectives  enshrined in Article  39  of  the Constitution, being one of the Directive Principles embodied in  the Constitution. Provisions of such a legislation  have to  be interpreted liberally and with a view  to  furthering the object of the legislation. [226B-C]     2.1 The very language of sub-s.(i) of s.3 indicates that a  person can ’hold’ land for the purposes of the Act as  an owner, as a limited owner, as a usufructuary mortgagee, as a tenant and as one who is in possession by virtue of a  mort- gage  by conditional sale or through part performance  of  a contract of sale. The Explanation thereto in plain  language states  that the same land can be held by one person in  one capacity  and by another person in a different capacity  and provides that such land shall be included in the holdings of both such persons. The Explanation thus clearly contemplates that the same land can be "held" as contemplated under  sub- s.  (i) by one person as the owner and by another person  as his  lessee or as a person to whom the owner  has  delivered possession  of the land in part performance of an  agreement to sell. It cannot, ,therefore, be said that only where  the land is in possession of a person can that land be  regarded as held by him. 1226G-227B]     2.2  The Explanation to s. 3(i) was incorporated in  the Andhra Pradesh Land Reforms Act because the legislature took the  view that, but for such a drastic provision,  it  would not  be possible to effectively implement the provisions  of the  said Act regarding the acquisition and distribution  of the  surplus land to the landless and other  deserving  per- sons.  If the legislature has used language in s.  3(i)  and the Explanation thereto which on a plain reading shows  that in  case of land covered under an agreement for sale  or  an agreement of lease, even though the purchaser or the  lessee might be in possession of the land, it would be included  in the  holdings of both of the purchaser as well.as the  owner or the lessee and the owner, there is no reason to cut  down the plain meaning of the language employed in that provision [230B, C-D] 222     State  of Andhra Pradesh v. Mohd. Ashrafuddin, [1982]  3 SCR  482  applied; Begulla Bapi Raju etc. etc. v.  State  of Andhra Pradesh etc. etc., [1983] 3 SCR 701 referred to.     Burmah  Shell oil Storage and Distributing Co. of  India Ltd.  & Anr. v. The Commercial Tax Officer & Ors., [1961]  1 SCR 902, distinguished.     The  Authorised  Officer (LR),  Vijayawada  v.  Kalyanam China Venkata Narasayya, [1978] 1 A.P. Law Journal 98  over- ruled.

JUDGMENT:     CIVIL  APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 3388  of

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1984. etc.     From the Judgment and Order dated 4.4.1989 of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in C.R.P. No. 1450 of 1981.     A.K.  Sen, C. Sitaramiah, P.A. Chaudhary, K.  Jagannatha Rao,  P.R.  Ramachandra Murthy, Mrs. Anjani, K.  Ram  Kumar, Y.P.  Rao,  P.S.R. Murhty, B. Kanta Rao, N.D.B.  Raju,  R.N. Keshwani, R.F. Nariman, Raj Kumar Gupta, P.C. Kapur,  Rajen- dra Chaudhary, A. Subba Rao, K.R. Nagaraja, P.K. Rao, A.T.M. Sampath,  P.N. Ramalingam, R. Venkatramani, G.  Narasimhulu, G.N. Rao and S.K. Sucharita for the Appellants.     K.  Parasaran, T.V.S.N. Chari, Mrs. B. Sunita  Rao,  Ms. Manjula Gupta and V. Sekhar for the Respondents. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by     KANIA,  J. This is a group of matters  comprising  Civil Appeal No. 3388 of 1984 in this Court and other cases  which have  been  placed  before us for hearing  along  with  this appeal. We propose to deal first with Civil Appeal No.  3388 of 1984.     This  appeal  by  special leave is  directed  against  a judgment of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in Civil  Revision Petition  No.  1450 of 1981. The question  involved  in  the appeal  before the High Court from which this appeal  arises was  whether  land which has been agreed to be sold  by  the owner under an agreement of sale and possession of which was delivered in part performance of the agreement .for sale but pursuant  to which no conveyance had been executed till  the relevant date, could be included both in the holding of  the owner-vendor as 223 well as the purchaser or whether it was liable to be includ- ed only in the holding of the purchaser for the purposes  of the  Andhra  Pradesh Land Reforms (Ceiling  on  Agricultural Holdings)  Act, 1973 (hereinafter referred to as  ’the  said Act’).     There  are a number of connected matters where the  same question is involved and which have been placed for  hearing before us. In some of these cases, a part of the  considera- tion has been paid and in a few others, the entire consider- ation  has  been  paid. It has also been  alleged  that  the possession  of  the land was transferred  to  the  purchaser pursuant  to the agreements of sale referred to. In some  of these  cases, lands belonging to the owners have been  given on  lease to tenants who are in possession thereof  as  les- sees.     In  order to appreciate the controversy  arising  before us, it is necessary to bear in mind the relevant  provisions of the said Act. Before the said Act was enacted, there  was in  force in Andhra Pradesh an Act entitled  Andhra  Pradesh (Ceiling on Agricultural Holdings) Act, 1961 which  provided for the imposition of a ceiling on holdings of  agricultural land.  After that Act had been in force for some  time,  the Central  Committee on Land Reforms made certain  recommenda- tions  regarding  the fixation of  ceiling  on  agricultural holdings and in line with this proposed policy, the said Act was enacted in 1973 to bring about comprehensive legislation for  the imposition of ceiling on agricultural  holdings  in the  State of Andhra Pradesh and with a view to replace  the aforesaid Act of 1961 as well as Andhra Pradesh Agricultural Lands  (Prohibition of Alienation Act, 1972). The object  of the legislation was to take over the lands in excess of  the ceiling prescribed and to distribute the same among landless and other deserving persons to subserve the common good. The said Act was included in the Ninth Schedule to the Constitu- tion at Item 67 by the Constitution 34th (Amendment) Act and was protected under Article 31-A. The object of the said Act

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was  agrarian reform. Under sub-section (c) of section 3  of the said Act ’ceiling area’ is defined as under: "3(c): ’ceiling area’ means the extent of land specified  in section 4 or section 4-A to be ceiling area." It  may  be mentioned here that the  agricultural  land  was classified into wet land, dry land and so on and appropriate areas were fixed as ceiling in respect of such lands  taking into  account the nature and yield capacity of the lands  in question. Section 3(i) runs as follows: 224 "3(i): ’holding’ means the entire land held by a person-- (i) as an owner; (ii) as a limited owner; (iii) as an usufructuary mortgagee; (iv) as a tenant; (v)  who is in possession by virtue of a mortgage by  condi- tional  sale or through part performance of a  contract  for the  sale  of land or otherwise; or in one or more  of  such capacities;  and  the  expression ’to hold  land’  shall  be construed accordingly; Explanation:  Where the same land is held by one  person  in one  capacity and by another person in any  other  capacity, such  land  shall be included in the holding  of  both  such persons." Section  3(m) provides that "notified date" means  the  date notified  under  sub-section (3) of section 1 on  which  the said  Act  came  into force. It may be  mentioned  that  the notified  date in respect of the said Act is 1.1.1975.  Very briefly  stated,  under section 4, the ceiling area  in  the case  of  a  family unit consisting of not  more  than  five members  was prescribed as one standard holding.  Where  the family  consisted  of  more than five  members,  there  was, broadly  speaking, a proportionate increase in  the  ceiling area. Under section 5, the standard holding is fixed  taking into account the classification of the land according to the nature  of  the land. Sub-section (1) of section 7  runs  as follows: "7(1).  Special provision in respect of  certain  transfers, etc. already made: Where  on  or after the 24th January, 1971  but  before  the notified date, any person has transferred whether by way  of sale,  gift,  usufructuary mortgage,  exchange,  settlement, surrender  or in any other manner whatsoever, any land  held by him or created a trust of any land held by him, then  the burden  of proving that such transfer or creation  of  trust has not been effected in anticipation of, and with a view to avoiding  or defeating the objects of any law relating to  a reduction in the ceiling on agricultural holdings, shall  be on 225 such  person, and where he has not so proved, such  transfer or  creation of trust, shall be disregarded for the  purpose of the computation of the ceiling area of such person."     Very  briefly stated, sub-section (2) of section 7  pro- vides  inter alia that any alienation made. by way of  sale, lease  for  a period exceeding six  years,  gift,  exchange, usufructuary  mortgage or otherwise as set out in  the  said sub-section  on or after 2nd May, 1972 and before the  noti- fied date in contravention of the Andhra Pradesh Agricultur- al Land (Prohibition of Alienation) Act, 1972 shall be  null and  void. The other sub-sections also provide that  in  the various other circumstances set out therein alienations made will be disregarded for purposes of fixation of ceiling.     Section  8 provides, in brief, that every  person  whose holding  on the notified date together with any land  trans-

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ferred  by  him on or after 24th January, 1971  exceeds  the specified  limits,  shall within 30 days from  the  notified date,  namely 1.1. 1975 or such extended period as the  Gov- ernment  may notify in that behalf furnish a declaration  in respect of his holding to the competent Tribunal.     Section  9 deals with determination of the ceiling  area by  the  Tribunal constituted under Section  6.  Section  10 deals  with  the surrender of lands in certain  cases.  Sub- section  (5) of the said section provides that it  shall  be open  to the Tribunal to refuse to accept the  surrender  of any  land  as contemplated under sub-section (1)  or  deemed surrender  of land as contemplated under sub-section (4)  of the said section in the circumstances set out in sub-section (5). Section 11 deals with the vesting of surrendered lands.     Section  12  deals with revision and  vesting  of  lands surrendered. The opening part of that section provides  that where any land is surrendered or deemed to have been surren- dered under the said Act by any usufructuary mortgagee or  a tenant,  the possession of such land shall, subject to  such rules,  as may be prescribed, revert to the owner.  Sub-sec- tion  (4)  of  section 12 provides that where  any  land  is surrendered or is deemed to have been surrendered under  the said Act by any person in possession by virtue of a mortgage by  conditional sale or through a part performance  of  con- tract  for  sale or otherwise the possession  of  such  land shall subject to such rules as may be prescribed, revert  to the owner. Sub-section (5-A) make an analogous provision  in connection  with  lands surrendered by  limited  owners  and provides  that  such surrendered lands shall revert  to  the person having a vested interest in the remainder. 226     Section  13  makes special provision for  the  exclusion from the holding of the owner of land belonging to him  held by a protected tenant where such land or part thereof stands transferred to the protected tenant under Section 38A of the Andhra  Pradesh  (Telengana Area) Tenancy  and  Agricultural Land Act, 1950.     Before  going into the merits of the  contentions  urged and considering the proper interpretation to be given to the relevant  sections of the said Act, we cannot lose sight  of the  fact that the said Act is a piece of agrarian  legisla- tion enacted with a view to achieve a more equitable distri- bution of lands for common good and with a view to  subserve the objectives enshrined in Article 39 of the  Constitution, being  one of the Directive Principles embodied in the  Con- stitution.  Provisions  of  such a legislation  have  to  be interpreted  liberally  and with a view  to  furthering  the object of the legislation and not with a view to defeat  the same  in a strict and constricted manner in which  a  taxing law, for instance, might be interpreted.     The  main submission of learned counsel for  the  appel- lants  is that the expression ’holding’ has been defined  in sub-section (i) of Section 3 of the said Act, the definition section set out earlier, as meaning the entire land held  by a  person (emphasis supplied) and that the use of  the  said word "held" in the definition indicates that the person  who is supposed to hold the land, must necessarily be the person in  possession  of the said land; and hence where,  in  part performance  of an agreement for sale or under a lease,  the purchaser or lessee has been put in possession of any  land, the owner of the said land cannot any longer be regarded  as holding  the said land and it cannot be said that  the  said land  is  held by him. It was submitted by  learned  counsel that  in  view of this context although the  Explanation  to sub-section  (i)  of section 3 is very  widely  worded,  its

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meaning  cannot be so extended as to cover a case where  the owner of the land is no longer in possession of the land and has  parted with the possession thereof under  an  agreement creating a right, legal or equitable, in the land concerned. We find it difficult to accept this contention. Clauses  (i) to  (v) of subsection (i) of section 3 set out  the  various capacities in which a person can be said to "hold" land  for the purposes of the said Act and among these capacities  are "as a usufructuary mortgagee, as a tenant and as one who  is in possession by virtue of a mortgage by conditional sale or through  part performance of a contract of sale".  The  very language of sub-section (i) of section 3 indicates that land can  be  held  as contemplated in the  said  sub-section  by persons in a number of capacities. The Explanation in  plain language states that the same land can be held by 227 one  person in one capacity and by another person in a  dif- ferent capacity and provides that such land shall be includ- ed  in  the holdings of both such persons.  The  Explanation thus clearly contemplates that the same land can be held  as contemplated  under-sub-section  (i) by one  person  as  the owner and by another person as his lessee or as a person  to whom the owner has delivered possession of the land in  part performance  of an agreement to sell. On a plain reading  of the language used in the Explanation, we find it that it  is not  possible to accept the submission that only  where  the land is in possession of a person can that land be  regarded as held by him.     Apart from what we have pointed out earlier we find that the  question which arises before us in this appeal  is  al- ready  covered  by the decision of this Court  in  State  of Andhra  Pradesh v. Mohd. Ashrafuddin, [1982] 3 SCR 482.  The facts of the case were that out of the total holding of  his land the respondent transferred some land to another  person under  two unregistered sale deeds pursuant to an  agreement for sale and gifted.away some land to his son. In the return submitted  by him under the said Act the respondent did  not include in his holding the area transferred under the unreg- istered  sale deeds or the land gifted by him which  was  in the possession of the purchaser and donee respectively.  The Land  Reforms Tribunal ignoring the two  transfers  computed his  holding at 1.7692 standard holding and called upon  him to surrender land equivalent to 0.7692 standard holding.  In revision,  the  High Court held that  the  land  transferred under the two sale deeds could not be included in the  hold- ing of the respondent for ascertaining the ceiling area.  In coming  to this conclusion, the High Court gave the  benefit of section 53A of the Transfer of Property Act to the person in possession of the plot pursuant to the contract for  sale and treated the land as a part of his holding. On appeal  to this court, a Division Bench comprising three learned Judges of  this Court reversed the decision of the High  Court  and held  that the High Court was in error in holding  that  the land in the possession of the transferee cannot be taken  to be  a part of the holding of the respondent. It was held  by this  Court that the expression "held" connotes both  owner- ship as well as possession. In the context of the definition it  is not possible to interpret the term "holding" only  in the  sense of possession. The Explanation to the  definition of  the  term "holding" clearly contemplates that  the  same land can be the holding of two different persons holding the land in different capacities, (See page 486). The Court went on to state that: "It  is  by  now well settled that a  person  in  possession pursuant  to a contract for sale does not get title  to  the

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land 228 unless there is a valid document of title in his favour.  In the  instant case it has already been pointed out  that  the transferee came into possession in pursuance of an agreement for  sale  but no valid deed of title was  executed  in  his favour. Therefore, the ownership remained with the  respond- ent-transferor.  But even in the absence of a valid deed  of title  the possession pursuant to an agreement  of  transfer cannot be said to be illegal and the transferee is  entitled to remain in possession" The Court went on to observe that: "There  may  conceivably  be cases where the  same  land  is included  in holding of two persons in different  capacities and serious prejudice might be caused to one or both of them if  they were asked to surrender the excess area.  To  safe- guard the interest of the owners in such a case the legisla- ture  has made a provision in section 12(4) and (5)  of  the Act. Even so there might be cases where some prejudice might be caused to some tenure holders." The Court further observed that: "But  if the definition of the term ’holding’ is couched  in clear and unambiguous language the court has to accept it as it  stands. So construed the same land can be a part of  the holding  of various persons holding it in different  capaci- ties.  When the terms of the definition are clear and  unam- biguous  there is no question of taking extraneous  aid  for construing it."     The correctness of this decision has been upheld by this court  in  Begulla Bapi Raju etc. etc. v.  State  of  Andhra Pradesh  etc.  etc., [1983] 3 SCR 70 1 at p. 7 17.  In  that case one of the contentions urged on behalf of the petition- ers  was  that  land transferred by  the  petitioners  under various  transfer  deeds to the outsiders and  who  came  in possession also could not be included in the holding of  the petitioners. This argument was negatived by a Bench compris- ing  three learned Judges of this Court, which followed  the decision of this Court in Mohd. Ashrafuddin’s case  (supra), and  did not accept the plea that the decision in that  case required reconsideration. The question raised for our determination in this appeal is 229 directly  covered against the appellant by the decisions  of this  Court  in two cases just referred to by us.  In  these circumstances,  even assuming that there is another  equally plausible  view  regarding the construction  and  the  legal effect  of section 3(i) of the said Act read  with  Explana- tion,  that would not necessarily justify our  reconsidering the  question which has already been decided by this  Court, although  the  decision was rendered by a  Bench  comprising only  three  learned Judges of this Court. In  our  opinion, unless we find that the decisions in the aforesaid cases are erroneous, it would not be proper on our part to  reconsider the  same. Apart from this, as we have pointed out  earlier, in our view, considering the clear language of section  3(i) of  the said Act read with Explanation to that section,  the view  taken  in Mohd. Ashrafuddin’s case  (supra)  is,  with respect,  the correct view, and we are inclined to take  the same  view  on  the construction and legal  effect  of  that provision.     Learned counsel for the appellant sought to place  reli- ance  on  the  decision of a Division Bench  of  the  Andhra Pradesh High Court in The Authorised Officer (LR), Vijayawa- da  v. Kalyanam China Venkata Narasayya, [1978] 1  A.P.  Law Journal  98.  In that case a Division Bench  of  the  Andhra

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Pradesh  High Court took the view that, if the owner of  the land  has  put the transferee in possession of the  land  in part  performance of a contract for sale, such land  can  be included  only in the holding of the transferee  and  cannot simultaneously be computed in the holding of the  transferor as  well, for that land is not "held" by him as an  "owner". It  could be included in the holding of the transferor  only as  and  when the transferee surrenders that land  and  that land reverts to the transferor as provided under section  12 of the said Act. The Division Bench also took the view  that the  expression  "holding"  and the expression  "held  by  a person"  occurring in section 3(i) of the said Act  must  be construed as taking in the idea of actual possession and not merely  any right, title or interest in the land  devoid  of actual  possession.  In our view, this  decision  cannot  be regarded  as  laying d,own good law and must be  treated  as overruled by the decisions of this Court in Mohd.  Ashrafud- din’s case (supra) and Begulla Bapi Raju’s case (supra).  We cannot  lose sight of the fact that the said Act is a  piece of agrarian reform legislation passed with a view to  effec- tively fix a ceiling on agricultural holdings and to achieve equitable  distribution of surplus land among  the  landless and  the  other  deserving persons. The  plain  language  of section  3(i) read with Explanation supports the view  taken by  this  Court in Mohd. Ashrafuddin’s case (supra).  1t  is true  that  the Division Bench of the  Andhra  Pradesh  High Court in the aforesaid judgment has given certain examples 230 where  the  interpretation  which has been  given  in  Mohd. Ashrafuddin’s  case  (supra), might lead to  some  hardship. That,  however, in our opinion, cannot  justify  restricting the effect of the plain language of the relevant  provisions in  the  manner  done by the Division Bench  of  the  Andhra Pradesh  High  Court. The Explanation to  section  3(i)  was incorporated  in the said Act because the  legislature  took the  view that, but for such a drastic provision,  it  would not  be possible to effectively implement the provisions  of the  said Act regarding the acquisition of surplus land  and distribution  of  the surplus land to the landless  and  the other  deserving persons. It is a notorious fact that  there were  a large number of cases where agreements for  sale  or documents for lease in respect of excess lands were executed by owners of lands in excess Of the ceiling area with a view to defeat the provisions of the said Act. In fact, a perusal of the facts in the cases before us generally lends  support to  the  existence  of such a situation.  In  these  circum- stances,  if  the legislature has used language  in  section 3(i) and the Explanation thereto which, on a plain  reading, shows  that in case of land covered under an  agreement  for sale or an agreement of lease, even though the purchaser  or the  lessee might be in possession of the land, it would  be included in the holdings of both of the purchaser as well as the  owner or the lessee and the owner, we see no reason  to cut down the plain meaning of the language employed in  that provision,  merely because that it might possibly result  in hardship  in few cases. Moreover we find that, to  some  ex- tent, the legislature has tried to mitigate this hardship by providing that, if the purchaser under the agreement of sale or  the  lessee  has in his holding land in  excess  of  the ceiling  area, such excess would revert to the owner of  the land.  If  the interpretation sought to be  put  by  learned counsel  for  the appellants, which finds support  from  the aforementioned  decision of the Andhra Pradesh  High  Court, were correct, we fail to see why such a provision as  afore- stated for reversion of excess land to the owner should have

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been made.     It  was contended by learned counsel for the  appellants that  if the construction placed on the said  provisions  by the  judgment  of the Division Bench of the  Andhra  Pradesh High Court in the aforesaid judgment was accepted, it is not as  if the object of the said legislation would be  defeated because  where an agreement for sale or agreement  of  lease cannot be shown to be bona fide, the land would be  included in the holding of the owner. This circumstance. however.  is of  a  little avail. Where such agreements for  sale  or  of lease are executed in writing and possession is handed  over to  the purchaser or the lessee, it would be very  difficult to show that the transaction was not bona fide although  the agreement might well have been executed really with a 231 view  to  defeat the provisions of the said Act.  We  cannot lose sight of the fact that section 3(i) and the Explanation only deals with cases where the transfer of ownership is not complete  and  the owner does not part completely  with  his legal  interest in the land, so that on the  termination  of the  agreement  for sale or agreement of lease  without  any document  being registered, the land would fully  revert  to the  owner. Moreover, in many cases, it was found  that  the owner  of the land himself continued to cultivate  the  land claiming  that he was doing so on behalf of his son who  was the  lessee  or the purchaser under an agreement.  In  these circumstances,  we  fail to see any reason to cut  down  the plain  meaning  of the provisions of section  3(i)  and  the Explanation thereto.     It  was submitted by learned counsel for the  appellants that the definition of the word ’holding’ contained in  sub- section  (i) of section 3 was an exhaustive  definition  and that  definition contained in the main section could not  be interpreted in the light of the Explanation thereto. It  was submitted by him that the meaning of the term ’holding’  and ’held’ in sub-section (i) of section 3 could not be governed by  the Explanation. In support of the contention,  reliance was  placed on a decision of this Court in Burmah Shell  Oil Storage  and  Distributing Co. of India Ltd. & Anr.  v.  The Commercial  Tax Officer and Others, [1961] 1 SCR 902 at  pp. 914-917.  In  our opinion, this decision is  hardly  of  any assistance in the matter before us. It is well settled  that the provisions in an Act have to be read harmoniously and in the  light of the context in which they occur. In our  opin- ion, there can be no quarrel with the reliance being  placed on the Explanation in order to understand the meaning of the term "holding" and "held" used in sub-section (i) of section 3  of the said Act. Although some other decisions have  been referred to us, we do not think any useful purpose would  be served  by discussing the same in view of what we  have  ob- served  earlier, nor would it serve any purpose to refer  to the  various examples of ownership set out in  the  American Jurisprudence to which our attention was drawn.     In the result, in our opinion, there is no merit in  the appeal  and the same must fail and is dismissed. Looking  to the facts and circumstances of the case, we, however, direct that there will be no order as to costs of the appeal.     The  other  connected Civil Appeals  and  Special  Leave Petitions  have  all  been directed to be  tagged  with  the aforesaid Civil Appeal disposed of by us as they involve the same points as raised in the said 232 Civil Appeal. Following our decision, the said Civil Appeals and  the Special Leave Petitions are dismissed but  with  no order as to costs.

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   In view of the dismissal of all the Appeals and  Special Leave  Petitions, the Civil Miscellaneous Petitions  therein do  not  survive and all are dismissed with no order  as  to costs. Interim orders, if any, are vacated.                                           Appeals and P.S. S                              Petitions dismissed. 233