REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO.2432 OF 2002

Y. Satyanarayan Reddy … Appellant

Versus

The Mandal Revenue Officer, A.P. … Respondent

J U D G M E N T

AFTAB ALAM, J.

1. This appeal arises from a proceeding under the Andhra Pradesh Land Grabbing  

(Prohibition) Act, 1982 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act’), and the appellant seeks to  

challenge the order passed by the Andhra Pradesh High Court setting aside the order of  

the Special  Court  holding the appellant  entitled to continue in possession over the  

government  land  under  his  unauthorised  occupation  on  payment  of  Rs.15,50,000/-  

(being the market value of the land, determined by the Court, as on the date of the  

order), as compensation, within 2 months from the date of its order.  

2. What perhaps led to the grant of leave for this appeal and what obliges us to  

dispose it of by writing a proper judgment is an earlier decision by the Andhra Pradesh

High Court that took a view contrary to the view taken in the present judgment and  

order  coming  under  appeal.  Otherwise,  the  matter  does  not  seem  to  merit  much  

consideration by this Court.

3. The  Mandal  Revenue  Officer,  Saroornagar  Mandal,  District  Ranga  Reddy  

(Respondent in this appeal) filed an application (LGOP No. 317 of 1988) before the  

Land Grabbing Tribunal-cum-District Judge, Ranga Reddy stating that the appellant  

had unauthorisedly encroached upon 1 Acre and 21 Guntas of Government land in  

Sy.No.86 of village Lingojiguda at Saroornagar Mandal. It was further stated that the  

land in question was covered by G.O.Ms. No.1122 dated 21/6/1961 and the land in the  

Lingojiguda village was mentioned at Serial No.16 in Annexure 4 of ‘list of villages’  

falling under Urban spread area where assignment is totally prohibited under  G.O.Ms.  

No.1409 dated 19/8/1978. It was also stated that the land in question was meant for  

public purpose.  The respondent made the prayer before the Tribunal  to declare the  

appellant as “land grabber” and direct his eviction.

4. The appellant filed his counter in which he admitted that the land forming the  

subject-matter of the proceeding was Government land. He, however, took the plea  

that  the  land  in  question  was  surrounded  from all  sides  by  his  land  and  he  was,  

therefore,  eligible  to seek assignment  of the area  under his  occupation in terms of  

G.O.Ms. No.1406 dated 25/7/1958. He further stated that in regard to that piece of land  

he had instituted a suit  for  declaration of title  and perpetual  injunction which was  

pending adjudication.        

5. In the first round the Tribunal found and held that the land forming the subject-

matter of the proceeding was in fact Government land and the appellant was in its  

unauthorised  occupation.  It,  accordingly,  directed  the  appellant  to  hand  over  

possession  of  the  land  to  the  respondent.  In  appeal,  however,  the  Special  Court  

remanded the matter to the Tribunal asking it to consider whether or not, the disputed  

land was required for any public purpose. Further, in case it was not required for any  

public purpose what would be its market value, on the date of the order, having regard  

to the nature of its use?

6. In the second round the Tribunal, by its order dated 6 March, 1996, found and  

held that  the  land  forming the  subject-matter  of  the  proceeding  could be used for  

providing house  sites  to  weaker  sections  and it  was,  therefore,  required for  public  

purpose. It further observed that allowing the appellant to continue in possession of the  

disputed land on payment  of  compensation  would defeat  the  purpose of  providing  

house sites to the weaker sections.  However,  as required by the Special  Court,  the  

Tribunal proceeded to determine the market value of the land and fixed its value, as on  

the date of the order, at Rs.10 lakhs per Acre. In light of its findings, the Tribunal held  

that the disputed land could not be assigned to the appellant who was a “land grabber”  

and he was liable to hand over possession of  the  disputed  land to  the  respondent.  

Hence,  the  Tribunal  once  again  allowed  the  petition  filed  by  the  respondent  and  

directed  the  appellant  to  hand  over  possession  of  the  land  to  the  Government

authorities within two months from the date of the order failing which the Mandal  

Land Revenue Officer would be free to take possession of the disputed land.

7. In  appeal,  the  Special  Court  upheld  the  finding  that  the  disputed  land  was  

Government property. It however, did not agree with the Tribunal that the land was  

required for any public purpose. The Special Court then stated the premise that it was  

open to the Court to deny restoration of possession of the grabbed land to its owner (in  

this case the State Government) and in lieu of possession levy compensation on the  

“land grabber”, in case it was satisfied that the grabbed land was not required for any  

public purpose. The Special Court observed that the appellant was having his lands  

almost around the land in question and though he had not acquired title by adverse  

possession, it had been in his possession for a long time. The land forming the subject-

matter of the proceeding was required by the appellant for the beneficial enjoyment of  

his other properties, Sy. Nos.84, 85, 87 and 88. Accordingly, the Special Court allowed  

the appellant’s appeal vide order dated 24 September, 1996 and gave the following  

direction:

“Accordingly,  in  the  event  of  the  appellant  depositing  the  sum  of  Rs.15,50,000/-  within  two  months  from  today  in  this  Special  Court,  the  appellant  is  entitled to continue in possession of  the same failing which the  concerned  Revenue  Divisional  Officer  is  directed  to  take  delivery  of  the  schedule land and intimate compliance to this Special Court. Accordingly, the  appeal is ordered. No costs.”    

8. The Mandal Revenue Officer challenged the order of the Special Court before  

the Andhra Pradesh High Court in W.P. No. 21506 of 1997.   

9. A  division  bench  of  the  High  Court,  hearing  the  writ  petition,  framed  the  

following two issues for consideration, arising in light of the rival contentions:  

1. Whether the Land Grabbing Tribunal or the Special Court constituted under  

the A.P. Land Grabbing (Prohibition) Act,  is empowered to determine the  

market  value of  the grabbed land and direct  the  complainant  before it  to  

receive such market value from the land grabber in lieu of the grabbed land?

2. Whether the Land Grabbing Tribunal or the Special Court has the power to  

examine the question as to whether a particular grabbed land is required for  

public purpose or not?

10. On a detailed consideration of the different provisions of the Act, the High Court  

answered the first issue as follows:

“Having regard to our above discussion, we have no hesitation to hold that the  Land Grabbing Tribunal or the Special Court constituted under the provisions of  the Act except having the competency of determining the compensation to be  paid to the land owner by the land grabber  for wrongful possession,  has no  power or authority to determine the market value of the grabbed land and direct  the land owner to receive such market value from the land grabber in lieu of the  grabbed land to be retained by the land grabber.”

It answered the second issue as follows:

“Neither the scheme of the A.P. Land Grabbing (Prohibition) Act, 1982 nor the  provisions contemplated thereunder, empower the Land Grabbing Tribunals or  Special Court, to go into the question as to whether a particular land is required  for  public  purpose  or  not,  which  domain  is  exclusively  vested  with  the  competent Government”

11. We have carefully gone through the High Court judgment coming under appeal  

and we find no infirmity in it. On the contrary we are in full agreement with the view  

taken by the High Court.  

12. The counsel  for  the  appellant,  however,  submitted  that  the  Tribunal  and the  

Special  Court  were fully  competent  to hold,  in an appropriate  case,  that  the  “land  

grabber” could remain in possession of the land on payment of its market value as  

compensation.  In  other  words,  the  Tribunal  or  the  Special  Court  could  ask  the  

Government to accept the market value of the grabbed land as compensation instead of  

restoring the  Government’s  possession over  the  grabbed land.  The learned counsel  

contended that the view taken by the High Court that the Tribunal or the Special Court  

did not have the power or authority to determine the market value of the grabbed land  

and direct the land owner to accept the value of the grabbed land as compensation in  

lieu of restoration of possession was contrary to law. In support of the contention, apart  

from an earlier judgment of the High Court (which was not cited before the Bench  

hearing the present matter!), he relied upon section 8(7) and certain guidelines framed  

under section 17-B and put in the schedule to the Act.

13. Before proceeding to examine the provisions referred to by the learned counsel,  

we may note that the land in question undeniably belongs to the Government and the  

appellant has been held to be “land grabber” within the meaning of section 2(d) of the  

Act.

14. The Act has a ‘Statement of Objects and Reasons’ that spells out in detail the  

necessity for the enactment. It will be useful to reproduce it here in full:

“An Act to prohibit the activity of land grabbing in the State of Andhra Pradesh  and to provide for matters connected therewith.

Whereas  there  are  organised  attempts  on  the  part  of  certain  lawless  persons  operating individually and in groups, to grab, either by force or by deceit  or  otherwise,  lands  (whether  belonging  to  the  Government,  a  local  authority,  a  religious or charitable institution or endowment, including a wakf, or any other  private persons) who are known as “land grabbers”

And  whereas  such  land  grabbers  are  forming  bogus  co-operative  housing  societies  or  setting  up  fictitious  claims  and  indulging  in  large  scale  and  unprecedented and fraudulent sales and lands belonging to the Government, a  local authority, a religious or charitable institution or endowment including a  wakf, or private persons, through unscrupulous real estate dealers or otherwise  in favour of certain sections of the people resulting in large accumulation of  unaccounted wealth and quick money to land grabbers;

And whereas, having regard to the resources and influence of the persons by  whom, the large scale on which and the manner in which, the unlawful activity  of land grabbing was, has been or is being organised and carried on in violation  by  law  by  them,  as  land  grabbers  in  the  State  of  Andhra  Pradesh,  and  particularly in its urban areas, it is necessary to arrest and curb immediately such  unlawful activity of land grabbing;

And whereas public  order  is  adversely affected by such unlawful  activity  of  land grabbers.”    

15. In view of the afore-stated objects and reasons of the Act,  to contend that it  

should be open to the Tribunal or the Special Court constituted under it to allow a  

“land grabber” to continue in possession over the Government land on payment of its  

market  value as  compensation  would amount  to  breaking open an escape-hatch to  

denude the Act of its very object and purpose.

16.  Bearing this in mind let us examine the provisions of Section 8(7) of the Act,  

relied upon by the appellant. Section 8 deals with the procedure and power of Special  

Courts and its sub-section (7) reads as follows:

“(7) It shall be lawful for the Special Court to pass such order as it may deem fit  to  advance  the  cause  of  justice.  It  may  award  compensation  in  terms  for  wrongful possession of the land grabbed which shall not be less than an amount  equivalent to the market value of the land grabbed as on the date of the order  and profits accrued from the land payable by the land grabber to the owner of  the grabbed land and may direct re-delivery of the grabbed land to its rightful  owner.  The amount of compensation and profits,  so awarded and cost of re- delivery,  if  any,  shall  be recovered as an arrear  of  land revenue in case the  Government is the owner, or the decree of a Civil Court, in any other case to be  executed by the Special Court:

Provided that the Special Court shall, before passing an order under this sub- section, give to the land grabber an opportunity of making his representation or  of  adducing  evidence,  if  any,  in  this  regard,  and  consider  every  such  representation and evidence.”   

17. From the plain and unambiguous language of the sub-section it is impossible to  

deduce that it empowers and authorises the Tribunal or the Special Court to allow the  

“land grabber” to continue in his/her illegal possession of the land on payment of its  

market value to the land owner. The compensation envisaged by the provision is not  

for continued illegal possession in future, but for wrongful possession of the grabbed  

land by the “land grabber” in the past. In case compensation is awarded it would be  

recoverable, along with the cost of re-delivery, as arrears of land revenue in case the  

owner of the land is the Government.

18.  To  us  the  meaning  of  the  section  8(7)  is  quite  clear  and  we find  that  the  

provision is capable of only one meaning. But the counsel for the appellant submitted

the opening sentence of the sub-section, “It shall be lawful for the Special Court to  

pass such order as it may deem fit to advance the cause of justice” made the meaning  

of the provision quite vague and its correct meaning was required to be understood  

with reference to the guidelines in the Schedule to the Act. In this regard he referred to  

section  17-B that reads as under:    

“17-B. Guidelines for interpretation of Act:- The Schedule shall constitute the  guidelines for the interpretation and implementation of the Act.”

19. He then took us to the Schedule and placed before us a passage from clause 5  

reading as under:   

“… In  order  to  advance  the  cause  of  justice,  the  Special  Tribunal  is  empowered to mould the relief. It can award not only compensation in terms of  money but also award profits accrued from the land and direct restoration of  land to the rightful owner. In case compensation and profits are awarded to the  Government,  in  order  to  ensure  quick  recovery  the  provisions  of  Revenue  Recovery Act are made applicable…”

20. We  are  completely  unable  to  see  how  the  above  passage  can  support  the  

contention being advanced on behalf of the appellant. It is clear to us that the above  

passage says  something quite  opposite  to what  is  contended by the  appellant.  The  

learned  counsel  laid  stress  on  the  opening  sentence  of  the  guideline,  according  to  

which the Tribunal was “empowered to mould the relief”. The sentence is not to be  

read in isolation, but along with what follows it and in light of the provisions of the  

Act as contained in section 8(7) that is already noted above.  

21. It appears that this patently wrong notion that the Special Courts have the power  

and authority to decline restoration of possession of the grabbed land in favour of its

owner  and  in  lieu  of  restoration  of  possession  direct  the  “land  grabber”  to  make  

payment of compensation equal to its market value has its roots in an earlier judgment  

of the High Court, on which great reliance was placed by the appellant, in C.P. Roy vs.   

Special Court, under A.P. Land Grabbing Act and Anr., 2000 (3) ALD 766 (D.B.). In  

that case a Division Bench of the High Court, in paragraph 56 of the judgment, made  

the following observation.

“56. Section 8 of sub-section 7 of the Land Grabbing Act give powers to the  Special Court that in case where it is found that the land has been grabbed, in  order to see justice is done, can call upon the grabber to compensate the State  by  paying  the  market  price  and  also  damages  in  lieu  of  handing  over  possession. But before fixing the market value, an opportunity shall be given to  the  person  aggrieved  to  make  a  representation  or  adducing  evidence  to  determine the correct value. The said section is extracted herein:

“It shall be lawful for the special court to pass such orders as it may deem fit to  advance the cause of justice. It may award compensation in terms for wrongful  possession  of  the  land  grabbed  which  shall  not  be  less  than  an  amount  equivalent to the market value of the land grabbed as on the date of the order  and profits accrued from the land payable by the land grabber to the owner of  the grabbed land and may direct re-delivery of the grabbed land to its rightful  owner.  The amount of compensation and profits,  so awarded and cost of re- delivery,  if  any,  shall  be recovered as an arrear  of land revenue in case the  Government is the owner, or the decree of a Civil Court, in any other case to be  executed by the Special Court:

Proviso to sub-section 7 of Section 8 reads as follows:

"Provided that the special court shall before passing an order under this sub- section, give to the land grabber an opportunity of making his representation or  of adducing evidence, if any, in this regard, and consider such representation  and evidence." ”    (emphasis added)

22. From the portion of the High Court judgment highlighted above, it is clear that  

the  High  Court  substituted  the  words  “for  wrongful  possession”,  as  appearing  in

section 8(7) for “in lieu of handing over possession” of the lands grabbed and thereby  

gave a meaning that is exactly opposite to what is envisaged under the section. We  

have no hesitation in holding that, in the case of CP Roy, the High Court completely  

misread section 8(7) and gave it a meaning completely opposite to what is said in it.  

23. Learned counsel  submitted that  Special  Leave Petitions from the High Court  

judgment in CP Roy [SLP (C) Nos. 4397-4400 of 2000] were filed before this Court  

but those were all dismissed. He produced before us a copy of the order dated 9/2/2001  

from which it appears that the Special Leave Petitions were dismissed in limine.  The  

order reads as follows:  

“We do not find any justifiable reason to entertain these petitions. The Special  Leave Petitions are, therefore, dismissed”

24. The counsel submitted that two other Special Leave Petitions were also similarly  

dismissed by this Court and produced copies of two other orders before us. In one of  

the  orders  dated  26/3/99  in  SLP  (C)  Nos.  4567-4568/97,  though  the  SLP  was  

dismissed in limine, the question of law was kept open.  

25. It is well-settled that the dismissal of a Special Leave Petition in limine does not  

amount to a clear affirmation of the High Court decision and it does not constitute any  

binding precedent. (See :  Workmen vs. Board of Trustees of the Cochin Port Trust,  

(1978) 3 SCC 119; Indian Oil Corporation Ltd. vs. State of Bihar, (1986) 4 SCC 146;  

Supreme Court Employees’ Welfare Association vs. Union of India, (1989) 4 SCC 187;  

CIT vs. Shree Manjunatheaware Packing Products & Camphor Works, (1998) 1 SCC

598;  P. Nallammal & Anr. vs. State,  (1999) 6 SCC 559;  UP State Road Transport   

Corporation vs. Omaditya Verma & Ors.,  (2005) 4 SCC 424)

26. In light of the discussions made above, we find no merit in the appeal, it is,  

accordingly, dismissed, but with no order as to costs.

…………………………….J. [B.N. Agrawal]

…………………………….J. [G.S. Singhvi]

…………………………….J. [Aftab Alam]

New Delhi, August 28, 2009.