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PETITIONER: WORKS MANAGER, CENTRAL RAILWAY WORKSHOP,JHANSI

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: VISHWANATH AND ORS.

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 09/10/1969

BENCH: DUA, I.D. BENCH: DUA, I.D. SHELAT, J.M. VAIDYIALINGAM, C.A.

CITATION:  1970 AIR  488            1970 SCR  (2) 726  1969 SCC  (3)  95

ACT: Factories  Act,  1948 (63 of 1948)-S.  2(1)-Time  keepers-If workers within the meaning of the section.

HEADNOTE: In  an application under s. 15 of the Payment of Wages  Act, 1936  the respondents claimed that they were workers  within the  meaning  of s. 2(1) of the Factories  Act,  1948.   The Additional District Judge found that some of the respondents were  time keepers who maintained attendance of  the  staff. job card particulars of the various jobs under operation and the  time  sheets  of the staff  working  on  various  shops dealing  with  the  production of Railway  spare  parts  and repairs  etc.  and  that other respondents  were  head  time keepers  entrusted with the task of supervising the work  of other  respondents.  He, therefore, came to  the  conclusion that the work done by the respondents was "incidental to" or "connected with" the manufacturing process.  The High  Court in  revision affirmed this order.  On the  question  whether the respondents fell within the purview of the definition of "worker" in s. 2(1) of the Factories Act. HELD : (ii) The conclusion of the Additional District  Judge on  the nature of the work of the respondents being  one  of fact  must  be  held  to be binding on  the  High  Court  on revision and also not open to reassessment on the merits  in this  Court  on special leave appeal from the order  of  the High Court. (ii) The  definition  in s. 2(1) is fairly wide  because  it takes  within  its  sweep  not  only  persons  employed   in manufacturing  process but also in cleaning any part of  the machinery  or premises used for a manufacturing process  and goes far beyond the direct connection with the manufacturing process  by  extending it to other kinds of work  which  may either  be  incidental  to or connected with  not  only  the manufacturing  process itself but also the subject  of  the- manufacturing  process.  The definition therefore  does  not exclude  those  employees  who were  entrusted  solely  with clerical   duties,  if  they  otherwise  fell   within   the definition  of  the word " worker".  All  legislation  in  a welfare  state  is  enacted with  the  object  of  promoting

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general  welfare, but certain types of enactments  are  more responsive to some urgent social demands and also have  more immediate  and visible impact on social vices  by  operating more directly to achieve social reforms.  The Factories  Act belongs   to  this  category  and,  therefore.  demands   an interpretation  liberal  enough to achieve  the  legislative purpose,  without doing violence to the language. [728  C-D; 731 B-D]

JUDGMENT: CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal.No. 1644 of 1966. Appeal  by special leave from the judgment and  order  dated January  18,  1966  of the Allahabad  High  Court  in  Civil Revision Application 24 of 1966. V.   A.  Sevid Muhammad and S. P. Nayar, for the  appellant. S.   C. Agarwal, R. K. Garg, D. P. Singh and S. Chakravarty. for respondents Nos.  1 to 28 and 30 to 57. 727 The Judgment of the Court was delivered by Dua, J. This appeal by special leave is directed against the order of a learned Single Judge of the Allahabad High  Court affirming  on revision under s. 115 Civil P.C. the order  of the  learned  Additional  District Judge,  Jhansi,  who  had allowed  the  respondent’s  appeal from  the  order  of  the learned  City  Magistrate, Jhansi, made  on  an  application presented  by the respondents under s. 15 of the Payment  of Wages  Act  IV  of  1936.   The  City  Magistrate  was   the "’authority"  appointed under s. 15 and the  district  court was  the court of appeal under s. 17 of the said  Act.   The respondents through the Assistant Secretary of the  National Railway Mazdoor Union Work-shop Branch, Jhansi had  asserted in  their  application under s. 15 that  they  were  workers within  the meaning of s. 2(1) of the Factories Act  (63  of 1948)  and  complained  that  they  were  denied  wages  for overtime work done by them on the erroneous ground that they were  not  workers  within  the  aforesaid  provision.   The learned  Magistrate  held  that  the  respondents  had  been entrusted  with  purely clerical duties and  they  were  not connected in any manner with the manufacturing process.   On this conclusion their application was dismissed. On  appeal the learned Additional District  Judge  disagreed with this view and came to the conclusion that the work done by  the respondents was incidental to or connected with  the manufacturing  process.  It was observed in the  order  that some  of  the respondents were entrusted with  the  duty  of checking the time work of each worker in the workshop, a few others  were  timekeepers  and  the  remaining   respondents prepared account sheets on the basis of the time sheets  and did  other work incidental to the running of  the  work-shop including payment of wages to the staff of the workshop  and the office.  The High Court on revision as already observed, affirmed the order of the learned Additional District Judge. On  appeal  in this Court the short question we  are  called upon  to  decide is whether the respondents, who  are  time- keepers  fall  within  the  purview  of  the  definition  of "worker" as contained in s.   2 (1) of the Factories Act. The  respondents  have raised a preliminary  objection  that the appeal is incompetent on the ground that respondent  No, 29  (T.  A. Kolalkar) had died after the order of  the  High Court  but  his  name continued to appear in  the  array  of respondents.   As  his legal representatives  had  not  been brought on the record, the appeal against him is incompetent and  since there was a  joint application on behalf  of  all

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the respondents which was dealt with and decided by a common order  by  the learned Magistrate, the  appeal  against  the other respondents must also be held to be incompetent.   The impugned order having become final as the 728 deceased  T. A. Kolalkar, the present appeal  against  other respondents should, according to the argument, be held to be incompetent  because the reversal of the impugned  order  as against them would give rise to conflicting decisions on the point.   Recently this Court disallowed.a similar  objection in Indian Oxygen Ltd. v. Shri Rani Adhar Singhand  others(1) and  when the attention of the respondent’s learned  counsel was drawn to that decision, the objection was not  seriously pressed. We now turn to the merits of the appeal.  The  word "worker" is defined in s. 2(1) of the Factories Act to  mean "a  person employed directly or through any agency,  whether for  wages  or  not, in any  manufacturing  process,  or  in cleaning  any part of the machinery or premises used  for  a manufacturing  process,  or  in  any  other  kind  of   work incidental to, or connected with, the manufacturing process, or   the  subject  of  the  manufacturing   process."   This definition  seems to us to be fairly wide because  it  takes within  its  sweep not only persons employed  in  any  manu- facturing  process  but  also in cleaning any  part  of  the machinery  or premises used for a manufacturing process  and goes far beyond the direct connection with the manufacturing process  by  extending it to other kinds of work  which  may either  be  incidental  to or connected with  not  only  the manufacturing  process  itself but also the subject  of  the manufacturing process.  The word " manufacturing process" is defined  in  s.  2(k) of the Factories Act  in  fairly  wide language.  It means any process for :               "(i) making, altering, repairing, ornamenting,               finishing, packing.. oiling, washing, cleaning               breaking   up,   demolishing,   or   otherwise               treating or adapting any article or  substance               with  a  view  to its  use,  sale,  transport,               delivery or disposal, or               (ii)  pumping oil, water or sewage, or               (iii) generating, transforming or transmitting               power; or               (iv)  composing  types for printing by  letter               press,  lithography,  photogravure  or   other               similar process or book binding;               (v)   constructing, reconstructing, repairing,               refitting,  finishing or breaking up ships  or               vessels;" Now the conclusion of the learned Additional District  Judge on  the  nature of work of the respondents,  which,  in  our opinion, (1)  Civil  Appeal  No. 1444 of 1966 decided on  24th  Sept. 1968. 729 being  one of fact, must be held to be binding on  the  High Court  on revision and also not open to reassessment on  the merits in this Court on special leave appeal from the  order of  the  High Court on revision, is that, the  time  keepers prepare the pay sheets of the workshop staff, maintain leave account,  dispose of settlement cases and  maintain  records for  statistical  purposes.  Fourteen  of  the  respondents, according  to this conclusion, are timekeepers who  maintain attendance of the staff, job card particulars of the various jobs under operation and time-sheets of the staff working on various shops dealing with the production of Railway  spare- parts  and  repairs etc.  Four of the respondents  are  head

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time-keepers entrusted with the task of supervising the work of  other  respondents.   The question  arises  if  on  this conclusion  it  can  be held that as a  matter  of  law  the respondents  fall  outside  the definition  of  "worker"  as contemplated  by s. 2( 1) of the Factories Act and that  the High Court erred in dismissing the revision. The  appellant’s  learned  counsel has  submitted  that  the expression  "incidental to" or "connected with"  connotes  a direct   connection  with  the  manufacturing  process   and therefore if the duties assigned to the respondents have  no such  direct connection with the manufacturing process  then they  cannot fall within the purview of the  word  "worker". In  support of his submission lie has referred to  some  law dictionaries.  In Law Lexicon in British India by Ramanathan Iyer  "incidental  power"  is stated to be,  power  that  is directly and immediately appropriate to the existence of the specific  power  granted and not one that has  a  slight  or remote  relation  to  it.   The  word  "incidental"  in  the expression  "incidental labour" as used in  Mechanic’s  Lien Statutes allowing liens for work and labour performed in the construction,  repairs etc. of a building etc. is stated  in this  Law  Lexicon  to mean labour  directly  done  for  and connected  with or actually incorporated in the building  or improvement : service indirectly or remotely associated with the  construction  work is not covered by  this  expression. Reference  has  next  been made by the counsel  to  the  Law Dictionary   by   Ballentine  where  also   the   expression "incidental power" is stated in the same terms.  In Stroud’s Judicial Dictionary the meaning of the words "incident"  and "incidental"  as used in various English statutes have  been noticed.  We do not think they can be of much assistance  to us.   The  decision in Haydon v. Taylor(1) noticed  in  this book at first sight appeared to us to be of some) relevance, but  on  going through it, we do not find it to be  of  much help  in construing the statutory provisions with  which  we are  concerned.  Similarly the decision in  Frederick  Hayes Whymper  v.  John  Jones Harney(2) seems  to  be  of  little guidance. (1)  122 E.R. 554 (2) 144 E.R. 436 730 On behalf of the respondents our attention has been drawn to a decision of this Court. in Nagpur Electric Light and Power Co.   Ltd.  V. Regional Director Employees  State  Insurance Corporation Etc.(1). This decision deals with the  Employees State Insurance Act and on a comparison of the definition of the word "employee" as contained in s. 2(9) of that Act with the  definition  of  the word "worker" in s. 2  (1)  of  the Factories Act, it is observed That the former definition  is wider than the latter.  It is further added that the benefit of  the  Factories  Act does not  extend  to  field  workers working  outside  the  factory whereas the  benefit  of  the Employees State Insurance Act extends inter alia to the  em- ployees mentioned in s. 2 (9) (i) whether working inside the factory  or  establishment  or  elsewhere.   Reliance   has, however,  been  Placed on behalf of the respondents  on  the observations  at  page 99 of the report where  reference  is made  to the clerks entrusted with the duty of  time-keeping and it is observed that all these employees are employed  in connection  with  the work of the factory.  A  person  doing non-manual work has been held in this case to be included in the  word "employee" within the meaning of s. 2 (9)  (i)  if employed  in connection with the work of the  factory.   The ratio of this decision which is concerned with the construc- tion  of  different statutory language intended to  serve  a

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different  object and purpose is of no direct assistance  in construing  the definition of the word "worker" as  used  in the Factories Act. The  respondents’  counsel  has  then  submitted  that   the previous  history  of the Act throws helpful  light  on  the legislative  intendment  and  in  this  connection  he   has referred  to  the  definition of the word  "worker"  in  the Factories Act XXV of 1934.  The word "Worker in s. 2 (h)  of that Act was defined to mean :               "a person employed, whether for wages or  not,               in  any manufacturing process, or in  cleaning               any part of the machinery or premises used for               a manufacturing process, or in any other  kind               of work whatsoever incidental to or  connected               with  the manufacturing process  or  connected               with   the   subject  of   the   manufacturing               ,process,  but  does not  include  any  person               solely employed in a clerical capacity in  any               room  or place where no manufacturing  process               is being carried on." It is argued that the deletion of the words conveying exclu- sion of persons solely employed in a clerical capacity in  a place where no manufacturing process is carried on  suggests that  the present definition of "worker" is wide  enough  to take  within  its fold even those persons who  are  employed solely  in clerical capacity if otherwise they  fall  within the definition.  The appellant counsel has, on his part,  by reference to tile definition in the Act (1)  [1967] 3 S.C.R. 92 731 of  1934, argued that the deletion of the word  "whatsoever" after  "  any  other  kind of work"  is  indicative  of  the legislative  intention to restrict the scope of  "any  other kind of work" in the current Act. The Factories Act was enacted to consolidate and amend  the, law  regulating  labour in factories.  It is  probably  true that all legislation in a welfare state is enacted with  the object  of promoting general welfare; but certain  types  of enactments are more responsive to some urgent social demands and  also have more immediate and visible impact  on  social vices by operating more directly to achieve social  reforms. The  enactments  with which we are concerned, in  our  view, belong  to  this  category  and,  there-.  fore,  demand  an interpretation  liberal  enough to achieve  the  legislative purpose,  without  doing  violence  to  the  language.   The definition of "worker" in the Factories Act, therefore, does not seem to us to exclude those employees who are  entrusted solely  with clerical duties, if they otherwise fall  within the  definition of the word "worker".  Keeping in  view  the duties  and  functions of the respondents as  found  by  the learned  Additional  District Judge, we are unable  to  find anything legally wrong with the view taken by the High Court that they fall within the definition of the, word  "worker". Deletion  of the word "whatsoever" on which the  appellant’s counsel  has  placed  reliance does not seem  to  make  much difference because that word was, in our view, redundant. We  have not been persuaded to hold that the High Court  was in error in affirming the decision of the learned Additional District  Judge.   In the result this appeal  fails  and  is dismissed with costs. R.K.P.S.                     Appeal dismissed. 732