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PETITIONER: WEST BENGAL STATE ELECTRICITY BOARD & ORS.

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: SAMIR K.  SARKAR

DATE OF JUDGMENT:       17/09/1999

BENCH: C.Banerjee, G.B.Pattanaik

JUDGMENT:

PATTANAIK, J.

       Leave granted.

     The  West  Bengal State Electricity Board has come  in appeal  against  the judgment of the Division Bench  of  the Calcutta  High  Court  dated 30th June 1998 in  M.A.T.   No. 4271  of  1997  whereunder the High Court has  directed  the appellants  to  consider the case of the private  respondent for appointment on compassionate grounds.  The father of the said  respondent,  Samir Kumar Sarkar was an employee  under the  State  Electricity Board and he died on  29th  November 1996 at the age of 56 years 10 months and 15 days, which was within  two years from the scheduled date of his  retirement on  superannuation.   When  the respondent  applied  for  an employment  on compassionate ground, the Board rejected  his prayer  on  the  ground  that under the  Rules  in  question dealing  with compassionate appointments, no appointment can be  given  if  the employee dies within two years  from  the scheduled  date  of  retirement   on  superannuation.    The respondent, therefore, filed a writ petition and the learned Single Judge, in view of the Rules, dismissed the same.  The respondent  went in appeal in the High Court.  The  Division Bench  of  the  High  Court  came  to  the  conclusion  that provision  disentitling appointment on compassionate  ground if  the  employees  dies within two years from the  date  of superannuation  only  in respect of clauses (iii), (iv)  and (v)   and  not  in  case  of   clauses  (i)  and   (ii)   is discriminatory  and violative of Article 14.  Therefore, the High  Court  quashed  that part of the  order  and  directed consideration  of  the case of respondent for  compassionate appointment.   It  is  not disputed that the  death  of  the father  of  the respondent was on account of illness and  it was  within two years from the date of superannuation.   Mr. V.R.   Reddy,  learned  senior  counsel  appearing  for  the appellants  contended  that  the  concept  of  compassionate appointment  is  itself  a discretionary one.  There  is  no statutory  rule  governing such appointments, conferring  an enforceable  right on the LRs of the deceased employee.  The idea  to  give  such compassionate appointment is  that  the children  of  the  employee who dies in harness may  not  be destitute  on  the  road and can have a decent  living.   To achieve  that  objective,  several  guidelines/criteria  are

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fixed.   The  reason  why the embargo in question  does  not apply  to  clauses (i) and (ii) but apply to clauses  (iii), (iv)  and (v) is for an avowed purpose inasmuch as in clause (i)  and  (ii),  the death having occurred due  to  accident arising  out  of  and  in course  of  employment  and  total disablement  due to accident in course of employment whereas under  clauses (iii), (iv) and (v), the death is not in  any way connected with the employment and, therefore, there is a reasonable  basis for the classification in question and the High  Court  was not justified in coming to  the  conclusion that  such  classification is discriminatory.  In  order  to appreciate  the  contention  raised  by  Mr.   V.R.   Reddy, learned  senior  counsel  for the appellants,  the  relevant office  order is quoted herein below in extenso:  The Board is   pleased  to  make   provision  for  consideration   for employment  of  a  dependent  of deceased  employee  in  the following   circumstances  and  subject   to  condition   as mentioned hereunder:-

     i)  In  case of death of an employee due  to  accident arising out of and in course of employment;

     ii)  Employees  rendered  totally disabled due  to  an accident arising out of an in course of employment;

     iii) Employees dying in harness;

     iv)  Employees reported missing subject to  observance of formalities as prescribed by the Board;

     v)   Employees   declared   lunatic   by   appropriate authority.

     No  employment  would  however, be considered  in  the following circumstances:

     a)  Where the death under (iii) above or the  incident under (iv) or the declaration under (v) above takes place in the  proceeding  two  years  from   the  scheduled  date  of retirement on superannuation of the concerned employees.

     b)  Where  a  dependent  of  the  deceased,   affected employee  is already in employment of the Board irrespective of the date of securing such employment.

     An  analysis  of the different clauses  providing  for compassionate  appointment in case of death of the  employee would  indicate  that  clauses  (i), (ii)  deal  with  death arising  out  of  and  in  course  of  employment  or  total disablement  arising  out  of and in  course  of  employment whereas clauses (iii) and (iv) have no relationship with the employment  in question In that view of the matter, we  find sufficient  force in contention of Mr.  V.R.  Reddy, learned senior  counsel appearing for the appellants that there is a reasonable  classification and consequently the embargo that no  employment  would  be  considered  when  criteria  under clauses  (iii), (iv) and (v) are satisfied, if such criteria happens  to  be within two years from the scheduled date  of retirement   on  superannuation,  cannot  be  held   to   be discriminatory.   The High Court, therefore, was totally  in error to hold that the embargo is violative of Article 14 of the  Constitution.   We,  accordingly, set  aside  the  said conclusion  of  the  High Court and hold  that  the  embargo contained  in clause (a) is valid.  On the admitted position

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that  the death of the father of the respondent occurred  on 29th  November  1996 which is within two years preceding  to the  date  of  superannuation, the respondent  will  not  be entitled  to  an compassionate appointment under the  office order  dated  15th March 1993 which deals with the  criteria for such appointment.  We, therefore, set aside the impugned judgment  of the Calcutta High Court and allow this  appeal. But  as there is no appearance on behalf of the  respondent, there will be no order as to costs.