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PETITIONER: VIVIAN RODRICK

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: STATE OF WEST BENGAL

DATE OF JUDGMENT27/01/1971

BENCH: SIKRI, S.M. (CJ) BENCH: SIKRI, S.M. (CJ) REDDY, P. JAGANMOHAN DUA, I.D.

CITATION:  1971 AIR 1584            1971 SCR  (3) 546  1971 SCC  (1) 468  CITATOR INFO :  R          1974 SC1039  (6)  RF         1977 SC2096  (22)  E&D        1989 SC1335  (60)

ACT: Criminal Law-Sentence of death-Inordinate delay in disposing of  appeal  by  High Court-If  ground  for  awarding  lesser sentence.

HEADNOTE:  The  accused  was committed to trial in July  1963  and  was  convicted and sentenced to death on September 4, 1964.   The  appeal  to  the  High Court under s. 411A,  Cr.   P.C.,  was  finally dismissed on February 6, 1970.  The High Court  left  it  to  the State Government whether it  should  reduce  the  sentence on account of inordinate delay.  In appeal to this Court on the question of sentence,  HELD  :  Section  302,  I.P.C.,  prescribes  two   alternate  sentences, namely, death sentence or imprisonment for  life.  When there has been inordinate delay in the disposal of  the  appeal  by the High Court, it is a relevant factor  for  the  High  Court  to  take into consideration  for  imposing  the  lesser sentence. [549 A-B]  In  the  present case, the appellant has been  for  6  years  under the fear of sentence of death, which must have  caused  him  unimaginable  mental agony.  In view of  the  excessive  delay  it  is a fit case for awarding  the  lesser  sentence  instead of leaving it to the Government to decide the matter  on a mercy petition. [549 B-D]  Nawab Singh v. State of U.P., A.I.R. 1954 S.C. 278, referred  to.

JUDGMENT:  CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No. 137  of  1970.  Appeal  by special leave from the judgment and  order  dated  February  6,  1970 of the Calcutta High  Court  in  Criminal  Appeal No. 5 of 1964.  O.   P. Rana, for the appellant.

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S.   P. Mitra and Sukumar Basu, for the respondent.  The Judgment of the Court was delivered by  Sikri,  C.J. In this case special leave was limited  to  the  question of sentence only The relevant facts for determining  this  point are as follows : The appellant, Vivian  Rodrick,  was tried by the High Court of Calcutta, in exercise of  its  original  jurisdiction, having been committed to  stand  his  trial  by  the Presidency Magistrate as early  as  July  31,  1963.   The substance of the charges against  the  appellant  were as follows :  547  (i)  that on January 13, 1963 the appellant was a member  of  an  unlawful  assembly guilty of rioting,  being  armed-with  deadly  weapons  and as such punishable under  section  148,  I.P.C.;  (ii)that  on  January 13, 1963 the appellant  committed  the  murder  of  one Vincent D’Rozaric and thereby  committed  an  offence punishable under section 302, I.P.C.; and  (iii)that  on  January 13, 1963 the  appellant  was  in  possession  of explosive substances for unlawful object  and  thereby  committed  an  offence  under  section  5  of   the  Explosive Substances Act.  Four  other persons, Stanley Rodrick, Ranjit  Mandal,  Simon  Das  and  Ranjit  Biswas were also tried  jointly  with  the  appellant and ,convicted under S. 302 read with S. 149,  and  also  under  s. 148, I.P.C. The jury  returned  a  unanimous  verdict of guilty against the appellant and on September  4,  1964  the Presiding Judge convicted the appellant  under  s.  302,  I.P.C., and sentenced him to death.  At the trial  the  appellant  was  also convicted for offences  under  s.  148,  I.P.C.,  and  s.  5 of the  Explosive  Substances  Act,  and  sentenced to, rigorous imprisonment for two years and  three  years respectively.  The terms of imprisonment were directed  to run concurrently.  The appellant filed a petition of appeal under s. 411A,  Cr.  P.C.,  on September 7, 1964, challenging his conviction  and  the  sentences  imposed  on him.  The  High  Court,  by  its  judgment  dated September 19, 1967 in Criminal Appeal No.  5  of 1964, confirmed the- conviction and sentences imposed  on  the appellant.  In considering the question of sentence  the  High Court observed that "the murder was a premeditated  and  cold-blooded  one.  There was not the slightest  provocation  from  the side of the deceased.  This is undoubtedly  a  fit  case  for  capital punishment.  No question of  showing  any  leniency  on the ground of tenderness of age arises  as  the  appellant  is now aged about 35 years." It was urged  before  the High Court that the sentence of death should be  reduced  to  rigorous  imprisonment for life on account of  the  long  delay that had taken place in hearing the appeal.   Although  the  High  Court  regretted the  delay  and  the  consequent  mental  suffering  undergone by the condemned  prisoner,  it  felt that the "delay in executing the death sentence was not  by  itself  a sufficient ground for which the  court  should  exercise  its jurisdiction to commute the death sentence  to  one of imprisonment for life."  The  appellant sought leave to appeal to this Court  against  the judgment of the High Court on October 21, 1967, and  the  same  548  was  refused  on January 8, 1968.  Having  obtained  special  leave, the appellant filed an appeal to this Court (Criminal  Appeal  No. 190 of 1968).  By its judgment dated  April  30,  1969, this Court set aside the the judgment and order of the  High  Court,  dated  September 19, 1967,  and  remanded  the  appeal  to the High Court for fresh disposal and hearing  in

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accordance  with  law and in the light of  the  observations  contained  in  this  Court’s judgment.  This  Court  in  its  judgment  in Cr.  Ap.  No. 190 of 1968  observed,  regarding  the four other co-accused, as follows  "Though the conviction was for an offence under section  302  read with section 149, I.P.C., curiously they were sentenced  to   varying  terms  of  imprisonment,  and  none  of   them  challenged their conviction in appeals."  On  remand the appeal was again dismissed by the High  Court  on  February  6, 1970.  Chakrabarti, J., with  Whom  Amaresh  Chandra  Roy, J., agreed, again considered the  question  of  Sentence  and held that although there had been a  delay  of  more  than five years in executing the death  sentence  that  was  not  by its,--If sufficient ground  for  commuting  the  death sentence.  The High Court referred to Nawab Singh  v.  The  State  of  Uttar Pradesh(") and Piare  Dusadh  v.  King  EMperor(2).  As the High Court did not find any  extenuating  circumstances  whatsoever that ’would .justify its taking  a  lenient view in the matter, it left to the State  Government  to  take a decision as to whether it should, on  account  of  inordinate  delay  in executing the sentence,  exercise  its  powers under S. 402, Cr.  P.C.  The  learned  counsel for the appellant  contends  that  the  matter  should not have been left to the  State  Government.  In  Nawab Singh v. The State of Uttar Pradesh("), which  has  been  referred  to by the High Court in its  judgment  dated  February 6, 1970, it is observed  "It is true that in proper cases an inordinate delay in  the  execution of the death sentence may be regarded as a  ground  for commuting it, but we desire to point out that this is no  rule  of law and is a matter primarily for consideration  of  the  local  Government.   If the Court  has  to  exercise  a  discretion  in  such matter, the other facts  of  such  case  would  have  to be taken into consideration.   In  the  case  before  us,  we  find  that  the  murder  was  a  cruel  and  deliberate  one  and there was  no  extenuatin  circumstance  whatsoever which would justify using ordering a  commutation  of the death sentence."  (1) A.I.R. 1954 S.C. 278.  (2) [1944] F.C.R. 61  549  It  seems  to us that the extremely excessive delay  in  the  disposal  of  the case of the appellant would by  itself  be  sufficient  for imposing a lesser sentence  of  imprisonment  for life under s. 302.  Section 302, I.P.C., prescribes  two  alternate sentences, namely, death sentence or  imprisonment  for  life, and when there has been inordinate delay  in  the  disposal of the appeal by the High Court it seems to us that  it  is  a relevant factor for the High Court  to  take  into  consideration  for  imposing the lesser sentence.   In  this  particular  case,  as pointed out above, the  appellant  was  committed to trial by the Presidency Magistrate as early  as  July,  31, 1963, and he was convicted by the Trial Judge  on  September  4,  1964.   It  is  now  January  1971,  and  the  appellant  has been’ for more than six years under the  fear  of   sentence   of  death.   This  must  have   caused   him  unimaginable  mental  agony.   In our opinion  it  would  be  inhuman  to make him suffer till the Government decides  the  matter on a mercy petition.  We consider that this is now  a  fit case for awarding the sentence of imprisonment for life.  Accordingly we accept the appeal, set aside the order of the  High  Court awarding death sentence and award a sentence  of  imprisonment for life.  The sentences under s. 148,  I.P.C.,  and  S. 5 of the Explosive Substances Act and under s.  302,  I.P.C., shall run concurrently.

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V.P.S.                                              Sentence  modified.  550