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CASE NO.: Appeal (civil)  1633 of 2008

PETITIONER: Vidyodaya Trust

RESPONDENT: Mohan Prasad R & Ors

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 27/02/2008

BENCH: Dr. ARIJIT PASAYAT & P. SATHASIVAM

JUDGMENT: J U D G M E N T

CIVIL APPEAL NO.   1633              OF 2008 (Arising out of SLP (C) No. 3473 of 2007)

Dr. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J.

1.      Leave granted.

        2.      This is the second round of litigation before this Court.  Challenge  in this appeal is to the order passed by a learned  Single Judge of the Kerala High Court holding that leave had  been rightly granted in terms of Section 92 of the Code of Civil  Procedure, 1908 (in short the ’CPC’).  

3.      Defendants 1 to 3, 6, 8 and 10 had moved the High Court  in Civil Revision Petition questioning order of learned District  Judge who had taken the view that the suit was maintainable  and justified under Section 92 of CPC.  

4.      Earlier the matter was before this Court in Civil Appeal  No.3679 of 2006. The factual position as was noticed in the  earlier appeal was as follows:

"Respondents as plaintiffs filed OP NO.238 of 2000 before  the District Judge, Ernakulam under Section 34 of the Indian  Trust Act, 1882 (in short the ’Trust Act’) in respect of  Vidyodaya Trust and administration of the said trust and the  school run by the trust. But the said Court by order dated  31.1.2000 held that the OP was not maintainable and  dismissed the petition. Thereafter, the suit No.20 of 2000 was  filed by the respondents as plaintiffs claiming several reliefs.  The respondents filed an application (IA 349 of 2000) seeking  leave of the Court to institute the suit under Section 92 of  CPC. According to the appellant without notice to him the  concerned Court granted leave to the respondents to institute  the suit. The suit was numbered as OS 20 of 2000. Plaintiffs  filed written statement inter-alia taking the stand that suit  was actuated by personal motives. The suit under Section 92  CPC is of a special nature which pre-supposes existence of a  Public Trust of religious or charitable character. From the  averments in the plaint and the reliefs sought for it is clear  that the plaintiffs were not suing to vindicate rights of the  public, and it has not been filed in the representative capacity.  The plaintiffs four in number are trustees who instituted both  the suits against other trustees for personal reliefs and as

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individuals and seeking vindication of alleged individual rights  and not as representatives of the public. Therefore, the suit as  framed is not maintainable under Section 92 CPC. The  defendants filed an application before the District Judge,  Ernakulam for hearing as preliminary issue, the question of  maintainability of the suit. On the basis of contentions raised  by the plaintiffs as well as defendants, the Court framed  preliminary issue as to whether the suit as framed is  maintainable under Section 92 CPC. By order dated 11.4.2003  the Court held that the suit was maintainable. Questioning correctness of the order, a petition for  revision in terms of Section 115 CPC was filed. The High Court  dismissed the Civil Revision petition on the ground that the  same was not maintainable.  Though the High Court made  reference to some factual aspects, it ultimately came to hold  that the revision petition was not maintainable as order dated  4.11.2003 was an interlocutory one. Thereafter the appellant  filed writ petition before the High Court praying, inter-alia, for  writ, direction or order, questioning the order dated 2003. By  order dated 20.8.2004 the High Court dismissed the Writ  petition holding that the view taken in the Civil Revision  apparently was not correct, as by no stretch of imagination it  can be held that the High Court had no jurisdiction. It  accepted the stand of the respondents herein that since there  was discussion on merits, though the petition was not held to  be maintainable subsequent proceedings initiated under  Article 227 of the Constitution of India, 1950 (in short the  ’Constitution’) cannot be maintained."  

5.      Both the orders i.e. one in the Revision Petition and the  other in the Writ Petition were challenged before this Court.  Taking note of the facts, the appeal was disposed of with the  following conclusions:  

"Judged in the aforesaid background the view  of the learned Single Judge that the Civil  Revision was not maintainable is clearly  indefensible. Learned counsel for the  respondent has fairly conceded to this  position. If it is held that the suit in terms of  Section 92 CPC is not maintainable, that  would have the result of final disposal of the  suit. However, the learned counsel made an  attempt to justify the order by stating that the  matter was also dealt with on merits. That  would not improve the situation. The Civil  Revision was clearly maintainable. Therefore,  we allow the appeal so far as it relates to Civil  Revision Petition No.1260/2003 disposed of by  judgment dated 5.2.2004 by the High Court.  The said order is set aside. The High Court shall now hear the Civil  Revision on merits and dispose of the same as  expeditiously as practicable preferably within  four months from the date of receipt of our  order. The time period is being fixed  considering the pendency of the matter for a  considerable length of time.  In view of the order passed in the appeal  relating to Section 115 CPC no order is  necessary to be passed in respect of the  judgment in the writ petition. It may be noted  that the learned Single Judge observed that  the Civil Revision was maintainable and,  therefore, declined to entertain the writ

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petition. This order was passed on the face of  the order passed by learned Single Judge  holding that it was not maintainable. The  same, therefore, is not justifiable. But it is not  necessary to deal with that matter as the Civil  Revision shall be heard on merit."  

6.      The High Court in the impugned judgment focused the  adjudication to the issue as to whether the plaintiffs in the  case at hand can be said to be laying the suit on behalf of the  beneficiaries and members of the public to protect the  interests of the public trust or whether they were airing only  private and personal grievances. The High Court took the view  that though there were certain personal reliefs claimed as  evident from the prayer portion, but that was not sufficient to  hold that the suit was not for protection of interests of public  trust but to claim and enforce private or personal rights. It  was held that the insistence of law was only that the  discretionary reliefs under Section 92 CPC shall not be  granted  when the plaintiffs have no genuine interest or  intention to protect the public right of the beneficiaries but are  only using the forum provided by Section 92 to air private and  personal grievances.  It was further held that there was prayer  to supplement the plaintiffs 1 to 3 and also 4th defendant in  the School Management Committee. The same cannot be  construed to be any prayer for enforcement of the personal  rights.  

7.      The learned Single Judge formulated certain procedures  for grant of leave by the Court.  It was also held that there  would be need for public notice under Order 1 Rule 8 CPC in a  suit under Section 92. It was finally concluded that though  there were certain inadequacies they did not vitiate the  proceedings. The Civil Revision was accordingly dismissed.  

8.      Learned counsel for the appellant with reference to  several averments in the plaint submitted that though the  High Court correctly formulated the issue that there is no bar  on trustees instituting the suit in terms of Section 92 CPC; yet  there has to be a pointed consideration as to whether they  were verblating a private or personal grievance or verdicating  public rights in respect of trust in representative character.  But having said so, it did not consider the true nature of the  suit filed.  

9.      Referring to various averments it was pointed out that  even on a cursory analysis the position comes clear that the  plaintiffs were highlighting personal grievances. It is pointed  out that plaintiff No.1 was a Vice Chairman, Plaintiff No.3 is  the father-in-law of plaintiff No.1 and most of the allegations of  alleged improper action revolved round close relatives of these  two plaintiffs.  Reference to the senior teacher made is nobody  else then the wife of plaintiff No.1.  All the resolutions were  adopted by trustees. It is essentially an inter-trust dispute.   

10.     The prayers (a), (b), (c) and (d) focus on defendants 2, 3  and 10 and prayer (e) which was deleted initially was for  removal of defendants 2, 3, 6, 9 and 10 and for supplementing  the School Management Committee with plaintiffs 1, 2, 3 and  4 and defendant No.4.  Basically, the allegations are against  defendants 2, 3 and 4.

11.     It was submitted that it is desirable that before the leave  is granted in terms of Section 92 CPC the other side should be

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heard.  This should obviate the subsequent application for  revocation of grant of leave.  All the allegations according to  learned counsel for the appellant are personal grievances.  

12.     Learned Single Judge overlooked the fact that objections  were taken by the governing council. Merely because their  objections or views did not find acceptance by majority, that  cannot be a ground to lay a suit under Section 92 CPC  questioning legitimate decisions taken by the majority.  The  Court does not deal with administration of trusts.  Only if the  pre-conditions are satisfied then only leave can be granted as  provided in Section 92. There must be an element of dis- honest intention and lack of probity. When action is taken  bona fide though there may be mistaken action, that would  not amount to breach of trust.  

13.     To find out whether the suit was for vindicating public  rights there is necessity to go beyond the relief and to focus on  the purpose for which the suit was filed. It is the object and  purpose and not the relief which is material. A co-trustee is  not remediless if the leave is not granted under Section 92.

14.     In reply, learned counsel for the respondents submitted  that while deciding on the question whether leave is to be  granted the statements in the plaint have to be seen and not  to the allegations in the written submissions.  It is permissible  to strike down the portion of averment. Though the general  principle may apply to the facts of the present case, what is  expected to be seen is if the trust has acted as a prudent man  would do and the standards of care and caution required to be  taken by a prudent man, and there should not be reckless  indifference and highest standard of rectitude and accuracy is  to be maintained.  

15.     The parameters to be kept in view while dealing with an  application for grant of leave in terms of Section 92 CPC have  been dealt with by this Court in several decisions. In B.S.  Adityan and Ors. v. B. Ramachandran Adityan and Ors. (2004  (9) SCC 720), it was inter alia held as follows:                  

"9. In this background, when a specific  provision has been made in the Code of Civil  Procedure in Section 104(1)(ffa) allowing an  appeal to be filed against an order refusing to  grant leave to file a suit, the appeal filed by the  respondents before the Division Bench was  certainly competent to be considered by that  Bench. In this case, on an earlier occasion,  when one of the suits was filed under Section  92 CPC, when the founder had executed a  deed of appointment of trustees and certain  interim orders were passed in that suit, the  said application was withdrawn without  obtaining leave under Order 23 Rule 1 on 19- 9-1978 inasmuch as the newly appointed  trustees had resigned their trusteeship and  withdrew their application under Section 92  CPC, the two suits CSs Nos. 352 and 353 of  1978 filed by the appellants were disposed of  as having become infructuous. Later on  another Application No. 165 of 1981 had been  filed under Section 92 CPC for leave to file a  suit for appointing them as additional trustees  and for rendition of accounts. In that

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proceeding Application No. 879 of 1991 was  filed for permission of court to cross-examine  the applicants therein R. Kannan Adityan and  R. Kathiresa Adityan in particular to prove the  fact that it was the father of those petitioners  therein who was supplying all documents and  materials and who was conducting the  proceedings. Application filed to cross-examine  the applicants was dismissed by the learned  Single Judge. On further appeal, the Division  Bench held that it would be in the interest of  justice to permit the appellants to cross- examine the said parties. The matter was  carried to this Court in Special Leave Petition  No. 6040 of 1982. This Court dismissed the  said special leave petition noticing that the  cross-examination "will be confined to the  question of sanction and principles governing  the same", of course, after noticing entire  documents. Again, another Application No.  4738 of 1982 was brought before the court to  dismiss Application No. 165 of 1981 under  Order 11 Rule 21 CPC which was, however,  dismissed by the learned Single Judge and the  matter was carried in appeal which was also  dismissed by the Division Bench. That matter  was brought before this Court. This Court  asked the parties to file the appropriate  affidavits in regard thereto and thereafter all  papers were placed before the Court. However,  this Court dismissed the special leave petition.  It is in this background the learned counsel  submitted that the Court ought to have  examined the matter in all necessary details  before granting permission under Section 92  CPC. In R.M. Narayana Chettiar case this  Court considered in detail the history of the  legislation and whether court is required to  give an opportunity of being heard to the  proposed defendants before granting leave to  institute a suit under Section 92 CPC and  stated the law on the matter. Although as a  rule of caution, court should normally give  notice to the defendants before granting leave  under the said section to institute a suit, the  court is not bound to do so. If a suit is  instituted on the basis of such leave, granted  without notice to the defendants, the suit  would not thereby be rendered bad in law or  non-maintainable. Grant of leave cannot be  regarded as defeating or even seriously  prejudicing any right of the proposed  defendants because it is always open to them  to file an application for revocation of the leave  which can be considered on merits and  according to law or even in the course of suit  which may be established that the suit does  not fall within the scope of Section 92 CPC. In  that view of the matter, we do not think, there  is any reason for us to interfere with the order  made by the High Court."  

16.     In R.M. Narayana Chettiar and Anr. v. N. Lakshmanan  Chettiar and Ors. (1991 (1) SCC 48), it was held as follows:

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"9. We may now discuss the main cases relied  on by the learned counsel for the respective  parties. Coming first to the cases relied upon  by learned counsel for the appellants, we find  that the first decision cited by him was the  decision of this Court in Swami  Parmatmanand Saraswati v. Ramji Tripathi. In  that case it was held that to see whether the  suit falls within the ambit of Section 92, only  the allegations in the plaint should be looked  into in the first instance. But, if, after the  evidence is taken, it is found that the breach of  trust alleged has not been made out and that  the prayer for direction of the court is vague  and is not based on any solid foundation of  fact or reason but is made only with a view to  bring the suit under the section then such a  suit must be dismissed. Learned counsel next  drew our attention to the decision of this Court  in Charan Singh v. Darshan Singh. Section 92  of the Code before its amendment in 1976 was  applicable to the case. The court cited with  approval the observations of Mukherjea, J. (as  he then was), in Mahant Pragdasji Guru  Bhagwandasji v. Patel Ishwarlalbhai Narsibhai   which runs as follows: (SCR p. 517)

 "A suit under Section 92, Civil  Procedure Code, is a suit of a  special nature which pre-supposes  the existence of a public trust of a  religious or charitable character.  Such suit can proceed only on the  allegation that there is a breach of  such trust or that directions of the  court are necessary.... It is only  when these conditions are fulfilled  that the suit has got to be brought  in conformity with the provision of  Section 92, Civil Procedure Code..."

10. Neither of the aforesaid decisions of this  Court deal with the question as to whether,  before granting leave to institute a suit under  Section 92, Advocate General, or later the  court, was required to give an opportunity to  the proposed defendants to show cause why  leave should not be granted. What learned  counsel for the appellants urged, however, was  that these decisions show that at the time  when the Advocate General or the court is  required to consider whether to grant leave to  institute a suit as contemplated under Section  92, it is only the averments in the plaint which  have to be examined and hence, the presence  of the defendant is not necessary. We may now  consider the High Court decisions relied on by  the learned counsel for the appellants.

       xx              xx                      xx

16. As far as the decisions of this Court which  have been pointed out to us are concerned, the

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question as to whether before granting leave to  institute a suit under Section 92 of the Code,  the court is required to give an opportunity of  being heard to the proposed defendants did  not arise for determination at all in those  cases. As far as the High Courts are  concerned, they have taken different views on  this question. The legislative history of Section  92 of the Code indicates that one of the objects  which led to the enactment of the said section  was to enable two or more persons interested  in any trust created for a public purpose of a  charitable or religious nature should be  enabled to file a suit for the reliefs set out in  the said section without having to join all the  beneficiaries since it would be highly  inconvenient and impracticable for all the  beneficiaries to join in the suit; hence any two  or more of them were given the right to  institute a suit for the reliefs mentioned in the  said Section 92 of the Code. However, it was  considered desirable to prevent a public trust  from being harassed or put to legal expenses  by reckless or frivolous suits being brought  against the trustees and hence, a provision  was made for leave of the court having to be  obtained before the suit is instituted.

17. A plain reading of Section 92 of the Code  indicates that leave of the court is a pre- condition or a condition precedent for the  institution of a suit against a public trust for  the reliefs set out in the said section; unless all  the beneficiaries join in instituting the suit, if  such a suit is instituted without leave, it would  not be maintainable at all. Having in mind the  objectives underlying Section 92 and the  language thereof, it appears to us that, as a  rule of caution, the court should normally,  unless it is impracticable or inconvenient to do  so, give a notice to the proposed defendants  before granting leave under Section 92 to  institute a suit. The defendants could bring to  the notice of the court for instance that the  allegations made in the plaint are frivolous or  reckless. Apart from this, they could, in a  given case, point out that the persons who are  applying for leave under Section 92 are doing  so merely with a view to harass the trust or  have such antecedents that it would be  undesirable to grant leave to such persons.  The desirability of such notice being given to  the defendants, however, cannot be regarded  as a statutory requirement to be complied with  before leave under Section 92 can be granted  as that would lead to unnecessary delay and,  in a given case, cause considerable loss to the  public trust. Such a construction of the  provisions of Section 92 of the Code would  render it difficult for the beneficiaries of a  public trust to obtain urgent interim orders  from the court even though the circumstances  might warrant such relief being granted.  Keeping in mind these considerations, in our  opinion, although, as a rule of caution, court

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should normally give notice to the defendants  before granting leave under the said section to  institute a suit, the court is not bound to do  so. If a suit is instituted on the basis of such  leave, granted without notice to the  defendants, the suit would not thereby be  rendered bad in law or non-maintainable. The  grant of leave cannot be regarded as defeating  or even seriously prejudicing any right of the  proposed defendants because it is always open  to them to file an application for revocation of  the leave which can be considered on merits  and according to law.  

       Xx                      xx                      xx 19. In the result, the appeals are allowed as  afore-stated. The impugned judgment of the  High Court is set aside. The trial court is  directed to dispose of the application for  revocation of leave on merits and in  accordance with law."

17.     In Swami Paramatmanand Saraswati and Anr. v. Ramji  Tripathi and Anr. (1974 (2) SCC 695), it was held as follows:

"5. The main allegations in the plaint were  that Brahmanand did not execute the Will  while he was in a sound disposing state of  mind, that Respondent 1 had not the requisite  learning in Sanskrit and the Vedas and,  therefore, he was not qualified to be nominated  as successor to the Headship of the Math, that  he came into possession of the Math properties  and has committed breach of trust by applying  for grant of succession certificate and other  acts, that Krishnabodhashram was duly  installed as the Shankaracharya of the Math  on June 25, 1953 and that direction of the  Court was necessary for the administration of  the Trust properties. The plaintiffs prayed for  the removal of Respondent 1 from the  Headship of the Math, a declaration that  Krishnabodhashram was the duly installed  Head of the Math and to appoint him as the  Head, and in the alternative, to appoint any  other competent person as the Head of the  Math. They further prayed for vesting of the  properties of the Jyotish Math in the new Head  and for rendition of accounts by Respondent 1,  etc., and to restrain him from prosecuting the  application for succession certificate and also  the mutation proceedings.                   xx                      xx              xx

10. A suit under Section 92 is a suit of a  special nature which presupposes the  existence of a public Trust of a religious or  charitable character. Such a suit can proceed  only on the allegation that there was a breach  of such trust or that the direction of the court  is necessary for the administration of the trust  and the plaintiff must pray for one or more of  the reliefs that are mentioned in the section. It

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is, therefore, clear that if the allegation of  breach of trust is not substantiated or that the  plaintiff had not made out a case for any  direction by the court for proper  administration of the trust, the very  foundation of a suit under the section would  fail; and, even if all the other ingredients of a  suit under Section 92 are made out, if it is  clear that the plaintiffs are not suing to  vindicate the right of the public but are  seeking a declaration of their individual or  personal rights or the individual or personal  rights of any other person or persons in whom  they are interested, then the suit would be  outside the scope of Section 92 (see N.  Shanmukham Chetty v. V.M. Govinda Chetty,  Tirumalai Devasthanams v. Udiavar  Krishnayya Shanbhaga, Sugra Bibi v. Hazi  Kummu Mia and Mulla: Civil Procedure Code  (13th edn.) Vol. 1, p. 400). A suit whose  primary object or purpose is to remedy the  infringement of an individual right or to  vindicate a private right does not fall under the  section. It is not every suit claiming the reliefs  specified in the section that can be brought  under the section but only the suits which,  besides claiming any of the reliefs, are brought  by individuals as representatives of the public  for vindication of public rights, and in deciding  whether a suit falls within Section 92 the court  must go beyond the reliefs and have regard to  the capacity in which the plaintiffs are suing  and to the purpose for which the suit was  brought. This is the reason why trustees of  public trust of a religious nature are precluded  from suing under the section to vindicate their  individual or personal rights. It is quite  immaterial whether the trustees pray for  declaration of their personal rights or deny the  personal rights of one or more defendants.  When the right to the office of a trustee is  asserted or denied and relief asked for on that  basis, the suit falls outside Section 92.  

11. We see no reason why the same principle  should not apply, if what the plaintiffs seek to  vindicate here is the individual or personal  right of Krishnabodhashram to be installed as  Shankaracharya of the Math. Where two or  more persons interested in a Trust bring a suit  purporting to be under Section 92, the  question whether the suit is to vindicate the  personal or individual right of a third person or  to assert the right of the public must be  decided after taking into account the dominant  purpose of the suit in the light of the  allegations in the plaint. If, on the allegations  in the plaint, it is clear that the purpose of the  suit was to vindicate the individual right of  Krishnabodhashram to be the  Shankaracharya, there is no reason to hold  that the suit was brought to uphold the right  of the beneficiaries of the Trust, merely  because the suit was filed by two or more

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members of the public after obtaining the  sanction of the Advocate-General and claiming  one or more of the reliefs specified in the  section. There is no reason to think that  whenever a suit is brought by two or more  persons under Section 92, the suit is to  vindicate the right of the public. As we said, it  is the object or the purpose of the suit and not  the reliefs that should decide whether it is one  for vindicating the right of the public of the  individual right of the plaintiffs or third  persons.

               xx              xx                      xx

14. It is, no doubt, true that it is only the  allegations in the plaint that should be looked  into in the first instance to see whether the  suit falls within the ambit of Section 92 (See  Association of R.D.B. Bagga Singh v. Gurnam  Singh, Sohan Singh v. Achhar Singh and Radha  Krishna v. Lachhmi Narain. But, if after  evidence is taken, it is found that the breach of  trust alleged has not been made out and that  the prayer for direction of the court is vague  and is not based on any solid foundation in  facts or reason but is made only with a view to  bring the suit under the section, then a suit  purporting to be brought under Section 92  must be dismissed. This was one of the  grounds relied on by the High Court for  holding that the suit was not maintainable  under Section 92."

18.     Prior to legislative change made by the Code of Civil  Procedure (Amendment) Act, 104 of 1976 the expression used  was "consent in writing of the Advocate-General". This  expression has been substituted by the words "leave of the  Court". Sub-Section (3) has also been inserted by the  Amendment Act. The object of Section 92 CPC is to protect the  public trust of a charitable and religious nature from being  subjected to harassment by suits filed against them. Public  trusts for charitable and religious purpose are run for the  benefit of the public. No individual should take benefit from  them.  If the persons in management of the trusts are  subjected to multiplicity of legal proceedings, funds which are  to be used for charitable or religious purposes would be  wasted on litigation. The harassment might dissuade  respectable and honest people from becoming trustees of  pubic trusts. Thus, there is need for scrutiny. In the suit  against public trusts, if on analysis of the averments  contained in the plaint it transpires that the primary object  behind the suit was the vindication of individual or personal  rights of some persons an action under the provision does not  lie. As noted in Swami Parmatmanand’s case (supra) a suit  under Section 92 CPC is a suit of special nature, which pre- supposes the existence of a public trust of religious or  charitable character. When the plaintiffs do not sue to  vindicate the right of the public but seek a declaration of their  individual or personal rights or the individual or personal  rights of any other persons or persons in whom they are  interested, Section 92 has no application.  

19.     In Swamy Parmatmanand’s case (supra) it was held that

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it is only the allegations in the plaint that should be looked  into in the first instance to see whether the suit falls within  the ambit of Section 92. But if after evidence is taken it is  found that the breach of trust alleged has not been made out  and that the prayer for direction of the Court is vague and is  not based on any solid foundation in fact or reason but is  made only with a view to bringing the suit under the Section  then suit purporting to be brought under Section 92 must be  dismissed.  

20.     In Chettiar’s case (supra) it was held that normally notice  should be given before deciding the question as to whether  leave is to be granted.  

21.     If in a given case notice has not been given and leave has  been granted, it is open to the Court to deal with an  application for revocation and pass necessary orders.  

22.     One of the factual aspects which needs to be highlighted  is that the allegations which have been made against  respondents 2, 3 and 10 are referable to a decision taken by  the Board, though may be by majority. The fundamental  question that arises is whether allegations against three of  them would be sufficient to taint the Board’s decision. As was  observed by this Court in Swamy Parmatmanand’s case,  (supra) to gauge whether the suit was for vindicating public  rights, the Court has to go beyond the relief and to focus on  the purpose for which the suit is filed. To put it differently, it is  the object or the purpose for filing the suit and not essentially  the relief which is of paramount importance.  There cannot be  any hard and fast rule to find out whether the real purpose of  the suit was vindicating public right or the object was  vindication of some personal rights. For this purpose the focus  has to be on personal grievances.   23.     On a close reading of the plaint averments, it is clear that  though the color of legitimacy was sought to be given by  projecting as if the suit was for vindicating public rights the  emphasis was on certain purely private and personal disputes.  

24.     In Sugra Bibi v. Hazi Kummu Mia (AIR 1969 SC 884) it  was held that the mere fact that the suit relates to public trust  of religious or charitable nature and the reliefs claimed fall  within some of the clauses of sub-Section (1) of Section 92  would not by itself attract the operation of the Section, unless  the suit is of a representative character instituted in the  interest of the public and not merely for vindication or the  individual or personal rights of the plaintiffs.  

25.     To put it differently, it is not every suit claiming reliefs  specified in Section 92 that can be brought under the Section;  but only the suits which besides claiming any of the reliefs are  brought by individuals as representatives of the public for  vindication of public rights. As a decisive factor the Court has  to go beyond the relief and have regard to the capacity in  which the plaintiff has sued and the purpose for which the  suit was brought. The Courts have to be careful to eliminate  the possibility of a suit being laid against public trusts under  Section 92 by persons whose activities were not for protection  of the interests of the public trusts.  In that view of the matter  the High Court was certainly wrong in holding that the grant  of leave was legal and proper. The impugned order of the High  Court is set aside. The appeal is allowed but without any order  as to costs.