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CASE NO.: Appeal (civil)  3066 of 2000

PETITIONER: Vemareddy Kumaraswamy Reddy & Anr

RESPONDENT: State of A.P.

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 13/02/2006

BENCH: ARIJIT PASAYAT & R.V. RAVEENDRAN

JUDGMENT: J U D G M E N T (With C.A. Nos. 3068, 3069, 3070, 3072, 3073 and 3110 of 2000)

ARIJIT PASAYAT, J.

                These appeals involve identical issues and are, therefore,  disposed of by this common judgment.  Challenge in these  appeals is to the order passed by a Division Bench of the  Andhra Pradesh High Court. Factual background is almost  undisputed and the controversy relates to the scope and ambit  of Rule 11 of the Andhra Pradesh Land Reforms (Ceiling on  Agricultural Holdings) Rules, 1974 (in short the ’Ceiling  Rules’).  The appellants were holding land in excess of the limit  prescribed under the Andhra Pradesh Land Reforms (Ceiling  on Agricultural Holdings) Act, 1973 (in short ’the Act’).  The  surplus land was surrendered by them which had cashew nut  tree plantation. On the surrendered land the trees were fruit  bearing trees.  The dispute relates to the amount payable in  respect of fruit bearing trees standing on the land which were  surrendered by the appellant.  The number of trees is also not  in dispute.  The amount payable for the land vested in the  Government the amounts were duly paid.  With regard to the  amount payable for fruit bearing trees a Commissioner was  appointed, who submitted a report regarding number of fruit  bearing trees and other trees standing on the land so  surrendered.  The Commissioner of Land Reforms Urban  Ceiling, Hyderabad, Andhra Pradesh directed the District  Collector to issue necessary instructions not to fix the  compensation payable in respect of the trees under the Rules  until further orders.  According to the authorities the payment  was to be made for one year only and not for thirty years as  was claimed by the appellants.   

       Writ petitions were filed before the High Court which  came to be dismissed by the impugned orders.

       Mr. M.N. Rao, learned senior counsel for the appellants  submitted that the High Court is not correct in its view that  the appellants are not entitled to get the amount for 30 years  and in accepting the stand of the Government that it was  payable only for one year.   

Learned counsel for the respondent-State on the other  submitted the view of the High Court is clearly  unexceptionable.  The purpose and object of the Statute under

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which the lands were surrendered cannot be lost sight of.  The  appellants have been rightly held to be entitled for amounts  payable for one year.   

In order to appreciate the rival submissions a few  provisions needs to be noted:

       A. Section 15 of the Act. "15. Amount payable for lands vested in the  Government:          The amount payable for any land vested  in the Government under this Act, shall be a  sum calculated at the rates specified in the  Second Schedule and it shall be paid at the  option of the Government, either in cash or in  bonds or partly in cash and partly in bonds.   The bonds shall be issued on such terms and  carry such rate of interest as may be  prescribed."

               B. Schedule II to the Act

Clause (3) of the Second Schedule to the Act provides as  follows:

"Where the land contains any fruit bearing  trees or permanent structures, the amount  payable therefore shall be calculated in such  manner as may be prescribed."

C. Rule 11 of the Rules.          "11. Fixation on value for fruit bearing trees  and structures etc. 91) The amount payable for  fruit bearing trees shall be at the seignorage  rates notified by the District Forest Officer as  applicable to the district from time to time and  for the Tribunal may require the District Forest  Officer in whose jurisdiction the land is  situated to furnish an estimate of the amount  payable for such trees.

(2) The amount payable for the structures of  permanent nature shall be equivalent to the  depreciated value of the structure as on the  specified date and for this purpose the  Tribunal may require the Executive Engineer,  Roads and Buildings Division, in the district to  furnish an estimate of the depreciated value of  such structure."           

At this juncture it is important to take note of the  notifications published in the Nellore District Gazettes dated  21.3.1982 and 23.4.1982.  There is no dispute that the  amounts payable for fruit bearing trees shall be at the  "seignorage rates" notified by the District Forest Officer from  time to time.

Notification dated 21.3.1982 reads as follows:- "R.C.D. 4 3209/82 NELLORE DISTRICT GAZETTE EXTRA ODRINARY PUBLISHED BY AUTHORITY NELLORE         SUNDAY MARCH 21ST 1982

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NOTIFICATION         In exercise of the powers conferred under  Rule 5 of the Rules to regulate the seignorage  fees to be levied for the removal of timber and  other procedure, issued U/s 26 of the A.P.  Forest Act, 1882, the Collector hereby fixes the  seignorage rates in respect of Cashew Trees  (Fruit bearing) in Nellore District as specified  in the ’Annexure’.  These rates shall come into  force with immediate effect.                                                 Sd/-                                         H.K. Babu,                         District Collector, Nellore,

Item No.64/82."

Seignorage rates of Cashew Trees (Fruit  Bearing) in Nellore District.

_______________________________________________________________________ S.No.   Tree            Age     Approximate     Rate            Seignorage                         Year    Girth   yield   per kg.         rates                                                                 Rs.   P.

1.      2.              3.      4.      5.      6.              7. _______________________________________________________________________

1.      Cashew          5th     78(g)    0.75   10              7.50                         6th     79.50   11.50   10              5.00                         7th     80.00    3.00   10              30.00 8th     80.50    4.50   10              45.00 9h      81.00    6.00   10              60.00 10th    81.00    7.50   10              75.00 11th    82.00    8.00   10              80.00 12th    82.00    8.50   10              85.00 13th    83.00    9.00   10              90.00 14th             9.50   10              95.00 15th            10.00   10              100.00 16th    84.00   10.00   10              100.00 17th    85.00   10.00   10              100.00 18th    85.00   10.00   10              100.00 19th    80.00   10.00   10              100.00 20th    86.00   10.00   10              100.00 21th    87.00   10.00   10              100.00 2nd     87.50   10.00   10              100.00 23rd    88.00   10.00   10              100.00 24th    88.00   10.00   10              100.00 25th    89.00   10.00   10              100.00 26th    89.00    9.00   10              90.00 27th    90.00    8.00   10              80.00 28th    90.00    7.00   10              70.00 29th    90.00    6.00   10              60.00 30th    90.00    6.00   10              60.00 ________________________________________________________________________

(Sd)H.K. Babu, Nellore.                                        Dist. Collector.

Dated 21.03.82"

The notification dated 23.4.82 which is crucial for this  case reads as follows:

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"R.C.D. 4 3209/82 NELLORE DISTRICT GAZETTE EXTRA ODRINARY PUBLISHED BY AUTHORITY NELLORE                 APRIL 23 - 1982

NOTIFICATION

       The following sentence may be added to  the Notification published Nellore District  Gazette (Extra-ordinary) dated 31.03.1982.

The seignorage rate in the column No.7  are the rate of trees per year and the tree will  yield for 30 years.  The seignorage rate per tree  is to be calculated for 30 years.

                                               Sd/-                                         H.K. Babu,                         District Collector, Nellore.

Dt. 23.04.1982 U.M. No.97/82"

A bare reading thereof makes the position clear that the  amounts are to be calculated from 5th to 30th years.

That being so, the stand of the State Government as  accepted by the High Court that the seignorage rate is for one  year and accordingly fixing it for the 12 year is clearly  unsustainable.  It is to be noted that the trees were 12 years  old and stood on the surrendered land. It is further clear that  up to 5 years cashew trees are held to be not fruit bearing  trees.

The emphasis for the State was that the object of the  concerned statue was not to confer any benefit beyond the  statutory entitlements and for that purpose according to  learned counsel for the State the object of the statute was  vital.  According to him for the purpose of construction of the  notifications of the District Collector, the same has  to be read  in a manner which would give true effect to the intention of  the statute.  

We shall deal with this plea in some detail.  

It is said that a statute is an edict of the legislature. The  elementary principle of interpreting or construing a statute is  to gather the mens or sententia legis of the legislature. It is  well settled principle in law that the Court cannot read  anything into a statutory provision which is plain and  unambiguous.           Interpretation postulates the search for the true meaning  of the words used in the statute as a medium of expression to  communicate a particular thought. The task is not easy as the  "language" is often misunderstood even in ordinary  conversation or correspondence. The tragedy is that although  in the matter of correspondence or conversation the person  who has spoken the words or used the language can be  approached for clarification, the legislature cannot be  approached as the legislature, after enacting a law or Act,  becomes functus officio so far as that particular Act is  concerned and it cannot itself interpret it. No doubt, the  legislature retains the power to amend or repeal the law so  made and can also declare its meaning, but that can be done

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only by making another law or statute after undertaking the  whole process of law-making.  

       Statute being an edict of the legislature, it is necessary  that it is expressed in clear and unambiguous language. In  spite of Courts saying so, the draftsmen have paid little  attention and they still boast of the old British jingle "I am the  parliamentary draftsman. I compose the country’s laws. And of  half of the litigation, I am undoubtedly the cause", which was  referred to by this Court in Palace Admn. Board v. Rama  Varma Bharathan Thampuran (AIR 1980 SC 1187 at. P.1195).  In Kirby v. Leather (1965 (2) All ER 441) the draftsmen were  severely criticized in regard to Section 22(2)(b) of the (UK)  Limitation Act, 1939, as it was said that the section was so  obscure that the draftsmen must have been of unsound mind.  

       Where, however, the words were clear, there is no  obscurity, there is no ambiguity and the intention of the  legislature is clearly conveyed, there is no scope for the court  to innovate or take upon itself the task of amending or altering  the statutory provisions. In that situation the Judges should  not proclaim that they are playing the role of a law-maker  merely for an exhibition of judicial valour. They have to  remember that there is a line, though thin, which separates  adjudication from legislation. That line should not be crossed  or erased. This can be vouchsafed by "an alert recognition of  the necessity not to cross it and instinctive, as well as trained  reluctance to do so". (See: Frankfurter, Some Reflections on  the Reading of Statutes in "Essays on Jurisprudence",  Columbia Law Review, P.51.)

Words and phrases are symbols that stimulate mental  references to referents. The object of interpreting a statute is  to ascertain the intention of the Legislature enacting it. (See  Institute of Chartered Accountants of India v. M/s Price  Waterhouse and Anr.  (AIR 1998 SC 74)) The intention of the  Legislature is primarily to be gathered from the language used,  which means that attention should be paid to what has been  said as also to what has not been said. As a consequence, a  construction which requires for its support, addition or  substitution of words or which results in rejection of words as  meaningless has to be avoided. As observed in Crawford v.  Spooner (1846 (6) Moore PC 1), Courts, cannot aid the  Legislatures’ defective phrasing of an Act, we cannot add or  mend, and by construction make up deficiencies which are left  there. (See The State of Gujarat and Ors. v. Dilipbhai  Nathjibhai Patel and Anr. (JT 1998 (2) SC 253)). It is contrary  to all rules of construction to read words into an Act unless it  is absolutely necessary to do so. (See Stock v. Frank Jones  (Tiptan) Ltd. (1978 1 All ER 948 (HL). Rules of interpretation  do not permit Courts to do so, unless the provision as it  stands is meaningless or of doubtful meaning. Courts are not  entitled to read words into an Act of Parliament unless clear  reason for it is to be found within the four corners of the Act  itself. (Per Lord Loreburn L.C. in Vickers Sons and Maxim Ltd.  v. Evans (1910) AC 445 (HL), quoted in Jamma Masjid,  Mercara v. Kodimaniandra Deviah and Ors.(AIR 1962 SC 847).  

The question is not what may be supposed and has been  intended but what has been said. "Statutes should be  construed not as theorems of Euclid". Judge Learned Hand  said, "but words must be construed with some imagination of  the purposes which lie behind them". (See Lenigh Valley Coal  Co. v. Yensavage 218 FR 547). The view was re-iterated in  Union of India and Ors. v. Filip Tiago De Gama of Vedem

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Vasco De Gama (AIR 1990 SC 981).  

In Dr. R. Venkatchalam and Ors. etc. v. Dy. Transport  Commissioner and Ors. etc. (AIR 1977 SC 842), it was  observed that Courts must avoid the danger of a priori  determination of the meaning of a provision based on their  own pre-conceived notions of ideological structure or scheme  into which the provision to be interpreted is somewhat fitted.  They are not entitled to usurp legislative function under the  disguise of interpretation.  

While interpreting a provision the Court only interprets  the law and cannot legislate it. If a provision of law is misused  and subjected to the abuse of process of law, it is for the  legislature to amend, modify or repeal it, if deemed necessary.  (See Commissioner of Sales Tax, M.P. v. Popular Trading  Company, Ujjain (2000 (5) SCC 515). The legislative casus  omissus cannot be supplied by judicial interpretative process.  (See Maulavi Hussein Haji Abraham Umarji v. State of Gujarat  and Anr. (2004(6) SCC 672) and State of Jharkhand and Anr.  V. Govind Singh (2005 (10) SCC 437)                  The residual question is the number of years for which  the Seignorage rates are to be computed.   We do not find any substance in the plea of learned  counsel for the appellants that the entitlement of the  appellants is for 30 years.  Admittedly the trees were 12 years  old at the time the land were surrendered and, therefore, for  the balance 18 years only the appellants will be entitled to at  the relevant seignorage rates. Therefore, the amount payable  for each 12 year old cashew tree at the seignorage rates, as per  the Notification dated 21.3.1982 (as amended by Notification  dated 23.4.1982) will be ’the seignorage rate for 12 year tree’  multiplied by the ’remaining age of the tree’ that is Rs.85x 18  = Rs.1530. The amount shall be paid within 3 months, along  with other statutory entitlements, if any.  The appeals are accordingly allowed to the aforesaid  extent.  No costs.