http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 1 of 25  

PETITIONER: VATTICHERUKURU VILLAGE PANCHAYAT AND ORS.

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: NORI VEKATRAMA DEEKSHITHULU AND ORS.

DATE OF JUDGMENT26/04/1991

BENCH: RAMASWAMY, K. BENCH: RAMASWAMY, K. KASLIWAL, N.M. (J)

CITATION:  1991 SCR  (2) 531        1991 SCC  Supl.  (2) 228  JT 1991 (5)   140        1991 SCALE  (1)818

ACT:      A.P.  Gram  Panchyat  Act,  1964-Section  64  and   65- Property  of  income belongs to or administered for  benefit of villagers in common- Vests in Gram Panchayat.      A.P.  Gram  Panchayat Act  1964-  Section85-Vesting  of Water  courses  and tanks, lands used by  public  with  Gram Panchayat-  Assumption of management by Government,  Subject to villagers’ prescriptive right.      A.P.  Inams  (Abolition and Conversion  into  Ryotwari) Act,  1956- Section 8-Tank-Grant of ryotwari patta to  users of inam land- Conclusive nature of their right , title   and interest.      Constitution   of India, 1950- Preamble, Chapter IV read with  section9,  Code  of  Civil  Procedure,  1908-   Social legislation-Conferrring   power     and    jurisdiction   on tribunals-Orders   passed  by  them  Finality-Exclusion   of jurisdiction   of  Civil   Courts-Purpose  of-Decisions   of Revenue  Courts  under section 3 read with  section7,  Inams Act-|Whether retriable in Civil Court.  Words  and  Phrases- ’Vest’,  Vested’,  ’Vesting’-Meaning of.

HEADNOTE:      Civil Appeal Nos. 931 of 1977 and  200 of  1978  relate to  the  same  dispute  though arose  from,  two  suits  and separate judgements.      Civil Appeal No. 931 of 1977 arose out of the suit  for possession by the Gram Panchayat against the descendants  of the  grantee  of inam. The suit was dismissed by  the  Trial Court and was confirmed by the High Court and the High Court granted leave under Art.133.      Civil Appeal No. 200 of 1978 arose out of the suit  for possession  and   mesne  profits  which  was  laid  by   the descendants  of the grantee of inam. The pleadings  are  the same in both cases.      A  Zamindar  granted  100 acres of land  inam  to  dig, preserve                                                        532 and maintain a tank in  favour of the predecessors of  the respondents of C.A. No. 931/77.      In  1700 A.D.i.e., 1190 Fasli, the tank was dug by  the villagers and ever since, the villagers were  using the tank for  their  drinking purpose and perfected their   right  by

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 2 of 25  

prescription.      In  course  of time the tank was silted  up  and  fresh water  existed only in and around 30 acres.  The   grantee’s descendants-respondents did not make any repairs, Grass  and trees  had been grown in the rest of the area and was  being enjoyed.      Under  section  3  of the  A.P.Inams  (  Abolition  and Conversion  into  Ryotwari)  Act,  (  Act  XXXVII  of  1956) Ryotwari   Patta   was  granted  to  the    respondents   in individuals  capacity and on appeal the Revenue   Divisional Officer  confirmed the same and it became final, as  it  was not challenged any further.      On 7.7.1965, the Gram panchayat- the appellant in  C.A. No. 931/77 took unilateral possession of the tank  and  ever since  ,  it  was exercising  possession,   supervision  and control over it.      After  the  expiry  of three year  from  the  date  of dispossession, the respoondents filed a suit for  possession based  on  title.  Earlier  thereto  the  appellant-   Gram- Panchayat had filed  a suit for possession.      The  Trial  Court  found that the tank  was  a  ’public trust’,  the  appellants would be  hereditary  trustees  and could  be removed only by taking action under s. 77  of  the A.P.  Hindu  Charitable  and  Religious   Institutions   and Endowments  Act, 1966 and that the respondents had  acquired title  by  adverse  possession.  Accordingly  the  suit  for possession  was  decreed relegating the filing  of  separate application for mesne profit.      On appeal, the High Court reversed the decree and  held that the tank was a public tank, and the tank and the  lands stood vested in the Gram Panchyat  under A.P. Gram Panchayat Act,1964.  Since, the Gram Panchayat was in possession  from July 7, 1966, though dispossessed the  respondents  forcibly and  as the suit was  not under s. 6 of the Specific  Relief Act,   1963,  but  one  based  on  title,  it   called   for interference  and  dismissed the suit.  This  court  granted leave to appeal under article 136.                                                         533      The  respondents in C.A. No. 931/77 (the appellants  in C.A.  No. 200/78) contended that in view of the  entries  of the Inam Fair Register, the tank was a public trust and  not a public tank; they could not be dispossessed until recourse made  under section 77 of the A.P. Charitable and  Religious Institutions  and   Endowments  Act;  that  under  the  Gram Panchayat Act, the lands did not vest in the gram Panchayat; and  that since the grant of ryotwari patta under the  Inams Act had become final, S. 14, thereof barred the jurisdiction of the Civil Court to entertain the suit.      The  appellant-Gram Panchayat in C.A. No.  931/77  (the respondents in C.A. No. 200/78) contended that the tank  and the  appurtenant land was correctly held as public  tank  by the  High Court that by operation of sections 85 and  64  of the  Gram Panchayat Act, the land and the tank stood  vested in the Panchayat, that the entries in the Inam Fair Register established  that  the grant of land was  for  preservation, maintenance and repairs of the tank and therefore, the grant should be in favour of the institution, i..e., the tank  and the  respondents  thereby did not acquire  any  title,  that ryotwari  patta  was only for the purpose of  land  revenue; that  the Gram Panchayat acquired absolute right, title  and interest  in  the land; and the suit was not a  bar  in  the facts of the case.      Dismissing both appeals, this Court      HELD: 1.01. Any property or income, which belongs to or has  been administered  for the benefit of the villagers  in

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 3 of 25  

common  or the holders in any of the village land  generally or  of  land of a particular description or of  lands  under particular source of irrigation shall vest in Gram Panchayat and  be administered by it for the benefit of the  villagers or  holders. The lands or income used for  communal  purpose shall  either  belong  to the Gram  Panchayat  or  has  been administered  by the Gram Panchayat. It is not the  case  of the  Gram Panchayat nor any finding recorded by  the  courts below    to that effect. So. s. 64 is not  attracted  though the  villagers acquired prescriptive right to use the  water from the tank for their use and of their cattle. [554D-F]      1.02.  All public water-courses,  springs,  reservoirs, tanks, cisterns, etc. and other water works either  existing on  the  date  of the Act or made  thereafter  by  the  Gram Panchayat,  or otherwise including those used by the  public ripened  into prescriptive right for the use and benefit  of the  public  and also adjacent or any appurtenant  land  not being  private  property shall vest in  the  Gram  Panchayat under s. 85(1) and be subject to its control. [554F-G]                                                         534      2.01. The word‘vesting’ in s. 85 would signify that the water-courses  and tanks, lands etc. used by the  public  to such  an  extent as to give a prescripvtive right  to  their use, are vested in the Gram Panchayat, and placed them under the  control  and  supervision of  the  Gram  Panchayat.  It confers  no  absolute  or full title. It  was  open  to  the Government,  even after vesting, to place  restriction  upon the  Gram  Panchayat in the matter of enjoyment and  use  of such  tanks,  and appurtenant lands etc. The  assumption  of management  by  the  Government  would  be  subject  to  the prescriptive right of the villagers, if any. The vesting  of the  tanks  etc.  in the Gram Panchayat  was  with  absolute rights  and  the village community  rights  would  over-ride against rights of the Government. [546C-F]      2.02. The tank is a public tank and not a public  trust and that under s. 85(1) and s. 64, the vesting of the tanks, the  appurtenant  land and the common land is only  for  the purpose of possession, supervision, control and use  thereof for the villagers for common use subject to the  over-riding title  by  the Government and its assumption  of  management should  be  in terms of sub-s. (3) of s. 85 of the  Act  and subject to the prescriptive right in the water, water spread tank for common use. [547A-B]      Gram Panchayat, Mandapaka & Ors. V. Distt.  Collecctor, Eluru & Ors. AIR 1982 AP 15, approved.      Anna Narasimha Rao & Ors. v. Kurra Venkata Narasayya  & Ors., [1981] AWR 325, OVER-RULED.      3.01. Under A.P. Land Encroachment Act, 1905; Talengana Area  Land  Revenue Act, relevant Abolition Acts  like  A.P. Estates (Abolition and Conversion into Ryotwari) Act,  1948, Inams Abolition Act etc. give absolute rights or vesting  in the  State  over  the forest  land,  tanks,  rivers,  mines, poramboke, land,  etc. free from all  encumbrances  and  the preexisting  rights  in the other land stood  abolished  and will be subject to the grant of Ryotwari Patta etc. [546F-H]      3.02 Grant of Ryotwari patta is not a title but a right coupled   with  possession  to  remain  in  occupation   and enjoyment,  subject  to payment of the land revenue  to  the State. [546H]      3.03.  The entries in the Inam Fair Register are  great acts of the State and coupled with the entries in the survey and settlement record                                                        535 furnishes  unimpeachable evidence. On construction of  these documents,  it would clearly emerge that the original  grant

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 4 of 25  

was  made for the preservation and maintenance of  the  tank and tax-free Inam land was granted for that purpose,  though it was in the name of the individual grantee. The grant  was for the preservation and maintenance of the tank. [548C-D]      3.04. The grant was for the institution. Under s. 3  of the  Inams  Act,  the  enquiry  should  be,  whether  (1)  a particular  land is Inam land; (2) Inam land in a  Ryotwari, Zamindar   or  Inam  Village;  and  (3)  is  held   by   any institution.  In view of the finding that the grant was  for the  preservation and maintenance of tank, the Inam land  in an  inam  village was held by the institution,  namely,  the tank.  Ryotwari patta shall, therefore, be in favour of  the institution.  Undoubtedly the ryotwari patta was granted  in favour of the descendants. [548D-F]      3.05. The pattas were obtained in the individuals name, the  trustees  of  an  institution  cannot  derive  personal advantage from the administration of the trust property. The grant of patta was for the maintenance of the trust. [548G]      3.06.  The descendants, though enjoyed the income  from the properties, did not effect the repairs and neglected the maintenance  and upkeep of the tank. They rendered the  tank disused and abandoned. By operation of s. 85 of the Act  the lands  and  tank  stood vested in  the  Gram  Panchayat  for control, management and supervision. [550E-F]      3.07.  A  hereditary  trustee is  entitled  to  be  the Chairman  of a Board of Trustees, if any, constituted  under the  Endowment  Act or else be in exclusive  possession  and management  of the public trust registered thereunder  until he  is removed as per the procedure provided therein.  Since the  tank  always  remained a public tank and  not  being  a public  trust, the Endowment Act does not apply.  Therefore, the  question  of  initiating  action under  s.  77  of  the Endowment  Act  for removal of the descendants  as  trustees does not arise. [550F-G]      Arunachalam  Chetty v. Venkatachalpathi Garu  Swamigal, AIR  1919  P.C. 62 at P. 65; Syed Md. Mazaffaral  Musavi  v. Bibi Jabeda & Ors., AIR 1930 Pc 1031; Bhojraj v. Sita Ram  & Ors,  AIR  1936  P.C. 60; M.  Srinivasacharyulu  &  Ors.  V. Dinawahi Pratyanga Rao & Ors., AIR 1921 Madras 467; Ravipati Kotayya  &  Anr. v. Ramaswamy Subbaraydu &  Ors.,  [1956]  2 A.W.R. 739, referred to.                                                        536      K.V.  Krishna  Rao v. Sub-Colletor,  Ongole,  [1969]  1 S.C.R. 624, followed.      Nori   Venkatarama   Dikshitulu   &   Ors.   v.    Ravi Venkatappayya & Ors., [1959] 2 A.W.R. 357, approved.      Krishan  Nair  Boppudu Punniah & Ors.  v.  Sri  Lakshmi Narasimhaswamy  Varu,  [1963]  1  A.W.R.  214;  Bhupathiraju Venkatapathiraju  &  Ors.  V.  The  President  Taluq  Board, Narsapur   &  Ors.;  [1913]  19  1.C.  727  (Mad.)   (D.B.), distinguished.      Tagore  Law Lecture, ‘‘Hindu Religious  Endowments  and Institutions at p. 6, distinguished.      4.01. In the laws made to restructure the social  order creating  rights  in favour of the citizens  and  conferring power and jurisdiction on the hierarchy of Tribunals or  the authorities  constituted thereunder and giving  finality  to their  orders or decisions and divested the jurisdiction  of the  established  civil  courts expressly  or  by  necessary implication  Departure  in the allocation  of  the  judicial functions would not be viewed with disfavor for creating the new  forums and entrusting the duties under the statutes  to implement  socio-economic  and fiscal laws. Courts  have  to consider,  when  questioned, why the  legislature  made  the departure. The reason is obvious. The tradition bound  civil

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 5 of 25  

courts  gripped with rules of pleading and strict  rules  of evidence  and  tardy  trial,  four  tier  appeals,   endless revisions  and  reviews under C.P.C. are not suited  to  the needed  expeditious  dispensation.  The  adjudicatory system provided  in  the  new  forums  is  cheap  and  rapid,.  The procedure  before the Tribunal is simple and not hide  bound by   the   intricate   procedure   of   pleadings,    trial, admissibility  of the evidence and proof of facts  according to  law.  Therefore, there is abundant  flexibility  in  the discharge  of  the  functions with  greater  expedition  and inexpensiveness. {552D-H]      4.02. In order to find out the purpose in creating  the Tribunals  under the statues and the meaning  of  particular provisions in social legislation, the Court would adopt  the purposive  approach to ascertain the socials ends  envisaged in the Act, to  consider scheme of the Act as an  integrated whole  and  practical means by which it was  sought  to   be effectuated to achieve them. Meticulous lexographic analysis of words and phrases and sentences should be subordinate  to this purposive approach. The dynamics of the  interpretative functioning  of  the Court is to  reflect  the  contemporary needs   and  the  prevailing  values  consistent  with   the constitutional  and  legislative declaration of  the  policy envisa-                                                        537 ged in the statute under consideration. [552H-553B]      4.03. The law should, therefore, respond to the clarion call of social imperatives evolve in that process functional approach as means to subserve ‘‘social promises’’ set out in the  Preamble,  Directive  Principles  and  the  Fundamental Rights of the Constitution. [553d]      4.04.  Section  9  of the Civil  Procedure  Code,  1908 provides  that whenever a question arises before  the  Civil Court  whether its jurisdiction is excluded expressly or  by necessary implication, the court naturally feels inclined to consider whether remedy afforded by an alternative provision prescribed by special statute is sufficient or adequate.  In cases  where exclusion of the civil court’s jurisdiction  is expressly  provided for, the consideration as to the  scheme of the statue in question and the adequacy of sufficiency of the remedy provided for by it may be relevant, but cannot be decisive.  Where  exclusion  is  pleaded  as  a  matter   of necessary  implication  such  consideration  would  be  very important and inconceivable circumstances might become  even decisive. [553G-554B]      4.05.  The  jurisdiction of a  Tribunal  created  under statute  may  depend upon the fulfilment of  some  condition precedent or upon existence of some particular fact. Such  a fact  is collateral to the actual matter which the  Tribunal has  to try and the determination whether it existed or  not is  logically  temporary prior to the determination  of  the actual  question which the Tribunal has to consider. At  the inception   of   an  enquiry  by  a  Tribunal   of   limited jurisdiction, when a challenge is made to its  jurisdiction, the Tribunal has to consider as the collateral fact  whether it  would act or not and for that purpose to arrive at  some decision as to whether it has jurisdiction or not. There may be  Tribunal which by virtue of the law constituting it  has the  power to determine finally, even the preliminary  facts on  which the further exercise of its jurisdiction  depends; but subject to that, the Tribunal cannot by a wrong decision with  regard to collateral fact, give itself a  jurisdiction which  it would not otherwise have except such tribunals  of limited  jurisdiction when the statue not only  empowers  to enquire  into jurisdictional facts but also the  rights  and

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 6 of 25  

controversy  finally it is entitled to enter on the  enquiry and  reach  a  decision  rightly  or  wrongly.  If  it   has jurisdiction  to do right, it has jurisdiction to do  wrong. It  may be irregular or illegal which could be corrected  in appeal  or revision subject to that the order  would  become final. [554B-F]      4.06.  The  Inams  Act  did not  intend  to  leave  the decisions of the revenue courts under s. 3 read with s. 7 to retry the issue once over in the civil court. [561D-E]                                                        538      4.07.  The  glimpse  of the object of  the  Inams  Act, scheme,  scope and operation thereof clearly  manifest  that Inams  Act  is  a self contained  code,  expressly  provided rights  and liabilities; prescribed procedure; remedies;  of appeal and revision, excluded the jurisdiction of the  civil court, notwithstanding anything contained in any law,  given primacy  of  Inams Act though inconsistent with  any  law  or instrument having force of law. The jurisdictional  findings are  an integral scheme to grant or refuse  ryotwari  pattta under  s. 3, read with s. 7 and not collateral findings.  It was subject to appeal and revision and certiorari under  Art 226.  The  decision of the Revenue Tribunal, are  final  and conclusive  between the parties or persons  claiming  right, title  or interest through them. The trick of pleadings  and the  camouflage  of  the reliefs are not  decisive  but  the substance  or the effect on the order of the tribunal  under the Inams Act are decisive. The civil suit except on grounds of  fraud, misrepresentation or collusion of the parties  is not maintainable. The necessary conclusion would be that the civil  suit  is not maintainable when  the  decree  directly nullifies the ryotwari patta granted under s. 3 of the Inams Act. [561E-562A]      Deena v. Union of India, [1984] ISCR, referred to.      Kamala Mills Ltd. v. State of Bombay, [1966] 1 SCR  64; Secretary  of State v. Mask & Co., [1940] L.R. 67 I.A.  222; Raleigh Investment Co. Ltd. V. Governor-General in  Council, L.R.  74 I.A. 50; Firm and Illuri Subbayya Chetty & Sons  v. State of Andhra Pradesh, [1964] 1 SCR 752; Deesika  Charyulu v. State of A.p., AIR 1964 SC 807; Dhulabhai & Ors v.  State of  M.P.  & Anr., [1968] 3 SCR 662; Hati  v.  Sunder  Singh, [1971] 2 SCR 163; Muddada Chayana v. Karam Narayana and Anr. Etc.,  [1979]  3 SCR 201; T. Munuswami Naidu v.  R.  Venkata Reddy, AIR 1978 A.P. 200; O. Chenchulakshmamma & Anr. v.  D. Subramanya Reddy, [1980] 1 SCR 1006; A. Bodayya & Anr. V. L. Ramaswamy(dead)  by  Lrs.,  [1984] Suppl. SCC  391;  Doe  v. Bridges, [1831] 1 B & Ad. 347 at p. 359; Premier Automobiles Ltd.  v.  Kamlakar Shantaram Wadke and  Ors., [1976]  1  SCR 427; State of Tamil Nadu v. Ramalinga Samigal Madam,  [1985] 4 SCC 10; Syamala Rao v. Sri Radhakanthaswami Varu, [1984] 1 A.P.L.J. 113; Jyotish Tahakur & Ors. v. Tarakant Jha & Ors., [1963]  Suppl. 1 SCR 13; Sri Athmanathaswami Devasthanam  v. K.  Gopalaswami  Aiyangar, {1964] 3 SCR  763;  Sri  VEdagiri Lakshmi Narasimha Swami Temple v. Induru Pattabhirami Reddy, [1967] 1 SCR 280; Shree Raja Kandragula Srinivasa Jagannadha Rao Panthulu Bahadur Garu v. State of Andhra Pradesh, [1970] 2  SCR  714; Dr. Rajendra Prakash Sharma v. Gyan  Chandra  & Ors.,  [1980]  3 SCR 207; Anne Basant  National  Girls  High School v. Dy.                                                        539 Director of Public Instruction & Ors., [1983] 1  SCC 200; Raja Ram Kumar Bhargava (dead) by Lrs. v.  Union of India,  [1988] 2 SCR 352; Pabbojan Tea Co., Ltd., etc. v. the Dy. Commissioner, Lakhimpur, etc., [1968] 1 SCR 260 and K. Chintamani Dora & Ors. v. G. Annamnaidu & Ors., [1974]  2 SCR 655, distinguished.

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 7 of 25  

    D.V.  Raju  v. B.G. Rao & Anr., [1961]  2  A.W.R.  368, approved.      P.pedagovindayy  v.  Subba Rao, [1969]  2  A.L.T.  336, over-ruled.      5.01.  The word ‘vest’ clothes varied colours from  the context and situation in which the word came to be used in a statue of rule. [545B-C]      5.02.  The  word [vest’], means, to give  an  immediate, fixed right of present or future enjoyment, to accrue to, to be  fixed,  to take effect, to clothe  with  possession,  to deliver  full  possession of land or of an estate,  to  give seisin to enfeoff. [545C-D]      5.03. The word, ‘vest’, in the absence of a context, is usually  taken to mean, ‘vest’ in interest rather than  vest in possesion’.[545E-F]      5.04.  ‘Vest’. ‘‘generally means to give  the  property in’’. [545E-F]      5.05.  The  word,  ‘vested’ was  defined,  ‘as  to  the interest acquired by public bodies, created for a particular purpose,  in works, such as embankments, whcih are  ‘vested’ in them by statute.’ {545D-E]      5.06. ‘‘Vesting’’ in the legal sense means, to  settle, secure,  or put in fixed right of possession; to  endow,  to descend, devolve or to take effect, as a right’. [545C]      Chamber’s Mid-Century Dictionary at P. 1230; Blacks Law Dictionary,  5th  Edition  at  P.  1401;  Stroud’s  Judicial Dictionary,  4th  Edition Vol, 5 at P. 2938, Item 12,  at  P 2940, Item 4 at P. 2939; Port of London Authority v.  Canvey Island Commissioners, {1932] 1 Ch. 446; Fruit and  Vegetable Merchants Union v. Delhi Improvement Trust, [1957] S.C.R. 1, referred to.      6.   Under  the  Gram  Panchayat  Act   the   statutory interposition  of vesting the tank and the appurtenant  land in the Gram Panchayat made it to retain possession,  control and   supervision  over  it,  though  the   Gram   Panchayat unlawfully  took  possession. The need to grant  decree  for possession   in  favour  of  the  Gram  Panchayat  is   thus redundant. The suit                                                        540 of  the  descendants normally to be decreed on  the  finding that  ryotwari patta under s. 3 of the Inams Act was granted in their favour and that they were unlawfully  dispossessed. Since  the  grant of ryotwari patta, though in the  name  of individuals,  was  to maintain the public tank  whcih  stood vested  under  s. 85 of the Act in the Gram  panchayat,  the descendants are divested of the right and interest  acquired therein. Thus the suit of the descendants also is liable  to be dismissed. [562A-C]

JUDGMENT:      CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal Nos.  931/77 & 200/78.      Appeals  by  Certificate from the Judgment  and  Decree dated  1.4.76  and  from  the  Judgment  and  Decree   dated 19.6.1975 of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in A.S. NO. 71/73 and Appeal No. 259 of 1972.           B. Kanta Rao for the Appellants.           C.   Sitaramiah,  and  B.  Parthasarthi  for   the Respondents.           The Judgment of the Court was delivered by:      K.RAMASWAMY,  J. Civil Appeal Nos. 931 of 1977 and  200 of  1978  relate to the same dispute though arose  from  two suits  and separate judgements. The Bench that  heard  Civil

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 8 of 25  

appeal No. 931 of 1977 directed on January 24, 1991 to  list Civil  Appeal  No. 200 of 1978 for  common  disposal.  Civil Appeal  No. 200 of 1978 arose out of O.S. No 118 of 1968  on the file of the Court of Add. Subordinate Judge. Guntur  and Appeal No. 259 at 1972 dated June 19, 1975 of the A.P.  High Court. The suit for possession and mesne profits was laid by the   descendants  of  Nori  Lakshmipathi   Somayaajulu   of Vatticherukuru,   Guntur  Taluq  and  District,  for   short ‘N.L.S.’.  The  dispute relates to the tank known  as  ‘Nori Lakshmipathi  Somayajulu’s  Western  Tank’  ‘‘Vooracheruva’’ (Village Tank). It consists of 100 acres of which roughly 30 acres is covered by water spread area marked A’ Schedule ‘B’ Schedule consists of 70 acres (silted up area). The tank was dug  in Fasli 1190 (1700 A.D.) Zamindar, Raja  Mainikya  Rao made  a  grant  of the land for digging  the  tank  and  its preservation,   maintenance   and   repairs.   It   is   the descendants’  case that it is a private tank enjoyed by  the ‘grantee’,  N.L.S. as owner and thereafter  the  descendants and  perfected the title by prescription. It was found as  a fact  by  the High Court and the descendants are  unable  to persuade  us from the evidence to differ from  the  findings that the tank is a ‘‘public tank’’ dug by                                                        541 the  village. The descendants’ plea and evidence adduced  in support  thereof that it is their private tank, was  negated by both  the courts. The Trial Court found that the tank  is a  ‘public  trust’,  the  appellants  would  be   hereditary trustees and could be removed only by taking action under s. 77  of the A.P. Hindu Charitable and Religious  Institutions and Endowments Act, 1966 for short ‘the Endowments Act’.  It also  held  that the descendants acquired title  by  adverse possession. Accordingly the suit for possession was  decreed relegating  to  file  a  separate  application  for   meesne profits.  On appeal the High Court reversed the  decree  and held  that  the tank is a public tank and the tank  and  the lands  stood  vested in the Gram Panchayat under  A.P.  Gram Panchayat Act 2 of 1964 for short ‘the Act’. Since the  Gram panchayat  was  in  possession from  July  7,  1965,  though dispossessed the descendants forcibly and as the suit is not under s. 6 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 but one based on title, it called for no interference. It dismissed the suit. This Court granted leave to appeal under Article 136.      Civil Appeal No. 931 of 1977 arose out of the suit  for possession  in O.S. No. 57 of 1966 on the file of the  court of  Subordinate Judge at Guntur filed by the Gram  Panchayat against the descendants. The suit was dismissed by the Trial Court and was confirmed by the High Court in A.S. No. 71  of 1973 and the High Court granted leave under Art. 133 on Dec. 10.  1976. The pleadings are the same as in the other  suit. In  addition the descendants further pleaded in the  written statement that the Gram Panchayat unlawfully took possession of  the  tank on July 7, 1965. They also acquired  title  by grant  of  ryotwari  patta  under s. 3  of  the  A.P.  Inams (Abolition and Conversion into Ryotwari) Act (Act XXXVII  of 1956), for short ‘the Inams Act’. The Gram Panchayat had  no manner  of  right  to interfere with  their  possession  and enjoyment. They also pleaded and adduced evidence that  they were  leasing  out the fishery rights and  grass  and  trees grown  on  the land. The income was being utilized  for  the repairs  of tank. The Trial Court and the High  Court  found that the lands were endowed to N.L.S. for the maintenance of the  tank and the descendants obtained ryotwari patta  under Inams  Act  and  are entitled to remain  in  possession  and enjoyment   as   owners  subject  to  maintain   the   tank. Accordingly the suit was dismissed. On appeal in A.S. No. 71

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 9 of 25  

of  1973  by  judgment dated April 1, 1976  the  High  Court confirmed the decree on further finding that by operation of s. 14 of the Inams Act, Civil Suit was barred. Thus both the appeals are before this Court.                                                        542           In   Civil   Appeal   No.  200   of   1978,   Shri Seetharamaiah  learned Senior Counsel for  the   descendants N.L.S. have no exclusive personal right title or interest in the  tank  and the appurtenant total land of 100  acres.  In view  of  the entries of the Inams Fair Register  for  short ‘I.F.R.,’ it is a public trust and not a public tank. Unless recourse is had to remove them from trusteeship under s.  77 of   the   Endowments   Act,  the   appellants   cannot   be dispossessed.  Since admittedly N.L.S. and  the  descendants were  enjoying  the  property till  date  of  dispossession, presumption  of  the continuance of the  enjoyment  anterior thereto  as  owners could be drawn. The High  Court  thereby committed  error  of  law in holding that  the  lands  stood vested in the Gram Panchayat under the Act and that it is  a public tank. In Civil Appeal No. 931 of 1977, it was further contended  that since the grant of Ryotwari patta under  the Inams   Act  had  became  final  s.  14  thereof  bars   the jurisdiction of the Civil Court to entertain the suit.  Shri B.Kanta   Rao,  learned  counsel  for  the  Gram   Panchayat contended  that the finding of the High Court that the  tank and  the  appurtenant  land,  namely,  the  plaint  schedule property,  as ‘public tank’, is based on evidence  that  the tank was dug by the villagers and that they have been  using for  their drinking purposes and the cattle is a finding  of fact. By operation of ss. 85 and 64 of the Act, the land and the tank stood vested in the Gram Panchayat. Entries in  the I.F.R.  establishes  that  the grant of  the  land  was  for preservation,   maintenance   and  repairs  of   the   tank. Therefore, the grant should be in favour of the institution, namely,  the  tank. The pattas obtained by  the  descendants should  be  for the benefit of the tank, though  granted  in individual  names.  By operation of s. 85 of  the  Act,  the descendants  acquired  no personal title  to  the  property. Ryotwari patta is only for the purpose of land revenue.  The Gram Panchayat acquired absolute right title and interest in the  land. The Civil Suit is not a bar on the facts in  this case.      Before appreciating the diverse contentions, the  facts emerged  from  the  findings in both the  appeals  could  be gathered  thus.  Admittedly the Zamindar. Raja  Manikya  Rao granted  100 acres of land in Inam village to dig  the  tank and the grant was for its preservation and maintenance,  the grant was in favour of N.L.S. In 1700 A.P., i.e. 1190 Fasli, the  tank  was  dug  by the villagers  and  ever  since  the villagers  have  been using the fresh water tank  for  their drinking  purposes  and of the cattle  and  perfected  their right by prescription. In course of time the tank was silted up  and in and around 30 acres the water spread area,  fresh water  is  existing.  No.  repairs  were  effected  by   the descendants. The rest of the land was silted up. Grass   and trees have been                                                        543 grown  thereon and was being enjoyed. On July 7,  1965,  the Gram  Panchayat took unilateral possession of the  tank  and ever  since  was  exercising  possession,  supervision   and control  over it. After expiry of three years from the  date of  dispossession, the descendants filed O.S. No.57 of  1966 for  possession  based on title. Earlier  thereto  the  Gram Panchayat  field  the suit for possession. Under  the  Inams Act,   Ryotwari  patta  under  s.  3  was  granted  to   the

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 10 of 25  

descendants in individual capacity and on appeal the Revenue Divisional  Officer,  Guntur confirmed the same.  It  became final as it was not challenged by filing any writ  petition. Both  the  suits now stood dismissed. The counsel  on  other side  have  taken  us  through  the  evidence  and  we  have carefully scanned the evidence.      From these facts the first question emerges is  whether the  tank  and  the appurtenant land stood  vested  in  Gram panchayat.      Section 64 of the Act reads thus:           ‘‘Vesting  of  common property or income  in  Gram           Panchayat-Any  property or income which by  custom           belongs  to  or  has  been  administered  for  the           benefit of the villagers is common, or the holders           in common of village land generally or of land  of           a  particular  description  or of  lands  under  a           particular source of irrigation, shall vest in the           Gram  Panchayat and be administered by it for  the           benefit of the villagers or holders aforesaid’’. Section 85 reads thus:           ‘‘Vesting of water works in Gram Panchayat-(1) All           public water-courses, springs, reservoirs,  tanks,           cisterns, fountains, wells, ponds an other  water           works (including those used by the public to  such           an extent as to give a prescriptive right to their           use) whether existing at the commencement of  this           Act  or  afterwards  made,  laid  or  erected  and           whether  made, laid or erected at the cost of  the           Gram Panchayat or otherwise for the use or benefit           of  the  public, and also any adjacent  land,  not           being private property, appertaining thereto shall           vest  in the Gram Panchayat and be subject to  its           control’’.           Provided  that nothing in this  sub-section  shall           apply to any work which is, or is connected  with,           a work of irrigation or                                                        544           to  any  adjacent land appertaining to  any  such           work.           (2)  Subject to such restrictions and  control  as           may  be prescribed, the Gram Panchayat shall  have           the fishery rights in any water work vested in  it           under  sub-section (1), the right to supply  water           from  any  such  work for  raising  seed  beds  on           payment  of the prescribed fee, and the  right  to           use  the  adjacent land appertaining  thereto  for           planting  of  trees  and  enjoying  the   usufruct           thereof or for like purpose.          (3)  The  Government may, by  notification  in  the          Andhra  Pradesh  Gazettee,  define  or  limit  such          control  or  may assume the administration  of  any          public  source  of  water-supply  and  public  land          adjacent and appertaining thereto after  consulting          the  Gram  Panchayat and giving due regard  to  its          objections, if any’’.                                         (emphasis supplied)      A bird’s eye view of the provisions brings out  vividly that  any  property or income which belongs to or  has  been administered  for the benefit of the villagers in common  or the holders in any of the village land generally or of  land of  a  particular description or of lands  under  particular source of irrigation shall vest in the Gram Panchayat and be administered  by  it  for the benefit of  the  villagers  or holders  aforesaid.  The lands or income  use  for  communal purpose  shall  either belong to the GRam Panchayat  or  has

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 11 of 25  

been administered by the Gram Panchayat. It is not the  case of the Gram Panchayat nor any finding recorded by the courts below  to the effect. So s. 64 is not attracted, though  the villagers acquired prescriptive right to use the water  from the tank for their use and of their cattle.      All  public water-courses, springs,  reservoirs,  tanks cisterns, etc. and other water works either existing on  the date of the Act or made thereafter by the Gram Panchayat, or otherwise  including  those use by the public  ripened  into prescriptive right for the use and benefit of the public and also  adjacent  or any appurtenant land  not  being  private property shall vest in the gram Panchayat under s. 85(1) and be  subject to its control. The proviso is not relevant  for the  purpose  of  this  case.  Under  sub-s  (2),  the  Gram Panchayat  shall have fishery rights therein subject to  any restriction or control prescribed by the Govt. by rules. The Gram Panchayat also shall have the right to use the adjacent land  appertaining thereto for planting trees  and  enjoying the  usufruct thereof or for like purposes. Sub-section  (3) gives over-riding power to                                                        545 the Govt., by a notification published in the A.P.  Gazettee to  define or limit the control or supervision by  the  Gram Panchayat  or  the Govt. may assume  administration  of  any public  source of water supply and public land adjacent  and appertaining  thereto. The only condition precedent  thereto is prior consultation of the Gram Panchayat and to have  due regard  to any objections. If raised, by the Gram  Panchayat and  issue notification published in the  Gazette   resuming the water sources or the land etc.      The word ‘vest’ clothes varied colours from the context and situation in which the word came to be used in a statute or  rule.  In Chamber’s Mid-Century Dictionary  at  p.  1230 defined  ‘‘vesting’’ in the legal sense ‘to settle,  secure, or  put in fixed right of possession; to endow, to  descend, devolve  or  to  take effect, as a right’.  In  Black’s  Law Dictionary,  5th  Edition at p. 1401, the word,  ‘vest’,  to give  an  immediate,  fixed  right  of  present  or   future enjoyment,  to  accure to, to be fixed, to take  effect,  to clothe  with possession, to deliver full possession of  land or  of  an estate, to give seisin to  enfeoff.  In  Stroud’s Judicial  Dictionary,  4th Edition, Vol. 5 at p.  2938,  the word  ‘vested’ was defined in several senses. At p. 2940  in item  12 it is stated thus ‘as to the interest  acquired  by public  bodies, created for a particular purpose,  in  works such as embankments which are vested in them by statue,  see Port  of  London Authority v. Canvey  Island  Commissioners, [1932]  1  Ch. 446 in which it was held that  the  statutory vesting was to construct the sea wall against inundation  or damages  etc. and did not acquire fee simple. Item 4  at  p. 2939,  the  word  ‘vest’, in the absence of  a  context,  is usually  taken to mean vest in interest rather than vest  in possession’.   In  item 8 to ‘vest’,. ‘‘generally  means  to give the property in’’. Thus the word ‘vest’ bears  variable colour taking its content from the context in which it  came to  be used. Take for instance, the land acquired under  the Land  Acquisition Act. By operation of ss. 16 & 17  thereof, the  property  so  acquired shall  vest  absolutely  in  the Government  free  from all encumbrances.  Thereby,  absolute right,  title  and  interest is  vested  in  the  Government without any limitation divesting the pre-existing rights  of its  owner.  Similarly,  under  s.  56  of  the   Provincial Insolvency  Act, 1920, the estate of the insolvent vests  in the receiver only for the purpose of its administration  and to pay off the debts to the creditors. The receiver acquired

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 12 of 25  

no  personal  interest  of  his own  in  the  property.  The receiver  appointed  by the court takes  possession  of  the properties in the suit on behalf of the court and administer the  property on behalf of the ultimate successful party  as an  officer of the court and he has no personal interest  in the  property  vested  thereunder. In  Fruit  and  Vegetable Merchants Union v. Delhi                                                        546 Improvement  Trust, [1957] SCR p. 1 the question was  whether the  Delhi  Improvement Trust was vested of the  Nazul  land belonging  to the Government with absolute right,  when  the property was entrusted under the scheme for construction  of the markets etc. It was held by this court that placing  the property  at the disposal of the trust did not signify  that the  Government  had  divested itself of its  title  to  the property and transferred the same to the trust. The  clauses in  the agreement show that the Government had  created  the Trust  as  its  agent  not  on  permanent  basis  but  as  a convenient   mode  of  having  the  scheme  of   improvement implemented  by  the  Trust subject to the  control  of  the Government.      The  word  ‘vesting’ in s. 85 would  signify  that  the water  courses and tanks, lands etc. used by the  public  to such an extent as to give a prescriptive right to their use, are vested in the Gram Panchayat, and placed them under  the control and supervision of the Gram Panchayat. It confers no absolute or full title. It was open to the Government,  even after vesting, to place restrictions upon the Gram Panchayat in  the  matter  or enjoyment and use  of  such  tanks,  and appurtenant  lands etc. Sub-section (3) of s.  85  expressly makes the matter clear. It empowers the Government to assume the administration of any such tank or lands or to define or limit  the  control which is vested in the  Gram  Panchayat. Gram  Panchayat  being  a statutory body  is  bound  by  the restrictions  imposed  by  sub-S3  (3)  The  assumption   of management by the Govt. would be subject to the prescriptive right  of the villagers if any. The Division Bench  in  Gram Panchayat,  mandapaka  & Ors. V. Distt.  Collector  Eluru  & Ors.,  AIR  1981 AP 15 considered the meaning  of  the  word ‘vesting  and correctly laid the law in its interpreting  s. 85  of the Act. Anna Narasimha Rao & Ors. V.  Kurra  Venkata Narasayya  &  Ors., [1981] 1 AWR p. 325 relied  on  by  Shri Kanta  Rao, though supports his contention that the  vesting of  the tanks etc. in the Gram panchayat was  with  absolute eights  and  the village community  rights  would  over-ride against  rights of the Government, in our view the  law  was not  correctly laid down. Under A.P. Land Encroachment  Act, 1905;  Talengana Area Land Revenue Act,  relevant  Abolition Act  like  A.P.  Estates  (Abolition  and  Conversion   into Ryotwari) Act, 1948, Inams Abolition Act etc. give  absolute rights of vesting in the State over the forest land,  tanks, rivers,   mines,  poramboke,  land,  etc.  free   from   all encumbrances  and the pre-existing rights in the other  land stood abolished and will be subject to the grant of Ryotwari patta  etc.  It is also settled law that grant  of  Ryotwari patta is not a title but a right coupled with possession  to remain in occupation and enjoyment subject to payment of the land revenue to the State. Therefore, we                                                        547 agree  with the High Court that the tank is public tank  and not  a public trust and that under s. 85(1) and s.  64,  the vesting  of the tanks, the appurtenant land and  the  common land  is  only for the purpose of  possession,  supervision, control  and  use thereof for the villagers for  common  use subject  to the over-riding title by the Government and  its

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 13 of 25  

assumption of management should be in terms of sub-s. (3) of s.  85 of the Act and subject to the prescriptive  right  in the water; water spread tank for common use. Admittedly,  N.S.L.  or  the  descendants  used  the  plaint schedule  property till July 7, 1965. The question  then  is what  rights  the descendants acquired  therein.  Admittedly within  six  months from the date of dispossession  no  suit under  s. 6 of the Specific Relief Act was laid.  Therefore, though the Gram Panchayat was not justified to take law into its  own  hand  to take unilateral  possession  without  due course  of law, since the suit filed by the descendants  was based  on  title the descendants in Civil Appeal  No.200  of 1978  have to establish their better title. Their claim  was based on the Ryotwari patta granted under s. 3 of the  Inams Act.  Therefore,  entries in I.F.R.  bear  great  evidenciary value  to ascertain their rights. In Arunachalam  Chetty  v. Venkatachalpathi  Garu Swamigal, AIR  1919 PC. p. 62  at  65 the  Judicial Committee of the Privy Council considered  the effect of the columns in the I.F.R. and held thus :           ‘‘It is true that the making of this Register  was           for the ultimate purpose of determining whether or           not  the lands were tax-free. But it must  not  be           forgotten  that the preparation of  this  Register           was a great act of State, and its preparation  and           contents  were the subject of  much  consideration           under elaborately detailed reports and minutes. It           is  to be remembered that the  Inam  Commissioners           through officials made enquiry on the spot,  heard           evidence  and examined documents, and with  regard           to  each individual property, the  government  was           put in possession not only of the conclusion  come           to  as to whether the land was tax-free, but of  a           statement  of  the  history  and  tenure  of   the           property  itself.  While their  Lordships  do  not           doubt that such a report would not displace actual           and  authentic evidence in individual  cases,  yet           the board, when such is not available, cannot fail           to  attach the utmost importance, as part  of  the           history  of the property, to the  information  set           forth in the Inam Register’’.                                                        548      Construction of the relevant entries in the I.F.R. is a question of law. Col. 2, the general class to which the land belongs,   described  as  ‘Dharmadayam’  endowment   for   a charitable  ‘‘institution’’, Col. 7, description  of  tenure for  the ‘‘preservation and repairs’’ of  Nori  Lakshmipathi Somayajulu Western Tanks at Vatticherkuru, Col. 9  tax-free, Col. 10, nature of the tenure, permanent, Col. 11, guarantor of the land Raja Manikya Rao in 1190 Fasli (1700 A.D.),  Col 13,   name  of  the  original  grantee  ‘Nori   Lakshmipathi Somayajulu’, Col. 21 to be confirmed under usual  conditions of  service  and  Col.  22, confirmed.  In  the  survey  and settlement record of the year 1906 of the same columns  have been  repeated.  The  land in the tank  were  classified  as Village  ‘Poramboke’ and the tank as ‘village tank’. In  the village   map  also  the  same  remarks   were   reiterated. Therefore,  the entries in the I.F.R. are great acts of  the State  and  coupled  with  the entries  in  the  survey  and settlement  record  furnishes  unimpeachable  evidence.   On construction  of  these documents, it would  clearly  emerge that  the original grant was made for the  preservation  and maintenance  of the tank and tax-free Inam land was  granted for  that  purpose  through  it  was  in  the  name  of  the individual  granted. We are of the view that the  grant  was for  the preservation and maintenance of the tank.  In  K.V.

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 14 of 25  

Krishna Rao v. Sub Collector, Ongole, [1969] 1 SCR 624  this court held under the Inam Act that the tank is a  charitable institution. Thereby we conclude that the grant was for  the institution. Under s. 3 of the Inams Act, the enquiry should be whether (1) a particular land is Inam land; (2) Inam land in a Ryotwari, Zamindar or Inam Village; and (3) is held  by any  institution. In view of the finding that the grant  was for the preservation and maintenance of tank, the Inam, land in an inam village was held by the institution, namely,  the tank.  Ryotwari patta shall, therefore, be in favour of  the institution.  Undoubtedly the ryotwari patta was granted  in favour of the descendants. In Nori Venkatarama Dikshitulu  & Ors.  v.  Ravi Venkatappayya & Ors., [1959] 2  A.W.R.357  in respect of the tope dedicated to the public benefits in  the same  village,  namely Vatticherukuru, one of  the  question that arose was whether the patta granted in the individuals’ names,  would  be  their  individual  property  or  for  the endowment.  The Division Bench held that though  the  pattas were  obtained in the individuals’ name, the trustees of  an institution  cannot  derive  personal  advantage  from   the administration  of the trust property. It was held that  the grant  of  patta was for the maintenance of  the  trust.  We approve that the law was correctly laid down.      In  Krishan Nair Boppudi Punniah & Ors. v. Sri  Lakshmi Narasimhaswamy Varu, by its trustees & Ors., [1963] 1 A.W.R. 214                                                        549 relied  on by Shri Sitaramaiah, on the basis of the  entries in  I.F.R., the finding was that the grant was in favour  of the   individual  burdened  with  service  and  not  to   an institution. Therefore, the ratio therein does not assist us to  the facts in this case. Moreover, in view of  the  stand taken by Shri Sitaramaiah that the lands are not the private property  of N.L.S. or his descendants but held by  them  as trustees, the grant of Ryotwari patta to the individuals  by necessary implication, as a corollary, is of no consequence. The  question then is whether the enjoyment of the  usufruct by  the  descendants  would clothe them with  any  right  as owners  of the land. In view of the concurrent finding  that descendants  did  not  acquire title  by  prescription,  the passage  in Tagore Law Lecture, ‘Hindu  Religious  Endowment and  Institutions’ at p. 6 relied on by Shri Sitaramaiah  to the  effect  ‘dedication  of tanks  and  trees’  as  private property  also  renders no assistance  to  the  descendants. Undoubtedly,  a  presumption of an origin  in  lawful  title could be drawn, as held in Syed Md. Mazaffaralmusavi v. Bibi Jabeda  & Ors., AIR (1930) P.C. 1031 that the court  has  so often   readily  made  presumption  in  order   to   support possessory rights, long and quietly enjoyed, where no actual proof  of title is forth coming. It is not a mere branch  of the  law  of  evidence. It was resorted to  because  of  the failure of actual evidence. The matter is one of presumption based upon the policy of law. It was also further held  that it  is not a presumption to be capriciously made nor  is  it one  which a certain class of possessor is entitled  to,  de jure.  In  a case such as the one in question where  it  was necessary  to indicate what particular kind of lawful  title was being presumed, the Court must be satisfied that such  a title  was in its nature practicable and reasonably  capable of   being   presumed   without  doing   violence   to   the probabilities  of the case. It is the completion of a  right to   which  circumstances  clearly  point  where  time   had obliterated  any  record of the  original  commencement.  The longer the period within which and the remoter the time when first a grant might be reasonably supposed to have  occurred

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 15 of 25  

the  less force there is an objection that the  grant  could not  have  been lawful. In Bhojraj v. Sita Ram &  Ors.,  AIR (1936) P.C. 60 it was further held that the presumption, not to supplement but to contradict the evidence would be out of place.  A  presumption  should be allowed to  fill  in  gaps disclosed  in the evidence. But the documentary evidence  in the I.F.R. and the survey and settlement records furnish the unerring  evidence.  Though  the  original  grant  was   not produced,  the grant was for the institution and not to  the individuals.  Therefore, the colour of title though  enabled them  to enjoy the usufruct for personal use, once the  tank and  the appurtenant land was found to be public  tank,  the descendants acquired no personal right over it. The decision in Bhupathiraju                                                        550 Venkatapathiraju  &  Ors.  v. The  President,  Taluq  Board, Naraspur  &  Ors., [1913]19.I.C.727(Mad.) (D.B.)  relied  by Shri  Sitaramaiah the finding was that the grant was to  the plaintiffs’  family subject to conditions of service.  Their right to take the usufruct of the trees therein was held  to be  for the benefit of the grantee. In that view  its  ratio cannot  be  applied  to  the  facts  in  this  case.  In  M. Srinivasacharyulu  & Ors. v. Dinawahi Pratyanga Rao &  Ors., AIR (1921) Madras 467 one of the contentions raised was that since the produce was being enjoyed by the trustees for over many  years for personal use, it must be construed that  the trust was for personal benefit of archakas. It was  repelled holding that it would be a dangerous proposition to lay down that  if the trustees of the religious trusts have for  many years  being applying the income to their own personal  use, the  trust-deed  must  be construed in  the  light  of  such conduct.  The decree of the trial court that  the  enjoyment was  for  the institution was upheld. The finding  in  Civil Appeal  No.  931 of 1977, that since the endowment  was  the dashabandam  the  descendants are entitled to  the  Ryotwari patta  cannot be upheld. Dashabandam grant of land  burdened with the service of a public nature was made at a time  when maintenance  of  water  sources and  water  courses  to  the benefits  of  the villagers was left to  the  villagers.  In Ravipati  Kotayya  &  Anr.v. Ramansami  Subbaraydu  &  Ors., [1956]  (2)  A.W.R.  739 it was held that  in  the  case  of dashabandam   inams  situated  in  Ryotwari  villages,   the government  has  the  right  of  resumption  on  default  of service.  The lands burdened with dashabandam service  which is  service  of  public  nature,  are  inclinable  as  being against   public  policy.  We,  therefore,  hold  that   the descendants, though enjoyed the income from the  properties, did not effect the repairs and neglected the maintenance and upkeep  of  the  tank. They rendered the  tank  disused  and abandoned.  By  operation of s.85 of the Act the  lands  and tank  stood  vested  in  the  Gram  Panchayat  for  control, management and supervision.      Undoubtedly, a hereditary trustee is entitled to be the Chairman  of a Board of Trustees, if any, constituted  under the  Endowment  Act or else be in exclusive  possession  and management  of the public trust registered thereunder  until he  is removed as per the procedure provided therein.  Since the  tank  always  remained a public tank and  not  being  a public  trust, the Endowment Act does not apply.  therefore, the  question  of  initiating  action under  s.  77  of  the Endowment  Act  for removal of the descendants  as  trustees does not arise.      In  the suit of the descendants the High Court did  not consider  the effect of grant of ryotwari patta under  Inams Act and in the suit of the

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 16 of 25  

                                                      551 Gram (Village) Panchayat the effect of vesting under s.85 of the  Act on the grant of ryotwari patta was not  considered. Only  s.  14  i.e.  the bar  of  civil  suit  was  focussed. Consequently  both  the suits were  dismissed  by  different division  benches.  The  question is  whether  the  suit  is maintainable.      All  communal lands, porambokes, tanks, etc.,  in  inam villages  shall vest in the government under s.2A  of  Inams Act  free  from all encumbrances. Section 3  determines  the inam   lands   whether  held  by  the  individual   or   the institution, provides procedure for determination and s.3(4) gives  right of appeal. Section 4 converts those lands  into ryotwari lands and accords entitlement to grant of  ryotwari patta.  Section 5 gives power to restitute the lands to  the tenants in occupation though were ejected between  specified dates. Section 7 gives power to grant ryotwari patta to  the tenants  to the extent of two thirds share in the  land  and one  third  to  the  land-holder. If  it  was  held  by  the institution, two third share would be to the institution and one  third  to  the  tenants.  Section  3  grants  right  of permanent  occupancy  to the tenants in inam lands  held  by institutions. Section 9 prescribes procedure for eviction of the tenants having right of permanent occupancy. Section 10- A provides right to ryotwari patta to tenants in Ryotwari or Zamindari  village  with the right of  permanent  occupancy, even  in the lands, held under customary right etc.  Section 12  fastens liability on the ryotwari pattadars to pay  land assessment. Section 13 gives exclusive power of jurisdiction to Tehsildar, the Revenue court and the collector to try the suit as per the procedure as of a Civil Court under the Code of Civil Procedure. Section 14 of the Inams Act reads thus:           14. " Bar of jurisdiction of Civil Courts: No suit          or  other  proceedings shall be instituted  in  any          Civil Court to set aside or modify any decision  of          the Tahsildar, the Revenue Court, or the  Collector          under  this  Act,  except where  such  decision  is          obtained  by misrepresentation, fraud or  collusion          of parties.". Section 14-A and Section 15 provides that:           "14-A   Revision  (1)   Notwithstanding   anything          contained in this Act, the Board of Revenue may, at          any time either suo moto or on application made  to          it,  call for and examine the records  relating  to          any proceedings taken by the Tahsildar, the Revenue          Court  or  the  Collector under this  act  for  the          purpose  of satisfying itself as to the  regularity          of                                                        552          such  proceeding  or the correctness,  legality  or          propriety  of  any decision made or  order   passed          therein;  and  if, in any case, it appears  to  the          Board  of revenue that any such decision  or  order          should be modified, annulled, reserved or  remitted          for consideration, it may pass order accordingly.           (2)  No order prejudicial to any person  shall  be          passed under sub-section (1) unless such person has          been   given   an   opportunity   of   making   his          representation.           15. Act to override other laws: "Unless  otherwise          expressly  provided  in this Act the  provision  of          this   act  and  of  any  orders  and  Rules   made          thereunder   shall  have   effect   notwithstanding          anything  inconsistent therewith contained  in  any          other  law  for  the time being  in  force  or  any

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 17 of 25  

        instrument  having  effect by virtue  of  any  such          law".      The  Constitution  intends  to  herald  an  egalitarian          social  order by implementing the goals  of  socio-          economic  justice set down in the Preamble  of  the          Constitution.  In  that  regard  the   Constitution          created  positive  duties on the State in  Part  IV          towards  individuals. The Parliament and the  State          legislatures  made diverse laws to restructure  the          social  order;  created  rights in  favour  of  the          citizens;  conferred power and jurisdiction on  the          hierarchy   of   Tribunals   or   the   authorities          constituted thereunder and given finality to  their          orders  or decisions and divested the  jurisdiction          of  the  established civil courts expressly  or  by          necessary  implication. The Inam Act is a  step  in          that  direction  as part of Estate  Abolition  Act.          Therefore,  departure  in  the  allocation  of  the          judicial   functions  would  not  be  viewed   with          disfavour   for  creating   the  new   forums   and          entrusting   the  duties  under  the  statutes   to          implement  socio-economic and fiscal laws. We  have          to  consider, when questioned, why the  legislature          made  this  departure. The reason is  obvious.  The          tradition bound civil Courts gripped with rules  of          pleading  and  strict rules of evidence  and  tardy          trial,  four  tier appeals, endless  revisions  and          reviews  under C.P.C are not suited to  the  needed          expeditious  dispensation. The adjudicatory  system          provided in the new forums is cheap and rapid.  The          procedure  before  the Tribunal is simple  and  not          hide bound by the intricate procedure of pleadings,          trial,  admissibility of the evidence and proof  of          facts   according  to  law.  Therefore,  there   is          abundant  flexibility  in  the  discharge  of   the          functions     with    greater    expedition     and          inexpensiveness.      In  order  to  find out the  purpose  in  creating  the Tribunals under                                                        553 the  statutes  and the meaning of  particular  provision  in social  legislation,  the Court would  adopt  the  purposive approach to ascertain the social ends envisaged in the  Act, to  consider  scheme of the Act as an integrated  whole  and practical means by which it was sought to be effectuated  to achieve  them. Meticulous lexographic analysis of words  and phrases   and  sentences  should  be  subordinate  to   this purposive  approach.  The  dynamics  of  the  interpretative functioning  of  the Court is to  reflect  the  contemporary needs   and  the  prevailing  values  consistent  with   the constitutional  and  legislative declaration of  the  policy envisaged in the statute under consideration.      In  Denna v. Union of India, [1984] 1 SCR 1 this  Court held that the "Law is a dynamic science, the social  utility of which consists in its ability to keep abreast of emerging trends in social and scientific advance and its  willingness to  readjust  its postulates in order to  accommodate  those trends.  Law is not static. The purpose of Law  is to  serve the  needs of life". The law should, therefore,  respond  to the  clarion  call  of social  imperatives  evolve  in  that process  functional  approach as means to  subserve  "social promises" set out in the Preamble, directive principles  and the fundamental Rights of the Constitution.      It  is seen that the Inam’s Act is an integral part  of the  scheme  of the Andhra Pradesh Estates  (Aboilition  and

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 18 of 25  

Conservation  into  Ryotwari)  Act, 26  of  1984  for  short ’Estate  Abolition Act’ to cover the left over minor  Inams. It  determined the pre-existing rights of the  Inamdars  and the  religious  institutions; envisages  grant  of  ryotwari patta afresh to the concerned and seeks to confer  permanent occupancy  rights  on  the tenants. It  also  regulates  the relationship  between  institutions  and  its  tenants.   It created  appellate  and revisional and forums  and  declared finality to the orders passed by the tribunals and expressly excluded    the   jurisdiction   of   the    Civil    Court, notwithstanding  anything  contained  in any  other  law  or inconsistent  therewith  the Inams Act  shall  prevail.  The exception  engrafted was that a suit would lie to  challenge the  decision  obtained  by  fraud,  misrepresentation   and collusion by parties.               Section  9 of the Civil Procedure  Code,  1908          provides that whenever a question arises before the          Civil  Court whether its jurisdiction  is  excluded          expressly  or by necessary implication,  the  Court          naturally feels inclined to consider whether remedy          afforded by an alternative provision prescribed  by          special statute is sufficient or adequate. In cases          where  exclusion of the Civil Court’s  jurisdiction          is expressly provided for, the consideration as  to          the scheme of the statute in question                                                        554 and  the adequacy or sufficiency of the remedy provided  for by  it  may  be  relevant, but  cannot  be  decisive.  Where exclusion  is pleaded as a matter of  necessary  implication such   consideration   would  be  very  important   and   in conceivable circumstances might become even decisive.      The  jurisdiction of a Tribunal created  under  statute may  depend upon the fulfilment of some condition  precedent or  upon existence of some particular fact. Such a  fact  is collateral  to the actual matter which the Tribunal  has  to try  and  the  determination whether it existed  or  not  is logically temporary prior to the determination of the actual question  which  the  tribunal  has  to  consider.  At  the inception   of   an  enquiry  by  a  Tribunal   of   limited jurisdiction, when a challenge is made to its  jurisdiction, the Tribunal has to consider as the collateral fact  whether it  would act or not and for that purpose to arrive at  some decision as to whether it has jurisdiction or not. There may be  Tribunal which by virtue of the law constituting it  has the  power to determine finally, even the preliminary  facts on  which the further exercise of its jurisdiction  depends; but subject to that, the Tribunal cannot by a wrong decision with  regard to collateral fact, give itself a  jurisdiction which  it would not otherwise had. Except such tribunals  of limited  jurisdiction when the statute not only empowers  to enquire  into jurisdictional facts but also the  rights  and controversy  finally it is entitled to enter on the  enquiry and  reach  a  decision  rightly  or  wrongly.  If  it   has jurisdiction  to do right, it has jurisdiction to do  wrong. It  may be irregular or illegal which could be corrected  in appeal  or revision subject to that the order  would  become final. The questions to be asked, therefore, are whether the Tribunal  has  jurisdiction  under Inam Act  to  decide  for itself  finally; whether the institution or the  Inamdar  or the tenant is entitled to  ryotwari patta under ss. 3,4  and 7 and whether the Tribunal is of a limited jurisdiction  and its decision on the issue of patta is a collateral fact.      The  consideration as to exclusion of the  jurisdiction          of Civil Court is no longer res integra. This Court          in bead-roll of decisions considered this  question

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 19 of 25  

        in  diverse  situations. In Kamala  Mills  Ltd.  v.          State  of  Bombay, [1966] 1 SCR  64  the  questions          arose were whether an assessment made in  violation          of the Bombay Sales Tax Act could claim the  status          of  an assessment made under that Act, and  whether          the  nature of the transactions was a  decision  of          collateral  fact. A Bench of seven Judges  of  this          Court  held  that  if it  appears  that  a  statute          creates  a special right or liability and  provides          for the determination of the right or liability  to          be dealt with by tribunals specially constituted in          that                                                        555          behalf would be considered whether all questions of          said right and liability shall be determined by the          tribunals  so constituted and it becomes  pertinent          to  enquire  whether remedies  normally  associated          with actions in Civil Courts are prescribed  by the          said statute or not. It was held that the Court was          satisfied  that the Act provided all  the  remedies          associated  with  actions in Civil Courts  and  the          remedy  for refund of the tax  illegally  collected          was provided and it was not collateral. Section  20          prohibits  such  a  claim  being  made  before   an          ordinary  Civil Court and held that the civil  suit          was  not maintainable. The leading decision of  the          Privy Council in Secretary of State v. Mask &  C0.,          [1940]  L.R. 67I.A.222; Raleigh Investment Co.  Ltd.  v.          Governor-General  in Council, L.R. 74 I.A.  50  and          the ratio in Firm and Illuri Subbayya Cheety & Sons          v.  State of Andhra Pradesh, [1964] 1 SCR 752  were          approved. In Desika Charyulu v. State of A.P.., AIR          1964  SC 807 a Constitution Bench was  to  consider          whether the jurisdiction of the Settlement  Officer          and   the  Tribunal  created  under   the   Estates          Abolition Act to determine whether Shotrium Village          was  an  inam estate was exclusive  and  the  Civil          Court’s jurisdiction to try the dispute was barred.          Despite  the fact that no express exclusion of  the          Civil  Court’s jurisdiction was made under the  Act          it  was  held  that very provision  setting  up  an          hierarchy    of   judicial   tribunals   for    the          determination   of  the  questions  on  which   the          applicability of the Act depends was sufficient  in          most  cases to infer that the jurisdiction  of  the          Civil   Courts   to  try  the  same   was   barred.          Accordingly  it was held that the  jurisdiction  of          the   Settlement  Officer  and  the   Tribunal   by          necessary  implication was exclusive and  that  the          Civil Courts are barred from trying or retrying the          question once over. The decisions of the Settlement          Officer  and  of the Tribunal were held  final  and          conclusive.      In  Dhulabhai & Ors. v. State of M.p. & Anr.  [1968]  3 SCR 662 another Constitution Bench reviewed the entire  case law  on  the question of maintainability of civil  suit  and laid  down  seven  propositions. Propositions 1  and  2  are relevant, which read thus:           "(1)  Where  the statute gives a finality  to  the          orders of the special tribunals the  Civil  Court’s          jurisdiction  must he held to be excluded if  there          is  adequate  remedy to do what  the  Civil  Courts          normally  do  in a suit. Such  provision,  however,          does  not exclude those cases where the  provisions          of  the particular Act have not been complied  with

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 20 of 25  

        or   the  statutory  tribunal  has  not  acted   in          conformity  with  the  fundamental  principles   of          judicial procedure.                                                        556          (2)   Where  there  is  an  express  bar   of   the          jurisdiction  of the Court, an examination  of  the          scheme  of the particular Act to find the  adequacy          or the sufficiency of the remedies provided may  be          relevant  but  is  not  decisive  to  sustain   the          jurisdiction of the civil court.           Where   there   is  no   express   exclusion   the          examination  of the remedies and the scheme of  the          particular  act to find out the intendment  becomes          necessary  and  the result of the  inquiry  may  be          decisive. In the latter case it is necessary to see          if  the  statute  creates  a  special  right  or  a          liability and provides for the determination of the          right  or liability and further lays down that  all          questions about the said right and liability  shall          be determined by the tribunals so constituted,  and          whether  remedies normally associated with  actions          in Civil Courts are prescribed by the said  statute          or not."      It  was  held  therein  that the  civil  suit  was  not maintainable  to call in question of assessment  made  under the  Madhya Bharat Sales Tax Act. In hatti v. Sunder  Singh, [1971]2  SCR 163 the tenant had a declaratory relief  before the  authorities  under Delhi land Reforms Act that  he  was Bhoomidar.  When it was challenged in the civil suit as  not being  binding, this Court held that the civil suit was  not maintainable.      In  Muddada  Chayana v. Karam Narayana and  Anr.  etc., [1979] 3 SCR 201 under s. 56(1) (c) of the Estates Abolition Act,  the dispute whether who the lawful ryot in respect  of any holding is, shall be decided by the Settlement  Officer. Whether  it is liable to be questioned in the  Civil  Court. Chinnappa  Reddy,  J.,  who had  intimate  knowledge  as  an Advocate  and the Judge on the subject reviewed the law  and held  that  the  Act  is  a  self-contained  code  in  which provision  was  also made for the  adjudication  of  various types of disputes arising, after an estate was notified,  by specially constituted tribunals.  On the general  principles it  was held that the special tribunals constituted  by  the Act must necessarily be held to have exclusive  jurisdiction to decide dispute entrusted by the statute to them for their adjudication. Dealing with the object of the Act it was held at p. 207 C-D that the Act intended to protect ryots and not to leave them in wilderness. When the Act provides machinery in s.  56(1)(c) to discover who the lawful ryot of a holding was,  it  was  not for the Court to denude the  Act  of  all meaning and by confining the provision to the bounds of  ss. 55  and  56(1)(a)  and  (b)  on  the  ground  of  contextual interpretation.  Interpretation of a statute, contextual  or otherwise must further and                                                        557 not  frustrate the object of the statute. It was  held  that the  civil suit was not maintainable and approved  the  Full Bench  judgment  of  5 judges of the High  Court  of  Andhra Pradesh in T. Munuswami Naidu v. R. Venkata Reddy., AIR 1978 A.P.   200.   The   same   view   was   reiterated   in   O. Chenchulakshmamma & Anr. v.D. Subramanya Reddy, [1980] 1 SCR 1006 and held that the order of the Addl. Settlement Officer was  final  in  so  far as the  dispute  between  the  rival claimants to the ryotwari patta was concerned and not liable to  be questioned in any court of law. In A. Bodayya &  Anr.

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 21 of 25  

v.L. Ramaswamy (dead) by Lrs. [1984] (Suppl). SCC 391  while reiterating  the  ratio  in both the  judgments,  Desai,  J. Speaking  for  a Bench of 3 Judges held  that  under  Estate Abolition  Act, who the lawful ryot was  decided.  Self-same question  directly  and  substantially raised  in  the  suit cannot  be  decided  by  the  Civil  Court  as  it  had   no jurisdiction to decide and deal with the same but Settlement Officer  had the exclusive jurisdiction to decide  and  deal with it. In Doe v.  Bridges, [1831] 1 B & Ad. 347 at p.  859 the oft quoted dictum of Lord Tenerden, C.J. reads that:           "where  an act creates an obligation and  enforces          the  performance in a specified manner, we take  it          to  be  a general rule that performance  cannot  be          enforced in any other manner."      In Premier Automobiles Ltd. v. Kamlakur Shantaram Wadke and  Ors.,  [1976] 1 SCR 427 a Bench of three  Judges  after reviewing  the  case  law held that if  a  dispute  was  not industrial dispute, not does it relate to enforcement of any right under the Industrial Dispute Act, the remedy lies only in  the civil court. If the dispute arises out of the  right or liability under the general common law and not under  the Act,   the  jurisdiction  of  the  civil  court  is   always alternative,  leaving  it to the election of the  suitor  to choose  his remedy for the relief which is competent  to  be granted  in a particular remedy. If the dispute  relates  to the enforcement of a right or obligation of the Act,the only remedy  available  to the suitor is to  get  an  application adjudicated  under the Act. In that view, it was  held  that the civil suit was not maintainable.           In State of Tamil Nadu v. Ramalinga Samigal Madam, [1985]  4 SCC 10 strongly relied on by Shri Kanta  Rao,  the question  therein was whether the jurisdiction of the  civil court  was  ousted  to redetermine the nature  of  the  land rendered by the settlement officer under s. II of the Estate Abolition  Act,  Tulzapurkar, J. speaking for  the  Division Bench proceeded on three fundamental postulates namely  that the  decision of the Settlement authorities under s.  11  of the Act was for (I)                                                        558 revenue  purposes’,"  that  is  to  say  for  fastening  the liability on him to pay the assessment and other dues and to facilitate  the  recovery of such revenue from  him  by  the Government;  and therefore, any decision impliedly  rendered on  the aspect of nature and character of the land  on  that occasion  will  have  to be regarded as  incidental  to  and merely  for the purpose of passing the order of granting  or refusing to grant the patta and for no other purpose".  (II) only revision against the order and not an appeal; and (III) that  by  Madras  Amendment, s. 64-c  was  deleted.  It  was unfortunate  that  it was not brought to the notice  of  the court  that  the  purpose of Estate Abolition  Act  was  not solely  for  the purpose of collecting the  revenue  to  the State.  The  Act had its birth from a  long  drawn  struggle carried  on by the ryots in Madras Presidency for  permanent ryotwari  settlement  of  tenures  and  grant  of  permanent occupancy  rights and the Indian National Congress  espoused their rights and passed resolution at Arvadi Session to make a  legislation in that regard. The recovery of  revenue  was only  secondary. In Syamala Rao v.Sri Radhakanthaswami  Varu [1984] 1 A.P.L.J. 113 a division Bench of the Andhra Pradesh High  Court  to  which one of us  (K.R.S.,J)  was  a  member considered the historical background, the purpose of the Act and  the scheme envisaged therein in extenso and  held  that the  preamble of the Estate Abolition Act was to repeal  the permanent settlements, the acquisition of the rights of  the

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 22 of 25  

land-holders in the Estates and introduction of the ryotwari settlement  therein;  under  s.  1(4)  by  issuance  of  the notification   the   prexisting  rights  shall   cease   and determined;   shall  vest  in  the  State  free   from   all encumbrances  and  declared that all  rights  and  interests created  in  particular  over the  State  ’shall  cease  and determine   as  against  the  Government’   protected   only dispossession  of a person in possession of the  ryoti  land who was considered prima facie entitled to a ryotwari patta. Section  11  envisaged to enquire into "the  nature  of  the land"  and  whether "ryotwari land  immediately  before  the notified  dates"  to be properly included or ought  to  have been  properly  included in the holding of  the  ryot".  The enquiry   under  the  Act  was  entrusted  to  the   Revenue Authorities who have intimate knowledge of the nature of the lands and the entries in the revenue records of the holders, etc.  Act created hierarchy of the tribunals, namely  Asstt. Settlement   Officer;   Settlement  Officer;   Director   of Settlements and Board of Revenue; provided revisional powers to those authorities and ultimately the order is subject  to the decision of the High Court under Art. 226. In that  view it  was held that by necessary implication the  jurisdiction of  the civil court was ousted, the decision  of  settlement authorities under s. 11 was made final and no civil suit was maintainable. The legislature having made the Act to  render economic justice to the ryots and                                                        559 excluded  the  dispute between land-holders  and  the  ryots covered  under ss. 12 to 15 and the ryots inter se under  s. 56(1)(c), from the jurisdiction of the Civil Court, it would not  be  the legislative intention to expose  the  ryots  to costly  unequal  civil  litigation with  the  state  of  the dispute  under  s. 11. It is not necessary in this  case  to broach further but suffice to state that unfortunately  this historical perspective and the real purpose and proper scope and  operation of Estate Abolition Act was not  focussed  to the  notice  of  this court. In Jyotish  Thakur  &  Ors.  v. Tarakant.  Jha  &  Ors.,[1963]  Suppl. 1 SCR  13  s.  27  of regulation III of 1872 provides that in respect of  transfer of ryoti interest in contravention of the regulation revenue courts shall not take cognizance of such a transfer. It  was contended  that by necessary implication the civil suit  was not  maintainable.  In  that context this  Court  held  that provisions therein were not intended to be exhaustive to bar the relief in Civil Court. In Sri Athmanathawami Devasthanam v.  K. Gopalaswami Aiyangar, [1964] 3 SCR 763  the  question was  whether  the  civil suit to  recover  damages  and  for ejectment  of  the ryoti lands belonging to the  temple  was barred.  The findings were that the lands were  ryoti  lands and  that the tenant acquired the occupancy rights, but  the lease  was granted in excess of 5 years.  It  was  contended that  it was a transfer without permission of the  Endowment department. While upholding that the lands were ryoti  lands and  the  tenant  acquired  occupancy  rights,  this   Court disagreeing  with  the High Court, held that  there  was  no transfer and that the tenant is liable to pay the arrears of rent and the suit was maintainable. In Sri Vedagiri  Lakshmi Narasimha Swami Temple v. Induru Pattabhirami Reddy,  [1967] 1 SCR 280 the contention raised was that s. 93 of the Madras Hindu  Religious and Charitable Endowments Act, 1951  was  a bar to maintain suit for rendition of accounts and  recovery thereof  against  the ex-trustees. This Court  repelled  the contention and held that the suit for rendition of  accounts was  not  expressly or by necessary implication  barred  the jurisdiction  of the civil court under s. 93. In Shree  Raja

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 23 of 25  

Kandregula Srinivasa Jagannadha Rao Panthulu Bahadur Garu v. State  of Andhra Pradesh, [1970] 2 SCR 714 it  was  conceded that  the  question whether Kalipathnam village is  an  Inam estate was to be adjudicated before the tribunals  appointed under  the  Rent Reduction Act.  It was contended  that  the tribunals have no jurisdiction to decide the validity of the notification  reducing  the  rent by operation  of  s.  8(1) thereof. It was held that there was no statutory prohibition to determine the nature of the land contemplated by the Rent Reduction   Act.  Accordingly  the  suit  was  held  to   be maintainable. In Dr. Rajendra Prakash Sharma v. Gyan Chandra & Ors.,[1980] 3 SCR 207 it was found that under s, 7 of  the Administration of Evacuee Property Act, 1950, no proceedings were taken to                                                        560 declare   the  suit  house  as  on  evacuee   property.   No notification  under  sub-s. (3) of 7 was  published  in  the gazette.  Under those circumstances it was held that  s.  46 did  not bar the civil suit. In Anne Besant  National  Girls High  School  v. Dy. Director of Public Instruction  &  Ors. [1983]  1 SCC 200 this Court held that the Civil  Court  has jurisdiction  to  examine whether action or decision  of  an administrative authority was ultra vires the relevant  rules of  Grant-in-Aid Code and Rule 9 (vii) was held to be  ultra vires. Accordingly the suit was held to be maintainable.  In Raja  Ram  Kumar Bhargava(dead) by Lrs. v. Union  of  India, [1988]  2  SCR 352 two questions were  raised,  firstly  the validity of the assessment and secondly recovery of the  tax paid  under  Excess  Profit  Tax Act,  1940.  On  the  first question it was held that the suit was not maintainable.  On the  second question, without going into the  technicalities of  the maintainability of the suit, this Court granted  the relief.  In Pabbojan Tea Co., etc. v. The  dy.  Commissioner Lakhimpur,  etc.[1968] 1 SCR 260 the questions were  whether the  workmen  were  ordinary  unskilled  labour  or  skilled labour; whether the jurisdiction of the authorities under s. 20  of the Minimum Wages Act, 1948 is exclusive and  whether the  jurisdiction of the Civil Court was barred. This  court held  that  the  authorities did not hold  any  inquiry  nor received any evidence for determining that issue. No  proper hearing was given to the parties to tender evidence. Section 20  is  not a complete Code as there was  no  provision  for appeal or revision against the orders passed under  s.20(3). There  was  no  further scrutiny  by  any  higher  authority against the imposition of penalty. The Act in terms does not bar  the  employers  from  instituting  a  suit.  In   those circumstances,  it  was held that the  legislature  did  not intend  to exclude the jurisdiction of the civil court.  The ratio  in K. Chintamani Dora & Ors. v. G. Annamnaidu &  ors. [1974] 2 SCR 655 also does not assist Gram Panchayat for the reason  that  the decree therein originally  granted  became final. Subsequently it was sought to be reopened in a  later suit.  Under those circumstances the civil suit was held  to be  maintainable  notwithstanding the  provisions  contained under the Estate Abolition Act.      Thus  we have no hesitation to hold that the  ratio  in all these case are clearly distinguishable and render little assistance  to  the  Gram Panchayat. The  scope,  ambit  and operation  of the Inams Act was considered by P.  Jaganmohan Reddy,J.  (as he than was) in D.V. Raju v. B.G. Rao  &  Anr. [1961]  2 A.W.R. 368 and held that the paramount  object  of the legislature was to protect the tenant in occupation  and is  sought  to  be achieved by making  effective  orders  of eviction  made  by the Civil Court either  in  execution  or otherwise. It further prohibits the institution of any  suit

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 24 of 25  

or proceeding in a Civil                                                        561 Court under s. 14 to set aside or modify any decision of the Tehsildar,  Collector  or Revenue Court  except  where  such decision  has been obtained by misrepresentation,  fraud  or collusion. Section 15 enjoins that the provisions of the Act and orders made thereunder shall have effect notwithstanding anything  inconsistent therewith contained in any other  law for the time being in force or any instrument having effect by virtue of absolute jurisdiction on the Tehsilder, Revenue Court or the Collector, as the case may be,  notwithstanding any provision of law or any suit or decree of a Civil  Court or for that matter even where evictions have taken place  in pursuance  of  such  decrees, the  evicted  tenants  can  be restored  to  occupation provided the requirements  for  the protection of the possession of the tenants are satisfied. In  that  case the occupant in  possession  laid  proceeding before  the  Tehsildar for injunction restraining  the  writ petitioner  from ejecting him from the lands. The  Tehsildar in exercise of the power under Rule 16 of the Rules  granted injuction  pending  consideration of his right  to  Ryotwari patta. The order of injunction was challenged firstly on the ground of ultra vires of Rule 16 and secondly on the  ground of  jurisdiction.  While  upholding the order  on  both  the grounds the learned Judge held that Tehsildar, Revenue Court and the Collector have exclusive jurisdiction and the  civil suit  is barred. We respectfully approve it as correct  law. The  Inams Act did not intend to leave the decisions of  the revenue courts under s. 3 read with s. 7 to retry the  issue once  over in the Civil Court. Undoubtedly the  decision  of the division Bench in P. Pedagovindayy v. Subba Rao,  [1969] 2  A.L.T. 336 is in favour of the contention that the  civil suit is maintainable. It is not good law.      Thus  the  glimpse  of the object of  the  Inames  Act, scheme,  scope and operation thereof clearly  manifest  that Inames  Act  is a self contained  code,  expressly  provided rights  and liabilities, prescribed procedure;  remedies  of appeal and revision, excluded the jurisdiction of the  civil court, notwithstanding anything contained in any law,  given primacy  of  Inams Act though inconsistent with any  law  or instrument having force of law. The jurisdictional  findings are  an  integral scheme to grant or refuse  ryotwari  patta under  s. 3, read with s.7 and not collateral  findings.  It was subject to appeal and revision and certiorari under Art. 226.  The  decision of the Revenue Tribunal, are  final  and conclusive  between the parties or persons  claiming  right, title  or interest through them. The trick of pleadings  and the  camouflage  of  the reliefs are not  decisive  but  the substance  or the effect on the order of the tribunal  under the Inams Act are decisive. The civil suit except on grounds of  fraud, misrepresentation or collusion of the parties  is not maintainable. The necessary conclusion would be that the civil suit                                                        562 is  not maintainable when the decree directly nullifies  the ryotwari  patta granted under s. 3 of the Inams  Act.  Under the  Gram  Panchayat  Act  the  statutory  interposition  of vesting  the  tank  and the appurtenant  land  in  the  Gram Panchayat   made  it  to  retain  possession,  control   and supervision  over it, though the Gram  Panchayat  unlawfully took possession. The need to grant decree for possession  in favour of the Gram Panchayat is thus redundant. The suit  of the  descendants normally to be decreed on the finding  that ryotwari  patta under s. 3 of the Inams Act was  granted  in their  favour  and that they were  unlawfully  dispossessed.

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 25 of 25  

Since  the  grant of ryotwari patta, though in the  name  of individuals,  was  to maintain the public tank  which  stood vested  under  s. 85 of the Act in the Gram  Panchayat,  the descendants are divested of the right and interest  acquired therein. Thus the suit of the descendants also is liable  to be dismissed. Accordingly, the decrees of dismissal of  both the  suits are upheld and the appeals dismissed. But in  the circumstances, parties are directed to bear their own costs. V.P.R.                                 Appeals dismissed.                                                        563