http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 1 of 4  

PETITIONER: VASUDEO KULKARNI

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: SURYAKANT BHATT & ANR.

DATE OF JUDGMENT02/03/1977

BENCH: GOSWAMI, P.K. BENCH: GOSWAMI, P.K. SHINGAL, P.N.

CITATION:  1977 AIR 1331            1977 SCR  (3) 109  1977 SCC  (2) 304

ACT:             Practice  and Procedure--Trial Court acquitted  the  ac-         cused--High Court-When could reverse trial court’s findings.

HEADNOTE:         The  appellant  was  a lawyer, under  whom  the  complainant         (first respondent) was a junior.  The appellant was  engaged         as counsel in certain cases by  the complainant’s father.The         appellant submitted statement of accounts to  the  complain-         ant’s  father  in respect of the sums spent by  him  in  the         suits. After a lapse of three years the complainant filed  a         complaint against the appellant making allegations under ss.         409,  468  and  474 I.P.C.  The trial  Court  acquitted  him         holding that the prosecution had been launched after inordi-         nate  delay and that there was no clear and conclusive  evi-         dence of criminal intention and dishonest mental act on  the         appellant’s part.  The High Court, on appeal, set aside  the         acquittal holding that the appellant’s explanation in regard         to the discrepancies was not true and could not be accepted.         Allowing the appeal to this Court,             HELD: There was no sufficient ground for the High  Court         to  interfere with the acquittal in this case when the  rea-         sons  given by the trial Court were weighty and  cogent  and         there  was  no compelling justification to take  a  contrary         view. [112 F]             The mere fact that certain amounts were in the hands  of         the  appellant  and the accounts  submitted  were  incorrect         would not lead to the conclusion that the appellant  commit-         ted criminal breach of trust.  [111 F]             In the instant case, the complainant was a junior of the         appellant and  he could himself easily find out the discrep-         ancy  in the accounts and could  have drawn the  appellant’s         attention to it.  The complainant’s father did not authorise         him to file the complaint nor was he examined to corroborate         the complainant.  Secondly, in a notice issued to the appel-         lant  by  the  complainant’s father the latter did  not  at-         tribute  any dishonest intention or criminal intent on  for-         mer’s part.  The High Court was wrong in holding the  charge         as  proved  and in reversing the order of the  trial  Court.         [111 G; 112 C]

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 2 of 4  

JUDGMENT:             CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No.  24         of 1972.             (Appeal  by Special Leave from the Judgment  and   Order         dated  22-10-1971 of the Madhya Pradesh High  Court  (Indore         Bench) in Crl. A. No. 292/70).         R.L. Kohli, R.C. Kohli and A.G. Ratnaparkhi, for the  appel-         lant.         M.K. Khan and S.K. Dhingra, for respondent No. 1.         Ram Panjwani and H.S. Parihar, for respondent No. 2.         The Judgment of the Court was delivered by             GOSWAMI,  J.  This appeal by special leave  is  directed         against  the  judgment of the High Court of  Madhya  Pradesh         convicting  the  appellant under section 409,  Indian  Penal         Code, and sentencing him to one         110         year’s rigorous imprisonment and to a fine of Rs. 250/-,  in         default  further rigorous imprisonment for three months,  in         appeal against acquittal at the instance of the  complainant         (first respondent herein).             The  appellant is a senior lawyer of 25 years’  standing         in Indore and the complainant was acting as his junior.  The         complainant’s  father, Dinubhai, was the senior partner of a         firm of Chartered Accountant, M/s. Dinubhai & Co., with  its         registered  office in Bombay and a branch office in  Indore.         The  Indore office was looked after by the  second  partner,         M.C. Mehta.  It appears that the firm was dissolved on  July         5,  1960,  when Mehta ceased to be a  partner  and  Dinubhai         appointed  the appellant as counsel and attorney for  filing         suits and for recovering dues from various parties.   Dinub-         hai filed a suit, being suit No. 13 of 1962, for recovery of         Rs.  12,500/- in the court of the Third Additional  District         Judge, Indore, impleading M.C. Mehta and one Chandulal  Shah         as defendants in that suit.   Although the suit was decreed,         it  appears there were two cross appeals against the  decree         in the High Court, one by Dinubhai and the other by  Chandu-         lal  Shah. The appellant was appearing for Dinubhai in  both         the  appeals.   He  received some amounts  in  advance  from         Dinubhai  and  submitted  a  statement  of account  of  Shri         Dinubhai  (Ex.  P-1)  dated February 9,  1965,  wherein  two         items,  namely,  Rs. 210/- and Rs. 110/- were  mentioned  as         being  towards   "paper  book   charges"   respectively   on         21-4-1964  and 22-9-1964.  The entry on 22-9-1964 shows that         the   amount of Rs. 110/- is one of several items  mentioned         therein as expenses incurred in the appeal flied by  Chandu-         lal Shah against Dinubhai.  So far as the items mentioned in         Ex.  P-1 on 21-4-1964 including the last item of Rs.  210/-,         there  is  no mention whether the expenditure  was  actually         incurred on that date.             The complainant was not pulling on well with his  father         for  some reason or other and also parted company  with  his         senior,  the  appellant. He filed a  complaint  against  the         appellant  on  December 8, 1967,  making  allegations  under         sections 409, 468 and 474 IPC.  Ultimately the appellant was         charged under section 409 IPC  with  regard  to  the amounts         of  Rs.  210/-  and Rs. 110/- which were  mentioned  in  the         statement  of account (Ex. P-1) received by the  complainant         on February 10, 1965.  The complainant examined himself  and         a  clerk  of  the High Court to prove  that  no  paper  book         charges  were  deposited on the dates mentioned in  the  ac-         counts.  On the other hand a sum of Rs. 26.50 was  deposited         as  paper book charges on March 18, 1965, in the  particular         appeal.             The  appellant denied the charge and stated  that  there

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 3 of 4  

       was  a typing error in the accounts and the  actual  figures         should  have been Rs. 211/(and not Rs. 210/-) and  Rs.  10/-         (and  not  Rs. 110/-).  When the appellant’s  attention  had         been drawn to these amounts  he  admitted these to be typing         errors and asked for adjustment of the amount  of Rs.  300/-         towards his fees in the case of Kothari Book Depot.             It  is rather curious that a criminal  complaint  should         have  been lodged against the appellant nearly  three  years         after the receipt of the accounts by the complainant.         111             The trial court acquitted the accused (appellant herein)         by observing as follows :--                             "To  sum  up, the prosecution  has  been                       launched  after inordinate unexplained  delay,                       there  is no clear and conclusive evidence  of                       the  criminal intention and  dishonest  mental                       act of the accused, the real aggrieved  person                       has  not  come with the  complainant  but  has                       already sought the alternative remedy in Civil                       Court  which  is being already  pursued.   The                       question whether or not the adjustment made by                       the  accused towards his fees was  proper  can                       more appropriately be decided by Civil  Court.                       Accused  having reasonable claim  against  the                       complainant  for any equivalent sum of  money,                       his  user  of  the disputed sum  for  his  own                       purpose will not amount to criminal breach  of                       trust".             The High Court, on the other hand, held that the  charge         was  established against the accused and set aside  the  ac-         quittal.  The  High Court held that the explanation  of  the         accused did not appear to be true and, therefore, could  not         be accepted.  It further held that it was clear that on  the         dates mentioned in the accounts no amounts were deposited as         paper  book charges in the High Court.  The High Court  con-         cluded as follows :--                             "Consequently it cannot be doubted  that                       the  respondent, who as an agent of  the  com-                       plainant’s  father  was  entrusted  with   the                       amounts,  showed  false expenses  and  thereby                       kept the amounts with himself.  In the face of                       these  facts and also on the finding that  the                       explanation given by the respondent cannot  be                       accepted,  the respondent  cannot escape  con-                       viction  under section 409 I.P.C. as that  was                       the   only  charge framed against him  by  the                       trying Magistrate".             The  statement  of  account (Ex. P.I ) as  well  as  the         correspondence  between the appellant and the  complainant’s         father,  who  was client, dearly show that there was  mutual         accounting and adjustment between them.  The mere fact  that         certain  amounts were in the hands of the appellant and  the         accounts  submitted  were incorrect would not  lead  to  the         inevitable   conclusion   that   the   appellant   committed         criminal  breach  of trust  in  respect  of   these   items.         The  complainant, who was  a junior  attached to   him   and         was   looking after his cases could himself easily find  out         the  discrepancies  in  the accounts and in a normal  course         he  would have drawn the attention of his senior on  receipt         of the statement of account in February 1965. The accused in         his  statement under section 342, Criminal  Procedure  Code,         stated, inter alia, as follows :--                             "Typing   error  has  occurred  in   the                       statement of account of Ex. P-1.  The  differ-                       ence  of Rs.  300.00  which  has occurred, has

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 4 of 4  

                     been adjusted against my fees in Kothari  Book                       Depot’s case at the instance of Suryakant.   I                       have  given   a  receipt for it  which  is  in                       possession  of Suryakant.  Surya kant used  to                       maintain  account of Court expenses of  Dinub-                       hai’s  cases in a register.  That register  is                       with Suryakant.                       112                       Suryakant used to remain present in the  court                       on  each date along with me.  He knows  every-                       thing.  Nothing is  concealed from him.  There                       is  Gadbad  of  money  between  Suryakant  and                       his father.  Hence on the instigation of other                       people  this  false case  has  been  launched.                       Suryakant  had  got  typed  the  statement  of                       account Ex. P-I from the register".             On  one  side  we have the  solitary  statement  of  the         complainant. Even his father is not there to corroborate him         or  even  to show that he authorised him to  file  the  com-         plaint.   As against his statement, we have the  explanation         of the appellant.  The trial court who had an opportunity to         see  the complainant giving evidence did not choose to  rely         on  his  version  of the case and preferred  to  accept  the         explanation of the appellant.  In this state of the evidence         we  fail  to see how the High Court, in  an  appeal  against         acquittal, thought it possible to hold the charge as proved.         While  the  complaint was filed on December 8, 1967,  a  few         months  earlier on May 16, 1967, a lawyer’s notice  was  ad-         dressed  to  the  appellant on behalf of  Dinubhai.  We  may         extract the following passage from that letter:                             "My  client  has instructed me  to  call                       upon you to remit to him  the  balance of  Rs.                       1700/-  lying with you (after  deducting  your                       fees  of  Rs. 3300/- from the  amount  of  Rs.                       5,000/-  paid to you) within 24 hours  of  the                       receipt of this reply otherwise my client will                       not  only  place  the matter  before  the  Bar                       Council of M.P. but, if so advised, will  also                       file  a suit for its recovery against  you  at                       your cost and consequences which please note".         This  would  clearly  show that  neither  Dinubhai  nor  his         lawyer  ever thought of attributing any dishonest  intention         or criminal intent to the appellant.  In view of this letter         it  is  not  possible to accept the sole  testimony  of  the         complainant imputing dishonest intention on the part of  the         appellant.   We  are clearly of opinion that  there  was  no         sufficient  ground for the High Court to interfere with  the         acquittal  in this case when the reasons given by the  trial         court  were  weighty  and cogent and there was no compelling         justification to take a contrary view.         At  the conclusion of the argument by Mr. Khan on behalf  of         the  complainant pressing for conviction of  the  appellant,         Mr.  Panjwani,appearing  on  behalf  of  the  State,  fairly         enough,  did not think  it proper to support the judgment of         the High Court.             In  the result the appeal is allowed.  The  judgment  of         the  High Court is set aside.  The appellant shall  be  dis-         charged from his bail bond.         P.B.R.                                                Appeal         allowed.         113