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PETITIONER: VANKAMAMIDI VENKATA SUBBA RAO

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: CHATLAPALLI SEETHARAMARATHARANGANAYAKAMMA

DATE OF JUDGMENT:       02/04/1997

BENCH: K. RAMASWAMY, D.P. WADHWA

ACT:

HEADNOTE:

JUDGMENT:                          O R D E R      This appeal  by special  leave arises from the judgment of the  Division Bench  of the High Court of Andhra Pradesh, made on 23.3.1985 in Appeal No. 543 of 1977.      The admitted  facts are  that one  V. Satyanarayana has executed a  will dated  December 1,  1950  bequeathing  2.66 acres of  wet land in favour of his wife Smt. Raghavamma and also another  gift deed  bequeathing lands  in favour of his daughter Smt.  Seetharamratna Ranganayakamma, the respondent herein. He  died on  December 2, 1950 leaving behind him his widow Raghavamma,  his minor  son, the  appellant herein and his  daughter   the  respondent.  Subsequently,  this  widow Raghavamma filed  OS No.182/53  in the Sub-Court, Tenali for partition of  all the  properties into  equal shares between herself and the appellant. Therein a compromise was effected and a  decree in  terms thereof  under Ex.A-11 was passed on July 13,  1955. Under  the  comprise  decree,  the  property bequeathed in  favour of  the respondent. Ranganayakamma was affirmed. The  properties sold by the appellant to the third party  also   was  affirmed.   the  balance   property   was partitioned in  equal shares  6.5  acres  with  a  right  of reversion to  the appellant  on the  demise  of  Raghavamma. Subsequently, on  April 25, 1959, the appellant has executed another gift  deed to  an extent  of 1.50  acres of  land in favour of  third party  jointly with  his mother wherein she acknowledged that  the  property  has  by  Raghavamma  under compromise decree under Ex.A-11 was conferred with a limited interest in  terms thereof.  Thereby, she  had  acknowledged that she had a life interest in the properties and under the compromise  decree.  Equally,  the  appellant  has  executed another gift  deed to  an extent  of 1.97  acres bequeathing under Ex.A-4  in favour of his  mother to enjoy the property during her  life time  as limited owner. She accepted, acted on and  enjoyed for  life. This  was also  pursuant  to  the compromise  decree  under  Ex.A-11.  Therein  also  she  had acknowledged that  she had  life interest  in the compromise decree under  Ex.A-11. After  the estate was abolished under the AP(AA)  Estate (Abolition  and Conversion into Ryotwari) Act 1948  (for short,  the ‘Abolition Act’), the claim under Section 15  of the Act was filed. Thereunder, the husband of

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the respondent  laid  the  claim  for  Ryotwari  patta.  The Settlement Officer  negatived the claim of the appellant and granted  patta  in  favour  of  Krishnamurthy,  namely,  the husband of the respondent. On appeal, in TAS No. 84/61 dated December 3,  1962, the  appellate authority  set  aside  the order and  granted joint  patta in  favour of appellant No.1 and his  mother Raghavamma.  On her demise on April 7, 1973, the appellant  filed an  application and patta to the entire extent was  granted  exclusively  in  favour  of  the  first appellant.      Raghavamma  had  executed  a  will  in  favour  of  the respondent bequeathing  the property obtained under Ex.A-11. In furtherance thereof, the respondent filed OS No. 94/73 of possession of  the properties  under the  will dated July 6, 1972. The  trial Court dismissed the suit. On appeal, it was decreed. Thus, this appeal by special leave.      The only  question that  arises  for  consideration  is whether Raghavamma,  the mother  of first respondent and the appellant has  a limited  estate under the compromise decree under Ex.A-11  attracting sub-section  (2) of  Section 14 or the same  was enlarged  into an absolute estate by operation of sub-section  (1) of  Section 14  of the  Hindu Succession Act, 1956  (for short,  the ‘Act’). The High Court proceeded on  the   premise  that   Raghavamma  being   a   widow   of Satyanarayana had  a right  to partition under Hindu Women’s Right to  Property Act,  1937 and, therefore, when she has a right to  file a suit for partition of the property acquired by her  under Ex.A-11,  compromise decree, is in recognition of her  pre-existing right to maintenance which was enlarged into an  absolute estate.  Therefore, by  operation of  sub- section (1) of Section 14 of the Act, the right was enlarged into an absolute estate.      The question  is: whether  the view  taken by  the High Court is  correct in law? Shri C. Sitaramiah, learned senior counsel appearing  for the appellant contends that by virtue of the settlement deeds, Ex.B-3 and A-4 dated April 25, 1959 executed by  the first  appellant jointly  with his  mother, Raghavamma in  favour of  third party and Raghavamma being a signatory to  the document,  had acknowledged  that she  has only life interest in term of the compromise decree, Ex.A-11 which recites  that she  has life interest and on her demise the property  would revert  back to the first appellant, the will  executed  by  her  is  neither  valid  nor  binds  the appellant. In  that view  of the  matter and in the light of the patta granted by the Settlement Officer under Section 15 of the  Act, the view taken by the High Court is not correct and the  suit itself  is not  maintainable. The  right under Section 14(2)  will be only restricted right and, therefore, she has  no right to will away the property has by her under Ex.A-11 in favour of the respondent.      Mr. A.  Subba Rao,  learned counsel  appearing for  the respondent, on  the other hand, contends that the compromise decree is  dated July 30, 1955, i.e., anterior to the coming into force of the Succession Act. It is only in recognitions of her pre-existing right, though her husband has executed a will under  which has  bequeathed 2.66  acres for  her  life towards maintenance  which Will  she did  not accept. On the other hand, in assertion of her right as a widow’s estate in her husband’s  property, she filed the suit for partition of the property  in two  equal shares  between herself  and her son, the  appellant herein.  Therein, the  compromise decree was effected  under Ex.A-11.  The compromise  reiterates her pre-existing right  to maintenance. Therefore, this is not a right acquired  for the first time under Ex.A-11. It is only in recognition  of her properties given to her under Ex.A-11

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enlarged into  an absolute  right and  operation of  Section 14(1) of  the Act. The gift deeds Ex.B-3 and A-4 executed on April  25,  1959  between  Raghavamma,  the  mother  of  the respondent, and  the first  appellant must  be understood in the light  of the  mutual affection  they has  at that time. Therefore, though  there is a recital that she has only life interest in  the property  has under  the compromise decree, that does  not stand  in her way to will away the properties during  her   life  time   in  favour  of  her  daughter-the respondent. Therefore,  absolute right she had under Section 14(1) cannot  be defeated  by her accepting Exs.B-3 and A-4. It is also contended that since her right under the will was required to  be established,  the first  respondent was  not required to  approach the  Settlement Authorities laying her claim for patta.      Under these  circumstances,  the  patta  granted  under Section 15 of the Abolition Act does not stand in the way of the Civil Court’s going into the question.      In view  of the  respective contentions,  the  question that arises  for consideration  is: whether  the  compromise decree, Ex.A-11,  is only  in  recognition  of  pre-existing right or whether Raghavamma has enlarged her limited right?      It is  well settled legal position that if the right by a Hindu woman under any instrument is in recognition of pre- existing right,  the limited  right though  prescribed under the instrument,  gets enlarged  into an  absolute  right  by operation of Section 14(1) of the Act. On the other hand, if a right  is acquired  for the first time under the document, then sub-section  (2) of  Section  14  gets  attracted  and, therefore,  the  right  acquired  under  the  instrument  by operation of  sub-section (2)  of Section  14 does  not  get enlarged.      This controversy  was considered  by this  Court  in  a recent judgment  rendered in  C. Masilamani  Mudaliar & Ors. vs. Idol  of Shri  Swaminathaswami Thirukoil & Ors [(1996) 8 SCC 525].  In paragraph  27, this Court, after consideration of the entire case law, has held as under:      "As  held  by  this  Court  if  the      acquisition   of    the    property      attracts sub-section (1) of Section      14, sub-section  (2) does  not come      into play.  If the  acquisition  is      for the  first  time,  without  any      vestige of pre-existing right under      the instrument,  document or device      etc.  then   sub-section   (2)   of      Section  14  gets  attracted.  Sub-      section (2)  being in the nature of      an exception,  it does  not  engulf      and wipe  out the operation of sub-      section  (1).  Sub-Section  (2)  of      Section 14  independently  operates      in its  own sphere.  The  right  to      disposition of  property by a Hindu      under Section  30 is required to be      understood in  this perspective and      if  any  attempt  is  made  to  put      restriction   female    under    an      instrument,  document   or  device,      though executed  after the  Act has      come  into   force,  it   must   be      interpreted in  the  light  of  the      facts and circumstance in each case      and  to   construe  whether   Hindu      female acquired  or  possessed  the

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    property in recognition of her pre-      existing right or she get the right      for  the   first  time   under  the      instrument without  any vestige  of      pre-existing right.  If the  answer      is  in  the  gets  attracted.  Thus      construed, both sub-section (1) and      (2) of  Section 14  will  be  given      their full  play without  rendering      either as  otiose or  aids as menas      of avoidance."      Shri C.  Sitaramiah, learned senior counsel, has placed reliance on  this paragraph  and contends that since she has acknowledged her  limited  right  under  compromise  decree, Ex.A-11, she  acquired only limited right for the first time under the  compromise decree and, therefore, sub-section (1) of Section  14 gets  attracted. On  the other  hand, Mr.  A. Subba Rao, learned counsel contends that this ratio squarely applies to  the facts  in this case. There also a compromise decree  was   executed.  Thereunder,  the  right  was  given enlarging the  limited estate  of a  widow into  an absolute estate attracting  section 14(1)  of the Act and, therefore, the ratio is in hi favour.      In view of the respective contentions, the question is; what right Raghavamma acquired under the document - Ex.A-11? Ex.A-11 expressly mentions as under:      "The plaintiff  gets  the  property      marked in  blue pencil  in the plan      attached hereto  and on  her  death      the same  shall devolve  on the Ist      defendant  (first   appellant)  and      that  Ist   defendant  do  get  the      residuary properties  shown in  the      plan hereto.  (more fully described      in the compromise petition)."      It is true, as rightly contended by Mr. Subba Rao, that a compromise  decree was  passed in  July, 1955;  it was  in recognition of  her pre-existing  right.  But  how  she  has understood her  limited right  gets reflected  in subsequent documents to  which she  was admittedly  a partly  and dealt with  after   the  Act  came  into  force  pursuant  to  the compromise decree.      Raghavamma, the  mother of the first respondent and the first appellant  has executed a sale deed, Ex.B-3, in favour of the  third party  alienating 1.50 acres of land has under the compromise  decree. Therein  she has specifically stated that she  has a  life interest  in terms  of the  compromise decree, Ex.A-11.  Similarly, a  gift deed  was  executed  in favour of  Raghavamma by  the first  appellant in respect of 1.90 acres  of land.  Thereunder also,  she had acknowledged not only  the limited estate had under the compromise decree but also  her limited  right under Ex.4 for enjoyment during her life time and the possession given as per the compromise decree. Thus,  it could  be seen that after the Act had come into force,  in 1959  she had acknowledged in Ex.A-3 and A-4 that what she obtained under the compromise decree, Ex.A-11, was a  limited right  with the  provision that  the property would revert to her son, the first appellant. Thus, it could be seen  that she  had admitted  that she  had only  limited right acquired  for the  first  time  under  the  compromise decree. Thereby,  sub-section (2)  of Section  14 of the Act and not sub-section (1) of Section 14 stands attracted. That apart, even  the Settlement  Officer  has  passed  an  order granting ryotwari  patta under  Section 15  of the Abolition Act which became final.

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    This Court in Vatticherukuri Village Panchayat vs. Nori Vnkatarama Deekshithulu  & Ors.  [(1991) Supp.  2 SCC  288], after considering  the entire  case law,  had held  that the civil Court  has no  jurisdiction to go into the correctness of the  patta granted  by the  Settlement Authorities. Under Section 9,  CPC, the Courts shall, subject to the provisions contained therein,  have jurisdiction  to try  all suits  of civil nature  excepting suits  cognizance of which is either expressly  or  impliedly  barred.  When  a  legal  right  is infringed, a  suit would  lie unless  there is a bar against entertainment of  such civil  suit and the civil Court would take cognizance of its. Therefore, the normal rule of law is that civil  Courts have  jurisdiction to  try all  suits  of civil nature  except those  of which  cognizance  is  either expressly or  by necessary implication excluded. The Rule of construction being  that every  presumption would be made in favour  of  the  existence  of  a  right  and  remedy  in  a democratic set  up governed  by rule of law and jurisdiction of  the   civil  Court  is  assumed.  The  exclusion  would, therefore,  normally   be  an   exception.  Court  generally construe the  provisions strictly  when jurisdiction  of the civil courts  is claimed  to be  excluded. However,  in  the development of  civil adjudication of civil disputes, due to pendency of  adjudication and abnormal delay at hierarchical stages, statutes  intervene and  provide alternative mode of resolution of  disputes with  less expensive but expeditious disposal. It  is settled  legal position  that if a Tribunal with limited  jurisdiction cannot  assume  jurisdiction  and decide for  itself  the  dispute  conclusively,  in  such  a situation, it  is the  Court  that  is  required  to  decide whether the Tribunal with limited jurisdiction has correctly assumed jurisdiction  equally settled that when jurisdiction is conferred  on a  Tribunal, the  Court examine whether the essential principle  of jurisdiction  have been followed and decided by the Tribunal leaving the decision on merits t the Tribunal. It  is also  equally settled  legal position  that where a  statute gives  finality to the order of the special Tribunal, the  civil court’s jurisdiction must be held to be excluded, if  there is  adequate remedy  to do what he civil Court would  normally  do  in  a  suit.  Such  a  provision, however, does   not exclude those cases where the provisions of the  particular Act  have not  been complied  with or the statutory Tribunal  has not  acted in  conformity  with  the fundamental principle  of judicial procedure. Where there is an express  bar of jurisdiction of the Court, an examination of the  scheme of the particular Act to find the adequacy or the sufficiency of the remedies provided may be relevant but is not  decisive to  sustain the  jurisdiction of  the civil Court. Where  there is no express exclusion, the examination of the  remedies and  the scheme  of the  particular and the result of  the inquiry  may be decisive. In the latter case, it is  necessary that the statute creates a special right or liability and  provides procedure  for the  determination of the right  or liability  and  further  lays  down  that  all questions  about  the  said  right  or  liability  shall  be determined  by  the  Tribunal  so  constituted  and  whether remedies is  normally associated  with the  action in  civil courts or prescribed by the statutes or not. Therefore, each case requires examination whether the statute provides right and remedies  and whether  the scheme of the Act is that the procedure provided  will be  conclusive and thereby excludes the jurisdiction  of   the civil  Court in  respect thereof. After the  advent of  independence, the land reforms was one of the policies of the Government abolishing fudal system of land tenures  and conforment  of the  Ryotwari patta  on the

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tiller of the soil. Thereby, the land reform laws extinguish pre-existing rights and create new rights under the Act. The Act confers jurisdiction on the Tribunals in matter relating thereto and  hierarchy  of  appeals/revisions  are  provided thereunder.   Thereby,   by   necessary   implication,   the jurisdiction of  the civil  Court to  take cognizance of the suits of  civil nature  covered under  the land  reform laws stands excluded giving not only the finality to the decision of the  Tribunal but  also ensuring expetitious, inexpensive and simple  procedure for  disposal of  the matters  by  the Tribunal and  make the  Ryotwari patta granted to the tiller of the  soil conclusive.  Under the  normal course  of civil procedure, the  jurisdiction of the trial of the civil suits in relation to the matters covered under the Acts being time consuming and  tardy the  lack of  his financial  support or otherwise incapacity  in defending  or working the rights in the civil courts and by hierarchy of appeals defeat justice. Obviously,  therefore,   the  civil   suits   by   necessary implication stand  excluded unless the fundamental principle of procedure  are not  followed by the Tribunals constituted under the  land reform laws. In this case, the Act concerned extinguishes the  pre-existing  right,  creates  new  rights under the  Act and  requires Tribunals  to enquire  into the rival claims  and a form of appeal has been provided against the order  of the  primary authority.  Thereby the right and remedy made  conclusive under  the Act are given finality by the orders  passed under  the  Act.  Thereby,  by  necessary implication, the  jurisdiction of  the  civil  Court  stands excluded.      Thus, it  could be  seen that  the civil  Court  cannot unsettle the  patta which has become final in the decree now passed pursuant to the declaration.      We are of the view that the Division Bench is not right in granting  the decree  for the  proprieties gifted  to her under the will dated 16.7.1972.      The  appeal   is  accordingly   allowed.  But,  in  the circumstance, without costs.