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PETITIONER: V.S. TALWAR

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: PREM CHANDRA SHARMA

DATE OF JUDGMENT01/03/1984

BENCH: MISRA RANGNATH BENCH: MISRA RANGNATH FAZALALI, SYED MURTAZA VARADARAJAN, A. (J)

CITATION:  1984 AIR  664            1984 SCR  (3)  51  1984 SCC  (2) 420        1984 SCALE  (1)367

ACT:      Construction of documents, Principle of-True meaning of clause 12  of  the  lease  deed  dated  5.1.1968-Meaning  of "office"-Whether "personal  Office" in  clause 12 would mean that the  premises were  let out  for composite purposes and not for  residential purposes  and therefore  eviction under section 14(1) (e) of the Delhi Rent Control Act cannot lie ?

HEADNOTE:      Prem Chand Sharma was admitted into tenancy of the suit premises under  a lease deed dated 5th January, 1968, clause 12, thereof provided.      "That the lessee shall use the premises for the purpose      of  Residential   Personal  office  only  and  not  for      commercial purposes."      The landlord, appellant, applied to the Rent Controller on March  4, 1972,  for eviction  of  the  Respondent  under section 14(1)  (e) of  the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958. The respondent tenant  obtained leave  to  contest  and  pleaded inter  alia   that  the  premises  were  let  out  both  for residential as  also for office and the composite purpose of the  tenancy  took  the  premises  out  of  the  purview  of residential accommodation. The Controller did not accept the defence and  passed an  order  for  eviction.  In  revision, however, the  High Court rejected the land lord’s submission holding that  the use of the word "personal" before "office" was intended to convey the idea that the tenancy was not for the  purpose  of  accommodating  a  place  of  business  and reversed the  decision of  eviction. Hence the appeal by the landlord, after obtaining special leave of the Court.      Allowing the appeal, the Court ^      HELD: (1) The word "office" is used in different senses and in  each case  that meaning must be assigned to it which conforms with  the language  used. Therefore, in the instant case, the  High Court  was not  right in  picking one of the meanings given in the chamber’s dictionary and proceeding to the conclusion  that "office"  is certainly  "not residence" and  a   letting  purpose  which  includes  office  must  be understood to  include a  purpose other than residence only. [54-A, 55A-B]

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    Macmillan v. Guest (1942) A.C. 561; Smt. Kanta Kathuria      v. Manak  Chand Surana,  (1970) 2  S.C.C. 232, referred      to. 52      2:1.  Law  is  fairly  settled  that  in  construing  a document the  ordinary rule  is to give effect to the normal and natural  meaning of  the words  employed in the document itself. [55 D-E]      Krishna Biharilal  v. Gulab  Chand and  Others,  [1971] Supp. S.C.R.  27; D.D.A.  v. D.C.  Kaushish, (1974) 1 S.C.R. 535; Monypenny  v. Monypenny,  [1861] 9  H.L.C. 114;  In re: Meredith, ex-parte Chick, [1879] 11 Ch. D. 731, referred to.      2:2. In  the instant  case it is clear that the parties to the  document were anxious enough and took proper care in order  to   keep  the  user  of  the  premises  confined  to residential purpose; that is why it was expressly stipulated in  the  lease  to  prohibit  commercial  user.  Even  while permitting an  office to be located, equal care was taken to put the  word ’personal’  before ’Office’ to convey the idea that the  tenant would  not be entitled to transact official business connected  with his  avocation. Although ordinarily an office  would mean  the place  where official business is transacted, a  personal office  in contradistinction  to  an office simpliciter  or a  commercial office would be a place where an outsider would not normally be admitted; commercial transactions would  not take place; there would be no fixity of the  location and the tenant would be entitled to use any portion of the premises as his personal office and the like. Such a  place  is  referred  to  as  personal  office  would essentially be residential and obviously while entering into the present  lease deed,  the parties  were  not  trying  to create a lease of premises for any other purposes. In para 2 of the  document, there  was no  description of any existing office room  and available  for such  use to the tenant, nor was space  earmarked for  any personal  office out  of  this accommodation. It was in the discretion of the lessee to use any part  as a  personal office.  Every lessee,  or for  the matter  of  that  every  person  maintaining  an  acceptable standard  of   living  does  set  apart  a  portion  of  the accommodation  available   to  him   which  can  answer  the description of  a personal  office. Even the clause relating to payment  of tax by the lessor do not support the stand of the lessee.  As contemplated  under the Transfer of Property Act a  document of  lease normally  provides the  rights and obligations  of   both  the   lessor  and   the  lessee.  In stipulating the  rent payable  for the use and occupation of the premises  the lessor  had undertaken  the  liability  of payment of  taxes  as  described  therein  as  long  as  the premises  were   used  for   residence  only.   This  clause necessarily means  that what  had been  stipulated was  only residential user.  In fact,  the lessor  had been paying the taxes and  the lessee  had not been called upon to share the burden. This  clause is  an added  provision to  clinch  the point in  dispute against  the tenant.  Therefore  the  High Court, went  wrong in  reversing the  decision of  the  Rent Controller by  merely relying  upon clause  12 of  the lease deed. [55C, 56F-G, 57A-B, D-E, GH, 58 A-B]      3.  Though  the  fact  that  the  tenant  has  been  in occupation for more than 14 years after the litigation began will disentitle  him to  any further  time to vacate, taking judicial notice  of the  fact that these days an alternative premises  would   be  very  difficult  to  find,  the  Court considered it appropriate to grant time to the Respondent to vacate the  premises upto  31st December,  1984  subject  to furnishing usual  undertaking within  four weeks  or to face

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eviction after four weeks. 53

JUDGMENT:      CIVIL APPELLATE  JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 2999 of 1980.      From the  judgment and order dated the 22nd April, 1980 of the High Court of Delhi at New Delhi in C.R. Petition No. 336 of 1979.      G.L. Sanghi,  Mr. A.K.  Verma and  S.  Kashwa  for  the appellant.      D.D. Thakur,  P.H. Parekh,  P.K. Menon  and R.K. Sharma for the respondent.      The Judgment of the Court was delivered by      RANGANATH MISRA,  J.-The landlord whose application for eviction of  the tenant,  respondent before us, was rejected by the  High Court  by reversing  the order  of the eviction passed by  the Additional  Rent Controller  has come  before this Court  on obtaining  special leave  and the short point arising for  consideration is  as to  the true  meaning of a clause in the rent deed.      The  respondent   was  admitted  into  tenancy  of  the premises in  question under  a lease deed dated 5th January, 1968. Clause 12 thereof provided:      "That the lessee shall use the premises for the purpose      of  Residential/Personal   office  only   and  Not  for      commercial purposes".        (underlinings are our own) The landlord, appellant before us, applied to the Controller on March  14, 1972,  for eviction  of the  respondent  under Section 14 (1) (e) of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 (’the Act’ for  short). The  tenant obtained  leave to contest and pleaded, inter alia, that the premises were let out both for residential as  also office and the composite purpose of the tenancy took  the premises out of the purview of residential accommodation. The Controller did not accept the defence and passed an  order for eviction. Thereupon, the tenant carried a revision  to the  Delhi  High  Court  and  reiterated  his defence that  the tenancy  was not  for residential purpose. The High  Court found  that there  was no  infirmity in  the finding about the bona fide requirement but adverting to the conclusion on the letting purpose held:      "It is  well known  that premises  may be  let out  for      residence only, for use as an office, for use as a shop      and for other com- 54      mercial purpose.  Once any  of the  latter purposes  is      combined with  the purpose  of use  as  residence,  the      premises let  out  for  a  composite  purpose  and  for      residence only.      The meaning  of the  word ’office’,  not defined in the Act, in  the Chamber’s  dictionary is a place where business is carried  oh. Office  is certainly  not  residence  and  a letting purpose  which includes office must be understood to include a purpose other than residence only". And ultimately concluded by saying:      "Clause (e)  of Section  14(1) is available as a ground      to  seek   eviction  of   tenants  only,   among  other      requirements,  if   the  premises   were  let  out  for      residence only and once the letting purpose is shown to      be composite,  an eviction petition under Section 14(1)      (e), without more, must fail." The High  Court rejected  the landlord’s submission that the use of  the word  ’personal’ before ’office’ was intended to

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convey the  idea that the tenancy was not for the purpose of accommodating a place of business.      Counsel for  the appellant  took us  to  the  terms  of clause 12  of the  lease agreement  and  emphasised  on  the feature that  commercial purposes  were clearly kept out and the lease was for residence and authorised the location of a personal office.  He also relied upon the description of the premises as  residential in  the  application  made  by  the tenant to  the controller  for  fixation  of  fair  rent  in respect of the very premises.      The word  ’office’ is  used in  different senses and in each case that meaning must be assigned to it which conforms with the  language used. In Volume 67, Corpus Juris Secundum at page  96, the  following  statement  appears:  "The  term ’office’  is   one  which  is  employed  to  convey  various meanings, and no one definition thereof can be relied on for all purposes  and occasions".  This Court  has approved  the observation of Lord Wright in Macmillan v. Guest, 1 where it was stated:      "The  word  ’office’  is  of  indefinite  content.  Its      various meanings 55      cover four columns of the New English Dictionary.. " See Smt.  Kanta Kathuria  v. Manak  Chand Surana(1). In this view of the position the High Court was not right in picking one of  the meanings  given to  the word  in  the  Chamber’s dictionary and proceeding to the conclusion that ’office’ is certainly not residence and a letting purpose which includes office must  be understood  to include  a purpose other than residence only.      Section 2(i) of the Act defines ’premises’ to mean "any building or  part of  a building which is, or is intended to be, let  separately for use as a residence or for commercial use or  for any  other purpose ......." Respondent’s counsel has argued  that tenancy  under the  Act can  be  for  three purpose;-(1) residential,  (2) commercial  and (3)  for  any other purposes depending upon the use for which the premises are let  out. Conceding  that the  definition is  capable of such  an  argument  being  built  up,  a  reference  to  the pleadings in this case shows that the permission in the rent deed of  locating a  personal office had been stated to be a commercial purpose.  Great care  seems to have been taken by the landlord  while inducting the tenant under the rent deed to put  a  total  prohibition  to  commercial  user  of  the premises. That  is why in clause 12 it has been specifically stated that  it is  "not for  commercial purposes".  In  the back-drop of  such a  provision in  the lease agreement, the true meaning  of the words ’personal office’ has to be found out. Law is fairly settled that in construing a document the ordinary rule  is to  give effect  to the normal and natural meaning of  the words  employed in  the document itself. See Krishna Biharilal  v. Gulabchand  and Ors. (2) This Court in D.D.A. v. D.C. Kaushish(3) observed:      "There (at  pages 28-29)  ’Construction  of  Deeds  and      Statutes’ by  Odger’s (5th  ed. 1967) the First General      Rule of  Interpretation formulated  is: ’the meaning of      the document or of a particular part of it is therefore      to be  sought for  in the  document itself’.  That  is,      undoubtedly, the  primary rule of construction to which      Sections 90  to 94  of the  Indian  Evidence  Act  give      statutory recognition  and  effect..  Of  course,  ’the      document’ means  ’the document’ read as a whole and not      piecemeal. 56           The rule  stated above  follows logically from the

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    Literal  Rule   of  Construction   which,  unless   its      application produces absurd results must be resorted to      first. This  is clear from the following passages cited      in  Odgers’   short  book   under  the  First  Rule  of      Interpretation set out above :           Lord Wensleydale in Monypenny v. Monypenny 1 said:           "the question  is not  what the  parties to a deed      may have intended to do by entering into that deed, but      what is  the meaning  of the words used in that deed; a      most important distinction in all cases of construction      and the  disregards of  which often  leads to erroneous      conclusions".           Brett, L.J.  in  Re  Meredith,  ex-parte  Chick  2      observed :           "I am  disposed to follow the rule of construction      which was  laid down  by Lord  Denman and Baron Parke..      They said  that in construing instruments you must have      regard not  to the  presumed intention  of the parties,      but to the meaning of the words which they have used." Since we  agree with this exposition of the law reference to the oral evidence or even to the tenant’s documents would be wholly out  of place. The terms of the document if they make any good meaning must be given effect to.      All the  provisions of  the lease  deed have to be read and in  fact with the assistance of counsel we have read the same more  than once  during the hearing. The parties to the document were  anxious enough  and took proper care in order to keep  the user  of the  premises confined  to residential purpose; that  is why  it was  expressly stipulated  in  the lease to  prohibit commercial user. Even while permitting an office to  be located,  equal care was taken to put the word ’personal’ before  ’office’ to  convey  the  idea  that  the tenant would  not be  entitled to transact official business connected with  his avocation. Although ordinarily an office would mean the place where official business is transacted a personal  office   in   contradistinction   to   an   office simpliciter or a commercial office would be a place where an outsider would not normally 57 be admitted;  commercial transactions  would not take place; there would  be no  fixity of  the location  and the  tenant would be  entitled to use any portion of the premises as his personal office and the like. Such a place if referred to as personal  office   would  essentially   be  residential  and obviously while  entering into  the present  lease deed, the parties were  not trying  to create  a lease of premises for any other  purposes as  now contended  by Mr. Thakur for the respondent.  The   High  Court,  therefore,  went  wrong  in reversing the  decision of  the Rent  Controller  by  merely relying upon clause 12 of the lease deed.      It is  relevant to note the description of the premises as given  in the  lease deed  itself.  Paragraph  2  of  the document described the premises thus :      "The lessor  hereby leases  to the lessee the following      described premises  of the  entire house  built on plot      No. 125.  Greater Kailash-I,  New Delhi  comprising  of      three bed rooms with two bath rooms, drawing-cum-dining      room, one  kitchen one front and central veranda, front      and back lawn, garage, servant quarter, above garage, a      servant W.C. and terrace." There was  no description  of any  existing office  room and available  for  such  use  to  the  tenant.  nor  was  space earmarked for any personal office out of this accommodation. As indicated above it was in the discretion of the lessee to use any  part as a personal office. Every lessee, or for the

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matter  of  that  every  person  maintaining  an  acceptable standard  of   living  does  set  apart  a  portion  of  the accommodation  available   to  him   which  can  answer  the description of a personal office.      Mr. Thakur  placed reliance  on another  clause of  the lease deed which reads as follows:      "That the  lessor shall  pay all  the taxes of any kind      whatsoever including  house tax,  ground rent as are of      may hereinafter  be assessed on the demised premises by      the municipality  or  any  other  authority  whatsoever      provided the premises are used for residence only." We do  not think  the terms of this clause support the stand of  the  lessee.  As  contemplated  under  the  Transfer  or Property Act  a document  of  lease  normally  provides  the rights and obligations of both the 58 lessor and  the lesses.  In stipulating the rent payable for the use  and occupation  of  the  premises  the  lessor  had undertaken the  liability of  payment of  taxes as described therein as  long as  the premises  were used  for  residence only. This  clause necessarily  means  that  what  had  been stipulated was  only residential  user. It is appropriate to take note of the admission of Mr. Thakur that the lessor had been paying  the taxes  and the  lessee has  not been called upon to  share the burden. This clause is an added provision to clinch the point in dispute against the tenant.      We are,  therefore, of  the view  that the  High  Court clearly erred  in law  in  reversing  the  decision  of  the Controller allowing  the eviction. The appeal is allowed and the order  of the  High Court  is set aside and the order of the Additional  Rent Controller  is  restored.  Parties  are directed to bear their respective cost throughout.      This is  a litigation  which began  in 1970. The tenant has been in occupation and continuing for about 14 years now after  the   application  for   eviction  had   been  filed. Ordinarily we  would not have allowed any time to the tenant keeping this  aspect in  view. But Mr. Thakur has urged upon us to  take judicial  notice of  the fact that these days an alternative premises  would be  very difficult  to find.  We allow time to the tenant until 30th December, 1984 to vacate the premises  subject to furnishing usual undertaking within four weeks from today. In the absence of the undertaking the tenant becomes liable to eviction after four weeks. S.R.                                         Appeal allowed. 59