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PETITIONER: V.   M. SYED MOHAMMAD AND COMPANY

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: THE STATE OF ANDHRA.(With Connected Appeal)

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 11/03/1954

BENCH: DAS, SUDHI RANJAN BENCH: DAS, SUDHI RANJAN MAHAJAN, MEHAR CHAND (CJ) MUKHERJEA, B.K. BOSE, VIVIAN HASAN, GHULAM

CITATION:  1954 AIR  314            1954 SCR 1117  CITATOR INFO :  R          1955 SC 661  (205)  R          1957 SC 877  (16)  R          1958 SC 538  (12)  R          1960 SC1254  (3,9)  RF         1992 SC1277  (85)

ACT:    Constitution  of India, art. 14-Government of India  Act, 1935,  entry  48 in List II of the  Seventh  Schedule-Madras General  Sales Tax Act (IX of 1939)-Whether,ultra vires  the Constitution  or  Government of India Act,  1935-Rule  16(5) framed  under the Act-Whether ultra vires s. 5 (vi)  of  the Act.

HEADNOTE:    Held, that the Madras General Sales Tax Act (IX of 1939), is  not  ultra vires the Government of India  Act,  1935  as entry  48  in  List  II  of  the  Seventh  Schedule  to  the Government of India Act, 1936 was wide enough to cover a law imposing ’a tax on the purchaser of goods as well as on  the seller.    Held, also that inasmuch as there was nothing to  suggest that  the  purchasers of other  commodities  were  similarly situated as the purchasers of bides and skins in the present case the Act 1118 was not void under art. 14 of the Constitution on the ground that  the impugned Act singles Out for taxing  purchaser  of certain specified commodities only but leaves out purchasers of Mother commodities.      Article   14   does  not  forbid   classification   for legislative  purposes provided such classification is  based on  some  differentia having a reasonable  relation  to  the object and purpose of the law in question.     Rule   16(5)  framed  under  the  Act  contravenes   the provisions  of  s.  5(vi) of the Act but  this  sub-rule  is severable  and  does not affect the validity  of  the  rules which  may  otherwise  lie  within the  ambit  of  the  Act.    Chiranjit  Lal  Chowdhury v. The Union of  India  ([1950]

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S.C.R. 869)relied upon.

JUDGMENT: CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeals Nos. 187 and 188 of 1953.   Appeals  under  article 132 of the Constitution  of  India from the Judgment and Order, dated the 29th August, 1952, of the  High  Court of Judicature at Madras in  Writ  Petitions Nos. 21 and 41 of 1952.    K.V.  Venkatasubramania Iyer (A.  N. Rangaswami and.   S. K. Aiyangar, with him) for the appellant.    M.     Seshachalapathi for the respondent.    V.K.   T.  Chari,  Advocate-General  of  Madras  (V.   V. Raghavan, with him) for the intervener (State of Madras).   T. R.   Balakrishna  lyer  and  Sardar  Bahadur  for   the intervener (State of Travancore-Cochin).      Nittoor  Sreenivasa  Rao, Advocate  General  Of  Mysore (Porus  A.  Mehta, with him) for the  intervener  (State  of Mysore).     Lal  Narayan Sinha (B.  K. P. Sinha, with him)  for  the intervener (State of Bihar).  1954.   March 11.  The Judgment of the Court was  delivered by   DAS J.-These two appeals arise out of Writ Petitions  Nos. 21  ’and 41 -of 1952, filed in the High Court of  Judicature at Madras under article 226 questioning the validity of  the Madras  General  Sales  Tax  Act (IX of  1939)  and  of  the Turnover and Assessment Rules framed under that Act. 1119   The  petitioners  are  tanners carrying,  on  business  in Eluru,  West  Godawari District, which is now  part  of  the newly created State of Andhra.  They make large purchases of untanned  hides  and skins and after tanning them  in  their tanneries they export the tanned hides and skins or sell the same to local purchasers.  In the High Court the  appellants impugned the Act and the rules on the following grounds :-I    (a)    The Provincial Legislature had no power under  the Government  of India Act of 1935 to enact a law  imposing  a tax on purchasers;   (b)  The  liability to pay tax on sales is thrown  on  the purchaser  not by the statute but by the rules.  This is  an unconstitutional  delegation  by  the  legislature  of   its functions to the executive and the imposition of ,the tax is accordingly illegal;     (c)   The  Act has become void under article 14  of  the Constitution,  as it singles out for taxation purchasers  in some trades and is, therefore, discriminatory; and     (d)   The  rules framed under the Act  are  inconsistent with  the provisions enacted in the body of the Act and  are void.     The  High Court repelled each of the  aforesaid  grounds except  that  under item (d).  It held that rule  16(5)  was ultra  vires in that it offended against section 5  (vi)  of the Act and dismissed their applications.  Hence the present appeals  by the appellants under the certificate granted  by the  High  Court that it was a fit case for appeal  to  this court.     Learned  advocate appearing in support of these  appeals has  not  pressed  the  objection under  item  (b)  but  has insisted  on  the remaining grounds of  objection.   In  our opinion the decisions of the High Court on those grounds are substantially well-founded and correct.  On the question  of

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legislative   competency  the  learned  advocate  drew   our ’attention to entry 54 in List II of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution of India and argued that this entry clearly indicated  that entry 48 in List II of the Seventh  Schedule to the -Government of India Act, 1935; under which the 145 1120 impugned Act was passed, was much narrower in its scope  and could not be read as authorise in a the making of a law with respect  to taxes on the purchase of goods.   This  argument appears  to  us to be fallacious, for the intention  of  the Constituent Assembly as expressed in entry 54 in List II  of the  Seventh Schedule to the Constitution cannot be a  guide for ascertaining the intention of a totally, different body, namely, the British Parliament, in enacting entry 48 in List 11  of the Seventh Schedule to the Government of India  Act, 1935.   Further, we agree with the High Court that entry  48 in  List  II of the Seventh Schedule to  the  Government  of India  Act,  on a proper construction, was  wide  enough  to cover  a law imposing tax on the purchaser of goods as  well and that the Constituent Assembly in entry 54 of List II  in the  Seventh  Schedule  to the  Constitution  accepted  this liberal  construction  of  the corresponding  entry  48  and expressed  in  clearer language what was  implicit  in  that corresponding entry.     The next point urged by the learned advocate was founded on   article  14  of  the  Constitution.   The   appellants’ grievance  is that the impugned -Act singles out for  taxing purchasers of certain specified commodities only but  leaves out  purchasers  of all other  commodities.   The  principle underlying  the equal protection clause of the  Constitution has been dealt with and explained in Chiranjitlal  Chowdhury v.  The Union of India (1) and several subsequent cases  and need not be reiterated.It is well,settled that the guarantee of equal protection of  laws   does  not  require  that  the same law should be made applicable to all persons.   Article 14,  it  has been said, does not forbid  classification  for legislative  purposes, provided that such classification  is based  on some differentia having a reasonable  relation  to the  object and purpose of the law in question.  As  pointed out by the majority of the Bench which decided  Chiranjitlal Chowdhury’s case, there is a strong presumption in favour of the  validity  of legislative classification and it  is  for those who challenge it as (1)  [1950] S.C.R. 1121 unconstitutional  to allege and prove beyond all doubt  that the legislation arbitrarily discriminates between  different persons  similarly circumstanced.  There is no  material  on the record before us to suggest that the purchasers of other commodities  are  similarly situated as  the  purchasers  of hides  and  skins.  The majority  decision  in  Chiranjitlal Chowdhury’s  case(1) clearly applies to the case  before  us and  there  is no getting away from the  position  that  the appellants before us have not discharged the burden of proof that,  according to the majority decision, was upon them  to do.   Lastly, the learned advocate urges that rule 16(5) clearly contravenes  the  provisions of section 5(vi)  of  the  Act. This  sub-rule has been held to be ultra vires by, the  High Court  and, indeed, the learned Advocate-General  of  Madras did not in the High Court, as before ,us, dispute that  rule 16(5)  was  repugnant  to  section  5(vi).   That  sub-rule, however, affects only unlicensed dealers and the  appellants who are admittedly licensed dealers are not affected by that

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sub-rule.  Further, it has not been suggested before us that the  appellants  were  ever called upon to pay  any  tax  on purchase of hides or skins in respect of Which tax had  been previously  paid by some prior purchaser.  That sub-rule  is clearly  severable  and cannot affect the  validity  of  the rules  which may otherwise be within the ambit of  the  Act. Our  attention has not been drawn to any other infirmity  in the rules.    In  the premises there is no substance in  these  appeals which must, therefore, be dismissed with costs.  Appeals dismissed. Agent for the respondent and for the interveners, States  of Madras, Mysore and Bihar: R. H. Dhebar. (1) [1950] S.C.R. 869. 1122