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PETITIONER: UNION OF INDIA

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: PRAFULLA KUMAR SAMAL & ANR.

DATE OF JUDGMENT06/11/1978

BENCH: FAZALALI, SYED MURTAZA BENCH: FAZALALI, SYED MURTAZA DESAI, D.A.

CITATION:  1979 AIR  366            1979 SCR  (2) 229  1979 SCC  (3)   4  CITATOR INFO :  RF         1986 SC2045  (45)  RF         1990 SC1962  (6)

ACT:      Code of  Criminal  Procedure,  1973,  S.  227-order  of discharge by a Special Judge, scope and ambit.

HEADNOTE:      The second  respondent,  a  Land  Acquisition  officer, allegedly, by  abusing his  official position, concealed the fact  that   the  land  which  was  the  subject  matter  of acquisition was  really  Khasmahal  land  belonging  to  the Government  and   having  made  it  appear  that  the  first respondent was  the undisputed  owner of the same, aided and abetted him in getting a huge sum of money as compensation.      The  charge-sheet  was  submitted  before  the  Special Judge, and  the prosecution  requested him to frame a charge against the  respondents under  ss. 5(2)  and 5(1)(d) of the Prevention of  Corruption Act  read with  s. 120B  IPC.  The Special  Judge,   Puri  went   through   the   charge-sheet, statements made by the witnesses before the police and other documents, and  coming to  the conclusion  that there was no sufficient  ground   for  framing   a  charge   against  the respondents, discharged  them under  s. 227  Cr.P.C.  ,1973, after  giving  cogent  reasons  for  passing  the  order  of discharge. In  revision the  High Court  upheld the  Special Judge’s order of discharge.      Dismissing the appeal by special leave, the Court ^      HELD:   1.    The    considerations    governing    the interpretation of  s. 227 of Cr. P.C. apply mutatis mutandis to the  proceedings under  the Prevention of Corruption Act, after the  charge-sheet  is  submitted  before  the  Special Judge. At  the stage of s. 227, the Judge has merely to sift the evidence  in order  to find out whether or not, there is sufficient ground  for proceeding  against the  accused. The sufficiency of ground would take within its fold, the nature of the  evidence recorded‘by  the police,  or the  documents produced before the court, which exfacie disclose that there are suspicious  circumstances against  the accused  so as to frame a charge against him. [231E, 233A-B]      State of Bihar v. Ramesh Singh, [1978] I SCR 257; K. P,

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Raghavan &  Anr. v.  M. H.  Abbas and Anr.. AIR 1967 SC 740; Almohan Das  & Ors.  v. State  of West  Bengal, [1969] 2 SCR 520; applied.      2. What has been acquired is merely the Raiyyati or the lessee’s interest,  and as the proprietary interest vests in the Government  itself,  there  is  no  question  of  either acquiring or  claiming compensation  for the interest of the Government. [239B]      Collector of  Bombay v.  Nusserwanji Rattanji  Mistri & Ors., AIR  1955 SC  298; and  The Special  Land  Acquisition officer, Hosanagar v. K. S. Ramachandra Rao & Ors., AIR 1972 SC 2224: applied. 230

JUDGMENT:      CRIMINAL APPELLATE  JURISDICTION: Criminal  Appeal  No. 194 of 1977.      (Appeal from  the Judgment  and order  dated 30-8-76 of the Orissa High Court in Criminal Revision No. 88/76).      Soli J.  Sorabjee, Addl.  Sol. Gen.  and E. C. Agarwala and Girish  Chandra for the appellant.      Gobinda Mukhoty and N. R. Chowdhary for the respondent.      The Judgment of the Court was delivered by      FAZAL ALI,  J. This  appeal  is  directed  against  the judgment dated 30th August, 1976 of the High Court of Orissa by which  the High Court has upheld the order of the Special Judge, Puri discharging respondents No. 1 and 2.      The facts  of the  case lie within a narrow compass and centre round an alleged conspiracy said to have been entered into between  respondents No.  1 and  2 in  order to  commit offences under  sections 5(2)  and 5(1)(d) of the Prevention of Corruption  Act (hereinafter referred to as the Act) read with section  120-B I.P.C.  The   main  charge  against  the respondents was  that between  19-2-1972  to  30-3-1972  the respondent entered  into an  agreement For  the  purpose  of obtaining pecuniary  advantage for  respondent No.  1 P.  K. Samal and  in pursuance  of the  said conspiracy  the second respondent Debi  Prasad Jena,  who was  the Land Acquisition officer aided  and abetted the first respondent in getting a huge sum  of money  for a  land acquired  by the  Government which  in   fact  belonged  to  the  Government  itself  and respondent No.  1 was  a skew  thereof. It is averred in the chargesheet that  respondent No.  1 by  abusing his official position concealed  the fact  that the  land which  was  the subject matter  of acquisition  and was  situated in Cuttack Cantonment  was  really  Khasmahal  land  belonging  to  the Government and  having  made  it  appear  that  he  was  the undisputed owner  of the  same, got  a compensation  of  Rs. 4,18,642.55.  The   charge-sheet  contains   a   number   of circumstances from  which the inference of the conspiracy is sought to be drawn by the police. After the charge-sheet was submitted before  the Special  Judge, the prosecution ousted him to  frame a  charge against the respondents. The Special Judge, Puri  after having  gone through the charge-sheet and statements made  by the  witnesses before the police as also other documents  came to  the conclusion  that there  was no sufficient  ground   for  framing   a  charge   against  the respondents and he accordingly discharged them under section 227 of  the Code  of Criminal  Procedure,  1973  hereinafter called the Code). The Special Judge has given cogent reasons 231 for passing the order of discharge. The appellant went up to the High  Court in revision against the order of the Special

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Judge refusing  to frame  the charge,  but  the  High  Court dismissed the  revision petition  filed by the appellant and maintained the  order of  discharge passed  by  the  Special Judge. Thereafter  the appellant  moved this  Court  by  ar, application for  special leave  which having been granted to the appellant, the appeal is now set for hearing before us.      The short  point which arises for determination in this case is  the scope  and ambit of an order of discharge to be passed by a Special Judge under section 227 of the Code. The appeal does not raise any new question of law and there have been several  authorities of the High Courts as also of this Court on the various aspects and grounds on which an accused person can  be discharged, but as section 227 of the Code is a new  section and  at the  time when  the  application  for special leave  was filed,  there was  no direct  decision of this Court on the interpretation of section 227 of the Code, the matter  was thought fit to be given due consideration by this Court.      We might,  state, to  begin with,  that so  far as  the present case  (offences committed  under the  Prevention  of Corruption  Act)   is  concerned  it  is  regulated  by  the procedure laid  down by the Criminal Law Amendment Act under which the police has to submit, charge-sheet directly to the Special Judge and the question of commitment to the Court of Session  does   not  arise,   but  the  Sessions  Judge  has nevertheless to follow the procedure prescribed for trial of sessions  cases   and  the   consideration   governing   the interpretation of  section 227  of the  Code  apply  mutatis mutandis to  these proceedings  after  the  charge-sheet  is submitted before the Special Judge.      Before interpreting  and analysing  the  provisions  of section 227  of the  Code so far as pure sessions trials are concerned, two  important facts  may be  mentioned.  In  the first place,  the Code  has introduced  substantial and  far reaching changes  in the  Code of 1898 as amended in 1955 in order to  cut out  delays and  simplify the  procedure,  has dispersed  with   the  procedure  for  commitment  enquiries referred to  m section  206 to  213 of the Code, of 1898 and has made  commitment more  or less  a legal formality. Under the previous  Code of  1898 the  Magistrate was  enjoined to take evidence  of the  prosecution  witnesses  after  giving opportunity to  the accused  to cross-examine  the witnesses 2nd was  then required to hear the parties and to commit the acceded to the Court of Session unless he chose to act under section 209  and found  that there  was no sufficient ground for committing  the accused person for trial. Under the Code the Committing  Magistrate has been authorised to peruse the evidence and the documents produced by the 232 police and  commit the  case straightaway  to  the  Sessions Court if the case is one which is exclusively triable by the Sessions Court.  Thus, it  would appear that the legislature while dispensing  with the  procedure for commitment enquiry under the  Code of  1898 has conferred a dual responsibility on the  Trial Judge who has first to examine the case on the basis of  the statement  of witnesses recorded by the police and the  documents filed  with a  view to find out whether a prima facie  case for  trial has  been made  out and then if such a  case is  made out to proceed to try the same. In our view the  legislature has  adopted this  course in  order to avoid frivolous  prosecutions and  prevent the  accused from being tried  of an offence on materials which do not furnish a reasonable probability of conviction. In the instant case, as the  offences alleged  to  have  been  committed  by  the respondents fall  within the  provisions  of  the  Act,  the

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Special Judge  has been  substituted for the Sessions Judge, the procedure  of the  Sessions Court  having  been  applied fully to  the trial of such cases. Thus, it is manifest that the accused has not only one opportunity and that too before the Sessions  Judge for  showing that  no case for trial had been made  out. This  was obviously  done  to  expedite  the disposal of the criminal cases.      Secondly, it would appear that under section 209 of the Code of  1898 the question of discharge was to be considered by a  Magistrate. This  power has  now been  entrusted to  a senior Judge,  namely, the  Sessions Judge who is to conduct the trial  himself and  who has  to decide before commencing the trial as to whether or not charges should be framed in a particular case  against  the  respondents  The  discretion, therefore,  is   to  be  exercised  by  a  senior  and  more experienced Judge  so as  to exclude  any abuse of power. In this view of the matter, it is manifest that if the Sessions Judge exercises  his discretion  in discharging  the accused for reasons  recorded by  him,  his  discretion  should  not normally be disturbed by the High Court or by this Court.      Section 227 of the Code runs thus:-           "If, upon  consideration of the record of the case      and  the   documents  submitted  therewith,  and  after      hearing  the   submissions  of   the  accused  and  the      prosecution in  this behalf,  the Judge  considers that      there is  not sufficient  ground for proceeding against      the accused,  he shall discharge the accused and record      his reasons for so doing." The words  ’not sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused’ clearly  show that  the Judge  is not  a mere  post office to frame the charge at the behest of the prosecution, but has  to exercise  his judicial  mind to the facts of the case in order to determine whether a case for trial 233 has been  made out  by the  prosecution. In  assessing  this fact, it  is not A necessary for the court to enter into the pros and cons of the matter or into a weighing and balancing of evidence  and probabilities  which is really his function after the  trial starts.  At the  stage of  section 227, the Judge has  merely to  sift the evidence in order to find out whether or  not there  is sufficient  ground for  proceeding against the  accused. The  sufficiency of  ground would take within its  fold the  nature of the evidence recorded by the police or  the documents  produced before the court which ex facie  disclose  that  there  are  suspicious  circumstances against the accused so as to frame a charge against him.:      The scope  of section 227 of the Code was considered by a recent  decision of  this Court  in the  case of  State of Bihar v. Ramesh Singh(1) where Untwalia, J. speaking for the Court observed as follows:-           "Strong suspicion  against  the  accused,  if  the      matter remains  in the region of suspicion, cannot take      the place  of proof  of his  guilt at the conclusion of      the trial.  But at  the initial  stage if  there  is  a      strong suspicion  which leads  the Court  to think that      there is  ground for  presuming that  the  accused  has      committed an  offence then  it is not open to the Court      to  say   that  there   is  no  sufficient  ground  for      proceeding against  the accused. The presumption of the      guilt of  the accused  which is  to  be  drawn  at  the      initial stage  is not in the sense of the law governing      the trial of criminal cases in France where the accused      is presumed to be guilty unless the contrary is proved.      But it  is only for the purpose of deciding prima facie      whether the Court should proceed with the trial or not.

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    If the  evidence which  the  Prosecutor  pro  poses  to      adduce to  prove the guilt of the accused even if fully      accepted before  it is  challenged in cross-examination      or rebut  ted by  the defence  evidence; if any, cannot      show that  the accused committed the offence then there      will be  no sufficient  ground for  proceeding with the      trial". This Court  has thus  held that whereas strong suspicion may not take  the place  of the proof at the trial stage, yet it may be sufficient for the satisfaction of ths Sessions Judge in order  to frame  a charge against the accused. Even under the Code  of 1898  this Court  has held  that  a  committing Magistrate had  ample powers  to weigh  the evidence for the limited purpose  of finding  out whether  or not  a case  of commitment to the Sessions Judge has been made out.      (1) [1978]1 S.C.R. 287.      16-817 SCI/78 234      In the  case of  K. P. Raghavan and Anr. v. M. H. Abbas and Anr.(1) this Court observed as follows:-           "No doubt a Magistrate enquiring into a case under      S. 209,  Cr. P.C.  is not  to act as a mere Post office      and has to come to a conclusion whether the case before      him is fit for 8 commitment of the accused to the Court      of Session". To the  same effect  is the  later decision of this Court in the case  of Almohan Das and ors. v. State of West Bengal(2) where Shah, J. speaking for the Court observed as follows:-           "A Magistrate  holding an  enquiry is not intended      to act merely as a recording machine. He is entitled to      sift and  weigh the  materials on  record, but only for      seeing  whether   there  is   sufficient  evidence  for      commitment;  and   not  whether   there  is  sufficient      evidence for  conviction. If  there is  no prima  facie      evidence or the evidence is totally unworthy of credit;      it is  the duty  to discharge  the accused: if there is      some evidence  on which  a conviction may reasonably be      based, he must commit the case". In the  aforesaid case  this Court was considering the scope and ambit of section 209 of the Code of 1898.      Thus, on  a consideration  of the authorities mentioned above, the following principles emerge:           (1)  That the Judge while considering the question                of framing  the charges  under section 227 of                the Code  has the undoubted power to sift and                weigh the evidence for the limited purpose of                finding out whether or not a prima facie case                against the accused has been made out:           (2)  Where the  materials placed  before the Court                disclose grave  suspicion against the accused                which has  not been  properly  explained  the                Court will  be, fully  justified in framing a                charge and proceeding with the trial.           (3)  The test  to determine  a  prima  facie  case                would naturally depend upon the facts of each                case and  it is  difficult to lay down a rule                of  universal   application.  By   and  large                however if two views are equally possible and                the Judge  is  satisfied  that  the  evidence                produced before him while      (1) A.I.R. 1967 S.C. 740.      (2) [1969] 2 S.C.R. 520. 235                giving rise  to some  suspicion but not grave                suspicion against     the accused, he will be

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              fully  within  his  right  to  discharge  the                accused.           (4)  That in  exercising  his  jurisdiction  under                section 227  of   the Code  the  Judge  which                under  the  present  Code  is  a  senior  and                experienced Judge cannot act merely as a Post                office or  a mouth-piece  of the prosecution,                but has  to consider  the broad probabilities                of the case, the total effect of the evidence                and the  documents produced before the Court,                any basic  infirmities appearing  in the case                and so  on. This  however does  not mean that                the Judge  should make  a roving enquiry into                the pros and cons of the matter and weigh the                evidence as if he was conducting a trial.       We  shall now apply the principles enunciated above to the present  case in  order to  find out  whether or not the courts below  were  legally  justified  in  discharging  the respondents.      Respondent No.  1 was a Joint Secretary in the Ministry of Information and Broadcasting from April, 1966 to January, 1969. Later  he worked as Joint Secretary in the Ministry of Foreign Trade  till 12-11-1971. Thereafter, respondent No. 1 was working  as Joint  Secretary, Ministry  of Education and Social  Welfare.   The  second  respondent  worked  as  Land Acquisition  officer   in  the   Collectorate,  Orissa  from February 1972 to 18th August, 1973.      In the  year 1969  the All-India Radio authorities were desirous of  having a  piece of  land  for  construction  of quarters  for   their  staff  posted  at  Cuttack.  In  this connection, the said authorities approached respondent No. 1 who had  a land  along with  structure in  the Cantonment at Cuttack. As  the All-India Radio authorities found this land suitable, they  approached  respondent  No.  1  through  his mother for  selling the land to them by private negotiation. As this did not materialise, the All-India Radio authorities moved the  Collector of  Cuttack to  assess the price of the land and  get it acquired. Accordingly, the Tehsildar of the area directed  the Revenue  officer,  Cuttack;  to  fix  the valuation of  the land  of respondent  No.  1.  The  Revenue officer reported  back that  the land belonged to respondent No. 1  and was his private land and its value would be fixed at Rs. 3000 per guntha. It is common ground that the land in question was  situated  in  Cuttack  Cantonment  and  was  a Khasmahal land which was first leased out to one Mr. Boument as far  back as 1-9-1943 for a period of 30 years. The lease was given  for building purposes. In 1954.  Mrs. Boument who inherited the property after her husband’s death transferred the 236 land to  respondent No.  1 with the consent of the Khasmahal authorities. When  respondent No.  1 came  to know  that the land  in  question  was  required  by  the  All-India  Radio authorities, he  wrote a  letter to  Mr. .  S. Gill  on 28th October, 1970  suggesting that the land- may be acquired but price fixed  by mutual  consent.  It  may  be  pertinent  to mention here  that in this, letter a copy of which being Ex. D-4 (12)  is to  be found  at page  86  of  the  paper-book, respondent No.  1 never  concealed the  fact that  the  land really belonged  to  the  Government.  In  this  connection, respondent No. 1 wrote thus:-           "I have  represented to  you against  the  revenue      authorities  quoting   a  higher   price  for   similar      Government land  more adversely  situated and  a  lower      price  for   my  land   despite  its  better  strategic

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    location".      We have mentioned this fact because this forms the very pivot of  the case  of the  appellant in order to assail the judgment of  the courts  below. A  perusal  of  this  letter clearly shows  that respondent  No. 1  made  no  attempt  to conceal that  the land  in question  was, a  Government land which was  leased out  to his vendor. A copy of the original agreement which  also has  been filed  shows that  under the terms of  the lease,  the same  is entitled  to  be  renewed automatically at  the option  of the  lessee and  unless the lessee violates  the conditions  of the  lease, there  is no possibility of the lease being resumed. As it is, the lease  had  been continuing  from the  year 1943  and there was no possibility or  its not  being renewed  on 1-9-1973 when the period expired. In these circumstances, therefore, it cannot be said that the letter written by respondent No. 1 referred to above was an evidence of a criminal intention on the part of respondent  No.  1  to  grab  the  huge  compensation  by practising fraud on the Government. Respondent No. 1  a high officer  of   the  Government   and  was  a  lessee  of  the Government, a  fact which  he never  concealed and if he was able to  get a  good customer  for purchasing  his  land  or acquiring the  same, there  was no  harm In  writing to  the concerned authority to fix the proper valuation and take the land.  There,   was  no   question  of  any  concealment  or malpractice committed by respondent No. 1.      Apart from  this, the  contention of the appellant that the fact that the land being Khasmahal land belonging to the Government was deliberately suppressed by the respondents is completely  falsified   by   the   circumstances   discussed hereinafter:           The land  in question was situated in a Cantonment      area and  it is  not disputed  that all  lands  in  the      Cantonment area  were Khasmahal  Lands belonging to the      Government. 237      The High  Court in  this  connection  has  observed  as follows:           "Government authorities  admit that  the  land  in      question was  known to  be Khasmahal land from the very      inception. This  must lead  to an  inference  that  the      authorities knew  that the  interest  of  the  opposite      party No.  1 in  the land  was that of a lessee and the      State Government was the proprietor". The High  Court  has  further  observed  that  a  number  of witnesses who were examined by the police had stated that it was  common  Knowledge  that  all  khasmahal  lands  in  the Cantonment area  in Cuttack were Government lands Relying on the  statement  of  Mr.  T.  C.  Vijayasekharan,  Collector, Cuttack, the High Court observed as follows:-           "Shri Vijayasekharan  who has admittedly played an      important role  in the  land acquisition proceeding has      said that  it is  a matter of common knowledge that all      khasmahal lands  in  Cantonment  area  at  Cuttack  are      Government lands.  He has  further categorically stated      that Shri P. M. Samantray did not put undue pressure of      any kind".      Furthermore, it  would appear  that Mr.  B. C. Mohanty, Land Acquisition  officer submitted  a report about the land in question  on 15th  February, 1971 in which he had clearly mentioned that  the land in question was Government land and that respondent  No. 1 was a Pattidar in respect of the land as shown  in the record. Thus, one of the important premises on the basis of which the charge was sought to be framed has rightly been  found by  the High  Court not to exist at all.

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The records of the Government showed the nature of the land. Respondent No.  1 at  no time  represented to  the All-India Radio authorities  or the  Government that  the land was his private one  and the  records of the Government clearly went to show  that the  land was  a  Government  land.  In  these circumstances, therefore,  it cannot be said that respondent No. 1 acted illegally in agreeing to the land being acquired by the Government.      Another  important   circumstance  relied   on  by  the appellant  was  the  great  rapidity  with  which  the  land acquisition proceedings started and ended clearly shows that the respondents  had joined  hands to get the lands acquired and the  compensation paid  to respondent  No.  1.  In  this connection, reliance  was placed on the fact that the copies of the  records of  rights were prepared on 30th March, 1972 in which the land was no doubt shown as having been owned by the State.  Bhujarat report  was also  prepared on  the same date. Respondent  No. 1  presented his  copy of  the deed of transfer also on the same date and respondent No. 2 made the award for Rs. 4,18,642.55 also on the same 238 date. The  entire amount was disbursed also on the same date and possession  also was handed over on the same date. Prima facie, it would appear that the Officer acted in great hurry perhaps  at   the  instance   of  respondent  No.  1.  These circumstances are  clearly explainable and cannot be said to exclude  every   reasonable  hypothesis   bu  the  guilt  of respondent  No.   1.   Admittedly,   the   All-India   Radio authorities were  in a  great hurry to get the land acquired and take  possession of  the same. As respondent No. 1 was a high officer  of the  I.A.S. cadre  there may  have  been  a natural anxiety  on the part of the small officers posted in the district  of Cuttack  to  oblige  respondent  No.  1  by completing the  proceedings as early as possible and meeting the needs of the All-India Radio.      It would,  however,  appear  that  once  notices  under section 9(1)  and 10(1)  of the  Land Acquisition  Act  were issued  and   the  objection  filed  by  the  appellant  was withdrawn, because there was no one else in the field, there was no  impediment in  the way  of acquiring  the  land  and taking possession  from respondent  No. 1. In fact, it would appear as  pointed out by the High Court that as far back as 22nd February  1972 the  Land Acquisition  officer who was a person other than the second respondent had sent a letter to the Government  with the  counter signature of the Collector for sanctioning  the estimate  of acquisition  of 2 acres of land belonging to respondent No. 1. Later, however, the area of the  land was  reduced from  2 acres  to 1.764  acres and revised estimates  as desired by the Revenue department were sent on  7-3-1972. This estimate amounted to Rs. 4,18,642 55 and was  sent through  the A.D.M’s  letter,on 8-3-1972.  The Home Department  by their  letter dated 11-3-1972 sanctioned the  aforesaid   estimate.  There   after,  the   Government indicated to the Collector that an award might be passed for acquiring 1.764  acres  of  land.  These  facts  apart  from negativing the  allegations of  criminal conduct against the respondents  demonstrably   prove   the   untruth   of   the circumstance relied  upon in  the charge-sheet, namely, that unless the  respondent No.  1 and  2 acted  in  concert  and conspiracy with  each other, respondent No. 1 could not have known the  exact figure of the compensation to be awarded to him. In  this connection,  reliance was  placed on  a letter written by  respondent No. 1 to the Vigilance officer, L. S. Darbari on  15th March,  1972 where he had mentioned that as Karta of  the   H.U.F. he would be getting a compensation of

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Rs. 4,18,642.55  which is  to be  paid to  him on  the  10th March, 1972 and it was argued that unless the two respondents  were  in  league  with  each  other  how  could respondent No.  1 get these details. We are, however, unable to agree with this contention. 239      We have  already mentioned  that a  fresh estimate  for 1.764 acres     was prepared  and the total compensation was Rs.  4,18,642.55  as  only  the  Raiyyati  or  the  lessee’s interest was  proposed to  be acquired  and this  letter was sent to  the Government  for sanction  and the  estimate was sanctioned on 11-3-1972. It was contended that no notice was given to  the Khasmahal  department, so  that the Government could claim  compensation of the proprietary interest. It is obvious that  what has  been acquired in the present case is merely the  Raiyyati or  the lessee’s  interest and  as  the proprietary interest  vests in  the Government itself, there is no  question of either acquiring or claiming compensation for the interest of the Government. In the case of Collector of Bombay  v. Nusserwanji  Rattanji Mistri  &  Ors.(1)  this Court observed as follows:-           "If the  Government has  itself an interest in the      land, it  has  only  to  acquire  the  other  interests      outstanding therein,  so that it might be in a position      to    pass     it    on     absolutely    for    public      user..................... When  Government possesses an      interest in  land which  is the  subject of acquisition      under the  Act, that  interest is  itself outside  such      acquisition,  because  there  can  be  no  question  of      Government acquiring  what is its own. An investigation      into the  nature and  value of  that interest  will  no      doubt be  necessary for  determining  the  compensation      payable for  the interest outstanding in the claimants,      but that would not make it the subject of acquisition". To the  same effect is a later decision of this Court in the case of  The Special  Land Acquisition Officer, Hosanagar v. K. S. Ramachandra Rao & ors.(1) where this Court observed as follows:-           "Mr. M.  Veerappa, the  learned  counsel  for  the      State of  Mysore, contends  that the  Land  Acquisition      officer had  not assessed  the compensation payable for      the rights  of the  respondents in the land acquired ..      .......We have  gone through the Award made by the Land      Acquisition  officer.   The  Land  Acquisition  officer      appears to have valued the rights of the respondents in      the lands  acquired. Whether  the valuation made by him      is  correct   or  not   cannot  be   gone  into   these      proceedings."      As the appellant was naturally interested in finalising the  deal   as  quickly  as  possible,  there  could  be  no difficulty in finding out the esti-      (1) AIR 1955 S.C. 298.      (2) AIR 1972 S.C. 2224. 240 mates which had been sanctioned a week before respondent No. 1 wrote  the letter  to the  Vigilance Department. This fact proves the bona-fide rather than any wrongful conduct on the part of  respondent No.  1 which  may  lead  to  an  adverse inference being drawn against him.      Finally, it  was argued  that what  was acquired by the Government  was   merely  the  lessee’s  interest,  but  the respondent No.  1 appears  to have  got compensation  as the owner. This is factually incorrect. We have already referred to the  circumstances which clearly show that the Government was fully aware that it was only the lessee’s interest which

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was being  acquired and  even the  fresh  estimate  for  Rs. 4,18,642. 55,  which was sent to the Government was shown as representing the  Raiyyati interest.  Mr. Agarwala appearing for the  respondents fairly  conceded that  having regard to the nature,  character and  situation of  the land, it could not be  said that the amount of compensation awarded did not represent the  market value  of the lessee’s interest of the land.      On the  other hand, in the counter-affidavit at page 87 of the  paper book,  it has  been alleged that 16 sale-deeds executed during  the year  1970  and    sale-deeds  executed during the  year 1971  pertaining to the village in question were acquired  at the  rates  varying  from  Rs.  42,165  to 750,000. The  High Court  has  also  pointed  out  that  the records before  the Trial  Judge  show  that  the  Collector Vijayasekharan had  valued the  land at the rate of Rs. 1.70 lakhs per  acre as  far back 1: as 3-2-1970 and if two years later the  valuation was  raised to Rs. 2 lakhs it cannot be said that the land was in any way over-valued.      Lastly, there  does not appear to be any legal evidence to show any; meeting of mind between respondents No. 1 and 2 at any  time. Although  the Collector  at the  time  of  the acquisition was  a distant  relation of  respondent No. 1 he had  himself   slashed  down   the  rate   of   compensation recommended by  the Revenue officer from Rs. 2,10,000 to Rs. 2,00,000 and  it was never suggested by the prosecution that the Collector  was in  any way  a  party  to  the  aforesaid conspiracy.      For these  reasons, therefore,  we  find  ourselves  in complete agreement  with the  view taken  by the  High Court that there  was no  sufficient ground for trying the accused in the  instant case.  Moreover, this  Court could  be  most reluctant to  interfere with  concurrent findings of the two courts in the absence of any special circumstances.      For the  reasons given above, the judgement of the High Court is affirmed and the appeal is dismissed. M.R.                                       Appeal dismissed. 241