UNION OF INDIA Vs M.M.SHARMA
Bench: MUKUNDAKAM SHARMA,ANIL R. DAVE, , ,
Case number: C.A. No.-002797-002797 / 2011
Diary number: 6277 / 2011
Advocates: ANIL KATIYAR Vs
RANJAN KUMAR
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 2797 OF 2011 [Arising out of S.L.P (C) No. 9032 of 2011]
CC No. 4808/11
Union of India and Anr. …. Appellants
Versus
M.M. Sharma ....Respondent
JUDGMENT
Dr. MUKUNDAKAM SHARMA, J.
1. Delay condoned.
2. Leave granted.
3. The present appeal is directed against the judgment and
order dated 27.09.2010 whereby the Delhi High Court partly
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allowed the writ petition filed by the respondent herein by
issuing a direction to the appellants to pass a speaking order
by giving reasons for imposing the penalty of dismissal from
service in exercise of powers under Article 311(2)(c) of the
Constitution and not any other penalty.
4. In order to appreciate the contentions raised by the
parties hereto some basic facts leading to filing of the aforesaid
writ petition in the High Court must be stated.
5. The respondent was posted as First Secretary w.e.f.
02.07.2007 to 03.05.2008 in the Embassy of India, Beijing,
China. While on special assignment, the respondent came
under adverse notice and was found to be involved in an
unauthorized and undesirable liaison with foreign nationals of
the host country. The conduct of the respondent was enquired
into by the Intelligence Bureau (IB). The Director, upon
completion of the said inquiry forwarded a detailed report
including findings of the Inquiry Officer. The aforesaid report
was considered and it was felt that in view of the seriousness of
the case and the adverse implications on the security of the
State, it would not be expedient to hold the inquiry due to the
following reasons: -
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(i) The respondent was on special assignment and entrusted with responsible duties of external intelligence. Any formal inquiry would jeopardize security of India, as it would reveal details of intelligence operation in the host country.
(ii) For a proper disciplinary inquiry to be conducted, witnesses would be required to be examined. In this case witnesses can be either foreign nationals or officers working under cover in Indian Embassy in China and examination thereof would certainly jeopardize the security of the State.
6. Consequently, the competent authority took a decision
that the services of the respondent should be dispensed with by
exercising powers under Clause (c) of Second Proviso to Article
311(2) of the Constitution of India. Consequent thereto an
order dated 22.12.2009 was issued intimating and stating that
the President is satisfied to invoke Clause (c) of Second Proviso
to Article 311(2) of the Constitution of India that in the interest
of the security of the State it is not expedient to hold the
inquiry in the case of the respondent. It was also mentioned in
the said order that the President is also satisfied that on the
basis of information available the activities of the respondent
are such as to warrant his dismissal from the service.
7. The respondent challenged the aforesaid order by filing an
Original Application before the Central Administrative Tribunal,
Principal Bench, New Delhi (hereinafter referred to as ‘the
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Tribunal’) which was registered as OA No. 176 of 2009. In the
said Original Application contentions raised inter alia were that
the order dated 22.12.2008 passed in exercise of power under
Clause (c) of Second Proviso to Article 311(2) of the
Constitution of India should be set aside. The aforesaid
application was heard and the Tribunal passed an order on
10.12.2009 disposing of the said Original Application by
holding that the order does not reveal that there has been
application of mind with regard to the nature of punishment to
be awarded to the respondent. The Tribunal directed the
Government to re-consider whether the aforesaid penalty
awarded to the respondent could be substituted by any other
punishment.
8. Pursuant to the aforesaid order passed by the Tribunal
the matter was placed before the competent authority once
again and in compliance of the order of the Tribunal an order
was passed by the Cabinet Secretariat, Government of India on
03.06.2010, which reads as follows:
“WHEREAS Shri M.M. Sharma was dismissed from service under the provisions of sub-clause (c) of the second proviso to clause 2 of Article 311 of the Constitution vide order No/2/2008-DO.II (A) 9Pt.I)-3643 dated 22.12.2008:
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AND WHEREAS, Shri M.M. Sharma filed an Original Application No. 176/2009 in the Principal Bench of Central Administrative Tribunal, New Delhi praying for setting aside and quashing the said order of dismissal; dated 22.12.2008.
AND WHEREAS the Hon’ble Tribunal in their order dated 10.12.2009 in the said OA No. 176/2009 directed the Government to consider whether the penalty of dismissal could be substituted by ‘reduction in rank’ or the ex-officer could be granted any pensionary benefits.
AND WHEREAS, the Government, in pursuance of observations of Hon’ble Tribunal re-considered the case of dismissal of Shri M.M. Sharma.
NOW, THEREFORE, the President orders that it is not possible either to substitute the penalty of Shri M.M. Sharma from ‘dismissal’ to ‘reduction in rank’ or to grant him any pensionary benefits.
(BY ORDER AND IN THE NAME OF THE PRESIDENT) (K.B.S. KATOCH)
ADDITIONAL SECRETARY TO THE GOVT. OF INDIA”
9. The aforesaid order passed by the President came to be
challenged before the Tribunal by the respondent by filing an
Original Application which was registered as OA No. 2440 of
2010. The aforesaid application was taken up for hearing and
the same was disposed of by the Tribunal vide its Judgment
and Order dated 04.08.2010. By the aforesaid Judgment and
Order, the Tribunal dismissed the Original Application holding
that the matter called for no interference in the hands of the
Tribunal. While coming to the aforesaid conclusion the
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Tribunal hold that invocation of power under Article 311(2) (c) of
the Constitution of India cannot be faulted with because of the
sensitive nature of the issues involved, which have become final
and binding on the parties. It was also held that only question
that was required to be decided by the competent authority was
to re-consider the nature of penalty imposed on the
respondent.
10. Since the Tribunal held the appellants have re-considered
the question of punishment reiterating that it is not possible
either to substitute the penalty of the respondent from
‘dismissal’ to ‘reduction in rank’ or to grant him any pensionary
benefits, therefore, the same indicates and establishes the
satisfaction for arriving at the decision of the competent
authority to maintain the penalty of dismissal.
11. The aforesaid order was challenged by the respondent
before the High Court of Delhi by filing a writ petition in which
the High Court partly allowed the writ petition holding that the
order which was passed by the competent authority on
03.06.2010 was not a reasoned order. The High Court
therefore issued a direction that the appellants must pass a
reasoned order showing its application of mind. The High
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Court set aside the order dated 04.08.2010 passed by the
Tribunal and directed the appellants to give reasons for levying
the penalty of dismissal from service and pass a fresh order.
The aforesaid Judgment and Order passed by the High Court is
under challenge in this appeal on which we heard the learned
counsel appearing for the parties and also scrutinised the
entire records.
12. Within the scheme of the Constitution of India, provisions
relating to public service may be found in Articles 309, 310 and
311. It is important to note that these provisions (namely
Articles 310 and 311) afford protection to public servants from
penalty in the nature of dismissal, removal, or reduction which
cannot be imposed without holding a proper inquiry or giving a
hearing. An explicit articulation of “protection” in Article 311 of
the Constitution itself gives an impression of complete
‘protection’ to the civil servants.
13. Article 311 provides for protection to public servant from
punitive action being taken against them by an authority
subordinate to one who appointed him, or without holding an
inquiry in accordance with law. Exceptions in Article 311 are
contained in second proviso in the nature of clauses (a), (b) &
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(c) which provide that the said Article shall not apply to
employees who have been punished for conviction in a criminal
case or where inquiry is not practicable to be held for reasons
to be recorded in writing or where the President or Governor as
the case may be is satisfied that such an order is required to be
passed without holding an enquiry in the interest of security of
the State.
14. In order to appreciate the ambit or scope of power to be
exercised under Article 311 of the Constitution of India it is to
be noticed that in India we apply the doctrine of ‘pleasure”,
which is recognized under our constitution by way of Article
310 of the Constitution of India. Under the aforesaid provision,
all civil posts under the Government are held at the pleasure of
the Government under which they are held and are terminable
at its will. The aforesaid power is what the doctrine of pleasure
is, which was recognized in the United Kingdom and also
received the constitutional sanction under our Constitution in
the form of Article 310 of the Constitution of India. But in
India the same is subject to other provisions of the Constitution
which include the restrictions imposed by Article 310 (2) and
Article 311(1) and Article 311(2) . Therefore, under the Indian
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constitution dismissal of civil servants must comply with the
procedure laid down in Article 311, and Article 310(1) cannot
be invoked independently with the object of justifying a
contravention of Article 311(2). There is an exception provided
by way of incorporation of Article 311 (2) with sub-clauses (a),
(b) and (c). No such inquiry is required to be conducted for the
purposes of dismissal, removal or reduction in rank of persons
when the same relates to dismissal on the ground of conviction
or where it is not practicable to hold an inquiry for the reasons
to be recorded in writing by that authority empowered to
dismiss or remove a person or reduce him in rank or where it is
not possible to hold an enquiry in the interest of the security of
the State. These three exceptions are recognized for dispensing
with an inquiry, which is required to be conducted under
Article 311 of the Constitution of India when the authority takes
a decision for dismissal or removal or reduction in rank in
writing. In other words, although there is a pleasure doctrine,
however, the same cannot be said to be absolute and the same
is subject to the conditions that when a government servant is
to be dismissed or removed from service or he is reduced in
rank a departmental inquiry is required to be conducted to
enquire into his misconduct and only after holding such an
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inquiry and in the course of such inquiry if he is found guilty
then only a person can be removed or dismissed from service or
reduced in rank. However, such constitutional provision as set
out under Article 311 of the Constitution of India could also be
dispensed with under the exceptions provided in Article 311(2)
of the constitution where clause (a) relates to a case where
upon a conviction of a person by a criminal court on certain
charges he could be dismissed or removed from service or
reduced in rank without holding an inquiry. Similarly, under
clause (c) an inquiry to be held against the government
employee could be dispensed with if it is not possible to hold
such an inquiry in the interest of the security of the State.
Sub-clause (b) on the other hand provides that such an inquiry
could be dispensed with by the concerned authority, after
recording reasons, for which it is not practicable to hold an
inquiry. The aforesaid power is an absolute power of the
disciplinary authority who after following the procedure laid
down therein could resort to such extra ordinary power
provided it follows the pre-conditions laid down therein
meaningfully and effectively.
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15. It should also be pointed out at this stage that clause (b)
of the second proviso to Article 311 (2) of the Constitution of
India mandates that in case the disciplinary authority feels and
decides that it is not reasonably practical to hold an inquiry
against the delinquent officer the reasons for such satisfaction
must be recorded in writing before an action is taken. Clause
(c) of the second proviso to Article 311 (2) on the other hand
does not specifically prescribe for recording of such reasons for
the satisfaction but at the same time there must be records to
indicate that there are sufficient and cogent reasons for
dispensing with the enquiry in the interest of the security of the
State. Unless and until such satisfaction, based on reasonable
and cogent grounds is recorded it would not be possible for the
court or the Tribunal, where such legality of an order is
challenged, to ascertain as to whether such an order passed in
the interest of security of State is based on reasons and is not
arbitrary. If and when such an order is challenged in the court
of law the competent authority would have to satisfy the court
that the competent authority has sufficient materials on record
to dispense with the enquiry in the interest of the security of
the State.
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16. We have analyzed the facts of the present case and on
such analysis, we find that even in the first order passed by the
Tribunal on 10th December, 2009 itself it was clearly recorded
that it could be held from the records, as available, that there
essentially was no arbitrariness in the approach of the
Government of India while dealing with an officer who had by
his conduct showed that he was not reliable for holding
sensitive or superior positions and therefore invocation of
power under Article 311(2)(c) of the Constitution of India also
cannot be faulted because of the sensitive nature of the issues.
17. The aforesaid order passed by the Tribunal in the due
course has become final and binding as no challenge was made
as against the aforesaid observation by any of the parties before
any higher forum. The Tribunal, however, by the aforesaid
order issued a direction to the Government to consider as to
whether the penalty could be substituted by issuing a lesser
punishment.
18. In terms of the aforesaid order the competent authority
reconsidered the matter and maintained the order of
punishment awarded to the respondent holding that it is not
possible either to substitute the penalty of the respondent from
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dismissal to reduction in rank or to grant him any pensionary
benefit. The said order therefore indicates that the direction of
the Tribunal was duly complied with and an effective and
conscious decision was taken by the competent authority to
maintain the penalty of dismissal.
19. There are credible and substantial materials on record in
terms of clause (c) to second proviso to Article 311(2) of the
Constitution. The aforesaid action of invoking the extra
ordinary provisions like clause (c) to second proviso to Article
311(2) was also found to be justified by the Tribunal in the
earlier stage of litigation itself.
20. Despite the said fact the High Court held that the order
dated 04.08.2010 passed by the Tribunal not being a speaking
order showing application of mind cannot be upheld and
consequently the High Court passed the impugned order dated
27.09.2010 thereby setting aside the order passed by the
Tribunal with a direction to the appellants herein to pass a
fresh speaking order giving reasons for its decision. The said
findings of the High Court are being challenged in this appeal
contending inter alia that a conscious and informed decision
has been taken on the basis of materials on record to dismiss
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the respondent from the service and the reasons for inability to
hold an inquiry in the interest of the security of the State have
also been recorded although there is no such mandate to
record such reasons. The records indicate that there are
sufficient reasons and materials on record as to why the service
of the respondent was dispensed with in the interest of the
security of the State. We are also satisfied that the reasons
contained in the records establish that in the facts of this case
holding of an enquiry was rightly dispensed with in the interest
of security of the country. We must hasten to add that the
Tribunal had in the earlier round of litigation upheld the action
of the appellants in dispensing with the enquiry in the interest
of the security of the State. The said order of the Tribunal has
also become final and binding. Therefore, challenge in the
present round of litigation is whether the appellants are
justified in awarding the punishment of dismissal from service
on the respondent which also deprives him from getting any
pensionary benefit.
21. The original records were placed before us, which we have
perused. The allegations against the respondent are very
serious which could jeopardize the sovereignty and integrity of
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India. The records also disclose the highly objectionable
activities and conduct of the respondent which is unbecoming
of a responsible Government servant. The Inquiry Committee
took the decision of not disclosing the grounds for taking action
against the delinquent officer under clause (c) of the proviso to
Article 311(2) of the Constitution because disclosure of the
same or holding of an inquiry has the potential to jeopardize
national security and relations with a neighbouring country
and such disclosure could lead to gross embarrassment to the
Government of India. Intelligence Bureau has already
conducted an inquiry and findings of the inquiry officer were
based on the written statement of the suspected officer and
other officers; analysis of phone records; and recovery of
photographs from the laptop of the respondent. In that context
and in view of the reasons recorded it was concluded that the
allegation had far reaching effects and therefore it was decided
to dispense with holding of any inquiry in the matter and also
to dismiss him from service.
22. A very high level committee considered the entire record
and the allegations against the respondent and on the basis of
the materials available on record, the committee prima facie
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came to the conclusion that action could be taken for his
dismissal under clause (c) to second proviso to Article 311(2) of
the Constitution. The aforesaid recommendation is available
on record and the High Court could have called for such record
and therefrom satisfy itself that there are sufficient and cogent
reasons recorded for taking action under Article 311(2) (c) of
the Constitution and also for imposing the penalty for
dispensation of the service of the respondent by way of
dismissal from the service.
23. In our considered opinion, in the present case, charges
against the delinquent officer being very serious and also in
view of the fact that the respondent was working in a very
sensitive post, it cannot be said to be a case of disproportionate
punishment to the offence alleged. The reasons recorded in the
official file against the person for dismissing him from service
need not be incorporated in the impugned order passed.
24. The High Court while passing the impugned order was
fully and effectively aware of the reasons as to why the
requirement of holding an enquiry in accordance with law was
dispensed with. Being so situated, the High Court could have
examined and scrutinised the original records to ascertain for
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itself as to whether the order imposing the penalty of dismissal
of service is justified or not in the light of the allegations and
the reports of the fact finding enquiry. The power to be
exercised under clauses (a), (b) and (c) being special and
extraordinary powers conferred by the Constitution, there was
no obligation on the part of the disciplinary authority to
communicate the reasons for imposing the penalty of dismissal
and not any other penalty. For taking action in due discharge
of its responsibility for exercising powers under clause (a) or (b)
or (c) it is nowhere provided that the disciplinary authority
must provide the reasons indicating application of mind for
awarding punishment of dismissal. While no reason for arriving
at the satisfaction of the President or the Governor, as the case
may be, to dispense with the enquiry in the interest of the
security of the State is required to be disclosed in the order, we
cannot hold that, in such a situation, the impugned order
passed against the respondent should mandatorily disclose the
reasons for taking action of dismissal of his service and not any
other penalty.
25. If in terms of the mandate of the Constitution, the
communication of the charge and holding of an enquiry could
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be dispensed with, in view of the interest involving security of
the State, there is equally for the same reasons no necessity of
communicating the reasons for arriving at the satisfaction as to
why the extreme penalty of dismissal is imposed on the
delinquent officer. The High Court was, therefore, not justified
in passing the impugned order.
26. For the aforesaid reasons, we hold that the order and
direction passed by the High Court cannot be sustained.
Consequently, we set aside the same and restore the order
dated 04.08.2010 passed by the Central Administrative
Tribunal, Principle Bench at New Delhi in OA No. 2440 of 2010.
27. The present appeal is accordingly allowed to the aforesaid
extent leaving the parties to bear their own costs.
.............................................J [Dr. Mukundakam Sharma]
.............................................J [Anil R. Dave]
New Delhi, March 30, 2011.
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