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CASE NO.: Appeal (civil)  4406 of 2005

PETITIONER: Union of India & Ors.                                    

RESPONDENT: Braj Nandan Singh                                                

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 19/10/2005

BENCH: ARIJIT PASAYAT & Dr. AR. LAKSHMANAN

JUDGMENT: J U D G M E N T

ARIJIT PASASYAT, J.

       Challenge in this appeal is to the judgment rendered by  a Division Bench of the Patna High Court holding that  respondent is entitled to pension under the Central Civil  Services Pension Rules (in short the ’Rules’). The view  expressed by the Central Administrative Tribunal about the  respondent’s entitlement to suspension was upheld.  

       The undisputed factual background is as follows:-

       The respondent was serving as a temporary Sorter on  being appointed by the Superintendent, Railway Mail Service,  ’U’ Division, Muzaffarpur w.e.f. 14.10.1959.  He was posted  in the office of SRO Sonepur. He tendered his resignation on  16.5.1977 to contest election to Bihar Legislative Assembly.   The resignation was accepted by letter dated 17.5.1977. Long  after the resignation was accepted i.e. nearly after about  two decades, the respondent filed a representation before  the Chief Post Master General, Bihar Circle, Patna for grant  of pension.  The same was rejected on the ground that since  the respondent had resigned, by operation of Rule 26(1) of  the Rules his past service stood forfeited and, therefore,  he was not entitled to any pension.  The decision was  communicated by the Assistant Director, Bihar Circle, Patna.   An application under Section 19 of the Administrative  Tribunal Act, 1985 was filed before the Patna Bench of the  Central Administrative Tribunal (in short the ’Tribunal’).   The Tribunal by its order dated 14.3.2001 held that the  forfeiture of past service was not sustainable in law.  It  was held that by operation of Rule 26 the benefit available  to a retired government servant cannot be denied on the  purported ground of forfeiture of past service.  It was  noticed that though the original application was filed after  about 21 years from the date of acceptance of resignation  same cannot be a ground to deny the benefits.  The  appellants filed a writ petition before the Patna High Court  questioning correctness of Tribunal’s decision.  The High  Court by its order dated 17.4.2003 held that to receive  retirement benefits is a right of service which is inherent,  and Rules should not be torn out of context to deny post  retirement benefits.   

       In support of the appeal learned counsel for the  appellants submitted that Rule 26(1) in clear terms  postulates about forfeiture of past service in case of  resignation. Once the past service is forfeited the

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qualifying period for receiving pension does not exist.   Therefore, the Tribunal and the High Court were not  justified in their views.   

       In response, learned counsel for the respondent  submitted that the entitlement of pension flows from the  Rules.  There are specific provisions under which pensionary  benefits can be denied.  Rule 26 cannot be pressed into  service to deny the benefits.  He submitted that Rule 26(2)  provides an escape route to the forfeiture of past service.   Merely because after acceptance of resignation the employee  did not take up another appointment under Government that  would not take away the right to receive pension flowing  from the Rules.   

       In order to appreciate rival submissions Rule 26 which  is the pivotal provision needs to be quoted.  The same reads  as under:                                          "26. Forfeiture of service on resignation

(1)     Resignation from a service or post,  unless it is allowed to be withdrawn in the  public interest by the Appointing Authority,  entails forfeiture of past service.

(2)     A resignation shall not entail  forfeiture of past service if it has been  submitted to take up, with proper permission,  another appointment, whether temporary or  permanent, under the Government where service  qualifies."

       Rule 26 as the heading itself shows relates to  forfeiture of service on resignation.  In clear terms it  provides that resignation from a service or a post, unless  it is allowed to be withdrawn in the public interest by the  Appointing Authority, entails forfeiture of past service.   The language is couched in mandatory terms.  However, sub- rule (2) is in the nature of an exception.  It provides that  resignation shall not entail forfeiture of past service if  it has been submitted to take up, with proper permission,  another appointment, whether temporary or permanent, under  the Government where service qualifies.  Admittedly this is  not the case in the present appeal. Rule 5 on which great  emphasis was laid down by the learned counsel for the  respondent deals with regulation of claims to pension or  family pension.  Qualifying service is dealt with in Chapter  III.  The conditions subject to which service qualifies are  provided in Rule 14.  Chapter V deals with classes of  pensions and conditions governing their grant.  The effect  of Rule 26 sub-rules (1) and (2) cannot be lost sight of  while deciding the question of entitlement of pension.  The  High Court was not justified in its conclusion that the rule  was being torn out of context.  After the past service is  forfeited the same has to be excluded from the period of  qualifying service. The language of Rule 26 sub-rules (1)  and (2) is very clear and unambiguous.  It is trite law that  all the provisions of a statute have to be read together and  no particular provision should be treated as superfluous.   That being the position after the acceptance of resignation,  in terms of Rule 26 sub-rule (1) the past service stands  forfeited. That being so, it has to be held that for the  purpose of deciding question of entitlement to pension the

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respondent did not have the qualifying period of service.  There is no substance in the plea of the leaned counsel for  the respondent that Rule 26 sub-rules (1) and (2) has  limited operation and does not wipe out entitlement to  pension as quantified in Rule 49.  Said Rule deals with  amount of pension and not with entitlement.     

       It is well settled principle in law that the Court  cannot read anything into a statutory provision which is  plain and unambiguous. A statute is an edict of the  Legislature. The language employed in a statute is the  determinative factor of legislative intent.  

       Words and phrases are symbols that stimulate mental  references to referents. The object of interpreting a  statute is to ascertain the intention of the Legislature  enacting it. (See Institute of Chartered Accountants of  India v. M/s Price Waterhouse and Anr.  (AIR 1998 SC 74))  The intention of the Legislature is primarily to be gathered  from the language used, which means that attention should be  paid to what has been said as also to what has not been  said. As a consequence, a construction which requires for  its support, addition or substitution of words or which  results in rejection of words as meaningless has to be  avoided. As observed in Crawford v. Spooner (1846 (6) Moore  PC 1), Courts, cannot aid the Legislatures’ defective  phrasing of an Act, we cannot add or mend, and by  construction make up deficiencies which are left there. (See  The State of Gujarat and Ors. v. Dilipbhai Nathjibhai Patel  and Anr. (JT 1998 (2) SC 253)). It is contrary to all rules  of construction to read words into an Act unless it is  absolutely necessary to do so. (See Stock v. Frank Jones  (Tiptan) Ltd. (1978 1 All ER 948 (HL). Rules of  interpretation do not permit Courts to do so, unless the  provision as it stands is meaningless or of doubtful  meaning. Courts are not entitled to read words into an Act  of Parliament unless clear reason for it is to be found  within the four corners of the Act itself. (Per Lord  Loreburn L.C. in Vickers Sons and Maxim Ltd. v. Evans (1910)  AC 445 (HL), quoted in Jamma Masjid, Mercara v.  Kodimaniandra Deviah and Ors.(AIR 1962 SC 847).  

The question is not what may be supposed and has been  intended but what has been said. "Statutes should be  construed not as theorems of Euclid". Judge Learned Hand  said, "but words must be construed with some imagination of  the purposes which lie behind them". (See Lenigh Valley  Coal Co. v. Yensavage 218 FR 547). The view was re-iterated  in Union of India and Ors. v. Filip Tiago De Gama of Vedem  Vasco De Gama (AIR 1990 SC 981).  In Dr. R. Venkatchalam and Ors. etc. v. Dy. Transport  Commissioner and Ors. etc. (AIR 1977 SC 842), it was  observed that Courts must avoid the danger of a priori  determination of the meaning of a provision based on their  own pre-conceived notions of ideological structure or scheme  into which the provision to be interpreted is somewhat  fitted. They are not entitled to usurp legislative function  under the disguise of interpretation.                The above position was highlighted by this Court in  Maulavi Hussein Haji Abraham Umarji v. State of Gujarat and  Another (AIR 2004 SC 3946).

       The High Court’s judgment affirming the order of the  Tribunal cannot be sustained and deserves to be set aside

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which we direct.  The appeal is allowed but without any  order as to costs.