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PETITIONER: UNION OF INDIA ETC.

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: VALLURI BASAVAIAH CHAUDHARY ETC. ETC.

DATE OF JUDGMENT01/05/1979

BENCH: SEN, A.P. (J) BENCH: SEN, A.P. (J) CHANDRACHUD, Y.V. ((CJ) BHAGWATI, P.N. KRISHNAIYER, V.R. TULZAPURKAR, V.D.

CITATION:  1979 AIR 1415            1979 SCR  (3) 802  1979 SCC  (3) 324  CITATOR INFO :  RF         1980 SC1568  (2)  RF         1981 SC 234  (54,91)  R          1983 SC1303  (2)  RF         1988 SC 220  (1,11)  D          1988 SC1708  (15)  R          1989 SC1796  (5)  RF         1990 SC1796  (3)  RF&E       1992 SC1567  (4)

ACT:      Constitution   of    India   1950.   Art.   252(1)-Term ’legislature’ therein  means only  the House  or  Houses  of Legislature and not the Governor-’An Act of Legislature’, ’A legislative Act’,  ’A  resolution  of  the  House’,  ’Bill’- Difference between.      The Urban  Land  (Ceiling  and  Regulation)  Act  1976- Whether ultra  vires Parliament  so far  as State  of Andhra Pradesh is  concerned-Inclusion of  State  of  Rajasthan  in Schedule I  of the  Act  and  categorisation  of  the  urban agglomerations of the cities and towns of Jaipur and Jodhpur in category  ’C’ and Ajmer, Kota and Bikaner in Category ’D’ whether  beyond   legislative  competence   of   Parliament- Existence  of   a  master  plan  not  a  sine  qua  non  for applicability of Act to an urban agglomeration.      The   Andhra    Pradesh   (Telengana   Area)   District Municipalities Act,  1956. S.  244(1)(c)(iii)-Master plan to designate the land subject to compulsory acquisition.

HEADNOTE:      The  State   Legislatures  of  eleven  States,  (Andhra Pradesh,  Gujarat,  Haryana,  Himachal  Pradesh,  Karnataka, Maharashtra, orissa,  Punjab, Tripura, U.P. and West Bengal) considered  it  desirable  to  have  a  uniform  legislation enacted by  Parliament for  the imposition  of a  ceiling on urban property  for the country as a whole and in compliance with cl.  (1) of  Art. 252  of  the  Constitution  passed  a resolution to that effect.      Parliament accordingly, enacted the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation)  Act, 1976.  In the  first instance, the Act

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came into  force on  the date of its introduction in the Lok Sabha i.e. January 28,1976 and covered the Union Territories and the eleven States which had already passed the requisite resolution under  Art. 252(1) of the Constitution, including the State  of Andhra  Pradesh.  Subsequently,  the  Act  was adopted, after  passing resolutions under Art. 252(1) of the Constitution by  the State  Legislatures  of  Assam,  Bihar, Madhya Pradesh, Manipur, Meghalaya and Rajasthan. The Act is in force  in seventeen  States and all the Union Territories in the country.      The primary  object and  the purpose  of the Urban Land (Ceiling and  Regulation) Act,  1976 was  to provide for the imposition  of   a  ceiling   on  vacant   land   in   urban agglomerations, for  the acquisition  of such land in excess of the  ceiling  limit,  to  regulate  the  construction  of buildings on  such land and for matters connected therewith, with a view to preventing the concentration of urban land in the hands  of a few persons and speculation and profiteering therein, and  with a  view to  bringing about  an  equitable distribution of land in urban agglomerations to subserve the common good,  in furtherance  of the Directive Principles of Articles 39(b) and (c). 803      The legislation  falls  under  Entry  18,  List  II  of Seventh Schedule of the Constitution, which refers to ’Land, that is  to say,  rights in  or over  land, etc.’  The State Legislatures alone  are competent  to enact  any legislation relating  to  land  of  every  description  including  lands situate in urban areas.      The  resolutions  passed  by  the  State  Legislatures, vested in  Parliament the  power to  regulate  by  law,  the imposition of  a ceiling  on urban  immovable  property  and acquisition of  such property  in excess of this ceiling, as well as  in respect  of ’all matters connected therewith and ancillary or incidental thereto.’      In writ  petitions filed  by the  respondents, the High Court being  of the view that the term ’legislature’ in Art. 252(1) of  the Constitution  comprises both  the  Houses  of Legislature, (the  Legislative Assembly  and the Legislative Council) and  the Governor of the State, struck down the Act on the ground that the Parliament was not competent to enact the impugned Act for the State of Andhra Pradesh inasmuch as the Governor  of Andhra  Pradesh did  not participate in the process of  authorisation for  the passing of the Act by the Parliament.      The High  Court observed  that since two distinct terms ’legislature’ and  ’Houses of  Legislature’ were used in the same article  they must,  as a  matter of construction, bear different  meanings,   and  The   Urban  Land  (Ceiling  and Regulation) Act 1976 is ultra vires the Parliament so far as the State  of Andhra Pradesh is concerned. It also held that even assuming  the Act  is in  force in the State, it is not applicable to  Warangal because  there was  no  master  plan prepared in  accordance with  the requirements  of s. 244(1) (c)  of   the  Andhra   Pradesh  (Telengana  Area)  District Municipalities Act, 1956.      In the  connected writ  petition  under  Art.  32,  the question raised  was whether  the inclusion  of the State of Rajasthan in  Schedule I  to the  Urban  (Land  Ceiling  and Regulation) Act,  1976 and  the categorisation  of the urban agglomeration of  the cities and towns of Jaipur and Jodhpur in category  ’C’ and Ajmer, Kota and Bikaner in category ’D’ therein is  beyond the  legislative competence of Parliament and, therefore,  the Act is liable to be struck down to that extent.

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    In the  appeals to  this Court,  it  was  contended  on behalf of the appellant, that the term ’legislature’ in Art. 252(1) must, in the context, mean the House or the Houses of Legislature, as  the case may be and it does not include the Governor. The key to the interpretation of the first part of cl. (1)  of Art. 252 lies in the words ’to that effect’, and they obviously  refer to  the ’desirability’  of  Parliament making a  law on  a State  subject. It  was pointed out that though the  Governor is  the component  part  of  the  State Legislature under  Art. 168, he is precluded by the terms of Art.  158(1)   from  being  a  member  of  either  House  of Parliament or  of a  House of  Legislature of any State. Not being a  member of  the House  or Houses of Legislature of a State,  as   the  case   may  be,   the  question   of   his participation, in  the proceedings  of the State Legislature in passing  a resolution  under Art.  252(1) does not at all arise. To  concede to  the Governor the power to participate in the  process of authorization for the passing of a law by the Parliament  on a State subject under Art. 252(1), as the High Court  had done, or to the process of ratification of a constitutional amendment  by  the  State  Legislature  under proviso to  Art. 368(2) to a constitutional amendment by the Parliament under  Art.  368(1),  would  create  a  dangerous situation and  would be  destructive of  the  constitutional system which  is based  on the Westminster model under which the Governor is only the constitutional head of the state. 804      The  Parliament   being  invested  with  the  power  by resolution passed  under the first part of Art. 252(1) by as many as  eleven states,  to legislate on the subject i.e. to make a  law for  the imposition  of a  ceiling on  immovable property, it had the competence to so structure the Act that it was  capable of  being adopted  by other States under the second part of Art. 252(1). A fortiori, the specification of the State  of Rajasthan  by which the Act may be adopted, as well as  the  categorisation  of  the  urban  agglomerations therein to which it may apply, had to be there.      Allowing the appeals and dismissing the writ petition; ^      HELD: 1  (a) Declared  that the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act  1976 a  law enacted  by the  Parliament  by virtue of  its powers under Article 252(1) is and has always been in  force in  the State  of Andhra  Pradesh with effect from January 28, 1976. [831D]      (b)  Declared   that  the  Act  extends  to  the  Urban agglomerations of Warangal. [831D]      (c) The  Act applies  to the  States of  Rajasthan with effect from March 9, 1976. [831D]      2. Art.  252  appears  in  Part  XI  headed  ’Relations between the  Union and  the States’  and occurs in Chapter I relating to  ’Legislative Relations’, i.e., dealing with the distribution of legislative powers between the Union and the States. Our constitution though broadly federal in structure is  modelled  on  the  British  Parliamentary  system,  with unitary features.  Parliament may  assume legislative powers (though temporarily)  over any  subject under Art. 249, by a two third  vote that  such legislation  is necessary in ’the national interest’,  while a Proclamation of Emergency under Art. 352 is in operation, Parliament is also competent under Art. 250 to legislate with respect to any such matter in the State List.  Art. 251  makes it  clear that  the legislative power of  the State  legislatures to make any law which they have power  under the Constitution to make, is restricted by the provisions of Articles 249 and 250, but, if any law made by the  legislature of a State is repugnant to any provision

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of a  law  enacted  by  the  Parliament,  the  law  made  by Parliament shall  prevail and  the law  made  by  the  State legislature to  the extent  of repugnancy shall not be valid so long  as the  law enacted  by Parliament is effective and operative. [812H-813C]      3. While  Art. 263  provides for  the  creation  of  an Inter-State  Council   for  effecting   administrative   co- ordination between the States in matters of common interest, Art. 252  provides the  legislative  means  to  attain  that object. [813F]      4. The  effect of  the passing  of a  resolution  under cl.(1) of Art. 252 is that Parliament, which has no power to legislate with respect to the matter which is the subject of the resolution,  becomes entitled  to legislate with respect to it,  and the  State legislature ceases to have a power to make a law relating to that matter. After the enactment of a law by  the Parliament under this Article, it is open to any of the  other States  to adopt  the Act  for such  State  by merely  passing   a  resolution   to  that   effect  in  its legislature, but  the operation  of the  Act in  such  State cannot  be  from  a  date  earlier  than  the  date  of  the resolution passed  in  the  Legislature  adopting  the  Act. [813E, F] 805      5. The question as to whether or not there is surrender by the  State Legislature  of its power to legislate, and if so, to  what extent,  must depend  on the  language  of  the resolution passed under Art. 252(1). [813G]      M/S. R.M.D.C.  (Mysore) Private  Ltd. v.  The State  of Mysore [1962] 3 SCR 230 referred to:      6. Article  252(2) specifically  lays down  that  after Parliament makes an Act in pursuance of the resolution, such Act cannot  be amended  or repealed by the State Legislature even though  the matter  to  which  the  Act  of  Parliament relates was  included in  List II of the Seventh Schedule of the Constitution. [813H]      7. Art.  252(1) is  in two parts. The first part of the Article is  only introductory  the second  is the  operative part. The first part merely recites about the "desirability" of the  Parliament legislating  on a  subject in  respect of which it  has no  power to  make laws  except as provided in Articles 249  and 250.  The words  "to that  effect" in  the first part,  therefore,  refer  to  the  ’desirability’  for effecting administrative  control by the Parliament over two or more  States in  respect of  matters of  common interest. Thus the  word ’legislature’  in  the  first  part  of  Art. 252(1), in  the context in which it appears, cannot mean the three component parts of the State Legislature, contemplated by Art. 168, but only the House or Houses of Legislature, as the case  may be,  i.e. excluding the Governor. [815D, 815H- 816A]      8. The  High Court  had completely  overlooked the fact that there  is  a  clear  distinction  between  ’an  Act  of legislature,’ ’a  legislative act’  and ’a resolution of the House. [816B]      9. It is quite clear from an enumeration of the powers, functions and duties of the Governor, that he cannot, in the very nature of things, participate in the proceedings of the House or  Houses of Legislature, while the State Legislature passes a  ’resolution’ in terms of Art. 252(1), he not being a member of the legislature under Art. 158. [817C]      10. The  right of  the Governor to send messages to the House or  Houses of the Legislature under Art. 175 (2), with respect to  a Bill  pending in the legislature or otherwise, normally arises  when the Governor withholds his assent to a

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Bill under  Art. 200,  or  when  the  President,  for  whose consideration a  Bill is  reserved for  assent, returns  the Bill withholding his assent. [817E]      12. A  ’Bill’  is  something  quite  different  from  a ’resolution of  the  House’  and,  therefore,  there  is  no question of  the Governor sending any message under Art. 175 (2) with  regard to a resolution pending before the House or Houses of the Legislature. [817F]      12. The  constitutional requirement  under  proviso  to Art. 368  (2) of  a ratification  by the  legislature of not less than one half of the States is that so far as the State legislatures are  concerned, it  requires that  a resolution should be  passed ratifying the amendment. Such a resolution requires voting,  and the  Governor  never  votes  upon  any issue. [818E]      Jatin Chakravarty  v. Shri  H. K. Bose A.I.R. 1964 Cal. 500 approved.      13. What  is  true  of  a  ratification  by  the  State legislatures under  proviso to  Art. 368(2), is equally true of a resolution of the House or Houses of the 806      Legislature under  Art. 252(1).  The Governor,  nowhere comes in the picture at all in those matters. [818F]      14. The  absence  of  the  words  ’unless  the  context otherwise requires’  in Art. 168, cannot control the meaning of  the   term  ’legislature’   in  Art.  252(1).  The  term ’legislature’, in  the context in which it appears, can only mean the House or Houses of Legislature, as the case may be. [819C, D]      15. The  subject matter  of Entry  18, List  II of  the Seventh Schedule i.e. ’land’ covers ’land and buildings’ and would, therefore,  necessarily include  ’vacant  land.’  The expression ’urban  immovable property’  may mean  ’land  and buildings’ or  ’buildings’ or ’land’. It would take in lands of every  description i.e.  agricultural land, urban land or any other  kind and  it necessarily  includes  vacant  land. [820G-H]      16. Before  the Act  was introduced in the Lok Sabha on January  28,  1976  it  was  preceded  by  State  wise  deep consideration and  consultation by  the  respective  States, including the  State of  Andhra Pradesh. A working Group was constituted and  in its report it proposed the imposition of a ceiling  on urban  immovable property  and defined  ’urban area’ to  include the  area within the territorial limits of municipalities or other local bodies and also the peripheral areas outside  the said  limits. The  Govt. prepared a Model Bill in  pursuance of  the Report  and a copy of each of the Report of the working Group and the Model Bill was placed on the table  of Parliament.  The said documents were forwarded to the  State Government  of Andhra  Pradesh, besides  other State   Governments   for   consideration   by   the   State Legislatures before  they passed  a  resolution  under  Art. 252(1). [821A-C]      17. The  State Legislatures  were, therefore,  aware of the position  when they  passed a resolution authorising the Parliament to  make a  law in  respect  of  urban  immovable property. Their  intention was  to include  the lands within the territorial  area of  a municipality or other local body of an  urban area  and also its peripheral area. The concept of ceiling  on urban  immovable property  and the nature and content of urban agglomeration ultimately defined by s. 2(n) of the impugned Act, was, therefore, fully understood by the State Governments. [821D-E]      18. It  is but  axiomatic that once the legislatures of two or more states, by a resolution in terms of Art. 252(1),

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abdicate  or   surrender  the   area  i.e.  their  power  of legislation on  a State subject, the Parliament is competent to make  a law  relating to  the subject. It would indeed be contrary to  the terms of Art. 252(1) to read the resolution passed by  the State Legislature subject to any restriction. The resolution, contemplated under Art. 252(1) is not hedged in with conditions. In making such a law, the Parliament was not bound  to exhaust  the whole  field of  legislation.  It could make  a law,  like the  present Act,  with respect  to ceiling on vacant land in an urban agglomeration, as a first step towards the eventual imposition of ceiling on immovable property of every other description. [822B-D]      19. Under  the scheme  of the  Act the  imposition of a ceiling on  vacant land  in  urban  agglomeration  does  not depend on  the existence of a master plan. The definition of ’urban land’,  as contained  in s. 2(o) of the Act is in two parts, namely  (i) in  a case  where there  is a master plan prepared under the 807 law, for the time being in force, any land within the limits of an  urban agglomeration  and referred  to as  such in the master plan,  is treated to be urban land, and (2) in a case where there  is no  master plan, or the master plan does not refer to  any land as urban land, any land within the limits of an  urban agglomeration  and situate in any area included within the  local limits  of a  municipality or  other local authorities is  regarded as  such. The existence of a master plan within the meaning of s. 2(h) is, therefore, not a sine qua non  for the  applicability  of  the  Act  to  an  urban agglomeration. [824D-F]      20. A master plan prepared by a municipality may or may not contain  a proposal  for compulsory acquisition of land, or any  descriptive matter or map to illustrate a scheme for development. Mere  absence of  such proposal  for compulsory acquisition or  a map  or descriptive  matter would  not  be tantamount to  there being no master plan. A master plan may include proposals  for development  of areas  required to be covered by s. 244, sub-s.(1), cl.(c) contiguous and adjacent to the  municipal limits  of a  city or  town, but  may  not designate the  land to be compulsorily acquired, the absence of which  would not  invalidate the  scheme. This is because the municipality  has always  the power  under s. 250 of the Act to  acquire the land required for implementation of such scheme. [825E-F]      21. The revised master plan prepared for Warangal does, as it  should provide  for various  development schemes,  it also designates the lands subject to compulsory acquisition. Even, if  it were  not so, the master plan prepared under s. 244, sub-s.(1),  cl.(c) did  not cease  to be ’a master plan prepared in  accordance with  the law  for the time being in force’, within  the meaning  of  s.  2(h)  of  the  Act,  in relation to  the town  of Warangal.  The Act  is,  therefore clearly applicable  to the  urban agglomerations of Warangal and it extends not only to all the lands included within the local limits  of the Warangal Municipality but also includes the peripheral  areas specified  i.e. one  kilometre  around such limits. [825G-826A]      22. The  Parliament having been invested with powers to legislate on  a State  subject,  by  resolutions  passed  by Legislatures of  two or  more States  under Art.  252(1) has plenary powers  to make suitable legislation. It follows, as a necessary corollary, that the Act passed by the Parliament under Art.  252(1) can  be so structured as to be capable of being effectively  adopted  by  the  other  States.  Article 252(1) undoubtedly  enables the Parliament to make a uniform

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law. The  Act so  passed would  automatically apply  to  the States, the  legislatures of  which have passed a resolution in terms  of Art.  252(1), and  at the  same time it must be capable of  being adopted  by other  States which  have  not sponsored a  resolution, i.e. the non-sponsoring States. The second part  of Art.  252(1) will  be meaningful  only if it were so  interpreted otherwise,  it would be rendered wholly redundant. [830A-C]      23. The  Act would automatically apply from the date of its  application  to  those  States  which  had  passed  the resolution in  terms of  the first  part of Art. 252(1), and would extend  to the  adopting States  from the  date of the resolutions passed  by the  legislatures of such States. The Parliament had, therefore, in fact and in law, competence to legislate on  the subject  of the  imposition of  ceiling on urban immovable property, and the Schedule to the Act cannot therefore, be  struck down  in  relation  to  the  State  of Rajasthan. [830F] 808      24. In  a law  relating to the imposition of ceiling on vacant land in urban agglomerations throughout the territory of India,  it was  competent for  the Parliament under Entry 18, List  II of Seventh Schedule not only to have the States specified in  the Schedule  to the  Act where  the law  will extend,  but   also  include  the  categorisation  of  urban agglomerations in  respect of  the whole of the territory of India. [830E]

JUDGMENT:      CIVIL  APPELLATE   JURISDICTION:  Civil   Appeal   Nos. 1896/76, 265-300/77 and 29-38/77 and 5/77.      (From the  Judgment and  Order dated  3-12-1976 of  the Andhra Pradesh  High Court  in Writ  Petition Nos.  1634/76, 2068, 2426,  2477, 2585, 3026, 2914, 2918, 2926, 2965, 3471, 2517, 2522,  2581, 2597,  2401, 2461-2462, 2465, 2469, 2485, 2507, 2877,  2949, 3213, 3469, 2492, 2509, 2513, 2514, 2520, 2523, 2818,  2935, 2951  and 2936 of 1976, 2509, 2513, 2514, 2520, 2523,  2818, 2932,  2935, 2936 and 2951/76 and 2492 of 1976).                             AND                WRIT PETITION NO. 350 OF 1977            (Under Article 32 of the Constitution)      S. V.  Gupte, Attorney General of India (1896/76), U.R. Lalit (1896/76)  R. N. Sachthey, Girish Chandra, K. N. Bhatt (1896/76) Miss  A. Subhashini  for the  Appellants in  C.As. 1896 and 265-300/ 77 for Respondent No. 1 in W.P. 350/77 and for the  Union of India in C.As. 29-38/77 and Respondent No. 4 in C.A. 5/77.      V. M.  Tarkunde, K.  K. Mehrish,  S. M.  Jain and S. K. Jain for the Petitioner in W.P. 350/77.      T. V.  S. Narasimhachari  and  M.  S.  Ganesh  for  the Appellant in CAs. 5 and 29-38/77.      K. K.  Venugopal, Addl.  Sol. Genl.  and S. S. Khanduja for Respondents 2-3 in W.P. 350/77.      B. Kanta  Rao for  RR 1-50, 53-66, 68-83, 85-91, 93-95, 97-100 and 112-114 in C.A. 1896/76.      Vepa P.  Sarathi and  B. Parthasarathi for RR 28 and 53 in C.A. 276/77.      P. Ram  Reddy, A.  V. V. Nair and Subodh Markendaya for the other  appearing Respondents  in C.As.  279, 280-84, 286 and 293/77.      R. K.  Mehta, for  Advocate General  for the  State  of Orissa.

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    Badridas Sharma,  for Advocate General for the State of Rajasthan. 809      The Judgment of the Court was delivered by      SEN, J.-These  appeals, by  certificate,  are  directed against the  judgment and  order of  the Andhra Pradesh High Court dated  December 3,  1976 allowing  a batch  of thirty- seven  writ   petitions.  The  appeals  raise  an  important question,  namely,  whether  the  Urban  Land  (Ceiling  and Regulation) Act,  1976 is  ultra vires the Parliament so far as the  State of  Andhra Pradesh  is concerned. A subsidiary question is  also involved  as to  whether even assuming the Act is  in force  in the  State, it  is  not  applicable  to Warangal because  there  was  no  master  plan  prepared  in accordance with  the requirements  of s.  244(1) (c)  of the Andhra Pradesh (Telengana Area) District Municipalities Act, 1956.      A further  question arises in a connected writ petition under Art.  32 of the Constitution, whether the inclusion of the State  of Rajasthan  in Schedule  I to  the  Urban  Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976 and the categorisation of the urban  agglomerations of  the cities and towns of Jaipur and Jodhpur  in category  ’C’ and Ajmer, Kota and Bikaner in category ’D’  therein, is  beyond the legislative competence of Parliament and, therefore, the Act is liable to be struck down to that extent.      The State  Legislatures of  eleven States,  namely, all the Houses  of the  Legislature  of  the  States  of  Andhra Pradesh,  Gujarat,  Haryana,  Himachal  Pradesh,  Karnataka, Maharashtra, Orissa, Punjab, Tripura, Uttar Pradesh and West Bengal considered it desirable to have a uniform legislation enacted by  Parliament for  the imposition  of a  ceiling on urban property  for the country as a whole and in compliance with cl.  (1) of  Art. 252  of  the  Constitution  passed  a resolution  to  that  effect.  One  merit  of  such  Central legislation is  that property  owned by families anywhere in India can  be aggregated  for valuation  purposes,  and  the basis of  acquisition and  compensation can  be uniform  all over the country.      The Parliament  accordingly,  enacted  the  Urban  Land (Ceiling and  Regulation) Act,  1976. In the first instance, the Act  came into  force on the date of its introduction in the Lok  Sabha, i.e., January 28, 1976 and covered the Union Territories and  the eleven  States which had already passed the  requisite   resolution  under   Art.  252(1)   of   the Constitution,  including   the  State   of  Andhra  Pradesh. Subsequently, the Act was adopted, after passing resolutions under  Art.   252(1)  of   the  Constitution  by  the  State Legislature of  Assam on  March 25, 1976, and those of Bihar on April  1, 1976,  Madhya Pradesh  on  September  9,  1976, Manipur on March 12, 1976, 810 Meghalaya on  April 7,  1976 and Rajasthan on March 9, 1976. Thus, the  Act is  in force in seventeen States, and all the Union territories in the country.      Schedule  I   to  the   Act  lists   out  all   States, irrespective of whether or not they have passed a resolution under Art.  252(1) authorising the Parliament to enact a law imposing a  ceiling on  urban immovable  property,  and  the urban agglomerations in them having a population of two lacs or more.  The ceiling  limit of  vacant land of metropolitan areas  of  Delhi,  Bombay,  Calcutta  and  Madras  having  a population exceeding  ten lacs falling under category ’A’ is 500 sq. mtrs.; urban agglomerations with a population of ten lacs  and  above,  excluding  the  four  metropolitan  areas

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falling  under   category  ’B’  is  1000  sq.  mtrs.;  urban agglomerations with  a population between three lacs and ten lacs falling under category ’C’ is 1500 sq. mtrs., and urban agglomerations with  a population between two lacs and three lacs falling  under category  ’D’  is  2000  sq.  mtrs.  The schedule does  not mention the urban agglomerations having a population of  one lac  and above; but if a particular State which passed  a resolution  under s.252(1),  or if  a  State which subsequently  adopts the  Act, wants to extend the Act to such  areas, it  could do  so by  a notification under s. 2(n)(B) or  s.  2(n)(A)(ii),  as  the  case  may  be,  after obtaining the previous approval of the Central Government.      The primary  object and  the purpose  of the Urban Land (Ceiling and  Regulation) Act,  1976, ’the Act’, as the long title  and   the  preamble  show,  is  to  provide  for  the imposition  of   a  ceiling   on  vacant   land   in   urban agglomerations, for  the acquisition  of such land in excess of the  ceiling  limit,  to  regulate  the  construction  of buildings on  such land and for matters connected therewith, with a view to preventing the concentration of urban land in the hands  of a few persons and speculation and profiteering therein, and  with a  view to  bringing about  an  equitable distribution of land in urban agglomerations to subserve the common good,  in furtherance  of the Directive Principles of Art. 39(b) and (c).      The legislation  falls  under  entry  18,  List  II  of Seventh Schedule  of  the  Constitution,  which  refers  to: ’Land, that  is to  say,  rights  in  or  over  land,  etc.’ Admittedly, the  State Legislatures  alone are  competent to enact any  legislation relating to land of every description including lands  situate in  urban areas.  The two Houses of the  Andhra   Pradesh  Legislature,   however,  passed   the following resolution  on April  8, 1972  and April  7,  1972 respectively: 811      "Resolution passed  by the  Andhra Pradesh  Legislative Assembly on                     the 8th April, 1972.                          RESOLUTION      Whereas this  Assembly considers that there should be a ceiling on Urban Immovable Property;      And whereas  the  imposition  of  such  a  ceiling  and acquisition of  urban immovable  property in  excess of that ceiling are  matters with respect to which Parliament has no power to  make law  for the  State  except  as  provided  in Articles 249 and 250 of the Constitution of India;      And  whereas   it  appears   to  the   Andhra   Pradesh Legislative Assembly  to be  desirable  that  the  aforesaid matters should  be regulated  in the State of Andhra Pradesh by Parliament by law;      Now, therefore,  in pursuance  of clause (1) of Article 252 of  the Constitution, this Assembly hereby resolves that the imposition  of a ceiling on urban immovable property and acquisition of  such property  in excess  of the ceiling and all matters  connected therewith or ancillary and incidental thereto should  be regulated  in the State of Andhra Pradesh by Parliament by law."      The record  shows that  similar resolutions were passed by  all   the  remaining   ten  State   Legislatures.  These resolutions vested  in the  Parliament the power to regulate in the  aforesaid eleven  States by  law the imposition of a ceiling on  urban immovable property and acquisition of such property in excess of this ceiling, as well as in respect of ’all matters connected therewith and ancillary or incidental thereto’. The expression ’immovable property’ takes in lands

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of every  description, i.e.  agricultural lands, urban lands or of any other kind.      The  High   Court  was   of  the  view  that  the  term ’legislature’ in  Art. 252(1)  of the Constitution comprises both  the   Houses  of  Legislature  i.e.,  the  Legislative Assembly and the Legislative Council and the Governor of the State. It  struck down  the  Act  on  the  ground  that  the Parliament was  not competent  to enact the impugned Act for the State  of Andhra  Pradesh inasmuch  as the  Governor  of Andhra  Pradesh  did  not  participate  in  the  process  of authorization for  the passing of the Act by the Parliament. It observed,  since two  distinct  terms  ’Legislature’  and ’Houses of  Legislature’ were  used in the same article they must, as  a matter of construction, bear different meanings. In that  view, if  went on to say that the passing of an Act in terms  of the  first part  of Art.  252(1) is a condition pre-requisite to the passing of a resolution by the House or Houses 812 of Legislature,  as the  case  may  be,  entrusting  to  the Parliament the  power  to  legislate  on  a  State  subject, stating:           "In  our  opinion,  the  only  way  in  which  the Legislature of  a State,  consisting of the Governor and one or two  Houses of  Legislature, as  the  case  may  be,  can express its  view that  it  is  desirable  to  enact  a  law regulating a  particular matter,  is by  enacting a  law and passing an  Act to  that effect.  Because it is difficult to conceive of  the Legislature  consisting of the Governor and the House  or Houses of the Legislature of a State acting in any manner  than by  passing an  enactment; no  such Act has been passed  by the  Legislature  of  the  State  of  Andhra Pradesh  consisting  of  the  Governor  and  the  Houses  of Legislature of  Andhra Pradesh,  expressing the desirability of having  the matter  of imposition  of a  ceiling on urban lands regulated by Parliament."                                          (Emphasis supplied)      We are  afraid, the  construction placed  by  the  High Court on  Art. 252  (1) cannot be sustained. Article 252 (1) of the Constitution reads:           "If it  appears to the Legislatures of two or more States to  be desirable that any of the matters with respect to which Parliament has no power to make laws for the States except as  provided  in  articles  249  and  250  should  be regulated in  such States  by  Parliament  by  law,  and  if resolutions to  that effect  are passed by all the Houses of the Legislatures  of those  States, it  shall be  lawful for Parliament  to  pass  an  Act  for  regulating  that  matter accordingly, and  any Act  so passed  shall  apply  to  such States and  to any  other  State  by  which  it  is  adopted afterwards by resolution passed in that behalf by the House, or where  there are two Houses, by each of the Houses of the Legislature of that State."      In order  to appreciate  the content, scope and meaning of the  provisions of  Art. 252, it is necessary to refer to the scheme of the Constitution. It appears in Part XI headed ’Relations between  the Union  and the States’ and occurs in Chapter I relating to ’Legislative Relations’, i.e., dealing with the  distribution of  legislative  powers  between  the Union and  the States. It would appear that our Constitution though broadly  federal in  structure, is  modelled  on  the British Parliamentary System, with unitary features. Thus, 813 even apart  from  emergencies,  the  Parliament  may  assume legislative power  (though  temporarily)  over  any  subject

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under Art. 249, by a two-third vote that such legislation is necessary in  ’the national  interest’. While a Proclamation of Emergency  under Art.  352 is in operation the Parliament is also  competent under  Art. 250 to legislate with respect to any  such matter  in the State list. Article 251 makes it clear that  the legislative  power of the State legislatures to make any law which they have power under the Constitution to make,  is restricted  by the  provisions of Arts. 249 and 250; but,  if any  law made by the legislature of a State is repugnant  to   any  provision  of  a  law  enacted  by  the Parliament, the law made by Parliament shall prevail and the law  made   by  the  State  legislature  to  the  extent  of repugnancy shall  not be valid so long as the law enacted by Parliament is effective and operative.      Reverting back  to Art.  252, it  will be  noticed that this article  corresponds to  s. 103  of the  Government  of India Act, 1935. It empowers the Parliament to legislate for two or  more States  on any  of the  matters with respect to which it  has no  power to  make laws  except as provided in Arts. 249 and 250.      The effect of the passing of a resolution under cl. (1) of Art.  252 is  that Parliament,  which  has  no  power  to legislate with respect to the matter which is the subject of the resolution,  becomes entitled  to legislate with respect to it.  On the  other hand,  the State legislature ceases to have a  power to  make a  law relating to that matter. While Art. 263 provides for the creation of an Inter-State Council for  effecting   administrative  co-ordination  between  the States in  matters of common interest, Art. 252 provides the legislative means to attain that object. After the enactment of a law by the Parliament under this article, it is open to any of  the other  States to adopt the Act for such State by merely  passing   a  resolution   to  that   effect  in  its Legislature, but  the operation  of the  Act in  such  State cannot  be  from  a  date  earlier  than  the  date  of  the resolution passed  in the  Legislature adopting the Act. The question as  to whether  or not  there is  surrender by  the State Legislature  of its  power to legislate, and if so, to what extent,  must depend  on the language of the resolution passed under  Art. 252  (1): M/s.  R.M.D.C. (Mysore) Private Ltd. v. The State of Mysore.(1) Clause (2) specifically lays down that  after Parliament makes an Act in pursuance of the resolution, such  Act cannot  be amended  or repealed by the State Legislature even though the matter to which the Act of Parliament relates  was included  in List  II of the Seventh Schedule of the Constitution. 814      The learned  Attorney General rightly contends that the term ’legislature’  must, in  the context, mean the House or the Houses  of Legislature,  as the  case may be and it does not include  the Governor.  It is  urged that the key to the interpretation of the first part of cl. (1) of Art. 252 lies in the  words ’to  that effect’  and they obviously refer to the ’desirability’  of Parliament  making a  law on  a State subject. It  is pointed  out that though the Governor is the component part  of the  State Legislature under Art. 168, he is precluded by the terms of Art. 158(1) from being a member of  either  House  of  Parliament  or  of  a  House  of  the Legislature of any State. Not being a member of the House or Houses of  Legislature of  a State,  as the case may be, the question  of   his  participation,   it  is   said,  in  the proceedings of the State Legislature in passing a resolution under Art.  252(1) does  not  at  all  arise.  He  drew  our attention to  different provisions  of the Constitution, and in particular  to proviso  to Art.  368(2) which  requires a

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ratification by  the Legislatures  of not less than one-half of the  States to a Bill passed by the Parliament under Art. 368(1) in  exercise of  its constituent  powers to amend the Constitution. It  is urged  that to  concede to the Governor the power to participate in the process of authorization for the passing  of a  law by  the Parliament on a State subject under Art.  252(1), as  the High  Court had  done, or to the process of ratification of a constitutional amendment by the State  Legislatures  under  proviso  to  Art.  368(2)  to  a constitutional  amendment   by  the  Parliament  under  Art. 368(1), would  create a  dangerous situation  and  would  be destructive  of  our  constitutional  system  based  on  the Westminster model,  under which  the Governor  is  only  the constitutional head  of the  State. The  contentions of  the learned Attorney General must, in our opinion, be accepted.      In the  State of Bihar v. Maharajadhiraja Sir Kameshwar Singh of  Darbhanga &  Ors.(1) in  repelling the  contention that the  words ’law’  and ’legislature’  were  deliberately used in  Art. 31(3)  as a special safeguard, which, in order to ensure  that no hasty or unjust expropriatory legislation is  passed   by  a  State  Legislature,  requires  for  such legislation  the   assent  of  both  the  Governor  and  the President, Patanajali Sastri C.J. observed:           "It is  true that  the "Legislature"  of  a  State includes the  Governor  and  that  a  bill  passed  by  such Legislature cannot  become  a  law  until  it  receives  the Governor’s assent ..... The term "legislature" is not always used in  the Constitution  as including the Governor, though article  168  makes  him  a  component  Part  of  the  State Legislature. In article 815      173, for  instance, the  word is  clearly used  in  the sense of  the  "Houses  of  legislature"  and  excludes  the Governor. There  are other provisions also where the word is used in  contexts which  exclude the Governor. Similarly the word ’law’ is sometimes loosely used in referring to a bill. Article 31(4),  for  instance,  speaks  of  a  "bill"  being reserved for  the President’s  assent  "after  it  has  been passed" by  the "legislature  of a State" and of "the law so assented to."  If the expression "passed by the legislature" were taken  to mean "passed by the Houses of the legislature and assented  to by the Governor"....then, it would cease to be a "bill" and could not longer be reserved as such. Nor is the phrase  "law so  assented to"  strictly accurate, as the previous portion  of the  clause makes it clear that what is reserved for  the President’s  assent and what he assents to is a "bill" and not a "law."      This decision really clinches the whole issue.      Article 252(1)  is in  two parts. The first part merely recites  about   the  "desirability"   of   the   Parliament legislating on a subject in respect of which it has no power to make  laws except  as provided  in Articles  249 and 250. This power  to legislate is vested in the Parliament only if two or  more State Legislatures think it desirable to have a law enacted  by the  Parliament on  such matter  in List II, i.e., with  respect to  which the Parliament has no power to make laws  for  the  States,  and  all  the  Houses  of  the Legislatures of  those States express such desire by passing a resolution  to that  effect.  The  Legislatures  of  those States should not only think it desirable and expedient, but actually pass resolution that the Parliament should regulate the  matter   in  those  States,  in  order  to  invest  the Parliament with  the power to legislate on such subject. The passing of  such resolution by the State Legislatures of two or more  States, is  a condition precedent for investing the

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Parliament with  the power  to make  a law  on that topic or matter, and  then only it shall be lawful for the Parliament to make  a law  for regulating  that matter accordingly. The law so  made or  enacted by  the Parliament under Art 252(1) will apply  only to  those States  whose  Legislatures  have passed resolutions  under that  provision and  also to those States which  have afterwards adopted the same by resolution passed by the Legislatures of such States in that behalf. It would appear  that the  first part  of the  article is  only introductory, the  second is  the operative  part. The words "to that  effect" in the first part, therefore, refer to the ’desirability’ for  effecting administrative  control by the Parliament over two or more States in respect of matters 816 of common  interest. Thus,  the word  ’legislature’  in  the first part  of Art.  252(1), in  the  context  in  which  it appears, cannot, mean the three component parts of the State Legislature contemplated  by Art. 168, but only the House or Houses of  Legislature, as  the case may be, i.e., excluding the Governor.      There  is  a  clear  distinction  between  ’an  Act  of legislature’, ’a  legislative act’  and ’a resolution of the House’.  The  High  Court  has  completely  overlooked  this distinction.      The Governor  is a  constitutional head  of  the  State Executive, and  has, therefore,  to act  on the  advice of a Council of  Ministers  under  Art.  163.  The  Governor  is, however, made  a component  part of  the  State  Legislature under  Art.  164,  just  as  the  President  is  a  part  of Parliament. The  Governor has  a  right  of  addressing  and sending  messages  to  under  Arts.  175  and  176,  and  of summoning, proroguing  and dissolving  under Art.  174,  the State Legislature,  just as the President has in relation to Parliament. He  also has  a similar  power of  causing to be laid before  the  State  Legislature  the  annual  financial statement under  Art. 202(1),  and  of  making  demands  for grants and recommending ’Money Bills’ under Art. 207 (1). In all these matters the Governor as the constitutional head of the  State  is  bound  by  the  advice  of  the  Council  of Ministers.      The Governor  is, however, made a component part of the legislature of  a State  under Art.  168, because every Bill passed by  the State  legislature has to be reserved for his assent under  Art. 200. Under that article, the Governor can adopt one  of the  three courses, namely (i) he may give his assent to  it, in which case the Bill becomes a law; or (ii) he may  except in  the case  of a  ’Money Bill’ withhold his assent therefrom,  in which  case  the  Bill  falls  through unless the  procedure indicated  in  the  first  proviso  is followed,  i.e.,   return  the  Bill  to  the  Assembly  for reconsideration with  a message, or (iii) he may (subject to Ministerial advice)  reserve the  Bill for the consideration of the President, in which case the President will adopt the procedure laid  down in  Art. 201. The first proviso to Art. 200 deals  with a  situation where  the Governor is bound to give his  assent when the Bill is reconsidered and passed by the Assembly.  The second  proviso to that article makes the reservation for  consideration of  the President  obligatory where the  Bill would, ’if it became law’, derogate from the powers of  the High  Court. Thus,  it is  clear that  a Bill passed by  a State  Assembly may  become law if the Governor gives his  assent to  it, or if, having been reserved by the Governor for  the consideration  of  the  President,  it  is assented to  by the  President. The  Governor is, therefore, one of

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817 the three  components of a State legislature. The only other legislative function of the Governor is that of promulgating Ordinances under  Art. 213(1)  when both  the Houses  of the State legislature  or the  Legislative Assembly,  where  the legislature  is   unicameral,  are   not  in   session.  The Ordinance-making power of the Governor is similar to that of the President,  and it  is co-extensive with the legislative powers of the States legislature.      From an enumeration of the powers, functions and duties of the  Governor, it  is quite  clear that he cannot, in the very nature of things, participate in the proceedings of the House or  Houses of Legislature, while the State legislature passes a  resolution in  terms of  Art. 252(1),  not being a member of the legislature under Art 158.      The function assigned to the Governor under Art. 176(1) of addressing  the House  or Houses  of Legislature,  at the commencement of  the first session of each year, is strictly not a legislative function but the object of this address is to acquaint  the members of the Houses with the policies and programmes  of   the  Government.  It  is  really  a  policy statement prepared  by the  Council of  Ministers which  the Governor has  to read  out. Then  again, the  right  of  the Governor to  send messages  to the  House or  Houses of  the Legislature under  Art. 175(2),  with respect to a Bill then pending in  the legislature  or otherwise,  normally  arises when the  Governor withholds his assent to a Bill under Art. 200, or  when the  President, for whose consideration a Bill is reserved  for assent,  returns the  Bill withholding  his assent. As  already stated,  a  ’Bill’  is  something  quite different from  a ’resolution  of the House’ and, therefore, there is  no question  of the  Governor sending  any message under Art. 175(2) with regard to a resolution pending before the House or Houses of the Legislature.      Similar considerations  must also  arise with regard to ratification of  a Bill passed by the Parliament in exercise of its  constituent power of amending the Constitution under Art. 368(1).  In Jatin  Chakravorty v.  Sri  Justice  H.  K. Bose(1) D.  N. Sinha  J., as he then was rightly negatived a challenge to the constitutional validity of the Constitution (Fifteenth Amendment)  Act, 1963,  which amended Art. 217 of the Constitution raising the age of retirement of a Judge of the High  Court from  60 to  62 years  on the ground that no assent of  the Governor  in the  State of  West  Bengal  was taken, observing:           "A legislature  discharges a variety of functions. The House has to be summoned or prorogued, bills have to 818      be introduced,  voted upon  and  passed,  debates  take place  on   important  political  questions,  ministers  are interrogated, and  so on. The Governor, though a limb of the legislature does  not take  part in every such action. While the Governor  summons the House and may prorogue or dissolve it (Art. 174) or address the legislature (Art. 175), he does not sit in the House or vote upon any issue. When a Bill has been passed  by the  House or Houses, Art. 200 requires that it shall be presented to the Governor for assent. The assent of the  Governor is necessary, only because the Constitution expressly requires  it. Whenever  the assent of the Governor is necessary or the assent of the President is necessary, it is  specifically  provided  for  in  the  Constitution  (see Articles 31-A,  200, 201  and 304).  The necessity  of  such assent cannot  be implied,  where not  specifically provided for."                                          (Emphasis supplied)

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    Reverting  to   the  constitutional  requirement  under proviso to Art. 368(2) of a ratification by the legislatures of not less than one-half of the States he observed:           "So far  as the  State legislatures are concerned, it requires that a resolution should be passed ratifying the amendment.  Such  a  resolution  requires  voting,  and  the Governor never votes upon any issue." (Emphasis supplied)      The interpretation  placed by  D. N.  Sinha J. upon the proviso to  Art. 360(2)  in Jatin Chakravorty’s case (supra) is in  consonance with  the constitutional system. Any other construction  would  result  in  an  alarming  situation  as constitutional  amendments  by  the  Parliament  under  Art. 368(1), could be held up by the Governor of a State. What is true of  a ratification  by  the  State  legislatures  under proviso to  Art. 368(2),  is equally true of a resolution of the House  or Houses  of the  Legislature under Art. 252(1). The Governor,  in our  view, nowhere comes in the picture at all in these matters.      It is,  however, argued,  on behalf  of the respondents that both  the expressions  ’legislature’ as well as ’Houses of Legislature’  are used  in Art.  252 and,  therefore, the term ’Legislature’  must be understood in the sense in which it is  used in Art. 168. In support of the contention, it is said that  it is the ’Legislature’ which is surrendering its sovereign legislative  functions and,  therefore, it must be the legislature,  as defined  in Art.  168, which  should do that, and  not a  part of the legislature. It is pointed out that Art. 168 does not use the words. 819 ’unless the context otherwise requires’. It is, accordingly, urged that  the words  ’to that  effect’ in Art. 252(1) mean that  the  legislature,  meaning  the  House  or  Houses  of Legislature  and   the  Governor,   is  desirous   that  the Parliament   should    legislate   on   a   State   subject. Conceptually, it  is said to be the better interpretation of the term ’legislature’ in the first part of Art. 252(1).      The respondents’  contention in  the present appeals is the same  as that prevailed in the High Court. The point has already been  dealt with  by us  at length.  The  contention cannot be  accepted because  it runs counter to this Court’s decision in  Kameshwar Singh’s  case (supra). The absence of the words  ’unless the  context otherwise  requires’ in Art. 168, cannot control the meaning of the term ’legislature’ in Art. 252(1).  It was  fairly conceded  at the  Bar that even without these words, a word or a phrase may have a different meaning, if  the  context  so  requires,  than  the  meaning attached  to   it  in   the  definition   clause.  The  term ’legislature’ in  the context  in which it appears, can only mean the House or Houses of Legislature, as the case may be. Learned  counsel   for  the   respondents,  tries   to  draw sustenance from s. 103 of the Government of India Act, 1935, which read:           "If it  appears to the Legislatures of two or more Provinces to be desirable that any of the matters enumerated in the  Provincial Legislative  List should  be regulated in those Provinces  by Act  of the  Federal Legislature, and if resolutions to that effect are passed by all the Chambers of those Provincial  Legislatures, it  shall be  lawful for the Federal Legislature  to pass  an  Act  for  regulating  that matter accordingly  but any  Act so  passed may, as respects any Province  to which it applies, be amended or repealed by an Act of the Legislature of that Province."      It is  submitted that when an Act passed by the Federal Legislature in  respect of  any of the matters enumerated in the Provincial  Legislative List  based on the resolution of

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the Legislatures  of two or more Provinces, could be amended or repealed  by an  Act of the Legislature of that Province, the Governor had necessarily to be consulted at the stage of introduction of  a resolution before the Legislature of that Province. There  is a  fallacy in  the argument.  The second part of s. 103 of the Government of India Act is replaced by Art. 252(2)  of the  Constitution which takes away the power of repeal  from the State Legislature and entrusts it to the Parliament. When  his attention  was drawn  to the fact that cl. (2) of Art. 252 of the Constitution 820 differs from  the provisions  of s. 103 of the Government of India Act,  1935, the  learned counsel  did not  pursue  the point  any   further.  Under  Art.  252(2)  an  amending  or repealing  Bill  must  go  through  the  same  procedure  as prescribed for  the original  Bill i.e., by the process laid down in  cl.(1) of  Art. 252. The surrender or abdication of the legislative  power of  the State  Legislature places the matter entirely in the hands of the Parliament.      Next, it  is urged  that the impugned Act passed by the Parliament was  without legislative  competence. It  is said that the  resolution, as  passed by  the State  Legislature, gave authority  to Parliament  to legislate  on a particular subject, i.e.,  ’ceiling on immovable property’, whereas the Parliament contrary  to the  resolution, passed  a law  on a different subject  i.e., ’ceiling  on  urban  land’.  It  is pointed out  that the  Working Group  with the  Secretary to Government of  India, Ministry  of Works,  Housing and Urban Development, in  its report  dated July 25, 1970 recommended that the  ceiling on urban property should be imposed on the basis of  the monetary  value of  properties and suggested a ceiling of  4 to  5  lacs  of  rupees.  The  Prime  Minister forwarded the  aforesaid report  of the  Working Group along with  a   draft  Bill,   prepared  on   the  basis   of  its recommendations, to  the Chief  Ministers of various States, with a view to securing concurrence and authorisation of the State  legislatures   under  Art.   252(1)  to   enable  the Parliament for enacting a uniform law for the whole country. It  was   said  that   the  State   Legislature   gave   the authorisation   to    the   Parliament   on   the   distinct understanding that  there was to be a law for the imposition of ceiling  on the basis of valuation of immovable property. It is  said  that  the  authorisation  was  for  ceiling  on ownership of  immovable property  and not  on area  of land. Idea of  ceiling, it  is said,  has  been  transferred  from persons to  objects. It  is,  accordingly,  urged  that  the impugned  Act,  insofar  as  it  provides  for  ceiling  for acquisition  of   vacant  land  by  the  State  was  not  in conformity with the real intendment of the resolution.      We are afraid, the contention cannot be accepted. It is not disputed that the subject matter of Entry 18, List II of the  Seventh   Schedule  i.e.,   ’land’  covers   ’land  and buildings’ and would, therefore, necessarily include ’vacant land’. The  expression ’urban  immovable property’  may mean ’land and  buildings’, or  ’buildings’ or  ’land’. It  would take in lands of every description, i.e., agricultural land, urban land  or any  other kind  and it  necessarily includes vacant land.      The Union of India before the High Court in its counter averred that, before the Act was introduced in the Lok Sabha on January 821 28, 1976,  it was  preceded by State-wise deep consideration and consultation  by the  respective States,  including  the State of  Andhra Pradesh  for a  period of  over five  years

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starting from  1970. A  Working Group  was constituted under the  Chairmanship  of  the  Secretary,  Ministry  of  Works, Housing and  Urban Development.  The report  of the  Working Group shows  that the  proposal was  to impose  a ceiling on urban immovable  property. In  its report  the said  Working Group defined‘urban  area’ to  include the  area within  the territorial limits  of municipalities  or other local bodies and also  the peripheral  area outside the said limits. Such inclusion of  the peripheral  limits in  an urban  area  was accepted by  the Government  and a  Model Bill  prepared  in pursuance thereof  also contained  such a definition. A copy of each  of the  report of  the Working  Group and the Model Bill referred  to was  placed on the table of the Parliament on December  15, 1970  and March  22, 1972 respectively. The said documents  were forwarded  to the  State Government  of Andhra  Pradesh,   besides  other   State  Governments,  for consideration by the State Legislatures before they passed a resolution under  Art. 252(1).  The State Legislatures were, therefore,  aware   of  the  position  when  they  passed  a resolution authorising  the Parliament  to  make  a  law  in respect of  urban immovable property. Their intention was to include  the   lands  within   the  territorial  area  of  a municipality or  other local  body of an urban area and also its  peripheral  area.  The  concept  of  ceiling  on  urban immovable property  and the  nature  and  content  of  urban agglomeration ultimately  defined by s. 2(n) of the impugned Act  was,   therefore,  fully   understood  by   the   State Governments.      In this  Court the  Union of India has placed on record an Approach  Paper of  the Study  Group which indicated that the Parliament was faced with several practical difficulties to implement the proposal to place a ceiling on ownership of built-up properties, namely:           "Firstly, the valuation of such properties is very difficult task, Secondly, it varies from urban area to urban area and  within the  same area  also and  might  result  in inequitable  application.   Thirdly,  in   our  inflationary situation the  values of properties quickly change from time to time.  Fourthly, investment  by persons  in  housing  and building is  like other  forms of investment and, subject to certain  restrictions,  primarily  to  prevent  speculation, needs to  be encouraged  to serve  social purposes. Fifthly, the  management  of  properties  which  may  vest  with  the government on  account of  any ceiling  would  pose  serious problems; perhaps,  a large  number of  properties may be in the form of slums or dilapidated 822      buildings and  in respect  of other  types of houses it may  not   be  possible   to  manage   or  dispose  them  of economically."      It was, therefore, suggested that ceiling in respect of built-up properties  was to  be brought about through fiscal and other restrictive measures.      It is but axiomatic that once the legislature of two or more States,  by a  resolution  in  terms  of  Art.  252(1), abdicate  or  surrender  the  area,  i.e.,  their  power  of legislation on  a State subject, the Parliament is competent to make  a law  relating to  the subject. It would indeed be contrary to  the terms of Art. 252(1) to read the resolution passed by  the State Legislature subject to any restriction. The resolution, contemplated under Art. 252(1) is not hedged in with conditions. In making such a law, the Parliament was not bound  to exhaust  the whole  field of  legislation.  It could make  a law,  like the  present Act,  with respect  to ceiling on vacant land in an urban agglomeration, as a first

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step towards the eventual imposition of ceiling on immovable property of every other description.      There is  no need to dilate on the question any further in this judgment, as it can be better dealt with separately. It is  sufficient for  purposes of these appeals to say that when Parliament  was invested with the power to legislate on the subject  i.e., ‘ceiling  on immovable  property’, it was competent for  the Parliament  to enact  the  impugned  Act, i.e., a law relating to ‘ceiling on urban land’.      In our  opinion, therefore,  the High Court was clearly in error  in  holding  that  the  Urban  Land  (Ceiling  and Regulation) Act,  1976, was  not applicable  to the State of Andhra Pradesh. In reaching that conclusion, it proceeded on the wrong assumption that ‘legislature’ for purposes of Art. 252(1) means the House or Houses of Legislature, as the case may be,  and the  Governor. In  consequence whereof, it felt into an  error in  holding that  the  State  Legislature  of Andhra Pradesh  could not,  in  law,  be  regarded  to  have authorised the  Parliament to  enact the  impugned  Act,  in relation to  that State, due to the non participation of the Governor.      There still remains the question whether the Act is not applicable to  Warangal for  the reason  that there  was  no master plan  prepared in conformity with s. 244(1) (c) (iii) of   the    Andhra   Pradesh   (Telengana   Area)   District Municipalities Act,  1956. The  section, so far as material, runs thus:           "244(1) (c)  The Master  Plan shall  include  such maps and  such descriptive matter as may be deemed necessary to illustrate the proposals, and in particular:      (i).................................................... ... 823      (ii)...................................................      (iii)  designate   the  land   subject  to   compulsory acquisition under  the powers  in that  behalf conferred  by this Act or any other law for the time being in force."      The High  Court has  clearly erred  in holding that the Urban Land  (Ceiling and  Regulation) Act, 1976 cannot apply to the  urban agglomeration  of Warangal.  In reaching  that conclusion, it  observed that  under s. 244(1) (c) (iii) the master plan  must designate  the land  subject to compulsory acquisition under the powers in that behalf conferred by the Act or any other law for the time being in force; otherwise, the master  plan prepared  for the town cannot be treated to be a  master plan  as prepared  in accordance  with law. The view taken  by the  High Court  is  wholly  unwarranted  and proceeds on a misconception of the scheme of the Act.      Section 3  of the Act provides that except as otherwise provided in  the Act,  on and from the commencement thereof, no person  shall be  entitled to  hold any  ‘vacant land’ in excess of the ceiling limit in the territories to which this Act applies  under sub-s.(2)  of s.  1. By  s. 4(1)(d),  the ceiling limit  placed on  such land  situate  in  an  ‘urban agglomeration’ falling  within  category  ‘D’  specified  in Schedule I, is fixed at two thousand square metres. An urban agglomeration is  made up of the main town together with the adjoining areas  of urban growth and is treated as one urban spread. The  expression ‘vacant  land’ is defined in s. 2(q) as meaning  land, not being land mainly used for the purpose of agriculture,  in an  urban agglomeration,  but  does  not include certain categories thereof. The term ‘urban land’ is defined in s. 2(o) as meaning:      "(o) ‘Urban land’ means.-           (i)  any land  situated within  the limits  of  an

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urban agglomeration  and referred  to as  such in the master plan; or           (ii) In  a case  where there is no master plan, or where the  master plan  does not  refer to any land as urban land, any  land within  the limits of an urban agglomeration and situated in any area included within the local limits of a municipality  (by whatever  name called),  a notified area committee, a town area committee, a city and town committee, a small  town committee,  a cantonment board or a panchayat, but does  not include any such land which is mainly used for the purpose of agriculture." 824 The expression  "urban agglomeration", as defined in s. 2(n) of the Act, so far as material, reads:      (n)  "urban agglomeration,-      (A)  in  relation  to  any  State  or  Union  Territory specified in column (1) of Schedule I, means:      (i)  the   urban   agglomeration   specified   in   the corresponding entry  in column  (2) thereof and includes the peripheral area  specified in  the  corresponding  entry  in column (3) thereof; and"      The urban  agglomeration of  Warangal is  specified  in Schedule I to the Act. The relevant entry reads:      "States           Towns        Peripheral    Category      ----------        ------       ---------     ---------        (1)               (2)           (3)           (4)      1. Andhra Pradesh  5.Warangal 1m   1Km.         D"      It is  quite clear that under the scheme of the Act the imposition  of   a  ceiling   on  vacant   land   in   urban agglomerations does  not depend on the existence of a master plan. The  definition of  ‘urban land’,  as contained  in s. 2(o) of  the Act is in two parts, namely (1) in a case where there is  a master  plan prepared under the law for the time being in  force, any  land within  the limits  of  an  urban agglomeration and referred to as such in the master plan, is treated to  be urban  land, and (2) in a case where there is no master  plan, or  the master  plan does  not refer to any land as  urban land,  any land within the limits of an urban agglomeration and  situated in  any area included within the local limit  of a municipality or other local authorities is regarded as  such. The existence of a master plan within the meaning of s. 2(h) is, therefore, not a sine qua non for the applicability of the Act to an urban agglomeration. The only difference is  that where  there is  a master  plan, the Act extends to  all lands  situate within  the local limits of a municipality or  other local  authority, and also covers the peripheral area  thereof; but  where there is no such master plan, its  applicability is confined to the municipal limits or the local area, as the case may be.      It is  common ground  that  there  was  a  master  plan prepared for  Warangal on  October 26, 1949. On September 7, 1963, the  Warangal Municipality resolved by a resolution to prepare a  fresh master  plan and  on February 18, 1966, the State Government  directed that  untill  the  new  plan  was prepared, the  old master plan should continue. There after, a revised master plan was prepared by the Direc- 825 tor of  Town Planning,  Hyderabad after  conducting physical and  socio-economic   surveys  and  sent  to  the  Municipal Council, Warangal for adoption and approval, in pursuance of its  resolution  dated  September  7,  1963.  The  Municipal Council by  its resolution dated April 30, 1969 approved the same with  some modifications.  The revised  master plan was submitted by  the Municipal  Council, Warangal  to the State Government for  sanction under  s. 244, sub-s.(1), cl.(d) of

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the, Andhra Pradesh (Telengana Area) District Municipalities Act, 1956.  On November  25, 1971,  the old  master plan was revoked by  the State  Government  and  a  new  master  plan sanctioned. The  master plan  contains proposals  for  areas required  to  be  covered  by  s.  244,  sub-s.(1),  cl.(c), contiguous and  adjacent to the municipal limits of Warangal which were under the jurisdiction of various gram panchayats and all such lands were deemed to be lands needed for public purpose within the meaning of the Hyderabad Land Acquisition Act, 1309  Fasli, and the Municipality could under s. 251 of the Andhra  Pradesh (Telengana Area) District Municipalities Act, 1956  acquire the lands required for the implementation of for  the master  plan. The  learned Attorney  General has placed before us the relevant notifications.      The word  "shall" in cl. (c) of sub-s. (1) of s. 244 of the Andhra  Pradesh (Telengana Area) District Municipalities Act, 1956 in its context and setting, is directory. A master plan prepared  by a  municipality may  or may  not contain a proposal  for   compulsory  acquisition   of  land,  or  any descriptive  matter  or  map  to  illustrate  a  scheme  for development. Mere  absence of  such proposal  for compulsory acquisition or  a map  or descriptive  matter would  not  be tantamount to  there being no master plan. A master plan may include proposals  for development  of areas  required to be covered by  s. 244,  sub-s.   (1),  cl.(c),  contiguous  and adjacent to  the municipal limits of a city or town, but may not designate  the land  to be  compulsorily  acquired,  the absence of  which would  not invalidate  the scheme.  It  is because the  municipality has  always the power under s. 250 of the  Act to  acquire the land required for implementation of such scheme.      It appears  that the  revised master  plan prepared for Warangal does, as it should, provide for various development schemes. For  ought we  know, it  also designates  the lands subject to  compulsory acquisition.  Even if it were not so, the master  plan prepared  under s. 244, sub-s. (1), cl. (c) did not  cease to  be ‘a  master plan prepared in accordance with law for the time being in force’, within the meaning of s. 2(h) of the Act, in relation to the town of Warangal. The Act,  is,   therefore,  clearly   applicable  to  the  urban agglomerations of 826 Warangal and  it extends  not only to all the lands included within the  local limits  of the  Warangal Municipality  but also includes  the  peripheral  areas  specified,  i.e.  one kilometre around such limits.      In this  group of cases, there is a writ petition filed by Maharao Sabeb Bhim Singhji, former ruler of the erstwhile princely State  of Kota.  It raises the question whether the Parliament had  legislative competence  to enact  the  Urban Land (Ceiling  and Regulation) Act, 1976, in relation to the State of  Rajasthan. The  question involved is common to all the States which subsequently adopted the Act.      The Bill,  after it  was passed  by both  the Houses of Parliament, received the assent of the President on February 17, 1976.  There is  a schedule annexed to the Act and among the various  States specified  in the schedule, is the State of  Rajasthan  with  the  urban  agglomerations  of  Jaipur, Jodhpur, Ajmer,  Kota and  Bikaner. Of  these, the cities of Jaipur  and   Jodhpur  are  declared  to  be  agglomerations belonging to  category ‘C’ while Ajmer, Kota and Bikaner are placed  in  category  ‘D’.  On  March  9,  1976,  the  State Legislature of  Rajathan  passed  the  following  resolution adopting the Act:           "Whereas  the   Legislature  of   Rajasthan  State

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considers it  expedient to  provide for  the imposition of a ceiling on  vacant land  in urban  agglomerations,  for  the acquisition of  such land in excess of the ceiling limit, to regulate the  construction of buildings on such land and for matters connected  therewith, with  a view to preventing the concentration of  urban land  in the  hands of a few persons and speculation  and profiteering therein and with a view to bringing about  an equitable  distribution of  land in urban agglomerations to subserve the common good.           And whereas  the Parliament  has no  power to make laws for  the States  with regard  to the  matters aforesaid except  as   provided  in   Article  249   and  250  of  the Constitution.           And whereas  this Legislature  is of  the  opinion that aforesaid matter may be regulated in Rajasthan State by the Urban  Land (Ceiling  and Regulation)  Act, 1976  (33 of Central Act of 1976) enacted by the Parliament.           Now therefore  the Legislature  of Rajasthan State passes the  following resolution  in  pursuance  of  Article 252:, clause (1) :-           "Rajasthan State  adopts the  Urban Land  (Ceiling and Regulation)  Act, 1976  (33 of  Central Act of 1976) for this State"." 827      When the  Bill was  introduced  in  the  Lok  Sabha  on January 28,  1976, it  cannot be  denied that  the State  of Rajasthan was  not one of the eleven States which had passed a resolution  under the  first part  of Art. 252(1), and the question that  arises is  whether  the  Parliament  had  the legislative competence  to enact  a law  in relation to that State. It  is argued  that the  inclusion of  the  State  of Rajasthan in  the Schedule as one of the States specified to which the  Act applies, or the categorisation of the various cities and  towns of that State, including the town of Kota, was non  est. It  is submitted  that the  legislature of the State of  Rajasthan never authorised the Parliament to enact a law  for the imposition of ceiling on immovable properties in that  State and,  therefore, the  Act was  still-born  in respect of  the State  of Rajasthan. It is accordingly urged that the  Act being  legislatively incompetent  in so far as the State  of Rajasthan  was  concerned,  it  could  not  be adopted by  a subsequent  resolution  passed  by  the  State legislature of Rajasthan on March 9, 1976.      The learned  Attorney General,  however, tries  to meet the challenge  to the  applicability of the Act to the State of  Rajasthan   from  two  aspects.  He  contends  that  the Parliament  was   undoubtedly  invested   with   legislative competence to enact a law for the imposition of a ceiling on urban land  for the  State of Rajasthan, both under Art. 250 as well  as under Art. 252. First of all, he points out that while there  was a  Proclamation of  Emergency in  force  on February 17, 1976, the Parliament had the power to legislate with respect  to any  matter in the State List under Article 250, which reads:           "250.  (1)   Notwithstanding  anything   in   this Chapter, Parliament shall, while a Proclamation of Emergency is in  operation, have  power to  make laws for the whole or any part  of the  territory of  India with respect to any of the matter enumerated in the State List.      (2) A law made by Parliament which Parliament would not but for  the issue  of a Proclamation of Emergency have been competent to  make shall, to the extent of the incompetency, cease to  have effect  on the expiration of a period of  six months after  the Proclamation has ceased to operate, except as respects  things done  or omitted  to be  done before the

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expiration of the said period."      The learned  Attorney General  is  no  doubt  right  in saying that  if a Proclamation of Emergency is in operation, under Art. 250(1) the power of the Parliament extends to the making of laws for the whole or any part of the territory of India with respect to any of the matters 828 enumerated in the State List, but the Act so passed will die out with the revocation of the Proclamation of Emergency, by reason of  Art 250(2)  on the  expiration of a period of six months after  the Proclamation has ceased to operate, except as respects  things done  or omitted  to be  done before the expiration of the said period. That conclusion is inevitable from the  words "shall  cease to  have effect"  appearing in Art. 250(2).      Now, the  further difficulty  in accepting  the learned Attorney General’s  contention is  that the Parliament never professed to  act under  Art 250(1).  Although he  drew  our attention to  the second  part of  the preamble  to the  Act which reads:           "AND WHEREAS  Parliament has no power to make laws for the  States with respect to the matters aforesaid except as provided in Articles 249 and 250 of the Constitution;" it is amply clear from the third part of the preamble, which reads:           "AND WHEREAS in pursuance of clause (1) of Article 252 of  the Constitution resolutions have been passed by all the Houses  of the  Legislatures of  the  States  of  Andhra Pradesh,  Gujarat,  Haryana,  Himachal  Pradesh,  Karnataka, Maharashtra, Orissa, Punjab, Tripura, Uttar Pradesh and West Bengal that  the matters  aforesaid should  be regulated  in those States by Parliament by law;" that the  Parliament never  intended to take recourse to its powers under  Art. 250(1), but proceeded to make such a law, being clothed  with its  powers to  legislate on the subject under Art.  252(1). The Act was, therefore, a law enacted by the Parliament  by virtue  of its  powers under Art. 252(1). The Statement  of objects  and  Reasons  really  places  the matter beyond all doubt. Its material portion reads:           "Statement of Objects and Reasons           There has  been a demand for imposing a ceiling on urban property  also, especially  after the  imposition of a ceiling on agricultural lands by the State Governments. With the growth  of population  and increases  in urbanization, a need for  orderly development  of urban  areas has also been felt.  It   is,  therefore,  considered  necessary  to  take measures for  exercising  social  control  over  the  scarce resource of urban land with a view to ensuring its equitable distribution amongst  the various  sections of  society  and also avoiding  speculative transactions  relating to land in urban agglomera- 829      tions. With  a view  to ensuring uniformity in approach Government of  India addressed the State Governments in this regard; eleven  States have  so far passed resolutions under Art. 252(1)  of the  Constitution empowering  Parliament  to undertake legislation  in this  behalf. The present proposal is to  enact a  Parliamentary legislation  in  pursuance  of these resolutions." (Emphasis supplied)      There  is   also  some   difficulty  in  accepting  the contention of  the learned  Attorney General  on a matter of construction of  Art. 252(1).  The question of adoption of a law made  by the Parliament in respect of any of the matters in State  List arises  under the  second part of Art. 252(1) and is  dependent upon  the ‘desirability’  expressed by the

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legislatures of two or more States empowering the Parliament to make  such a  law under  the first  part thereof.  We are inclined to  think that  some meaning  must be  given to the words "any  Act so  passed".  The  power  of  adoption,  is, therefore, related  to a  law made  under Art.  252 (1)  and cannot  be   exercised  in  respect  of  laws  made  by  the Parliament  under   Art.  250(1)  while  a  Proclamation  of Emergency is  in force. Furthermore, such a law, in terms of Art. 250(2),  ceases to  have effect  on the expiration of a period of  six months  after the  Proclamation has ceased to operate.      The  learned   Attorney   General,   however,   rightly contends, in  the alternative,  that  the  Parliament  being invested with  the power  by resolutions  passed  under  the first part  of Art.  252(1) by  as many as eleven States, to legislate on  the subject,  i.e., to  make  a  law  for  the imposition of  a ceiling  or immovable  property, it had the competence to  so structure  the Act  that it was capable of being adopted  by other States under the second part of Art. 252(1). A  fortiori,  the  specification  of  the  State  of Rajasthan by  which the  Act may  be adopted, as well as the categorisation of  the urban agglomerations therein to which it may apply, had to be there.      It is,  however, strenuously  urged on  behalf  of  the petitioner that law made by the Parliament under Art. 252(1) cannot be so designated as to extend to the States which had not sponsored  a resolution. Emphasis is laid upon the words "in such  States", and  it is  said that they mean "in those States", i.e.,  the sponsoring  States. In  support  of  the contention, our attention was particularly drawn to the word Accordingly’, and  it is  urged that  the law  passed by the Parliament under  Art. 252(1)  must  be  restricted  in  its operation to  those States,  i.e., to  those States in which the Legislature  passed a  resolution. We  are  afraid,  the contention cannot be accepted. 830      In our  considered judgment, the Parliament having been invested with  powers to  legislate on  a State  subject, by resolutions passed  by Legislatures  of two  or more  States under Art.  252(1), has  plenary  powers  to  make  suitable legislation. It  follows, as a necessary corollary, that the Act passed  by the  Parliament under  Art. 252(1)  can be so structured as  to be capable of being effectively adopted by the other  States. Article  252(1) undoubtedly  enables  the Parliament to  make a  uniform law.  The Act so passed would automatically apply  to the States the legislatures of which have passed a resolution in terms of Art. 252(1), and at the same time  it must  be capable  of beings  adopted by  other States which have not sponsored a resolution, i.e., the non- sponsoring States.  The second  part of  Art. 252(1) will be meaningful only  if it  were so  interpreted; otherwise,  it would be  rendered wholly  redundant. To  illustrate, if the part of  the Schedule  relating to the State of Rajasthan is treated as non est, the schedule which forms part of the Act cannot be  amended except  under Art.  252(2), i.e., ‘in the like manner’.  We fail  to appreciate how two or more States can now  pass a  resolution for  extension of the Act to the State of Rajasthan.      In a  law relating  to the  imposition  of  ceiling  on vacant land in urban agglomerations throughout the territory of India,  it was  competent for  the Parliament under Entry 18, List  II of  Seventh Schedule  is not  only to  have the States specified  in the  Schedule to  the Act where the law will extend,  but also  include the  categorisation of urban agglomerations in  respect of  the whole of the territory of

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India. The  Act would  automatically apply  from the date of its  application  to  those  States  which  had  passed  the resolution in  terms of  the first  part of Art. 252(1), and would extend  to the  adopting States  from the  date of the resolutions passed  by the  legislatures of such States. The Parliament had, therefore, in fact and in law, competence to legislate on  the subject  of the  imposition of  ceiling on urban immovable  property,  and  the  Schedule  to  the  Act cannot, therefore,  be struck  down in relation to the State of Rajasthan.      It is  conceded by  learned counsel  for the petitioner that if  the Act had been enacted without the Schedule, with an appropriate definition, of ‘an urban agglomeration’ in s. 2(n), in  general terms, making the law applicable to cities and towns  having, for  example, a population of one lac and above, five  lacs and  above etc., it would have been within the legislative competence of the Parliament. If that be so, then it is inexplicable why simply because some of the areas in some  of the  States have  been specified, although their State legislatures  had not  sponsored any  resolution,  the schedule, in so far as those States are 831 concerned should  be regarded as non est. If it is competent for the   Parliament to make a general law under Art. 252(1) to  facilitate   its  adoption  by  other  States,  it  must logically follow that the Parliament could also pass the Act in its present form.      We are  of the  opinion that  the Act with the Schedule annexed  became   applicable  in   those  States  where  the legislatures    passed     resolutions    expressing     the ‘desirability’ for  the Parliament  to make  a law  for  the imposition of  ceiling on  urban immovable  property, and it lay dormant  insofar as  the other States were concerned. It became applicable  to these  other States from the date that their Houses  of Legislatures  adopted it.  In that view, we must  hold   that  the   impugned  Act  is  not  beyond  the legislative competence  of the  Parliament  insofar  as  the State of Rajasthan is concerned.      In the result, the appeals succeed and are allowed. The judgment of  the Andhra Pradesh High Court is set aside, and it is  declared that the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976, is, and has always been, in force in the State of Andhra Pradesh  w.e.f.  January  28,  1976.  It  is  further declared that the Act extends to the urban agglomerations of Warangal. It  must, for reasons already stated, also be held that the  Act applies to the State of Rajasthan w.e.f. March 9, 1976.  The remaining  contentions advanced  in  the  writ petition will  be dealt  with separately.  There shall be no order as to costs in these proceedings. N.V.K.                                      Appeals allowed. 832