16 July 1998
Supreme Court
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UNION OF INDIA & ANR. Vs M/S MUSTAFA & NAJIBAI TRADING CO., & ORS.

Bench: S.C. AGARWAL,V.N. KHARE
Case number: Appeal Civil 152 of 1988


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PETITIONER: UNION OF INDIA & ANR.

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: M/S MUSTAFA & NAJIBAI TRADING CO., & ORS.

DATE OF JUDGMENT:       16/07/1998

BENCH: S.C. AGARWAL, V.N. KHARE

ACT:

HEADNOTE:

JUDGMENT:                       J U D G M E N T S.C. AGRAWAL,  J. :      This appeal,  by  special  leave,  has  been  filed  by Revenue against  the judgment of the Bombay High Court dated may 14,  1987 whereby  the High  Court, while allowing Civil Writ No.  6142 of  1986 filed  by the  respondents, has  set aside the  order dated April 6, 1984 passed by the Collector of Customs  (Preventive), Bombay [hereinafter referred to as ’the Collector’] as well as the order of the Customs, Excise and Gold  (Control) Appellate Tribunal [hereinafter referred to as  ’the Tribunal’]  dated November 26, 1985. By the said order of  the Collector  dated  April  6,  1984,  which  was affirmed in  appeal by  the Tribunal,  goods valued  at  Rs. 59,53,560/- c.i.f.  (Rs. 1,78,60,680/-  at the Indian market rate) were  confiscated under clauses (d) and (f) of Section 111 of  the Customs  Act, 1962  [hereinafter referred  to as ’the Act’].  The gunny  bags, white  cloth wrappings, wooden cases and the cartons which were used for keeping the seized goods were also confiscated under Section 118(1) of the Act. The  vessel,   MANSCO-3,  containing   the  said  goods  was confiscated under Section 115(2) of the Act but the owner of the vessel  was given  an option  to redeem it on payment of fine of  Rs. 7,50,000/-  within one  month of  the  date  of receipt of  the said  order and personal penalties were also imposed under  Section 112  of the  Act on respondent No. 2, the Managing Director of respondent No. 1 company (the owner of the  vessel) as  well as  on the Master of the vessel and other persons.      In September 1982 408 packets were consigned from Dubai to Afghanistan  via Karachi  and were  shipped to Karachi on the vessel  ’AMETHYST’. When  the  said  vessel  arrived  at Karachi port the Government of Pakistan refused clearance of the consignment  and the  goods remained  in transit shed at Karachi port. On April 25, 1983 the Central Board of Revenue of Pakistan  allowed reshipment  of the goods back to Dubai. Thereafter the  vessel, MANSCO-3,  was sent  from  Dubai  to Karachi for unloading certain cargo at Karachi and to return to Dubai  with the said consignment of 408 packets which had been detained  at the  Karachi port.  At  Karachi  port  408 packets were  loaded  on  the  vessel  for  the  purpose  of

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reshipment to  Dubai. 971  packages  of  goods  of  Pakistan origin were  also loaded  on the  said ship.  MANSCO-3  left Karachi on  August 16,  1983 but  instead of  proceeding  to Dubai the  vessel proceeded  to Bombay. MANSCO-3 reached the outer anchorage  of Bombay  harbour on August 20, 1983. From the outer  anchorage  the  said  vessel  entered  the  inner anchorage on  August 21,  1983 but  was sent  back to  outer anchorage on  the same  day. On  August 22,  1983 M/s Regent Shipping and  Trading  Company,  the  local  agents  of  the shipping company  which owned the vessel, MANCO-3, contacted the Captain  of the  ship as  well as  the Bombay Port Trust Pilot Station  and the  Bombay Port Trust Control. They were asked to  deposit the  piloting charges  by the  Bombay Port Trust authorities.  On August  23, 1983  piloting charges of Rs. 12,000/- were paid to the Bombay Port Trust by the local agents and  the ship was brought into the inner anchorage of Port Mazgaon  on August  23, 1983 at about 12.20 p.m. On the morning of  August 24,  1983 the  officers  of  the  Customs (Preventive) Wing  boarded MANSCO-3 and asked the Captain of the vessel  to produce  the crew  list, crew  property list, store list  and the  Import General Manifest. The Captain of the vessel  could not  produce any  of  the  above  referred documents. On  questioning the  Captain the Customs Officers came to  know that  the Chief Officer and the Chief Engineer of the vessel had left the vessel in a fishing craft without completing the  customs, health  and immigration formalities and had  gone ashore  when  the  vessel  was  at  the  outer anchorage.      Thereafter the  officers inspected  the  holds  of  the vessel and  found a  large number  of  white  cloth  wrapped packages bearing  the markings  ’Star Dubai’, Prince Dubai’, etc. They  further found  a large  number of  gunny  covered packages bearing  the marking ’In Transit to Afghanistan via Karachi and Chamman’ below the white cloth covered packages. Having regard  to the  markings it  appeared to the officers that the  goods were  meant for  shipment to Afghanistan and the Captain  had port  clearance for  Dubai from Karachi and not for  Bombay. The customs officers also came to know that the vessel  had on  its own  attempted to  come to the inner anchorage of  Bombay harbour  even before  Bombay Port Trust charges were  paid and  without being  escorted by  the Port Trust Pilot  and that  there was  a direction by the harbour pilot to  go back  to the  outer anchorage.  The  408  gunny packages bearing the markings ’In Transit to Afghanistan via Karachi and  Chamman’ were  found  to  contain  VCRs,  Video Cassettes, Car  Cassettes Players,  textiles, TV  sets.  All these packages  originated from Dubai and were valued at Rs. 56,21,320/- c.i.f. and Rs. 1,68,63,960/- (market value). The other packets  found  in  the  vessel  contained  ready-made garments, PVC pipes, footwears, aluminium utencils packed in 971 packing  and were valued at Rs. 3,32,240/- c.i.f. and Rs 9,96,720/- (market value) and the said goods originated from Pakistan. The  Customs Officers  recorded the  statements of the Captain  of the  vessel as well as the representative of the local  agents at Bombay. Since the captain and the local agents did  not take  any steps  to file  the Import general Manifest and  other documents  for the  purpose of voyage to Bombay, the  Customs Officers  seized all  the 1379  packets found  on   board  of   the  vessel.  After  completing  the investigation Show  Cause Notices  dated December  31,  1983 were issued  by the  Assistant Collector  of Customs, R & I, Bombay. A  reply dated  February 19,1984  to the  said  Show Cause Notice  was submitted  on  behalf  of  M/s  Mustafa  & Najibai Trading  Co., Dubai, respondent No. 1, the owners of MANSCO-3 and  respondent No.  2  the  Managing  Director  of

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respondent No.  1. The Captain and others sent their replies to the Show Cause Notice on February 20, 1984. After holding an inquiry  the Collector  passed the  order dated  April 6, 1984 for the confiscation of the goods that had been seized, valued at  Rs. 59,53,560/-  c.i.f. and  Rs. 1,78,60,680/- at the Indian  market rate under clauses (d) and (f) of Section 111 of  the Act  as well  as for  confiscation of  the gunny bags, white  cloth wrappings,  wooden cases  and the cartons which were  used for  keeping the seized goods under Section 118(1) of  the Act.  MANSCO-3 was  ordered to be confiscated under Section  115(2) of the Act but the owner of the vessel was given  an option  to redeem it on payment of fine of Rs. 7,50,000/- within  one month  of the  date of receipt of the said order. A personal penalty of Rs. 3,00,000/- was imposed on Mustafa  Najibi, respondent  No. 2, the Managing Director of respondent  No. 1,  and a  penalty of  Rs. 2,00,000/- was imposed on  Abdul Rahim  Kharti, the  master of  the vessel. Personal  penalties  were  also  imposed  on  certain  other persons, viz,  Mohammed Yousef  Abdulla, M/s  Aero  Maritime Ltd.,  Karachi,   Ramesh  Amritlal  Shah,  Abedin  Ghadialy, Ramanlal P.  Pandya and  Dawood Sharafuddin Kaldane. Feeling aggrieved by the said order of the Collector, an appeal C.D. (Bom.) A  No. 548  of 1984  was filed by Abdul Rahim Khatri, master of  the vessel MANSCO-3 and C.D. (Bom.) A No.  549 of 1984  was  filed  by  M/s  Mustafa  &  Najibi  Trading  Co., respondent No.  1 and  Nuruddin Nustafa,  respondent No.  2, Managing Director  of respondent  No. 1.  Both these appeals were dismissed  by the  Tribunal by order dated November 26, 1985. Feeling  aggrieved by  the said order of the Tribunal, Writ Petition  No. 6142 of 1986 was filed in the Bombay High Court by M/s Mustafa & Najibi Trading Co., respondent No. 1, the  owners   of  the  vessel  MANSCO-3,  Nuruddin  Mustafa, respondent No.  2, the Managing Director of respondent No. 1 company, and Mahmood Mohmed Abrahim Benzad, respondent No. 3 herein, who  claims to  be the owner of some of the packages which had  been shipped from Dubai to Karachi and which were seized from  MANSCO-3 by  the customs  authorities at Bombay port and  were ordered  to be  confiscated.  The  said  Writ Petition has  been allowed by the High Court by the impugned judgment. Hence this appeal.      We have  heard Shri  M.S. Usgaonkar  for the  Union  of India and  Ms.  A.J.  Rana,  the  learned  counsel  for  the respondents.      As  mentioned   earlier,  the   orders  passed  by  the Collector and  the Tribunal,  which have been quashed by the High Court, involve:-      (i)  confiscation of  the goods  which  were  found  in           MANSCO-3 during  the course  of inspection  of the           vessel by  the customs  authorities on  August 24,           1983 and had been seized;      (ii) confiscation of the vessel, MANSCO-3; and      (iii) Imposition  of personal  penalties on  respondent           No. 2,  the Managing  Director of respondent No. 1           company and on the Master of the vessel.      We will first take up the matter of confiscation of the goods. As  indicated earlier,  the goods  were ordered to be confiscated in exercise of power conferred under clauses (d) and (f)  of Section  111 of  the Act which are reproduced as follows :-      "111.  Confiscation  of  improperly      imported goods,  etc.-The following      goods brought  from a place outside      India   shall    be    liable    to      confiscation:-      (d) any goods which are imported or

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    attempted to  be  imported  or  are      brought within  the Indian  customs      waters for  the  purpose  of  being      imported,    contrary     to    any      prohibition  imposed  by  or  under      this Act  or any  other law for the      time being in force;      (f)  any   duitable  or  prohibited      goods  required   to  be  mentioned      under the regulations in any import      manifest or import report which are      not so mentioned;"      The expressions  "Import", "Import  manifest",  "India" and "Indian  Customs Waters" are defined in Section 2 of the Act in the following terms:-      "2(23).    ’Import’,    with    its      grammatical variations  and cognate      expressions,  means  bringing  into      India from a place outside India."      "2(24).   ’Import    manifest’   or      ’import report’  means the manifest      or report  required to be delivered      under Section 30."      "2(27).   ’India’    includes   the      territorial waters of India."      "2(28).  ’Indian   Customs   Water’      means the waters extending into the      sea upto  the limit  of  contiguous      zone of  India under  section 5  of      the Territorial  Waters Continental      Shelf, Exclusive  Economic Zone and      other Maritime   Zones  Act,  1976,      (80 of 1976) and includes  any bay,      gulf,  harbour,   creek  or   tidal      river."      In Section  30 of  the Act  the following  provision is made with  regard to delivery of import manifest in the case of a vessel or aircraft:-      "30. Delivery of import manifest or      import report.-(1)  the  person-in-      charge  of  a  conveyance  carrying      imported   goods    shall,   within      twenty-four  hours   after  arrival      thereof  at   a  customs   station,      deliver to  the proper  officer, in      the case of a vessel or a aircraft,      an import manifest, and in the case      of a  vehicle, an import report, in      the prescribed form:      Provided that,-      (a) In  the case  of a  vessel  bay      such manifest  may be  delivered to      the  proper   officer  before   the      arrival of the vessel;      (b)  if   the  proper   officer  is      satisfied that there was sufficient      cause for not delivering the import      manifest or  import report  or  any      part  thereof   within  twenty-four      hours  after  the  arrival  of  the      conveyance, he may accept it at any      time thereafter.      (2)  The   person  delivering   the      import manifest  or  import  report      shall at  the foot thereof make and

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    subscribe to  a declaration  as  to      the truth or its contents.      (3)  If   the  proper   officer  is      satisfied that  the import manifest      or import  report  is  in  any  way      incorrect or  incomplete, and  that      there was  no fraudulent intention,      he may  permit it  is to be amended      or supplemented."      Regulation  3   in  the   Import   Manifest   (Vessels) Regulations, 1971  [hereinafter referred  to as  ’the Import Manifest Regulations’]  framed under Section 157 of the Act, as in  force at  the relevant time, required that the import manifest must  be delivered  in duplicated  and should cover all the goods carried in a vessel and shall consist of :-      (i) a general declaration in form I,      (ii) a Cargo declaration in form II,      (iii) a Vessel’s Stores List in form III,      (iv) a list of the private property in the possession          of the Master, Officers and crew in form IV.      In Regulation  5(1) of  the Import Manifest Regulations it  was   provided  that  the  cargo  declaration  shall  be delivered in  separate sheets  in respect  of  each  of  the following categories  of cargo,  namely,  (a)  cargo  to  be landed,  (b)   Unaccompanied  baggage,   (c)  goods   to  be transshipped, and (d) same bottom or retention cargo.      The Collector  held that  the  seized  goods  had  been imported into  India without  an import licence and hence in contravention of  the prohibition imposed under Section 3 of the Imports  and Exports (Control) Act, 1947 and clause 3 of the Imports  (Control)  Order,  1955  and  were,  therefore, liable to  confiscation under  Section 111(d) of the Act and that the  goods were  also liable  to be  confiscated  under Section 111(f)  of the  Act because there was failure on the part of the Master of the vessel MANSCO -3 and the agents of the owners  of the  vessel at  Bombay  to  file  the  Import General Manifest  as required under Section 30 read with the Import Manifest  Regulations within  24 hours of the arrival of the  vessel in  the port  Bombay. The  submission of  the respondents that the goods were not meant for being unloaded in India  and being ’same bottom cargo’ they were covered by clause 11(e)  of the  Import (Control)  Order and  no import licence was  required for bringing them in this country, was rejected by  the Collector  on the  ground  that  under  the Import Manifest  Regulations same  bottom cargo or retention cargo carried  on a vessel has to listed on a separate sheet in the  Import Manifest  which has  to be  delivered in  the manner laid down in Section 30 of the Act within 24 hours of the arrival  of the  vessel in any customs port in India and that no  import manifest indicating the goods as same bottom cargo was  delivered under  Section 30  of the  Act. In  the absence of  an import  manifest listing  the goods  as  same bottom  cargo,   the  said  goods,  which  had  crossed  the territorial waters  of India,  had to  be treated  as having been imported  into India  in  view  of  the  definition  of ’Import’  contained   in  Section  2(23)  of  the  Act  and, therefore, they  were liable to be confiscated under Section 111(d)  of  the  Act  since  there  was  no  import  licence authorising their import.      On behalf  of the  respondents reliance  was placed  on clause (b) of the proviso to Section 30(1) of the Act and it was submitted  that it  provided for  a situation  where the Import General  Manifest is not delivered within 24 hours of the arrival  of the  vessel at  the  port  and  enables  its acceptance by the proper officer at any time thereafter. The

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submission was  the words  "may accept"  in the said proviso should be  read as  "shall accept". Reliance was also placed by the  respondents on  sub-section (3) of Section 30 of the Act which provides that the Import Manifest may be permitted to be amended or supplemented by the proper officer if he is satisfied that  the Import  Manifest is in any way incorrect or incomplete  and that  there was  no fraudulent intention. The Collector,  however, rejected the said contention on the view that there is nothing on record to show that the Master of the  vessel MANSCO-3  or its agents in Bombay at any time filed the manifest or thy had at any time made a request for being permitted to file the manifest and that in the absence of the  manifest the  question of  request being entertained for amending  or supplementing  the manifest  under  Section 30(3) of the act does not arise.      While  dealing   with  the   contention  based  on  the provisions of  Section  30(3)  of  the  Act,  the  Collector considered the  question whether  the voyage  of the  vessel MANSCO-3 to  Bombay was  bonafide and  found that  the  said voyage was  not bonafide having regard to inconsistencies in the statements  of the  Master of  the vessel  and the other crew members  and the  agents of  the  owner  regarding  the purpose of the visit of the vessel to Bombay. It was pointed out that  Aabdul Khatri  in his  statement had  said that he received a  telex from  the owners  of the vessel from Dubai asking him  to proceed  to Bombay to take 125 tons cargo for Dubai and  further that  the radar  and V.H.F.  sets of  the vessel MANSCO-3  were  not  working  and  they  were  to  be repaired at Bombay port.      As regards  the explanation  based on the telex message that the  vessel was  directed to  proceed to Bombay to load cargo for  Dubai, the  Collector has pointed out that Ramesh Shah, Director  of M/s  Regent Shipping and Trade Pvt. Ltd., the local  agents of  the owners of the vessel at Bombay, in his statement dated August 24, 1983, had stated that a telex was received  in his  office on  August 16,  1983 from Dubai saying that  the vessel  MANSCO-3 was  sailling from Karachi and was expected to reach Bombay on August 18, 1983 and that the vessel  was proceeding to Bombay as the radar and V.H.F. sets of  the vessel  were out  of order  and they were to be repaired at  Bombay. He  had further  stated that he did not have any  intimation regarding the cargo to be lifted by the vessel MANSCO-3  at Bombay  and no cargo had been kept ready by him  for loading.  Abedin Abdul Hussain Ghadiali, another Director of  M/s Regent Shipping and Trade Pvt. Ltd., in his statement dated  August 24,  1983, mentioned about repair of radar and  V.H.F. which  showed that  both Ramesh  Shah  and Abedin Abdul  Hussain Ghadiall,  the Directors  of the local agents at Bombay, did not have knowledge that the vessel had arrived at  Bombay for  lifting cargo  for  Dubai.  Mohammed Yousuf Abdulla, who claimed to be the promoter of M/s Regent Shipping and Trade Pvt. Ltd., in his statements dated August 25, 1983  and September  7, 1982,  had made  conflicting and inconsistent  statements.  Relying  upon  the  statement  of Ramesh shah,  the Collector held that no cargo was available at Bombay for being shipped on board the vessel MANSCO-3 and the agents  at Bombay  would not  have been in a position to arrange for 100 to 150 tons of cargo which the Master of the vessel had been instructed to lift from Bombay.      The explanation that the vessel MANSCO-3 was brought to Bombay for  repairing or  radar and V.H.F. sets was also not accepted by  the Collector  in view  of the statement of the Captain of  the vessel  dated August 25, 1983 wherein he had confirmed that  the Radar  was out  of order  even when  the vessel left  Dubai and repairs to the Radar were carried out

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at Karachi  before the  vessel left  that port  and that the V.H.F. set  was also  in working  order when the vessel left Karachi port  and according to Mirza Beg, Cadet on board the vessel, this  equipment went  out of  order  only  when  the vessel was  about 100 to 150 nautical miles from Bombay. The Collector held  that the  voyage of the vessel MANSCO-3 from Karachi to  Bombay was  neither to have the radar and V.H.F. equipments repaired,  nor was it for lifting 100 to 150 tons of cargo  from Bombay  as stated by the Captain and that the real purpose  of the  visit of the vessel MANSCO-3 to Bombay was known  only to  the owners  of the  vessel at Dubai, the agents at  Karachi and  Mohamed Yousuf  Abdulla who  were in constant touch  with each  other over  telephone and through telex and  that it  could not  be said  that the  voyage was bonafide and  there was  no fraudulent  intention.  In  this context, the Collector pointed out that in order to make the voyage look  bonafide a  large number  of cartons containing very cheap  quality of goods of Pakistani origin which could not have  any market  in Dubai were also placed on board the vessel and  the packages  containing  electronic  goods  and textiles which  bear markings  to show  that  they  were  in transit to  Afghanistan were  kept hidden below the packages containing cheap quality Pakistani goods. The Collector also referred to  the fact  that the agents at Karachi even after having informed  the Captain that he was  to sail for Bombay chose to  give him a port clearance for the port of Dubai in a sealed cover which casts serious doubt about the bonafides of the  voyage since  such practice  is not  indulged in  by shipping companies  engaged in regular and bonafide shipping operations and  this irregularity  on the  part of agents of the owners of the vessel MANSCO-3 at Karachi lent support to the view  that the  intention of  the owners,  the agents in Karachi and  the Master  and  the  persons  controlling  the affairs of the agents firm in Bombay were fraudulent. It was also observed  that the Captain of the vessel MANSCO-3 after arrival at  the outer  anchorage of  the Bombay  harbour  on August 20, 1983 surreptitiously and without getting in touch with the  control tower of the Bombay Port Trust and without completing the  Port Trust  formalities brought  the ship to the inner  anchorage which  would not have been done in case his intention was bonafide.      It was  urged on  behalf of  the respondents  that  the Captain brought the vessel inside the inner anchorage on his own because his wife was not feeling well and he was running short of  provisions. The said explanation was, however, not accepted by  the Collector  on the view that the purpose for which the  Captain entered the inner anchorage was obviously other  than   the  sickness  of  his  wife  or  shortage  of provisions on  board the  vessel because  in his evidence on February 25, 1984 during the course of cross-examination the Harbour Pilot  Captain Mavin  Kurve had deposed that when he boarded the  vessel MANSCO-3  on seeing  it anchored  in  an unauthorised spot  in the inner anchorage he was told by the Captain that there was nothing seriously wrong with his wife and that  she was feeling better and as regards the shortage of provisions,  the Collector  observed  that  in  case  the Captain was  short of  provisions and was not able to convey the message  to the total agents because of the breakdown of V.H.F. equipment shortly before the arrival of the vessel in Bombay harbour, the Captain could have requested the harbour pilot Captain  Mavin Kurve  to convey  the  message  to  his agents through  the Bombay Port Trust Control Tower and that instead of taking this course, the Captain chose to send two senior  officers  on  board  the  vessel,  viz.,  the  Chief Engineer and  the Chief Officer, without completing Customs,

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Health and  Immigration formalities, on a fishing craft in a manner which  is highly  irregular from  the  customs  angle since instances  of lakhs  worth  or  precious  metal  being smuggled by  people by  carrying it  on their person are not uncommon and  that these  two crew  members after contacting Mohammed Yousuf  Abdulla disappeared  and remained away from the vessel  for  quite  some  time.  Having  regard  to  the aforesaid facts  and circumstances,  the Collector  recorded the finding  that the intentions of the owners of the vessel MANSCO-3, the  Captain and  the agents,  including  Mohammed Yousuf Abdulla, were fraudulent and, therefore, the question of exercising  the discretion  for extending  the period for filling the  import manifest as provided under Section 30(1) of the  Act or  for considering amendment or supplementation of the manifest would not arise even if a request would have been made  for such  extension of the time limit for filling of the manifest or for its amendment.      The  Tribunal,   while  confirming  the  order  of  the Collector regarding  confiscation of goods under clauses (d) and (f)  of Section  111 of  the  Act,  has  considered  the evidence  that   was  produced  before  the  Collector.  The Tribunal did  not accept  the  explanation  offered  by  the owners and master of the vessel that the vessel MANSCO-3 had come to  Bombay from  Karachi for lifting another 100 to 125 tons of  cargo from Bombay for Dubai and for repair of Radar and V.H.F.  equipment. The  Tribunal  has  referred  to  the statements of Ramesh Shah and Abedin Abdul Hussain Ghadiali, the two Directors, and Mohammed Yousuf Abdulla, the promoter of M/s Regent Shipping and Trade Pvt. Ltd., the local agents of the  owners of  the vessel  at Bombay  that they  had  no information that  the ship  was coming to Bombay for loading additional cargo and that they had not arranged any cargo to be located  and has  held that  if the  vessel’s voyage from Karachi to  Bombay was  for avowed purpose of lifting 100 to 125 tons  of cargo there was no reason for the Bombay agents to deny  knowledge. The  Tribunal has  pointed out that they have not  merely denied  the knowledge  but were categorical that they  have no  such information  and no  cargo had been arranged. In  so far  as  repair  of  V.H.F.  equipment  was concerned, the  Tribunal found  that it  was working  at the time the  vessel left Karachi till it was about 150 nautical miles away  from Bombay  and, therefore, the question of the vessel salling to  Bombay for repair of the V.H.F, could not be true.  As regard  repair of  Radar the Tribunal has taken note of  the statement of the Captain of the vessel that the radar was  out of  order even  when the  vessel sailed  from Dubai and  that some repairing of the radar were carried out at Karachi and for want of time the entire repairs could not be carried  out, and  has observed  that if the repairing of the radar  was so  important as  to require the vessel to be sent from  Karachi to Bombay no reason was forthcoming as to why the vessel did not wait at Karachi for carrying out full repairs and  that the  repair theory  was invented  for  the purpose of  the case.  On the basis of the circumstances set out in  sub-paras (i)  to (xvii)  of para 23 of the judgment the Tribunal has concluded that the voyage of the vessel for Karachi to  Bombay was  not for the avowed purpose of repair of Radar  and loading of additional cargo of 100 to 125 tons and  that   the  vessel’s  entry  in  Bombay  port  was  for clandestine disposal  of 408  packages containing electronic and textile goods of foreign origin.      As regards  the non-filing of Import Manifest at Bombay the Tribunal has pointed out that the explanation offered by the Captain  was that  he was  under the belief that customs formalities would  be attended to by the local agents, while

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Ramesh Shah,  one of  the Directors of the local agents, had stated that  since no cargo was to be unloaded he thought it was not  necessary to  file the  Import General Manifest and has held  that the  Captain was  an experienced  Captain who knew his  responsibilities and on earlier voyage he did file a ’NIL’  manifest at  another  port  and  in  his  statement recorded on September 2, 1983 the Captain had stated that he was aware  that the  manifest has  to be  delivered  to  the customs immediately  when the vessel enters the customs area even if  the vessel  comes in  Ballast and  that, therefore, there was  no good  reason for  the Captain  to be under the impression that  the agents  would  attend  to  the  customs formalities and  that the explanation of Ramesh Shah that no Import General  Manifest was required to be filed because no cargo was to be unloaded at Bombay was also not based on any reasonable ground.  The  Tribunal  rejected  the  contention based on  clause (b)  of the  proviso to  sub-section (1) of Section 30 of the Act on the view that not only  no manifest was filed but there was not even a request for accepting the manifest after  the expiry  of 24 hours after arrival of the vessel at  the Port  of Bombay.  The Tribunal did not accept the contention that in view of sub-section (3) of Section 30 of the  Act it was the responsibility of the customs officer to inform the Captain or the agents to file the manifest and that non-delivery of the manifest could not have been made a ground for confiscation of the cargo. The Tribunal held that Section 30(3)  is an enabling provision which only confers a power on  the proper  officer to  permit the  manifest being amended or supplemented if the manifest is any way incorrect or  incomplete   and  that  it  was  not  the  case  of  the respondents herein  that they had filed a manifest which was incorrect or  incomplete. The Tribunal, therefore, held that since neither the Master of the vessel nor the agents of the owners of  the vessel  MANSCO-3 at  Bombay filed  the Import General Manifest,  there was a clear violation of Section 30 of the  Act and since violation of the provisions of Section 30(1) of the Act was intentional, the Collector committed no error in  ordering the  seizure of  the goods  under section 111(f) of the Act.      With regard to the confiscation of  goods under Section 111(d) of  the Act, the submission of the respondents before the Tribunal  was that  import of good takes place only when the goods  imported in the vessel are unloaded and get mixed up with the mass and reliance was placed n decisions of High Courts wherein  the expression  "import" had been construed. The Tribunal  rejected the  said contention and has observed that the American doctrine of "original package" which holds that importation  is not over so long as the goods are still in the  original package  has no application in this country in view  of the decision of this Court in State of Bombay v. F.N. Balsara,  1951 SCR  682. Relying  upon the  decision of this Court  in Radhakrishan  v. Union  of India, 1965(2) SCR 213, the Tribunal held that importation of goods is complete when the  goods  have  crossed  the  customs  frontier.  The decisions of the High Courts on which reliance was placed by the respondents  were held  to be inapplicable on the ground that they  were given  in  the  context  of  the  particular provision under  consideration and  not in  the  context  of Section 111(d)  of the  Act. The Tribunal also observed that admittedly the  goods were  prohibited goods  which required import licence  to import  into India and admittedly no such import  licence   was  obtained  and  that  there  had  been violation of  the Import  and Export  (Control) Act,  Import (Control) Order and the provisions of the Act.      The High Court, while exercising its jurisdiction under

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Articles 226  and 227  of the Constitution, has reversed the concurrent findings  of fact  recorded by  the Collector and the Tribunal  regarding the  avowed purpose of the voyage of the vessel MANSCO-3 from Karachi to Bombay, viz., picking up additional cargo  and repair  of Radar. Disagreeing with the findings recorded  by the Collector as well as the Tribunal, the High  Court has  accepted the explanation offered by the owners and  the master of the vessel MANSCO-3 for its coming to Bombay  from Karachi.  The High Court has held that there was nothing  to show that there was any fraudulent intention on the part of the owners of the vessel, the Captain and the agents at  Karachi in  the vessel  MANSCO-3 coming to Bombay from Karachi.      Shri Usgaonkar  has assailed  the said view of the High Court and has urged that in interfering with the findings of fact recorded  by the Collector as well as the Tribunal, the High Court  has exceeded the jurisdiction vested in it under Articles 226  and 227  of the  Constitution inasmuch  as the findings recorded  by the  Collector and the Tribunal do not suffer from  any infirmity  which could justify interference by the High Court. The said contention, in our opinion, must be accepted.      While exercising  its jurisdiction  under Articles  226 and 227 of the Constitution it is not open to the High Court to  re-appreciate   the   evidence   produced   before   the subordinate  tribunal   and  on   the  basis   of  such  re- appreciation  of   the  evidence  to  arrive  at  a  finding different from  that recorded  by such tribunal. The finding of   fact  recorded  by  the  subordinate  tribunal  can  be interfered with  by the High Court only if it is found to be based on no evidence or if such a finding can be regarded as perverse.  The high Court cannot convert itself into a court of appeal.  Reference, in  this context,  may be made to the decision of  this Court  in Collector  of Customs,  Madras & Ors. v.  D. Bhoormall, 1974 (2) SCC 544, wherein it has been said:-      "Even if  the Division Bench of the      High   Court    felt   that    this      circumstantial  evidence   was  not      adequate enough  to  establish  the      smuggled character  of  the  goods,      beyond doubt,  then  also,  in  our      opinion that  was not a good ground      to justify  interference  with  the      Collector’s order  in the  exercise      of  the   writ  jurisdiction  under      Article 226  of  the  Constitution.      The  function   of   weighing   the      evidence   or    considering    its      sufficiency was the business of the      Collector    or    the    appellate      authority  which   was  the   final      tribunal  of  fact.  "For  weighing      evidence and  drawing  interference      from it",  said Birch,  J. in R. V.      Madhub Chunder "there can be canon.      Each   case    presents   its   own      peculiarities and  in  each  common      sense  and   shrewdness   must   be      brought  to  bear  upon  the  facts      elicited".  It  follows  from  this      observation that  so  long  as  the      Collector’s  appreciation   of  the      circumstantial evidence  before him      was not illegal, perverse or devoid

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    of common  sense,  or  contrary  to      rules  of  natural  justice,  there      would be  no warrant for disturbing      his finding under Article 226." [p.      555]      Similarly, in  Indru Ramchand  Bharvani & Ors. v. Union or India & Ors., 1988 (4) SCC 1, this Court has said:-      "It must  be  reiterated  that  the      conclusions arrived at by the fact-      finding bodies, the Tribunal or the      statutory   authorities,   on   the      facts, found that cumulative effect      or preponderance of evidence cannot      be interfered  with where the fact-      finding body or authority has acted      reasonably upon  the view which can      be taken  by  any  reasonable  man,      courts   will   be   reluctant   to      interfere  in   such  a  situation.      Where, however,  the conclusions of      the  fact-finding   authority   are      based  on   no  evidence  then  the      question of law arises and that may      be looked into by the courts but in      the  instant  case  the  facts  are      entirely different.[pp. 9,10]      In the  present case,  the Collector  as  well  as  the Tribunal, after  carefully considering the evidence produced during course  of the proceedings, arrived at the conclusion that the explanation offered by the owners and master of the vessel MANSCO-3 for voyage of vessel from Karachi to Bombay, namely, to pick up additional cargo at Bombay and to get the Radar  and   V.H.F.  equipment   repaired  at   Bombay   was unacceptable. Reversing  the said  view the  High Court  has accepted the  said explanation.  The  explanation  that  the vessel MANSCO-3  came to Bombay to pick additional cargo was rejected by the Collector as well as the Tribunal in view of the statements  of Ramesh  Shah  and  Abedin  Abdul  Hussain Ghadiali, the two Directors of M/s Regent Shipping and Trade Pvt. Ltd.,  the agents of the owners of the vessel at Bombay that they  had no  knowledge that  the vessel had arrived at Bombay for  lifting cargo and that no cargo was available at Bombay which  could be  picked up  by the vessel and that in the telex  which was  received by the local agents at Bombay from the  owners of the vessel at Dubai there was no mention about picking  of additional  cargo by the vessel at Bombay. No reliance  was placed on the testimony of Mohammed Yousef, the promoter of M/s Regent Shipping and Trade Pvt. Ltd., for the reason  that he  had made  conflicting and  inconsistent statements as regards the purpose of the visit of the vessel MANSCO-3 to  Bombay. The  High Court  has proceeded  on  the basis that no importance could be attached to the statements of Ramesh  Shah and Abedin Abdul Hussain Ghadiali since they are not  "well  versed  in  the  field  and  have  not  much experience to their credit". The High Court, while observing that  "the   tendency  exhibited   by  Mohamed   Yousef   to prevaricate in that behalf is so eloquent that it gives rise to a  strong inference  to be drawn against him", has chosen to rely  on his  statement that  in  his  conversation  with Mustafa (respondent No.2) on telephone he had "promised that he would  arrange the  cargo for  the ship to compensate the expenses  of  previous  dealing".  The  said  statement  was subsequently contradicted as wrong by Mohammed Yousuf in his statement. The  High  Court  has  discarded  the  subsequent disclaimer and has said:

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    "However, the  fact remains that he      had been  in contact with the Dubai      persons and  was anxious  to supply      additional   cargo   and   at   the      relevant time  had   full knowledge      that the vessel was reaching Bombay      to  lift   additional   cargo   and      therefore it follows with necessary      implications that  he had  promised      that he would supply the cargo when      the ship  comes to promise that the      ship officials  at Dubai thought it      proper to  direct the ship to go to      Bombay from  Karachi to pick up the      additional cargo  for being brought      to Dubai."      There  is  nothing  to  corroborate  the  statement  of Mohammed Yousef  on which  reliance had  been placed  by the High Court.  On the  other hand,  the said  statement  about Mohammed Yousef  having promised to arrange for the cargo at Bombay does  not find support from the telex received at the office of the agents at Bombay on August 16, 1983 from Dubai and it  is belied by the fact that no cargo was available at the Bombay port for loading on the vessel when it arrived at Bombay.      Similarly,  as  regards  repair  of  Radar  and  V.H.F. Equipment the Collector and the Tribunal have found that the Radar was  not functioning  when the  vessel left  Dubai and that it  had been  repaired at  Karachi and  that the V.H.F. equipment was  working till  the vessel reached about 100 to 150 nautical  miles from Bombay port which shows that repair of Radar  and V.H.F.  equipment could  not be the reason for the vessel  MANSCO-3 proceeding  to Bombay from Karachi. The High Court,  while accepting the explanation that one of the reasons for  the vessel to proceed to Bombay was to have the Radar and  V.H.F. equipment  repaired at  Bombay,  has  laid stress on  the fact that at the time when the vessel reached Bombay  V.H.F.  equipment  was  not  working  and  that  two mechanics were  taken to  the vessel  for repairing of Radar and V.H.F.  equipment. The  fact that  the Radar  and V.H.F. equipment had  to be  repaired at  Bombay does not, however, mean that  they were  not functioning  when the  vessel left Karachi and it cannot be said that the vessel had to proceed to Bombay for repair of Radar and V.H.F. equipment.      A Perusal  of the  impugned judgment  of the High Court shows that  while dealing  with the  Writ Petition, the High Court embarked  upon re-appreciation of the evidence and has dealt with  the matter  as if  it was  hearing an  appeal on facts.  Such   a  course,  as  indicated  earlier,  was  not permissible. The Collector and the Tribunal, after carefully considering the  evidence produced  during the course of the proceedings, had  concurrently arrived  at the  finding that the vessel  MANSCO-3 had not come to Bombay from Karachi for a bonafide  purpose and that the explanation offered for the vessel proceeding  to  Bombay  from  Karachi  could  not  be accepted.  The   said  finding   cannot   be   regarded   as unreasonable or  perverse.  We  are,  therefore,  unable  to uphold the  decision of the High Court in reversing the said finding of fact recorded by the Collector and the Tribunal.      Moreover, bonafides  of the owners or the master of the vessel has  a bearing  only on  the  applicability  of  sub- section (3)  of Section  30 which enables the proper officer to permit  the import  manifest or  import report   to    be amended or  supplemented if  he is  satisfied that  the said import manifest  or import report is in any way incorrect or

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incomplete and  there is  no fraudulent  intention.  In  the present case,  the question  of applicability of sub-section (3) of  Section 30 does not arise because no import manifest was delivered  by the  Master of the vessel at any time. The intention of  the owners  or master  of the  vessel  has  no bearing on  the exercise  of the  power of  confiscation  of goods under  Section 111 of the Act because, as laid down by this Court,  confiscation of  goods  is  an  action  in  rem directed  against   the  goods   in  respect  of  which  the contravention rendering  them liable  to be  confiscated has taken place.  [See :Shewpujanrai  Indrasanrai  Ltd.  v.  The Collector of  Customs &  Ors., 1959  SCR 821  at p. 838; and Collector of  Customs, Madras & Ors. v. D. Bhoormall (supra) ]. In  the matter  of confiscation  of goods  under  Section 111(d) of the Act intention has, therefore, no bearing. What is required  to be  seen  is  whether  the  goods  had  been imported or  attempted to  be imported or brought within the Indian customs  water for  the purpose   of  being  imported contrary to  any prohibition  imposed by or under the Act or any other  law for  the time  being in force. If it is found that any  goods have  been imported  or  attempted    to  be imported or  brought within the Indian customs water for the purpose  of  being  imported  contrary  to  any  prohibition imposed by  or under  the Act  or any other law for the time being  in   force  the   said  goods   would  be  liable  to confiscation under  Section 111(d)  and the question whether the person  importing or bringing the said goods intended to commit violation  of the  provisions of the Act or any other law for  the time being in force would be of no consequence. Similarly,  clause   (f)  of   Section  111   provided   for confiscation of   any dutiable or prohibited goods which are required to be mentioned under the regulations in any import manifest, or  import report  and which  are not so mentioned therein. In  the  matter  of  confiscation  of  goods  under Section 111(f)  what is  required to  be seen is whether the goods are  dutiable or  prohibited goods and are required to be mentioned  in the  import manifest or import report under the regulations  made under  the Act  and whether  they  are mentioned in  the import  manifest/import report.  If it  is found that  the goods  are dutiable  or prohibited goods and are required  to be  mentioned under  the  regulations  made under the  Act in the import manifest/import report but have not been  so mentioned,  the goods  would be  liable  to  be confiscated and  the intention  of the default would have no bearing on  the exercise  of power  to confiscate the goods. Since mens  rea is  not essential  for invoking the power of confiscation of  the goods under Section 111 of the Act, the intention of  the master  of the  vessel or  the  owners  of vessel  and  the  circumstances    under  which  the  vessel containing the  goods came  to Bombay  has no bearing on the exercise  of  the  power  of  confiscation  of  goods  under Sections 111(d)  and 111(f)  and all  that has to be seen is whether the  conditions prescribed under the said provisions were fulfilled  so as  to justify  the confiscation  of  the goods.      As  regards   the  non-filing  of  the  Import  General Manifest either  by the  Captain of the vessel or the agents of the  owners of  the vessel  at Bombay, the High Court has held that  the Manifest  is required  to  be  filed  "within twenty four  hours after  the arrival  of the  vessel  at  a customs station"  and that time for filing the said Manifest would have  started running only after the Bombay Port Trust charges had  been paid  and the said cargo charges were paid on August 23, 1983. According to the High Court, the customs officials boarded  the vessel  on the  morning of August 24,

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1983 at  about 9/10  a.m. and  seized the  goods immediately thereafter mainly  on the  ground  that  no  Import  General Manifest had  been filed by that time. According to the High Court, the  period of  twenty four hours had not expired and there was still time to file the Import General Manifest. We find it  difficult to  agree with  the said view of the High Court. Under  Section 30(1)  an import  manifest has  to  be delivered within  twenty four hours after the arrival of the conveyance at  a customs  station. The  expression  ’customs station’ is  defined in  Section 2(13)  to mean "any customs port,  customs   airport  or   land  customs  station."  The expression "customs  port" is  defined in  Section 2(12)  to mean "any port appointed under clause (a) of section 7 to be a customs  port and  includes a place appointed under clause (aa) of  that section  to be  an inland container depot". In the present  case, the  vessel MANSCO-3  had arrived  at the outer anchorage  of the  Bombay Port on August 20, 1983. The outer anchorage  is a  part of  the Bombay  Port. This would show that  the vessel  MANSCO-3 had  arrived at  the customs port of  Bombay on August 20, 1983. In view of Section 30(1) of the  Act the  Import General  Manifest should  have  been delivered within  twenty four  hours of  the arrival  of the vessel at  the outer  anchorage on  August 20,1983. The High Court was  in error  in holding  that the  vessel  would  be treated to  have arrived  at the  customs port  of Bombay on August 23, 1983 after the Bombay Port Trust charges had been paid and  the signal  had been  given for  the vessel  to be brought into  the inner  anchorage or  on after  August  23, 1983. Proviso  (b) to  sub-section (1)  of Section 30, which empowers the proper officer to accept the import manifest or import report  at any time after the expiry of the period of twenty  four  hours  if  he  is  satisfied  that  there  was sufficient cause  for not  delivering the import manifest or import report  or any  part thereof within twenty four hours after the  arrival of  the conveyance, has no application in the present  case because  the  Collector  as  well  as  the Tribunal have  found that  no request for filling the Import General Manifest  after the  expiry of  the period of twenty four hours was made at any time either by the Captain of the vessel or by the local agents at Bombay.      The Tribunal  has held  that the Goods that were seized from the  vessel were  prohibited goods and the said finding has not  been upset by the High Court. In the circumstances, it  must  be  held  that  there  was  contravention  of  the requirement regarding  mentioning of the goods in the Import General Manifest  by the captain of the vessel and the local agents of  the owner  of the  vessel at Bombay and the goods seized were liable to be confiscated under Section 111(f) of the Act.      The High  Court has  held that the goods were obviously in transit  to Dubai which was the port of clearance and the visit to  Bombay port  was not  illegitimate or  illegal. In holding that there was no contravention of the provisions of clauses (d)  and (f)  of Section  111  the  High  Court  has proceeded on  the basis  that since  the vessel  had come to Bombay for  legitimate purpose  and there  was  no  lack  of bonafides on  the part  of the  master and the owners of the vessel in  the ship having come to Bombay, it cannot be said that there was violation of the provisions of Section 111(d) and (f) of the Act. As indicated earlier, the finding of the High Court  that there was no lack of bonafides  on the part of the  master of  the vessel  and the owners of the ship in the ship  having come  to Bombay, has been arrived at by the High Court  after reversing  the finding of fact recorded by the Collector  and the  Tribunal and it cannot be sustained.

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We have  also indicated  that mens  rea is not essential for invoking the  power of confiscation under Section 111 of the Act and,  therefore, the  intention of  the  owners  of  the vessel or  the master  of the  vessel has  no bearing on the exercise of  the power to confiscate the goods under clauses (d) and (f) of Section 111 of the Act.      The High  Court has  also held that direction regarding of the  goods could  not be sustained for the reason that no notice as required under Section 124 of the Act was given by the Collector  to the  owners of  the goods  ordered  to  be confiscated before  passing the  order  of  confiscation  of goods and  the notice  that was given to the local agents of the owners of the vessel cannot be a substitute for a notice which is  required to  be given  to the  owners of the cargo since the  local agents  have no concern whatsoever with the owners of  the cargo.  Section  124  of  the  Act  reads  as follows:-      "124.  Issue  of  showcause  notice      before confiscation of goods, etc.-      No order  confiscation any goods or      imposing any  penalty on any person      shall be  made under  this  Chapter      unless the  owner of  the goods  or      such person-      (a) is  given a  notice in  writing      informing him  of  the  grounds  on      which it  is proposed to confiscate      the goods or to impose a penalty;      (b)  is  given  an  opportunity  of      making a  representation in writing      within such  reasonable time as may      be specified  in the notice against      the  ground   or  confiscation   or      imposition  of   penalty  mentioned      therein; and      (c)   is    given   a    reasonable      opportunity of  being heard  in the      matter:      Provided that  the notice  referred      to   in    clause   (a)   and   the      representation   referred   to   in      clause (b)  may at  the request  of      the person concerned be oral."      Shri Usgaonkar  has urged  that confiscation  of  goods under Section  111 of  the Act is in the nature of a penalty in rem  which attached  to the  goods and  is district  from personal penalty  that can  be imposed  under Section 112 of the Act  which is  a penalty  in personam. The submission is that while  a notice  under Section  124 is  required to  be issued to the person on whom penalty under Section 112 is to be imposed,  the notice  to the  owner of  the goods  is not required to be given in every case and there may be cases in which the  notice has  to be  given to the person from whose possession the goods were seized instead of the owner of the goods. Shri Usgaonkar has, in this context, pointed out that under Section  123 of  the Act  in a case where any goods to which the  said section  applies are seized under the Act in the reasonable  belief that  they are  smuggled  goods,  the burden of proving that they are not smuggled goods shall be, in a  case where such seizure is made from the possession of any  person,  on  the  person,  on  the  person  from  whose possession the goods were seized.      In the  context of the Sea Customs Act, 1878 this Court has pointed  out the  distinction between penalty in rem and penalty in personam. In the case of Shewpujanrai Indrasanrai

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Ltd. (supra)  this Court  was dealing with Section 167(8) of the Sea  Customs Act, 1878 wherein it was prescribed that it would be  an offence  "if any  goods  the  importation    or exportation of  which is  for the  time being  prohibited or restricted by  or under  Chapter IV of this Act, be imported into or  exported from India contrary to such prohibition or restriction"  and  that  "such  goods  would  be  liable  to confiscation and  any person  concerned in  any such offence shall be  liable to  a penalty not exceeding three times the value of  the goods  or not  exceeding one thousand rupees". This Court,  after pointing  out that ’a distinction must at once be  drawn between  an action in rem and a proceeding in personam’, has observed that under Section 167(8) of the Sea Customs Act:-      "The penalty  provided is  that the      goods   shall    be    liable    to      confiscation. There  is  a  further      provision  in  the  penalty  column      that any  person concerned  in  any      such offence  shall be  liable to a      penalty not  exceeding  three  time      the value  of the  goods  etc.  The      point to note is that so far as the      confiscation  of   the   goods   is      concerned, it  is a  proceeding  in      rem and  the  penalty  is  enforced      against  the   goods  whether   the      offender is known or not known; the      order of confiscation under s. 182,      Sea Customs  Act, operates directly      upon the  status of  the  property,      and  under   s.  182  transfers  an      absolute title to Government." [pp.      836,837]      By way of illustration the Court has referred to a case ’where the  offender (the  smuggler,  for  example)  is  not known, but  the goods  in respect of which the contravention has taken place are known and have been seized."      Similarly, in  the case  of D.  Bhoormall (supra)  this Court, while considering the provisions of Section 167(8) of the Sea  Customs Act, 1878, has pointed out that proceedings for confiscation  of contraband goods are proceedings in rem and the  penalty of  confiscation is  enforced  against  the goods irrespective  of whether  offender is known or unknown and it is not necessary for the customs authorities to prove that any  particular person  is concerned with their illicit importation  or   exportation  and   it  is  enough  if  the department furnishes  prima facie  proof of  the goods being smuggled stocks.  It was  observed that  the second  kind of penalty which  is enforced  against the  person concerned in the smuggling  of the  goods is  one in  personam and in the case of  the said  penalty  the  Department  have  to  prove further that  the person  proceeded against was concerned in the smuggling.  It was held that "goods found to be smuggled goods can,  therefore,  be  confiscated  without  proceeding against any  person and  without ascertaining  who is  their real owner  or who  was actually  concerned in their illicit import." [pp. 550, 551 and 554]      This  distinction   between  the   nature  of  the  two penalties ,  viz., penalty  in rem  and penalty in personam, has been  maintained in  the Act.  The  provision  regarding confiscation of  goods contained  in Sections 111 and 113 of the Act  is a  penalty in  rem which is enforced against the goods, while  the personal  penalties imposed  under Section 112 and  other provisions  of the  Act are  in the nature of

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penalty in  personam which  are enforced  against the person concerned.      Section 124  of the Act, which incorporates the rule of audi altrem  partem, one  of the  two basic  tenets  of  the principles of  natural justice,  does not have the effect of making any  alteration in  the nature  of  these  penalties. There may  be situations  where the  goods are  found to  be smuggled goods  and are seized but the identity of the owner of the  goods is not known. Can it be said that since notice cannot be issued to the owner of the goods under Section 124 of the  Act, the  goods which are found to be smuggled goods cannot be  confiscated under  Section 111 of the Act? In our view, this question must be answered in the negative because confiscation of  goods under  Section 111  of the  Act is  a penalty in  rem which  attached to  the goods  which are the subject matter of the proceedings for confiscation and if it is found  that the  goods are liable to be confiscated under Section 111  of the  Act, they  can be  confiscated  without ascertaining their  real owner.  Moreover, in  so far as the rule of  audi altrem  partem is  concerned, the  position is well settled  that an  order passed in disregard of the said principle would  not be  invalidated if it can be shown that as a result of denial of the opportunity contemplated by the said rule  the person seeking to challenge the order has not suffered  any  prejudice.  Since  Section  124  of  the  Act incorporates the  said principle of natural justice, failure to give  the notice  to the  owner of  goods would  not,  by itself, ivalidate  an order  of confiscation. What has to be seen  is  whether  the  owner  of  the  goods  has  suffered prejudice on  account of  the failure  on the  part  of  the officer passing  the order for confiscation of goods to give a notice  to the owner of the goods before passing the order for confiscation  of goods. the owner of goods ordered to be confiscated cannot be said to have suffered any prejudice in a case where notice has been given to the person responsible for  the  alleged  contravention  on  which  the  order  for confiscation of  goods is  founded and  who alone  is  in  a position to offer an explanation for such contravention. The requirement regarding  issuing of notice to the owner of the goods under Section 124 cannot, therefore, be constructed as a  mandatory  requirement  so  as  to  have  the  effect  of invalidating an order. An order of confiscation would not be rendered invalid if there is substantial compliance with the requirements of Section 124 in the sense that before passing an order  of confiscation  a notice has been given either to the owner  of the  goods or  a person who is responsible for the contravention  on which  the order  for confiscation  of goods is  founded and who alone is in a position to offer an explanation for such contravention.      In the  present case,  Show Cause Notice dated December 31, 1983  were issued by the Assistant Collector of Customs, R &  I, Bombay, to M/s Mustafa & Najibai Trading Co., Dubai, respondent No.  1,  the  owners  of  the  vessel,  MANSCO-3, Nuruddin Mustafa, respondent No. 2, the Managing Director of respondent No.  1, Abdul  Rahim Khatri,  the Captain  of the vessel, MANSCO-3,  the Promoter and the two Directors of M/s Regent Shipping and Trade Pvt. Ltd., the local agents of the owners of the vessel at Bombay, M/s Aero Meritimes Ltd., the agents of  the owners  of the  vessel at Karachi and certain other persons.  Replies to  the said Show Cause Notices were filed on  behalf of  the owners  of the vessel as well as by the Master  of the  vessel and the local agent of the owners at Bombay. The owners of the cargo did not appear before the Collector. None  of the  owners of  the cargo challenged the order for  confiscation of  goods passed  by  the  Collector

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before the Tribunal and the order of the Collector regarding confiscation of  goods became final as against the owners of the goods.  In the Writ Petition filed before the High Court respondent No.  3, claiming to be the owner of a part of the cargo which was seized and confiscated., for the  first time sought to  challenge the  orders passed  by the Collector as well as  the Tribunal  regarding  the  confiscation  of  the goods. In  Para 8  of the  Writ Petition it has been averred that before  the Collector it was pointed out that the cargo belonged to  various parties  and mainly to respondent No. 3 and the names of the owners and other persons were furnished to the  Collector and  other customs  officers and that they should be  given an  opportunity of  hearing if any judicial order is  passed  in  respect  of  the  cargo  belonging  to respondent No.  3 and  other persons.  The replies that were filed on  behalf of respondent No. 1 before the Collector in response to  the Show Cause Notice do, not, however, support the said averment. Nor is there anything in the order passed by the  Collector to  show  that  any  such  contention  was advanced before  him. the judgment of the Tribunal also does not indicate  that  any  such  plea  was  raised.  the  said contention appears  to have  been raised  for the first time before the  High  Court.  Moreover,  under  the  Show  Cause Notices the  seized goods  were proposed  to be  confiscated under Sections  111(d) and  111(f) of the Act. The owners of the vessel,  MANSCO-3, the Master of the said vessel and the local agents  of the owners of the vessel at Bombay were the best persons  who could  offer an  explanation and show that there  was   no  contravention   which  could   justify  the confiscation of  goods under  Sections 111(d)  and 111(f) of the Act.  Since the  owners of the goods were not present on the scene  and had  no personal  knowledge, they  could  not offer an  explanation other  than that offered by the owners of the  vessel, the Master of the vessel and the local agent of the owners of the vessel at Bombay. In the circumstances, it cannot  be said  that the failure to issue a notice under Section 124  to the  owners of the goods has resulted in any prejudice to  the owners of the goods that have been ordered to be  confiscated of goods passed under Sections 111(d) and 111(f) of  the Act.  We are, therefore, unable to uphold the impugned judgment  of the  Higher Court  setting  aside  the order for  confiscation of  the goods  passed under Sections 111(d) and 111(f) of the Act.      The order  of confiscation  of the  vessel MANSCO-3 was passed under  Section 115(2)  of the  Act. At  the  relevant time, Section 115 provided as under :-      "115. Confiscation of conveyances.-      (1) The following conveyances shall      be liable to confiscation.-      (a) any vessel which is or has been      within the  Indian  customs  water,      any aircraft  which is  or has been      in India,  or any  vehicle which is      or has  been  in  a  customs  area,      while constructed, adapted, altered      or fitted  in any  manner  for  the      purpose of concealing goods;      (b) any  conveyance from  which the      whole or  any part  of the goods is      thrown   overboard,    starved   or      destroyed so  as to prevent seizure      by an officer of customs;      (c)  any  conveyance  which  having      been required to stop or land under      section 106  fails to do so, except

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    for the good and sufficient cause;      (d) any  conveyance from  which any      warehoused   goods    cleared   for      exportation,  or  any  other  goods      cleared  for  exportation  under  a      claim for  drawback, are  unloaded,      without  the   permission  of   the      proper officer;      (e)   any    conveyance    carrying      imported goods  which  has  entered      India and  is afterwards found with      the whole or substantial portion of      such  goods   missing,  unless  the      master of the vessel or aircraft is      able to  account for  the loss of ,      or deficiency in, the goods.      (2) Any  conveyance or  animal used      as a  means  of  transport  in  the      smuggling of  any goods  or in  the      carriage  of   any  smuggled  goods      shall be  liable  to  confiscation,      unless the  owner of the conveyance      or animal  proves that  it  was  so      used  without   the  knowledge   or      connivance of  the  owner  himself,      his agent,  if any,  and the person      in  charge  of  the  conveyance  or      animal and  that each  of them  had      taken all  such precautions against      such use  as are for the time being      specified in the rules:      Provided  that   where   any   such      conveyance is used for the carriage      of goods  or passengers  for  hire,      the owner  of any  conveyance shall      be given  an option  to pay in lieu      of   the    confiscation   of   the      conveyance a fine not exceeding the      market price of the goods which are      sought  to   be  smuggled   or  the      smuggled goods, as the case may be.      Explanation.-  In   this   section,      "market price"  means market  price      at the  date  when  the  goods  are      seized."      The consideration  which weighed with the High Court to set aside  the order regarding the confiscation of the goods also weighed  with  it  for  setting  aside  the  order  for confiscation of  the vessel  under Section 115(2) of the Act inasmuch as  the High  Court has  found that  there  was  no fraudulent intention on the part of the owners of the vessel in directing the vessel to proceed to Bombay from Karachi to lift additional  cargo and the purpose for which the vessel, MANSCO-3, was  directed to proceed to Bombay was to lift the said additional  cargo and also to have the Radar and V.H.F. equipment repaired.  We have  already  considered  the  said aspect  of  the  case  while  dealing  with  the  matter  of confiscation of  the goods  and  have  held  that  the  said finding of  the High  Court cannot be upheld. The High Court has set  aside the  confiscation of  the vessel  also on the ground that no notice was issued to the owners of the vessel under Section  124 of  the Act.  In this  regard, it  may be stated that  the Show  Cause Notice dated December 31, 1983, indicates that the said notice was issued to Mustafa Najibi, respondent No.  2, on behalf of respondent No. 1, the owners

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of the  vessel, as well as to Abdul Rahim Khatri, the master of the  vessel and the promoter and the two directors of M/s Regent Shipping  and Trade  Pvt. Ltd.,  the  agents  of  the owners of the vessel at Bombay. Respondent No. 1, the owners of the  vessel, had  full knowledge  of the  said Show Cause Notice because a reply to the said notice was filed on their behalf as well as on behalf of respondent No. 2 and they had contested the  proceedings before  the Collector.  In  these circumstances, we  are of  the view that the order regarding confiscation of  the vessel  could not  be set  aside on the ground that  no notice  under Section  124 of  the  Act  was issued to the owners of the vessel.      As regards  the penalty  that has  been  imposed  under Section 112  of the  Act, Shri Rana, the learned counsel for respondent No.  2, has  urged that  the  Collector  and  the Tribunal were  in error  in imposing  penalty on  respondent No.2 is  the owner of the vessel. It has been submitted that respondent No.2  is only  a Managing  Director or respondent No. 1  company which is the owner of the vessel. It has also been urged  that at  the relevant  time respondent No. 2 was not in  Dubai and  that he  had no  role in the vessel being directed to  proceed to  Bombay from Karachi and, therefore, penalty under  Section 112  of the  Act cannot be imposed on him. The order passed by the Collector proceeds on the basis that respondent No. 2 is the owner of the vessel. It appears that no  contention was  raised before  the  Collector  that respondent No. 2 was not the owner of the vessel and that he had no  particular role  in the  vessel  being  directed  to proceed  to   Bombay  from  Karachi.  Before  the  Tribunal. however, a  contention was  raised that respondent NO. 2 was only the  Managing Director  of respondent No. 1 company and not the  owner of  the vessel and reliance was placed on the affidavit of respondent No. 2 dated March 25, 1985 which was filed before  the Tribunal  wherein it  was stated  that the deviation of  voyage from  Karachi to Bombay was without his pre knowledge as at that time he was away from Dubai and was in Europe  in connection with his business. On behalf of the appellants reliance  was placed  on the  reply to  the  Show Cause Notice  wherein respondent  No. 2 was described as the joint  owner  of  the  vessel.  The  Tribunal  rejected  the contention urged  on behalf  of respondent  No.  2  and  has observed that  no independent  evidence has  been adduced to establish that  respondent No.  1 company  is owned  by  any other person  other than respondent No. 2 and that it in the reply to  the Show  Cause Notice  respondent No.  2 had been mentioned as  the owner of the vessel. The Tribunal has also referred to  the statement  of Mohammed  Yousef that  he had received the telex dated August 16, 1983 from respondent No. 2  and   has  observed   that  the  said  statement  clearly established that  respondent NO.  2 knew about the voyage of the vessel from Karachi to Bombay. On that view the Tribunal upheld the penalty imposed on respondent No. 2 under Section 112 of  the Act.  We do  not find  any infirmity in the said view of  the Tribunal.  We are,  therefore, unable to uphold the contention  of Shri  Rana that the Tribunal was in error in affirming  the  penalty  of  Rs.  3,00,000/-  imposed  on respondent No. 2 by the Collector.      In the  result, the  appeal is  allowed,  the  impugned judgment of the High Court is set aside and, while restoring the orders  of the  Collector and  the  Tribunal,  the  Writ Petition filed  by the respondents is dismissed. No order as to costs.