14 November 1991
Supreme Court
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UJJAIN VIKAS PRADHIKARAN Vs RAJ KUMAR JOHRI AND ORS. ETC.

Bench: MISRA,RANGNATH (CJ)
Case number: Appeal Civil 4554 of 1991


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PETITIONER: UJJAIN VIKAS PRADHIKARAN

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: RAJ KUMAR JOHRI AND ORS. ETC.

DATE OF JUDGMENT14/11/1991

BENCH: MISRA, RANGNATH (CJ) BENCH: MISRA, RANGNATH (CJ) KULDIP SINGH (J) MOHAN, S. (J)

CITATION:  1992 AIR 1538            1991 SCR  Supl. (2) 247  1992 SCC  (1) 328        JT 1991 (4)   424  1991 SCALE  (2)1097

ACT:     Land  Acquisition  Act,  1894---Section   4(1)---Notifi- cation under  Acquisition of lands for scheme No. 23  framed under    Madhya    Pradesh   Nagar   Tatha    Gram    Nivesh Adhiniyam--Non--compliance  of  statutory  requirements  for completing  Scheme--No  malafides--Effect  of  notification- Directions of Supreme Court under the Circumstances.

HEADNOTE:     A  notification  u/s.4(1) of the Land  Acquisition  Act, 1894  was  issued for acquisition of  the  questioned  lands along  with some other lands for the purpose of  development of the town. On 17.9.80 the same was quashed.     In 1985 another similar notification was issued u/s 4(1) of the Act, for acquisition of the same lands for the Scheme No.23  framed under Madhya Pradesh Nagar Tatha  Gram  Nivesh Adhiniyam, 1973.     The  respondents challenged the notification before  the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution.     The High Court allowed the writ petitions annulling  the notification  and  holding  that the Scheme  No.23  did  not operate against certain specified lands of the  respondents. It also found that the statutory requirements for completing the  scheme were not complied with and therefore, no  action for acquisition under the Scheme could be taken.     These  appeals were filed by the  Development  Authority against the High Court judgments by special leave. Disposing of the appeals, this Court,     HELD:  1. The pre-conditions had not been complied  with strictly under the statutory provisions. The High Court  has not found any malafides. The Development Authority in  ques- tion consisted of only one person. His own order was perhaps taken by him and the gov- 248 ernmental  authorities  as  the  requisite  resolution.  The respondents did not take the ground that there was no  valid authority behind the scheme. [249 E-F]      2.   The  huge  patch of land  has  been  substantially improved upon under the scheme. Cancellation of the  notifi- cation does not bring the matter to an end. Obviously, fresh

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proceedings  would be taken after complying with the  defect if  the judgment of the High Court is allowed to  stand.  If the  acquisition  is not made the respondents  should  enjoy usual  benefits of their land on account of the  development of  the neighbouring area and if the re-acquisition  is  not made there would be claim for higher compensation. [249 G250 A]      3.   It  is  directed that the  acquisition  remain  to subject,  to the condition that the notification under  sec- tion  4(1) of the Act issued in 1985 shall be deemed  to  be one  dated 1.1.88 and the market value of the land  for  the acquisition shall be determined with reference to that date, and  that as the deemed date of the notification under  sec- tion  4(1) to be postponed by almost three years and  during this  period since the appellant has brought about the  bulk of the improvements in the neighbourhood, 25 per cent of the potential  value of the land relatable to  the  improvements made  by  the appellant would only be available to  the  re- spondents,  but in fixing market value all other  legitimate considerations  shall  be taken into account.  There  is  no intention to extend the benefit under section 28 of the  Act to the owners of the lands already acquired under the  noti- fication  of 1980 or 1985 on the basis of court’s  direction that  the  respondents’ lands shall be deemed to  have  been notified under section 4(1) of the Act on 1.1.1988. [250  B- D]

JUDGMENT:      CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal Nos.4554  to 4556 of 1991.      From the Judgment and Order dated 18.2.91 of the Madhya Pradesh  High  Court in Misc. Petition Nos. 1707,  1746  and 1797 of 1986.      D.D..Thakur,  C.S.Chazed, V.Gambhir,  Surinder  Kamail, S.K.Gambhir and N.N.Bhatt for the Appellants.      K.K. Venugopal, P.P.Rao, G.L.Sanghi, K.K. Sharma, Ashok K.  Mahajan, L.R. Singh, D.Mehta, A.Vachher, R.N.Mittal  and S.K.Mehta for the Respondents.        The Judgment of the Court was delivered by 249 RANGANATH MISRA, CJ. Special leave granted.     Ujjain  Development Authority is in  appeal  challenging the judgment of the Madhya Predesh High Court, Indore Bench, rendered in an application under Article 226 of the  Consti- tution annulling the notification issued under section 4  of the Land Acquisition Act of 1894 (hereinafter referred to as ’the Act’) by holding that scheme No.23 flamed under  Madhya Pradesh  Nagar  Tatha Gram Nivesh Adhiniyam, 1973  does  not operate against certain specified lands of the  respondents. It would appear that there was a similar notification  under section  4(1)  of the Act for acquisition of the  self  same properties  along with some 600 hectares for the purpose  of development  of  Ujjain, a historical town of  Kalidas  fame within Madhya Pradesh. On 17.9.80 for different reasons  the notification had been quashed. In 1985 the impugned  notifi- cation was issued afresh under section 4(1) of the Act.     The High Court found that the requirements of the  stat- ute  for completing the scheme for the purpose of which  the acquisition  had been made had not been complied  with  and, therefore, no action for acquisition under the scheme  could be  taken. We have heard learned counsel for both the  sides and must state that the reasoning given by the High Court is difficult  to  find fault with. There are,  however  certain

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features  which lead us not to sustain the decision  of  the High  Court. Admittedly there has been a notification  under section  50(2)  of the Adhiniyam.  Gazette  Notification  in respect  of  Scheme No. 23 has also  been  produced.  Though there  is  a finding that the pre-conditions  had  not  been complied  with strictly under the statutory provisions,  the High  Court  has not found any mala fides.  The  Development Authority in question consisted of only one person. His  own order was perhaps taken by him and the governmental authori- ties  as the requisite resolution. The respondents  did  not take the ground that there was no valid authority behind the scheme.  In the earlier petition also such a ground had  not been  raised. The High Court called for the record and  dis- covered for itself that the statutory pre-condition had  not been  complied with for the said scheme to operate. If  this question had been raised when the earlier writ petition  was filed  about 12 years back, the defect could have then  been rectified.     It  is the admitted case before us that  the  undisputed huge  patch  of land has been  substantially  improved  upon under the scheme. Cancellation of the notification does  not bring  the  matter to an end.  Obviously  fresh  proceedings would be taken after complying with the defect if the  judg- ment of the High Court is allowed to stand. If the  acquisi- tion is not made the respondents should enjoy usual benefits of their land on account of the 250 development of the neighbouring area and if the  re-acquisi- tion  is made there would be claim for higher  compensation. Looking  at the matter from these different angles, we  have thought  it  appropriate  to allow the  appeal,  vacate  the judgment  of  the High Court and allow  the  acquisition  to remain subject, however, to the condition that the notifica- tion  under section 4(1) of the Act issued in 1985 shall  be deemed  to be one dated 1.1.88 and the market value  of  the land for the acquisition shall be determined with  reference to that date. We would like to point out that the  potential value  of the land has substantially enhanced on account  of the improvements made pursuant to the notification which had been  assailed.  We  have directed the deemed  date  of  the notification  under section 4(1) to be postponed  by  almost three years and during this period the appellant has brought about the bulk of the improvements in the neighbourhood.  We direct  that 25 per cent of the potential value of the  land relatable  to the improvements made by the  appellant  would only  be available to the respondents, but in fixing  market value  all  other legitimate considerations shall  be  taken into account. We make it clear that we have no intention  to extend  the  benefit  under section 28A of the  Act  to  the owners of the lands already acquired under the  notification of  1980  or  1985 on the basis of our  direction  that  the respondents’  lands  shall be deemed to have  been  notified under  section  4(1) of the Act on 1.1. 1988.  In  fact  our order  must  be  deemed to be a  separate  notification  for acquisition and, therefore, it would not be a common notifi- cation  for  the  purpose of section 28-A of  the  Act.  The respondents  should, therefore, be entitled to this  benefit that  instead of the notification under section 4(1) of  the Act  being of 1985, it shall be treated to be  of  1.1.1988. The appellate authority is now entitled to take position  in accordance with law subject to the valuation of the  compen- sation in the manner indicated. There will be no order as to costs. V.P.R.                                         Appeals  dis- posed of.

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