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PETITIONER: U.P. SALES TAX SERVICE ASSOCIATION

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: TAXATION BAR ASSOCIATION, AGRA & ORS.

DATE OF JUDGMENT01/09/1995

BENCH: RAMASWAMY, K. BENCH: RAMASWAMY, K. HANSARIA B.L. (J)

CITATION:  1996 AIR   98            1995 SCC  (5) 716  JT 1995 (6)   306        1995 SCALE  (5)102

ACT:

HEADNOTE:

JUDGMENT:                           JUDGMENT K. Ramaswamy, j.      Leave granted.      This appeal  by special  leave arises  from  the  order dated 14th October, 1993 of the Allahabad High Court made in Writ Petition  No.   Nil of  1993 titled  The  Taxation  Bar Asociation, Agra  through its  General Secretary  & Anr. vs. The state  of  U.P.  through  the  Secretary,  Institutional Finance & Ors.  Pursuant to our direction under Article 139A (1) of  the Constitution  withdrawing the said writ petition to this Court, we dispose of the same ourselves.      The crucial  question before  us is  whether  the  High Court  could   issue  a  writ  or  direction  prohibiting  a statutory authority,  viz.,   the Appellate  Authority under Section 9  of the  Uttar Pradesh  sales Tax  Act, 1948  [for short,    the Act   ] from  discharging  the  quasi-judicial functions; direction to the State Government to withdraw all powers from it and transferring the pending cases before the officer to  any other authority?  Whether advocates would be justified to  go on  strike as  a  pressure  group  in  that behalf?      The impugned  order is  the same,  as prayed for in the main writ petition, which reads as under:           "Until  further   orders  of   this      Court, the  respondent no.3 Satti Din is      restrained from discharging his function      as Deputy  Commissioner [Appeals]  Sales      Tax, Agra  under Section  9 of  the U.P.      Sales Tax  Act.   However,  it  will  be      uponto the  Commissioner, Sales Tax U.P.      to transfer  the  cases  pending  before      respondent no.3 to some other Court".      The  facts   not  in   controversy  are   that  on  2nd September,1993, pursuant  to  a  resolution  passed  by  the Taxation Bar  Association, Agra,  one Ramesh  Chander Gupta,

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Advocate and  President of  that Association  along with two others met  respondent  No.3,    Satti  Din,  the  appellate authority in  his chamber  and  accused  him  of  "demanding illegal gratification  in the  discharge of  his  duties  as appellate authority  and dissatisfaction  widely  prevailing amongst the  advocates  and  litigants".    Allegations  and counter-allegations of  hurling abuses  against  each  other have been  made resulting  in widespread violence.  It would appear from  the record  that the  members of the appellant- Association,  the   staff  of   the  office  of  the  Deputy Commissioner and  other staff  of the Government officers in Agra and  some general  public on the one hand and advocates on the  other hand alleged to have ben involved in violence. Crimes have  been registered  against each other, with which we are  not concerned  and it  would  be  inappropriate  and inexpedient to  mention them  here in detail.  Law will take its own course.  Suffice it to state that the 1st respondent appears to  have  made  a  representation  to  the  District Magistrate, Agra, who thereon asked Satti Din to go on leave on the  condition that  advocates would withdraw the strike. Though Satti  Din had initially gone on leave, the advocates continued strike.   On  his superior officer‘s instructions, Satti Din  had rejoined  duty as  appellate authority.    On registration of  the crime  case against  the advocates,  it would appear that on September 6, 1993, an emergency meeting of associations  of Agra  and Firozabad  was held and it was resolved to  boycott and the courts and observe total strike on September  7, 1993;  and in  a joint  meeting of  all the Associations a  resolution was  passed  resolving  immediate enquiry into the charges of corruption against, and transfer of, respondent  No.3.   They further resolved to continue to boycott  courts  and  go  on  indefinite  strike  called  by Taxation   Bar    Associations.       The   advocates   made representation to  the Governor  on 4th  September, 1993 and further representations  to all  concerned.  It would appear that they  had  also  approached  the  Advocate  General  to initiate contempt proceedings against the 3rd respondent and the Advocate  General also appears to have issued show cause notice to  the  3rd  respondent  under  Section  15  of  the Contempt of  Courts Act.   We  are not  concerned  with  the legality or  appropriateness of any of the said proceedings. Suffice it  to state  that when the indefinite strike evoked no response,  the 1st respondent filed the writ petition for a mandamus for the aforestated reliefs.      To satisfy  whether there  is  some  substance  in  the allegations of  corruption imputed to the officer, we issued notice to the Government to produce his confidential service records and also directed the Secretary to the Government to file an affidavit, pursuant to which the Secretary has filed an affidavit  and  has  also  produce  confidential  service records of  the 3rd respondent.  We find no adverse remarks, much less  any allegation of corruption made against the 3rd respondent at  any time.   The  Secretary has certified that the officer is competent and honest, but an average officer. It would  appear from  the record  that  the  allegation  of demand of  illegal gratification was mentioned for the first time by  Ramesh Chander  Gupta on  2nd September,  1993.  To support the  imputations, he  filed a  copy of  the decision dated 28th  July, 1993 rendered by the 3rd respondent in the matter of  M/s. Ashok  Auto Sales  Nunihai, Agra  v.  Asstt. Commissioner [Assessment].      The allegation  of Ramesh Chander Gupta is that the 3rd respondent was  demanding in  every case  25 percent  of the assessable  tax   as  illegal   gratification  and   he  was dismissing the  appeals in  which illegal  gratification was

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not paid.   It  is not  his case  that he  paid the  alleged demanded amount.   In  the abovesaid  appeal,  the  assessee filed his  return for  the year  1989-90  and  the  admitted liability was of Rs.16,38,121.38.  The turnover was about 10 crores.   The disputed  tax amount was Rs.93,07,457.02.  The 3rd respondent  allowed  the  appeal  and  reduced  the  tax liability from  Rs.93,07,457.02 and  assessed  the  tax  for Rs.70,21,943.70.   Except the  allegation on  this occasion, and  repetition   thereafter  by  the  other  advocates,  no allegation of  corruption was  imputed to the 3rd respondent at any  point of  time earlier  to 2nd  September, 1993.  It appears from  the affidavit  filed by  one of  the advocates before the  Sales Tax  Commissioner that  the 3rd respondent dismissed his appeals for default.      We searched  for the  reasons for  the trouble.  In the face of  the Government‘s  undisputed record of integrity of the  officer  and  in  the  absence  of  any  allegation  of corruption prior  to 2nd  September, 1993 and in the face of dismissal of  the appeals  for default,  it would apear that the 3rd  respondent was  not easily  conceding to the prayer for adjournments but was disposing of the matters on merits. Thus, he  appears to  have irked or incurred the displeasure of the advocates, who, it may be, invented the imputation to avoid inconvenient  officer.   The consequential  strike was carried out by the advocates but to no success.  When it was proved to be ineffective, they tapped judicial process under Article 226  of the Constitution on October 13, 1993 and the High  Court  at  the  admission  stage  issued  the  interim direction practically  allowing the writ petition on October 14, 1993.      From these  facts the  question that emerges is whether the High  Court, at  the instance  of the  advocates and the Bar, could prohibited the quasi-judicial statutory authority from  discharging  the  statutory  duties  and  whether  was justified  in  directing  the  Government  to  withdraw  the functions from  him and  transfer the  same  to  some  other jurisdiction?      Judicial  review   is  the   basic  structure   of  our Constitution which  entrusts that  power to  the  Judiciary. Judiciary is  the sentinel  on the  qui vive  to protect the liberty and  rights of  the citizens, apart from keeping the other organs of the State exercising that process within the confines of the Constitution and the laws, Articles 323A and 323B empower  the Parliament and the appropriate legislature to make  law  to  constitute  Tribunals  to  adjudicate  the disputes, complaints  or offences with respect to all or any of the  matters specified  therein.   Sub-clause  2  (a)  of Article 323B  provides for constitution of the Tribunal "for levy, assessment, collection and enforcement of any tax".  A glance at  the provisions in Section 9 of the Act shows that any dealer  or other  person aggrieved  by an  order of  the assessing authority,  other than those passed under excluded sections,  is  provided  with  a  right  of  appeal  to  the appellate authority.   It  also regulates  the procedure for disposal of  the appeal  and in some cases the orders attain finality and  in some cases the orders are appealable to the Sales Tax  Tribunal.   The appellate  authority  has  power, after giving  opportunity of hearing, to confirm or annul or modify the  order of the assessing officer, and to reduce or enhance the amount of assessment or penalty arising from the orders of  the assessing authority.  It is also empowered to set aside  the order  and to direct re-assessment or to pass fresh order  after specified  enquiry  or  to  direct  fresh enquiry and  to submit  a report  within the specified time. Section 9  of CPC envisages to exclude taking congnizance of

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civil  dispute   by  express   provisions  or  by  necessary implication.   It  would  thus  be  clear  that  as  regards assessment, levy  and collection  of sales  tax  or  penalty under the  Act, though  the dispute in relation thereto is a cognizable civil  dispute by  a  civil  court  of  competent jurisdiction, the statute by necessary implication takes out the disputes covered by the Act from the jurisdiction of the civil  court   and  gives   exclusive  jurisdiction  to  the appellate authority  and a  further revision to the Tribunal with ultimate  power of  judicial review  by the  High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution.      It is  fundamental that  if rule  of law is to have any meaning and  content,  the  authority  of  the  court  or  a statutory authority and the confidence of the public in them should not  be allowed  to be shaken, diluted or undermined. The courts  of justice and all tribunals exercising judicial functions from  the highest  to  the  lowest  are  by  their constitution entrusted  with  functions  directly  connected with the  administration of justice.  It is that expectation and confidence  of all  those, who  have or  likely to  have business  in   that  court  or  tribunal,  which  should  be maintained so  that the  court/tribunal  perform  all  their functions on  a higher  level of  rectitude without  fear or favour,  affection   or  ill-will.      Casting   defamatory expressions upon  the character, ability or integrity of the judge/judicial officer/authority  undermines the  dignity of the court/authority  and it would tend to create distrust in the popular mind and impedes confidence of the people in the courts/tribunals  which   is  of  prime  importance  to  the litigants in  the protection  of their rights and liberties. The protection  to the  judges/judicial officer/authority is not personal  but accorded to protect the institution of the judiciary from  undermining the  public  confidence  in  the efficacy of judicial process.  The protection, therefore, is for fearless  crucial process.   Any  scurrilous, offensive, intimidatory   or   malicious   attack   on   the   judicial officer/authority  beyond   condonable  limits,  amounts  to scandalising  the   court/tribunal  amenable   to  not  only conviction for  its contempt  but also  liable to  libel  or defamation  and   damages   personally   or   group   libel. Maintenance of  dignity of  the  court/judicial  officer  or quasi-judicial authority  is, therefore, one of the cardinal principles of  rule of  law embedded in judicial review, any uncalled for  statement or  allegation against  the judicial officer/statutory authorities, casting aspersions of court‘s integrity  or   corruption  would   justify  initiation   of appropriate action for scandalising the court or tribunal or vindication of  authority or  majesty of the court/tribunal. The accusation  of the  judicial  officer  or  authority  or arbitrary and corrupt conduct undermines their authority and rudely  shakes   them  and   public  confidence   in  proper dispensation of  justice.   It is  of necessity  to  protect dignity or authority of the judicial officer to maintain the stream of  justice pure  and  unobstructed.    The  judicial officer/authority needs  protection personally.   Therefore, making wild  allegations of corruption against the presiding officer  amounts   to   scandalising   the   court/statutory authority.   Imputation of  motives  of  corruption  to  the judicial oficer/authority  by any person or group of persons is a  serious inroad  into the  efficacy of judicial process and threat  to judicial  independence and  needs to be dealt with strong arm of law.      In Brahma Prakash Sharma & Ors. vs.  The State of Uttar Pradesh [AIR  1954 SC  10] a  Constitutional Bench  of  this Court held  that a  resolution passed by the Bar Association

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expressing want  of  confidence  in  the  judicial  officers amounts to scandalising the court to undermine its authority and thereby committed contempt of the court.      In Tarini  Mohan &  Ors. v. Pleaders [AIR 1923 Calcutta 212] the facts were that pursuit to the resolution passed by the Bar  Association to  boycott the  subordinate court as a protest  against   courts  for   alleged  ill-treatment   of pleaders, the  petitioner-pleaders refused  to appear in the court.   Action was  drawn up  under Section 14 of the Legal Practitioners Act against several pleaders for their failure to appear  in the  court in  matters which were entrusted to them by  their clients.   The  Full Bench  of the High Court held that pleaders deliberately abstained from attending the court and  took part  in a concerted movement to boycott the court a  course of conduct held not justified.  The pleaders had duties  and obligations  to their  clients in respect of suits and  matters entrusted  to them  which were pending in the that  court.  They had duty and obligation to co-operate with the court in the orderly administration of justice.  By the course which they had adopted, the pleaders violated and neglected  those   duties  and   obligation  in  both  those respects.   If the pleaders thought they had a just cause of complaint, they  had two  courses open  to them  - to make a representation to  the District  judge or to the High Court. Thus boycotting  the court  was held  to be  highhanded  and unjustified and  further action  was dropped  with the  hope that those  observations would  be sufficient to prevent any further recurrence  of conduct  of a similar nature with the warning that  if the  conduct was  repeated the consequences might be of serious nature.      This ratio was followed In the matter of a pleader [AIR 1924  Rangoon   320]  wherein   also  in  pursuance  of  the resolution of the local Bar Association to boycott to court, a pleader  refrained from  appearing in  the  court  without obtaining  his   client‘s  consent   and  left   his  client undefended as  a result  of which his client was detained in jail for  about a  month more.  The Division Bench held that the pleader  was guilty  of unprofessional  conduct and  the subsequent consent  given by  the client  did not affect his liability.      It has  ben a  frequent spectacle in the recent past to witness that  advocates strikes  work and boycott the courts at the  slightest provocation overlooking the harm caused to the judicial  system in  general and  the litigant public in particular and  to themselves in the estimate of the general public.  An advocate is an officer of the court and enjoys a special status  in the  society.  The workers in furtherance of  collective   bargaining  organism   strike  as  per  the provisions of  the Industrial  Disputes Act as a last resort to  compel   the  management  to  concede  their  legitimate demands.      It is not necessary to go into the question whether the advocates, like  workmen, have  any right  at all  to go  on strike or  boycott court.   In  Federal Trade Commission vs. Superior Court  Trial Lawyers Association et al. [493 US 411 : 107  L ED  2d 851]  (1989)  the  Attorneys  who  regularly accepted court appointments to represent indigent defendants in minor felony and misdemeanor cases before the District of Columbia  Superior   Court  sought   an  increase   in   the statutorily fixed  fees they were paid for the work they had done. when  their lobbying  efforts to  get increase  in the fees failed,  all the  attorneys, as  a group,  agreed among themselves that  they would not accept any new cases after a certain date,  if the  District of  Columbia had  not passed legislation providing  for an  increase in  their fees.  The

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trial lawyers‘  association to  which the attorneys belonged supported and  publicised their  agreement.   When they were not accepting  the  briefs  which  affected  the  District‘s criminal justice  system, the Federal Trade Commission [FTC] filed a  complaint against  the trial  lawyers‘  association complaining that  they had  entered into a conspiracy to fix prices and go in for a boycott which was an unfair method of competition  violating   Section  5  of  the  Federal  Trade Commission Act  [15 USCS  45].  The administrative law judge rejected various defences of the association and recommended that the  complaint to  browbeat the  boycott be  dismissed. The Court  of Appeals  for the District of Columbia reversed the FTC  order holding  that the  attorneys are protected by Federal Constitution‘s  First Amendment etc.  On certiorari, majority of  U.S.A. Supreme  Court speaking through Stevens, J. held  that the  lawyers had  no protection  of the  First Amendment [free  speech] and  the action  of  the  group  of attorneys to  boycott the  courts constituted  restraint  of trade within the meaning of Section 1 of Shernan Act against unfair  method  of  competition.    Though  the  object  was enactment of  a favourable  legislation, the boycott was the means by  which the  attorneys sought  to obtain  favourable legislation.   The Federal  Constitution‘s  First  Amendment does not protect them.      Shri K.K.  Venugopal, a  leading senior  member of this bar and  ex-president of  the Supreme Court Bar Association, in this  article "The  Legal Profession  at the  Turn of the Century" [(1989) 1 NLSJ 121], opined that boycott amounts to contempt of  court and  the advocates  participating in  the strike keep their clients as hostages and their interests in jeopardy.   Shri P.P.Rao,  another senior member of this Bar and former President of the Supreme Court Bar Association in his article  "Strike by  Professionals" published  in Indian Advocate -  journal of  the Bar  Association of  India [Vol. XXIII  1991   (Part  I)]   -  opined   that  it  amounts  to professional  misconduct.     Shri  H.M.  Seervai,  a  noted distinguished jurist  in his article "Lawyers Strike and the Duty  of  the  Supreme  Court"  republished  in  the  Indian Advocate [Vol.  XXIII 1991  (Part I)],  opined that  lawyers ought to  know that  at least  as long  as lawful redress is available to  aggrieved lawyers,  there is  no justification for lawyers  to join  in an  illegal conspiracy  to commit a gross, criminal  contempt of  court, thereby striking at the heart of  the liberty  conferred  on  every  person  by  our Constitution.   Strike is  an attempt  to interfere with the administration of  justice.  The principle is that those who have duties to discharge in a court of justice are protected by the  law and  are shielded  by the law to discharge those duties, the  advocates in  return have  duty to  protect the courts.   For once  conceded that  lawyers are above the law and the  law courts, there can be no limit to lawyers taking the law  into their  hands to  paralyses the  working of the courts.   "In my  submission", he said that "it is high time that the  Supreme Court  and the  High Court  make it  clear beyond doubt  that they  will not  tolerate any interference from anybody  or authority  in the  daily administration  of justice.   For in no other way can the Supreme Court and the High Court maintain the high position and exercise the great powers conferred  by the  Constitution and  the  law  to  do justice without fear or favour, affection or ill-will."      Shri Nariman,  yet another  learned senior  members  of this Court and President of the Bar Association of India and Editor of  the Indian Advocate - in his article "Boycott - a lawyer’s‘s  weapon"   published  in   the  Journal   ‘Indian Advocate‘ [Vol. XVIII 1978 Nos. 1 & 2], opined that when the

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lawyers boycott the courts, confidence in the administration of justice  is shaken.   The  longer the boycott the greater the jeopardy  to the  system.   The boycotting of a court by members privileged  to practise,  there is virtually holding justice to  ransom.   It certainly  contributes to the law‘s delays.  An absention from the courts by those who have held themselves out  as practising,  there is  a  threat  to  the administration of  law and  undermines the rule of law which is the  bedrock of  our  Constitution.    He  ended  with  a quotation by  Sir Norman  Macleod [AIR 1920 Bombay 168] that "those who live by the law should keep the law".      In a recent article by R.D. Sharma published in Pioneer dated 9th  August, 1994, it is stated that law courts do not belong to  the lawyers  alone.   They belong  to the people. Lawyers must  realise the  untold harships  and miseries  to which the litigants are subjected to and the extent to which the cause  of justice  suffers on  each day they boycott the courts on  one pretext  or another.   It is this realisation which needs  to be asserted vigorously than ever before.  It is, therefore,  stated that  the public image of the lawyers admittedly is  at its  nadir and  if remedial  steps are not initiated from within, a day will come when society finds it convenient to dispense with them altogether.  If it happens, it will  be bad  not only  for the  profession but  also for freedom, democracy and rule of law in the country.      In Court  of its  own motion v. Mr. B.D. Kaushik & Ors. [1991 (4)  Delhi Lawyer 316], a full Court of the Delhi High Court was  constrained to consider the outrageous conduct on the part  of M/s.    B.D.  Kaushik,  Rajinder  Kumar,  Rajiv Khosla, Jugal  Wadhwa,  R.N.  Vats,  Jatin  Singh  and  P.S. Rathee, contemners  in that case.  The contemners, aided and abetted by  others in  large number  stormed  various  court rooms on  September 26,  1991 at  about 10.30  a.m.,    When Judges  were  transacting  their  judicial  functions;  they individually and  collectively stood  on the  chairs, tables and dais  of the  Court Masters and acted in amazing manner, shouted abuses and slogans such as "Chief Justice and Judges Hai Hai,  Murdabad".   They also  prevented various  lawyers from discharging  their judicial functions as oficers of the Court and  also stoped  the litigants  from conducting their cases in the Court.  In a threatening tone they also shouted at the  Judges saying  "Stop the work, we will not allow the courts to  function and you should retire to your chambers". They insisted  upon the Chief Justice in his Court to listen to their  Memorandum to  be read  by Rajiv  Khosla which was read by B.D. Kaushik, the President of the Association.  The contents of  the Memorandum  scandalised or  tended to lower the authority  of the  High  Court.    This  outrageous  and unbecoming episode  continued to  linger on and hover in the High Court  till almost  12.30 p.m.   The  conscience of the Court was  shocked due  to the  contumacious conduct  of the contemners for  initiation of  the Court‘s  suo mottu action under Article  215 of the Constitution.  The Full Bench, per majority, held that the contempt committed by the contemners is gravest  and that  it could  not  be  imagined  that  any contempt worse  than that  was possible, as the contempt was committed not by laymen but by those who are officers of the Courts.      In Common  Cause v.  Union of India [1995 (1) SCALE 6], this Court  is directly grappling with the problem of strike by Advocates.  Noticing that it was not necessary to go into the wider  question whether  members of the profession could at all  go on  strike or  boycott courts, it was felt that a committee be  constituted in that behalf to suggest steps to be taken  to prevent  such boycott or strike.  The committee

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suggested that,  instead of  the Court  going into the wider question, interim  arrangements be  made to  see whether  it would be  workable.   The suggestions  made on  November 13, 1994 were  incorporated in the order passed by this Court as an interim  measure that  the Advocates should not resort to the strike or boycott the court or abstain from court except in serious,  rarest of  rare  cases;  instead,  they  should resort to  peaceful demonstration  so as  to  avoid  causing hardship to the litigant public.      The Court indicated as under :           "(1) In the rare instance where any      association   of    lawyers   (including      statutory  Bar  Councils)  considers  it      imperative to  call upon  and/or  advise      members  of   the  legal  profession  to      abstain from  appearing in courts on any      occasion, it  must be  left open  to any      individual   member/members    of   that      association to be free to appear without      let,  fer  or  hindrance  or  any  other      coercive step.      (2)No such  member who  appears in court      or   otherwise   practices   his   legal      profession, shall  be visited  with  any      adverse or penal consequences, whatever,      by any association of lawyers, and shall      not suffer  any expulsion  or threat  of      expulsion therefrom.      (3)The above  will  not  preclude  other      forms of  protest by  practicing lawyers      in courts such as, for instance, wearing      of arm  bands and other forms of protest      disrupt   the   court   proceedings   or      adversely affect  the  interest  of  the      litigant.   Any such  forms  of  protest      shall not  however be  derogatory to the      court or to the profession.      (4)Office bearers  of a  Bar Association      (including Bar  Council) responsible for      taking decisions mentioned in clause (1)      above shall  ensure that  such decisions      are implemented in the spirit of what is      stated  in  clauses  (1),  (2)  and  (3)      above."      Accordingly, the  court directed the members of the bar to adopt further course of action in terms thereof.  Instead of working  that order  in its letter and spirit and given a trial, strikes  or boycotts  of courts/tribunals  are  being continued abegging.  When in writ petition No. 553/94 titled Supreme Court  bar Association  v. State  of  U.P.  &  Ors., Concerning contempt of the High Court by some of the members of the  Bar Association  of Allahabad  High  Court  and  the police officials  had come  up for  orders,  pursuant  to  a suggestion made by the Bar by order dated February 21, 1995, this Court  directed  the  Attorney  General  to  convene  a meeting of  some of the leading senior members of the Bar of the Supreme  Court to  suggest ways  and means to tackle the problem of  strike or  boycott by  the Advocates.   Pursuant thereto, the  Attorney General  for India held two meetings, whereat they  reached consensus that a Standing Committee be constituted  at  different  levels  of  courts  to  consider complaints and  to manage the crisis.  Similar views appears to have  also been expressed by the Bar Council of India and also the  Bar council  of State  of U.P.   The  problem  was relegated to be considered in the Common Cause case (supra).

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However, it  would be  imperative to  remind ourselves  that self-regulation alone  would retrieve  the  profession  from lost social respect and enable the members of the profession to keep the law as useful instrument of social order.      In  this   case,  the  respondent-Association  and  the advocates resorted  to boycott  the courts  on the  specious plea of  non-transfer of Satti Din, the appellate authority, who seems  to be  honest and willing to discharge his duties diligently.   When the Government stuck to its stand and did not yield  to the  pressure  despite  the  strike,  the  Bar Association filed writ petition in the High Court.  Question is whether  the High Court was justified in entertaining the writ petition  and issuing the directions quoted above.  The High Court  has power  to issue  a writ  of  prohibition  to prevent a court or tribunal from proceeding further when the inferior court  or tribunal  [a] proceeds  to act without or inexcess of  jurisdiction, [b]  proceeds to act in violation of the  rules of  natural justice, [c] proceeds to act under law which  is itself ultra vires or unconstitutional, or [d] proceeds to  act in contravention of the fundamental rights. None of  these situations  indisputably arises in this case. As noted  above, Section  9 of the Act is a complete code in itself for  conferment  of  jurisdiction  on  the  appellate authority, the  procedure for  dispensation and the power to pass orders  thereon.  The appellate authority was acting in furtherance thereof.   it has, therefore, to be seen whether the High  Court was  justified in issuing orders restraining the authority  from exercising  those statutory  powers  and further to  deprive that  authority to exercise those powers by transferring the same to any other jurisdiction.      S. Govinda  Menon vs.  Union of  India & Anr. [AIR 1967 SC1274] relied  on by the 1st respondent is of no avail.  In that case  the  acts  and  omissions  were  imputed  to  the officer, doubting  his integrity, good faith and devotion to duty expected  of a  civil servant,  though integral  to the discharge of  statutory functions  under  the  Madras  Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments Act, 1951.  The question was  whether   the  officer   is  amenable  to  disciplinary jurisdiction when  his conduct  or integrity  was subject of disciplinary enquiry  under All  India Services  [Discipline and Appeal]  Rules, 1955.   It  was held therein that he was amenable  to   disciplinary  jurisdiction   and  action  for misconduct.   This case has no relevance to the facts of the present case.      The decision  in Dwarka  Nath vs.  Income-tax  Officer, Special Circle, D Ward, Kanpur & Anr.  [AIR 1966 SC 81] also is of  no assistance  to the  1st respondent.   Though  this court  was   considering  the   scope  and   nature  of  the jurisdiction of  the High  Court under Article 226, there is no doubt now as regards the scope of the jurisdiction of the High Courts.   however  wide its  power be,  the question is whether a  writ or  order of  prohibition  could  be  issued prohibiting  a  statutory  authority  from  discharging  its statutory  functions  or  transferring  those  functions  to another jurisdiction.      Having given  our anxious and careful consideration, we are of the considered view that the High Court does not have the aforesaid  power.   Exercise of such power generates its rippling effect  on the  subordinate judiciary  and statuary functionaries.    On  slightest  pretext  by  the  aggrieved parties or displeased members of the bar, by their concerted action  they   would  browbeat   the  judicial  officers  or authorities, who  would always  be deterred from discharging their duties according to law without fear or favour or ill- will.    Therefore,  we  hold  that  writ  petition  is  not

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maintainable.   The impugned orders are clearly and palpably illegal and are accordingly quashed.      Before parting  with the  case, we  are  distressed  to notice, as  rightly pointed  out by  the  learned  solicitor General, that  an advocate  instead of  arming himself  with armory of  precedents, was  armed with licensed revolver and was  attending  the  courts  with  licensed  fore-arm.    He pretended to  provide himself  with the revolver to shoot in self-defence.  It is regrettable that advocates attend court with fire  arms; it  is not  befitting to the dignity of the legal profession and is a distressing feature.  Such conduct being  not   consistent  with   the  dignity  of  the  legal profession, to maintain and enhance which the 1st respondent is formed, the same needs to be deprecated.      Before drawing the curtain on this unsavory episode, we express  our   deep  appreciation  for  valuable  assistance rendered by  Shri Dipankar  Gupta, learned Solicitor General as amicus curiae and learned counsel