30 April 1969
Supreme Court
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U.P. ELECTRIC SUPPLY CO. LTD. Vs R. K. SHUKLA ANR. ETC.

Case number: Appeal (civil) 1567 of 1968


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PETITIONER: U.P. ELECTRIC SUPPLY CO.  LTD.

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: R.   K. SHUKLA ANR.  ETC.

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 30/04/1969

BENCH: SHAH, J.C. BENCH: SHAH, J.C. MITTER, G.K.

CITATION:  1970 AIR  237            1970 SCR  (1) 507  1969 SCC  (2) 400  CITATOR INFO :  RF         1971 SC2521  (11)  RF         1972 SC 451  (20)  RF         1972 SC1579  (4)  D          1975 SC1745  (2,3)

ACT: Industrial  Dispute-Electricity  undertaking taken  once  by U.P.   State  Electricity  Board  under  s.  6   of   Indian Electricity  Act, 1910-Retrenchment compensation claimed  by workmen-Dispute  whether  to  be  decided  under  Industrial Disputes  Act,  1947  (Central)  or  under  U.P.  Industrial Disputes  Act, 1947-Sec. 6-H(2) of U.P. Act-Jurisdiction  of Labour  Court  under--Whether  can  decide  question  as  to retrenchment  compensation being payable-Effect of  s.  6-O- Board whether liable to pay the compensation Effect of ss. 6 and  7  of  Indian  Electricity Act  and  Cl.   V  of  Sixth Schedule.

HEADNOTE: In  exercise  of  the  power  under  s.  6  of  the   Indian Electricity  Act,  1910 the undertakings  of  the  appellant company  at  Allahabad and Lucknow were taken  over  by  the State Electricity Board, U.P. with effect from September 17, 1964.   The  workmen  of the company  were  taken  into  the employment  of the Board without any break in continuity  of employment.   Certain workmen of the  Allahabad  undertaking filed  before the Labour Court applications under s.  6-H(2) of  the  U.P. Industrial Disputes Act 1947, for  payment  of retrenchment  compensation and salary in lieu of notice.   A group  of  workmen ’from the Lucknow undertaking  also  sub- mitted  applications under s. 6-H(2) with the same  prayers; in addition they claimed compensation for accumulated earned leave not enjoyed by them     till September 16, 1964.   The Labour Court allowed the applications.  The Company appealed to  this  Court by special leave.         According  to  the company  there  was no retrenchment of the  workmen  because they had voluntarily left the service of the company to join the  service  of the Board with no break in  their  service. The  questions that fell for consideration wer  (i)  Whether the  matter  was to be decided under the provisions  of  the Industrial   Disputes  Act,  1947  or  those  of  the   U.P.

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Industrial Disputes Act, 1947; (ii) Whether the Labour Court had  jurisdiction under s. 6-H(2) of the U.P. Act to  decide the applications or because of there being dispute as to the liability to pay retrenchment compensation the matter was in view  of  item  10 of the second schedule to  the  U.P.  Act within   the  exclusive  jurisdiction  of   the   Industrial Tribunal;  (iii)  Whether  s.  6-0  of  the  U.P.  Act  also necessitated   that  the  question  of  liability   to   pay retrenchment compensation be first determined; (iv)  Whether in view of ss. 6 & 7 of the Indian Electricity Act, 1910 and ss.  57 & 57A of the Indian Electricity (Supply)  Act,  1948 read  with  Cl.   V  of  the  sixth  schedule  thereto,  the liability  to pay retrenchment compensation was that of  the Board and not that of the company; (v) Whether the claim  of the  Lucknow workmen for compensation for earned  leave  not enjoyed by them was allowable. Held  : (i) Under the Seventh Schedule to  the  constitution legislation in respect of ’Trade Union Industrial and Labour Disputes’  falls within Entry 22 of the Concurrent List  and both  the State and the Union are competent to legislate  in respect  of that field of legislation.  Act 1 of 1957  added to  the U.P. Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, s. 6-R(2)  which enacts  that  the rights and liabilities  of  employers  and workmen  relating  to  lay-off  and  retrenchment  shall  be determined in accordance with the provisions of 508 ss.  6-J to 6-0.  Act 1 of 1957 received the assent  of  the President  and by virtue of Art. 254(2) of the  Constitution s. 6-R(2) of the U.P. Act prevails notwithstanding any prior law  made by the Parliament.  The rights and obligations  of the  parties had therefore to be decided under the U.P.  Act including s. 6-R(2). [511 H-512 D] Rohtak  & Hissar Districts Electric Supply Company v.  State of U.P., [1966] 11 L.L.J. 330, distinguished. (ii) Section   6-H(1)   and  (2)  of  the  U.P.   Act   were substantially the same as     sub-ss. (1) and (2) of s. 33-C of the Central Act and cases decided    by this Court  under the latter provisions were applicable in the  interpretation of the former.  According to the rule laid down in s. 6-H(2) the  Labour  Court  was competent  to  determine  what  each workman was entitled to receive from the employer by way  of retrenchment compensation payable in terms of money and  the denial  of  liability  of the company  did  not  affect  the jurisdiction of the Labour Court.  Where, however, as in the present  case, the dispute was whether the workmen had  been retrenched and computation of the amount of compensation was subsidiary or incidental, the, Labour Court had no authority to trespass upon the powers of the industrial Tribunal which had  exclusive  jurisdiction  under item 10  of  the  second schedule  of  the U.P. Act to decide  disputes  relating  to retrenchment. [514 B-D 517 F] The  Central Bank of India, Ltd. v. P. S.  Rajagopalan  etc. [1964]  3 S.C.R. 140 and Bombay Gas Co. Ltd. v. Gopal  Bhiva and Others, [1964] 3 S.C.R. 709, applied. The  Board  of  Directors of  the  South  Arcot  Electricity Distribution Co. Ltd. v. N. K. Mohammad Khan etc., [1969]  2 S.C.R. 902, explained. Chief Mining Engineer, East India Coal Co. Ltd. v.  Rameswar and  Others, [1968] 1 S.C.R. 140, State Bank of Bikaner  and Jaipur  v. R. L. Khandelwal, [1968] 1 L.L.J. 589 and  Punjab National Bank Ltd. v. K. L. Kharbanda, [1962] Supp. 2 S.C.R. 977, referred to. (iii)     Assuming that the Labour Court had jurisdiction to determine  the liability of the company to pay  retrenchment compensation  no  order awarding  retrenchment  compensation

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could still be made without recording a finding that workmen were  retrenched  and  compensation  was  payable  for   the retrenchment.   For  s.  6-0 of the U.P.  Act  deprives  the workmen  of  the right to retrenchment compensation  in  the conditions  mentioned therein.  The company asserted ,  that the conditions precedent to the exercise of the jurisdiction did  not exist while the workmen asserted the  existence  of the  conditions.   Without deciding the,  issue  the  Labour Court  could not compute the amount of compensation  payable to  the workmen on the assumption that the workmen had  been retrenched  and their claim fell within s. 6-0. [518 B;  519 B-C] (iv) Sections 6 and 7 of the Indian Electricity Act did  not support  the  case  of the Company that  the  liability  was enforceable  against  the  Board  after  it  took  over  the undertaking.   Under  these sections  when  the  undertaking vests  in  the  purchaser, any  debt,  mortgage  or  similar obligation attaches to the purchase money in substitution of the   undertaking.   The  liability  to   pay   retrenchment compensation  is a debt : if it arises on transfer  it  will attach  to  the  purchase money payable to  the  Company  in substitution of the undertaking. [521 A-B] 509 (v)  The  provisions  of  ss.  57  and  57A  of  the  Indian Electricity (Supply) Act, 1948, also did not assist the case of  the  Company.  These sections deal with  the  licencee’s charges  to  consumers and the Rating  Committees.   In  the Sixth  Schedule to the Act (incorporated into every  license by s. 57 ’aforesaid) it is provided by cl.  IV that  certain amount  shall be appropriated towards Contingencies  Reserve from  the revenues of each year of account.  Clause  V  then provides for the appropriation of the Contingencies  Reserve :it requires the undertaking to hand over the  Contingencies Reserve to the purchaser.  If the retrenchment  compensation becomes  properly  due to the employees of the  Company,  it would,  by virtue of cl.  V sub-cl. (2) proviso, be  charged upon  the Contingencies Reserve and the balance alone  would be  handed  over  to the purchaser.   In  the  present  case however  there was no finding by the Labour Court  that  the Contingencies  Reserve had been paid over to the  purchaser. 521  C-522  Cl  (vi) The claim of  the  Lucknow  workmen  to compensation  in  lieu of earned leave not enjoyed  by  them could not be allowed.  After the company closed its business it  could  obviously  not give any  earned  leave  to  these workmen ’and the latter could not claim it.  In the  absence of a statutory provision to that effect no such compensation was payable. [522 E]

JUDGMENT: CIVIL  APPELLATE  JURISDICTION: Civil Appeals Nos.  1567  of 1968, 585 to 1026 and 1027 to 1082 of 1969. Appeals  by  special leave from the orders dated  March  28, 1968  and  July  20, 1968 of the Labour  Court  (11),  U.P., Lucknow in     Misc. Cases Nos. 102 of 1965 etc. M. C. Chagla, Harish Chandra, H. K. Purl and Bishambar Lal for the appellant (in all the appeals).      J. P. Goyal and V. C. Prashar, for respondent No. 1 (in all  the appeals).      S.  P. Nayar, for the Attorney-General (in  C.As.  Nos. 585 to    1026 and 1027 to 1082 of 1969). The Judgment of the, Court was delivered by Shah, J. These three groups of appeals arise out of orders      made by the Presiding Officer, Labour Court (11), U.P.,

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Lucknow   awarding  retrenchment  compensation  to   certain employees  of  the  U.P. Electric Supply  Company  Ltd.  (in liquidation).  In  the last group of appeals orders  of  the Labour  Court awarding in addition thereto compensation  for earned   leave  not  enjoyed  by  the  employees  are   also challenged. The U.P. Electric Supply Company Ltd.-hereinafter called the Company’-held two licences issued in 1914 by the  Government of  U.P. for generating and distributing electricity  within thetowns  of  Allahabad  and Lucknow.  The  periods  of  the licenses  expired  in 1964. Pursuant to  the  provisions  of paragraph 12(1) in each of the said licenses and in exercise of the power under s. 6 of the Indian Electricity Act, 1910, the State Electricity Board, U.P.-hereinafter referred to as "the  Board  took  over the undertaking of  the  Company  at Allahabad  and Lucknow from the mid-night of  September  16, 1964.  The Company accordingly 510 ceased   to  carry  on  the  business  of   generation   and distribution  of  electricity in the areas  covered  by  the original  licences.  All the workmen of the undertakings  at Allahabad  and Lucknow were taken over in the employment  of the  Board with effect from September 17, 1964, without  any break in the continuity of employment. On December 22, 1964, 443 workmen employed in the  Allahabad undertaking  filed  before the  Labour  Court,  applications under  S. 6-H(2) of the U.P. Industrial Disputes Act,  1947, for payment of retrenchment compensation and salary in  lieu of  notice.   The work-men submitted that fresh  letters  of appointment were issued by the Board on September 16,  1964, taking them in the employment of the Board with effect  from September  17, 1964 "in the posts and positions  which  they previously  held", but without giving credit for their  past services with the Company.  The workmen contended that  they were  entitled  to retrenchment compensation and  salary  in lieu of notice, and prayed for computation of those benefits in  terms of money and for directions to the Company to  pay them the amount so computed. A group of 56 workmen employed at the Company’s  undertaking at Lucknow also submitted applications under s. 6H(2) of the U.P.  Industrial Disputes Act, for payment  of  retrenchment compensation  and  salary  in lieu of notice  and  also  for compensation  for  accumulated earned leave not  enjoyed  by them till September 16, 1964. In  the applications filed by the workmen of  the  Allahabad undertaking,  the  Labour  Court  awarded  to  each  workman retrenchment  compensation  at the rates  specified  in  the order  and  also  one month’s salary  and  costs.   To  each workman of the Lucknow undertaking the Labour Court  awarded retrenchment  compensation at the rate specified, salary  in lieu of one month’s notice, and also, wages for 30 days  for earned  leave not enjoyed by the workman before the  closure of the undertaking, and costs.  The Company has appealed  to this Court against the orders with special leave. The  orders  for payment of  retrenchment  compensation  are resisted by the Company on two grounds-               (i)   that the Labour Court was incompetent to               entertain  and  decide  the  applications  for               awarding retrenchment compensation; and               (ii)  that  the  workmen  were  not  in   fact               retrenched, and in any event since the workmen               were  admitted  to the service  of  the  Board               without break in continuity, and on terms  not               less favourable than the terms enjoyed by them               with the Com-

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             511               pany,  the Company was under no  liability  to               pay retrenchment compensation. Some  argument  was advanced before us that  in  determining matters relating to the award of retrenchment  compensation, the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, and not the U.P. Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, apply.  The question is  academic, because on the points in  controversy  between the  parties,  the statutory provisions  of  the  Industrial Disputes  Act, 1947, and the U.P. Industrial  Disputes  Act, 1947, are substantially the same.  We may, however,  briefly refer  to  this argument since, relying upon a  judgment  of this Court to be presently noticed, counsel for the  workmen insisted  that  s. 33-C(2) of the  Industrial  Disputes  Act alone may apply. After the enactment of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, by the  Dominion Parliament, the U.P. Industrial Disputes  Act, 1947, was enacted by the Provincial Legislature.  The scheme of  them  two Acts is substantially the same.   Chapter  V-A relating  to  layoff  and  retrenchment  was  added  in  the Industrial  Disputes Act by Act 43 of 1953 with effect  from October 24, 1953.  From time to time amendments were made in the provisions of the Act.  By s.   25-J (2) it was provided               "For  the  removal  of doubts,  it  is  hereby               declared   that  nothing  contained  in   this               Chapter   shall  be  deemed  to   affect   the               provisions of any other law for the time being               in  force in any State in so far as  that  law               provides  for  the  settlement  of  industrial               disputes,  but the rights and  liabilities  of               employers and workmen in so far as they relate               to  lay-off and retrenchment shall  be  deter-               mined  in  accordance with the  provisions  of               this Chapter."               After this sub-section was incorporated in the               Industrial  Disputes  Act, 1947,  a  group  of               sections including s. 6-R were incorporated in               the U.P. Industrial Disputes Act by U.P. Act 1               of 1957.  Section 6-R(2) provided :               "For  the  removal  of doubts,  it  is  hereby               declared that nothing contained in Sections 6-               H  to  6-R  shall ’be  deemed  to  affect  the               provision of any other law for the time  being               in  force so far as that law provides for  the               settlement  of  industrial disputes,  but  the               rights   and  liabilities  of  employers   and               workmen  in so far as they relate  to  lay-off               and   retrenchment  shall  be  determined   in               accordance with the provisions of Sections 6-H               to 6-Q." By virtue of s. 6-R(2) the provisions of the U.P. Industrial Disputes  Act, prima facie, apply in the matters of  lay-off and retrenchment, because under the Seventh Schedule to  the Constitution 512 legislation  in  respect of "Trade  Unions,  Industrial  and Labour  Disputes"  falls within Entry 22 of  the  Concurrent List  and  both  the State and the Union  are  competent  to legislate in respect of that field of legislation.   Whereas by  adding  s.  25-J(2)  it  was  enacted  that  under   the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, the rights and liabilities of employers  and workmen in so far as they relate  to  lay-off and retrenchment shall be determined in accordance with  the provisions  of  Ch.   V-A of that Act, by the  U.P.  Act  as

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amended  by Act 1 of 1957, s. 6-R(2) enacts that the  rights and liabilities of employers and workmen relating to lay-off and retrenchment shall be determined in accordance with  the provisions of ss. 6-J to 6-Q. Competence  of the State Legislature to enact s.  6-R(2)  is not  denied.   Act  1 of 1957 received  the  assent  of  the President  and by virtue of Art. 254(2) of the  Constitution s.  6-R(2)  of the U.P. Act  prevails,  notwithstanding  any prior  law  made by the Parliament.  The provisions  of  the U.P. Act including s. 6-R(2) therefore apply in  determining the  rights  and obligations of the parties  in  respect  of retrenchment compensation.  The observation to the  contrary made  by  this Court in Rohtak & Hissar  Districts  Electric Supply Company v. State of U.P. (1) which primarily raised a dispute  relating to the validity of certain model  standing orders  proceeded  upon a concession made at  the  Bar,  and cannot   be  regarded  as  decisive.   Since  the   relevant provisions  of the two Acts on the matter in controversy  in these groups of appeals are not materially different, we  do not think it necessary in this case to refer the question to a larger Bench. We, accordingly, propose to refer only to, the provisions of the U.P. Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.  Section 4-A of  the U.P.  Act authorises the State Government to constitute  one or  more  Labour Courts for the adjudication  of  industrial disputes  relating  to  any matter specified  in  the  First Schedule  and for performing such other functions as may  be assigned to them under the Act.  The items specified in  the First Schedule are-               1.    The  propriety or legality of  an  order               passed  by  an  employer  under  the  Standing               Orders;               2 .   The  application and  interpretation  of               Standing Orders               3 .   Discharge   or  dismissal   of   workman               including reinstatement of, or grant of relief               to, workmen wrongfully dismissed;               4.    Withdrawal  of any customary  concession               or privilege;               (1) [1966] 11 L.L.J. 330.               513               5.    Illegality  or otherwise of a strike  or               lock-out; and               6.    All matters other than those,  specified               in the Second Schedule."               Section 4-B authorises the State Government to               constitute  one or more  Industrial  Tribunals               for  the adjudication of  industrial  disputes               relating  to any matter whether  specified  in               the  First  Schedule or the  Second  Schedule.               Item  10  of the Second  Schedule  relates  to               "Retrenchment   of  workmen  and  closure   of               establishment". Prima facie, disputes relating               to  retrenchment  of workmen  and  closure  of               establishment   fall  within   the   exclusive               competence of the Industrial Tribunal, and not               within  the  competence of  the  Labour  Court               constituted  under  s. 4-A.  The  Company  had               expressly  raised a contention that  they  had               not  retrenched  the  workmen  and  that   the               workmen   had   voluntarily   abandoned    the               Company’s  service by seeking employment  with               the Board’ even before the Company closed  its               undertaking.               The workmen contended by their petitions filed

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             before  the  Labour  Courts  that  they   were               retrenched,  the  Company contended  that  the               workmen   had   voluntarily   abandoned    the               employment  under  the  Company  because  they               found it more profitable to take up employment               under the Board without any break in the  same               post  and on the same terms and conditions  on               which they were employed by the Company.  This               clearly raises the question whether there  was               retrenchment  of workmen, which gave  rise  to               liability to pay retrenchment compensation.  A               dispute    relating   to    retrenchment    is               exclusively  within  the  competence  of   the               Industrial  Tribunal by virtue of item  10  of               the  Second  Schedule to the  U.P.  Industrial               Disputes Act, and is not within the competence               of the Labour Court.  Section 6-H of the  U.P.               Act provides :               (1)   Where any money is due to a workman from               an  employer under the provisions of  Sections               6-J to 6-R or under a settlement or award,  or               under an award given by an adjudicator or  the               State   Industrial   Tribunal   appointed   or               constituted  under this Act, before  the  com-               mencement  of  the  Uttar  Pradesh  Industrial               Disputes    (Amendment    and    Miscellaneous               Provisions)   Act,  1956,  the  workman   may,               without   prejudice  to  any  other  mode   of               recovery,  make  an application to  the  State               Government  for the recovery of the money  due               to  him,  and  if  the  State  Government   is               satisfied that any amount is so due, it  shall               issue  a  certificate for that amount  to  the               Collector  who  shall proceed to  recover  the               same as if it were an arrear of land revenue.               (2)   Where any workman is entitled to receive               from the employer any benefit which is capable               of  being  computed  in terms  of  money,  the               amount at which such               514               benefit should be computed may, subject to any               rules  that  may  be made under  this  Act  be               determined  by  such Labour Court  as  may  be               specified   in  this  behalf  by   the   State               Government,  and the amount so determined  may               be  recovered as provided for  in  sub-section               (1).               (3) Under S. 6-H(2) the Labour Court was competent to  determine what each workman was entitled to receive from the  employer by  way  of retrenchment compensation payable  in  terms  of money  and  the denial of liability by the Company  did  not affect the jurisdiction of the Labour Court. In  several  decisions  of  this  Court  the  inter-relation between   sub-ss.   (1)  &  (2)  of  s.  33-C   (which   are substantially  in the same terms as sub-ss. (1) & (2) of  S. 6-H  of the U.P. Industrial Disputes Act) was examined.   It was held by this Court in The Central Bank of India Ltd.  v. P.  S. Rajagopalan etc.(1) that the scope of s.  33-C(2)  is wider than that of S. 33-C(1).  Claims made under s. 33-C(1) can only be those which are referrable to settlement,  award or   the  relevant  provisions  of  Ch.   V-A,   but   those limitations  are not to be found in S. 33-C(2).   The  three categories  of claims mentioned in S. 33-C(1) fall under  S. 33-C(2) and in that sense s. 33-C(2) can itself be deemed to

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be  a kind of execution proceeding, but it is possible  that claims  not based on settlements, awards or made  under  the provisions  of Ch.  V-A may also be competent under  s.  33- C(2).   Elaborating  this  thesis  Gajendragadkar,  J.,  who delivered the judgment of the Court observed (pp. 155-156)               "There is no doubt that the three,  categories               of claims mentioned in s. 33C(1) fall under s.               33C(2) and in that sense, s. 33C(2) can itself               be   deemed   to  be  a  kind   of   execution               proceeding; but it is possible that claims not               based on settlements, awards or made under the               provisions   of  Chapter  V-A,  may  also   be               competent   under  s.  33C(2)  and  that   may               illustrate   its  wider  scope.    We   would,               however,  like to indicate some of the  claims               which would not fall under s. 33C(2),  because               they formed the subject matter of the  appeals               which  have  been  grouped  together  for  our               decision along with the appeals with which  we               are  dealing  at present.  If an  employee  is               dismissed  or demoted and it is his case  that               the  dismissal  or demotion  is  wrongful,  it               would  not be open to him to make a claim  for               the  recovery of his salary or wages under  s.               33C(2).   His demotion or dismissal  may  give               rise to an industrial dispute which may               (1)   [1964] 3 S.C. 140.                515               be  appropriately tried, but once it is  shown               that  the  employer has dismissed  or  demoted               him, a claim that the dismissal or demotion is               unlawful   and,   therefore,   the    employee               continues  to be the workman of  the  employer               and  is  entitled to the benefits due  to  him               under a pre-existing contract, cannot be  made               under s. 33C(2)." The same view was reiterated in Bombay Gas Co. Ltd. v. Gopal Bhiva and Others(1). Mr. Goyal on behalf of the workmen, however, contended  that in a recent judgment of this Court a different view has been expressed.   He  invited  our  attention  to  The  Board  of Directors  of the South Arcot Electricity  Distribution  Co. Ltd.  v.  N.  K. Mohammad Khan, etc.(2). In  that  case  the Electricity undertaking was taken over by the Government  of Madras  in  exercise of the powers conferred by  the  Madras Electricity Supply Undertakings (Acquisition) Act, 1954, and the employees of the undertaking were taken over by the  new employer.   The employees claimed retrenchment  compensation from  the  old  employer under s. 25FF,  of  the  Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.  It was urged before this Court that the Labour  Court  was  incompetent  to  decide  the  claim  for retrenchment  compensation.   This Court  observed  that  s. 25FF(b)  applied  as  the terms of  service  under  the  new employer  were  less  favourable than those  under  the  old employer,  and under the terms of ss. 15 (1 ) & (2)  of  the Acquisition  Act  and  ss.  9A  and  10  of  the  Industrial Employment  (Standing  Orders) Act, 1946, liability  to  pay retrenchment compensation rested upon the previous  employer and  on  that  account the Labour  Court  was  competent  to entertain the petitions under s. 33C(2).  The language of s. 25FF  in the view of the Court made it perfectly clear  that if  the  right to compensation accrued under  the  Act,  the workmen    became   entitled   to    receive    retrenchment compensation,  when  under the Madras  Act  the  undertaking stood transferred to the State Government from the  Company.

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Referring  to the contention that the Labour Court  was  not competent  to  determine the liability to  Day  retrenchment compensation,  where  the liability itself was  denied,  the Court  referred  to  the judgments of this  Court  in  Chief Mining  Engineer, East India Coal Co. Ltd. v.  Rameswar  and Others(3);  State Bank of Bikaner (4) ; and Jaipur v. R.  L. Khandelwal Punjab National Bank Ltd. v. K. L.  Kharbanda(5); Central  Bank of India v. P. S. Rajagopalan  and  Others(6); and  Bombay Gas Company Ltd. v. Gopal Bhiva  and  Others(1), and proceeded to observe that the right (1) [1964] (2) [1969] 2 S.C.R. 902. (3) [1968] 1 S.C.R. 140. (4) [1968] 1 L.L.J. 589. (5) [1962]  Supp. 2 S.C.R. 977. (6) [1964] 3 S.C.R. 140. 516 which  has  been  claimed by the various  workmen  in  their applications  under S. 33C(2) of the Act was a  right  which accrued to them under s. 25FF of the Act and was an existing right at the time when those applications were made, and the Labour Court had jurisdiction to decide, in dealing with the applications under that provision, whether such a right  did or  did  not exist.  The mere denial of that  right  by  the Company,  it was said, could not take away its  jurisdiction and that the order of the Labour Court was competently made. The  decision in the Central Bank of India v. P. S.  Rajago- palan  and  Others(1), to which we  have  already  referred, makes  it clear that all disputes relating to  claims  which may be computed in terms of money are not necessarily within the  terms  of S. 33C(2).  Again in Chief  Mining  Engineer, East India Coal Co. Ltd. v. Rameswar and Others (2 ) Shelat, J., observed :               "........ that the right to the benefit  which               is sought to be computed under S. 33C(2)  must               be  an existing one, that is to  say,  already               adjudicated  upon  or provided  for  and  must               arise in the course of and in relation to  the               relationship between an industrial workman and               his  employer.  Since the scope of sub-s.  (2)               is wider than that of sub-s. (1) and the  sub-               section is not confined to cases arising under               an  award, settlement or under the  provisions               of Ch.  V-A, there is no reason to hold that a               benefit  provided  for under a  statute  or  a               scheme  made thereunder, without -there  being               anything  contrary  under such statute  or  s.               33C(2),   cannot  fall  within   sub-s.   (2).               Consequently,  the  benefit  provided  in  the               bonus scheme made under the Coal Mines  Provi-               dent  Fund and Bonus Schemes Act, 1948,  which               remains to be computed must fall under  sub-s.               (2)   and  the  Labour  Court  therefore   had               jurisdiction  to  entertain  and  try  such  a               claim,  it  being  a claim in  respect  of  an               existing  right arising from the  relationship               of an industrial workman and his employer." That  judgment clearly indicates that in order that a  claim may be adjudicated upon under S. 3 3C (2), there must be  an existing  right  and the right must arise  under  an  award, settlement  or under the provisions of Ch.  V-A, or it  must be  a  benefit  provided  by a  statute  or  a  scheme  made thereunder  and there must be nothing .contrary  under  such statute or S. 3 3C (2).  But the possibility of a mere claim arising under Ch.  V-A is not envisaged by the Court in that

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case  as  conferring jurisdiction upon the Labour  Court  to decide matters which are essentially within the jurisdiction of the  Industrial Tribunal. (1)  [1964] 3 S.C.R. 140. (2) [1968] 1 S.C.R. 140. 517 The legislative intention disclosed by ss. 33 C ( 1 ) and  3 3 -C (2) is fairly clear.  Under s. 33-C(1) where any  money is  due to a workman from an employer under a settlement  or an  award or under the provisions of Ch.  V-A,  the  workman himself, or any other person authorised by him in writing in that  behalf,  may make an application  to  the  appropriate Government  to recover of the money due to him.   Where  the workman  who  is entitled to receive from the  employer  any money  or any benefit which is capable of being computed  in terms of money, applies in that behalf, the Labour Court may under  s.  33-C(2) decide the questions arising  as  to  the amount  of  money  due or as to the  amount  at  which  such benefit shall be computed.  Section 33-C(2) is wider than s. 33C(1).   Matters which do not fall within the terms  of  s. 33C(1)  may,  if  the workman is shown  to  be  entitled  to receive  the benefits, fall within the terms of  s.  33C(2). If  the liability arises from an award, settlement or  under the  provisions of Ch.  V-A, or by virtue of a statute or  a scheme made thereunder, mere denial by the employer may  not be sufficient to negative the claim under s. 33-C(2)  before the  Labour Court.  Where however the right to  retrenchment compensation which is the foundation of the claim is  itself a  matter which is exclusively within the competence of  the Industrial  Tribunal to be adjudicated upon a reference,  it would  be straining the language of section 33C(2)  to  hold that the question whether there has been retrenchment may be decided by the, Labour Court.  The power of the Labour Court is to compute the compensation claimed to be payable to  the workmen  on the footing that there has been retrenchment  of the  workmen.  Where retrenchment is conceded, and the  only matter in dispute is that by virtue of s. 25FF no  liability to  pay  compensation has arisen the Labour  Court  will  be competent  to  decide  the question.  In  such  a  case  the question is one of computation and not of determination,  of the  conditions  precedent  to  the  accrual  of  liability. Where,  however,  the dispute is whether workmen  have  been retrenched  and computation of the amount is  subsidiary  or incidental,  in our judgment, the Labour Court will have  no authority  to trespass upon the powers of the Tribunal  with which  it  is  statutorily  invested.   In  the   unreported judgment  of  this Court in The Board of  Directors  of  the South  Arcot  Electricity  Distribution Co. Ltd.  v.  N.  K. Mohammed Khan, etc.(1) apparently the only argument advanced before  this  Court was that s. 25FF applied  to  that  case having regard to the fact that the terms of employment under the  new  employer  were  not  less  favourable  than  those immediately applicable to them before the transfer, and  the Court proceeded to hold that the Labour Court was  competent to determine the compensation. (1)  [1969] 2 S.C.R. 902. 518 The  finding  that  the  Labour  Court  was  incompetent  to decide .the applications of the workmen would be  sufficient to  dispose of the appeals before us.  But  other  arguments were advanced before us, and which have an important bearing on  the claims made : we propose briefly to deal with  these arguments. Assuming that the Labour Court had jurisdiction to determine the   liability   of  the  Company   to   pay   retrenchment

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compensation  no  order awarding  retrenchment  compensation could  still be made without recording a finding that  there was retrenchment of the workmen and compensation was payable for  retrenchment.   Section  6-0  of  the  U.P.  Industrial Disputes Act (which in its phraseology is somewhat different from s. 25FF of the Industrial -Disputes Act) provides :               "Notwithstanding anything contained in Section               6-N   no   workman  shall   be   entitled   to               compensation  under  that  section  by  reason               merely  of  the  fact that there  has  been  a               change  of  employers in any  case  where  the               ownership or management of the undertaking  in               which  he is employed is transferred,  whether               by agreement or by operation of law, from  one               employer to another               Provided that-               (a)   the service of the workman has not  been               interrupted by reason of the transfer;               (b)   the  terms  and  conditions  of  service               applicable to the workman after such  transfer               are not in any way less favourable than  those               applicable  to  him  immediately  before   the               transfer; and               (c)   the  employer to whom the  ownership  or               management   of   the   undertaking   is    so               transferred   is,  under  the  terms  of   the               transfer  or otherwise, legally liable to  pay               to   the   workman,  in  the  event   of   his               retrenchment,  compensation on the basis  that               his  service has been continuous and  has  not               been interrupted by the transfer." In  the present groups of appeals it is common  ground  that -there  was no interruption resulting from  the  undertaking being -taken over by the Board.  The agreements between  the Board  and the workmen to admit the workmen into  employment of  the  Board were reached before the undertakings  of  the Company  were  taken over.  The Company contended  that  the terms and conditions of service applicable to workmen  after the  transfer  were not in any way less  favourable  to  the workmen than those applicable to them immediately before the undertakings were taken ,over, and that the employer to whom the ownership or manage- 519 ment of the undertakings were so transferred was, under  the terms of the transfer or otherwise, legally liable to pay to the   workmen,   in  the  event   of   their   retrenchment, compensation  on  the  basis that their  services  had  been continuous and had not been interrupted by the taking  over. The workmen denied that claim.  The Labour Court could award compensation only if it determined the matter in controversy in  favour  of  the workmen it could  not  assume  that  the conditions of the proviso to s. 6-0 were fulfilled.  Section 6-0  is in terms negative.  It deprives the workmen  of  the right   to  retrenchment  compensation  in  the   conditions mentioned therein.  The Company asserted that the conditions precedent  to  the exercise of jurisdiction did  not  exist. The  workmen  asserted  the  existence  of  the  conditions. Without  deciding  the  issue, the Labour  Court  could  not compute  the amount of compensation payable to the  workmen. On  the assumption that the workmen had been retrenched  and their claim fell within the proviso to s. 6-0. It was urged by Mr. Goyal on behalf of the workmen that this plea  was not raised or argued before the Labour Court,  and it cannot be permitted to be raised in this Court.  But this contention was raised in the reply filed by the Company, and

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the  judgment  of the Labour Court does  indicate  that  its authority  to  decide that question was  disputed.   We  are unable  to  hold that the objection though  raised  was  not urged  before  the  Labour Court, and  on  that  account  to confirm  the  decision of the Labour Court which  until  the matter  in  controversy was decided could not  be  rendered. Even  if,  therefore,  the Labour  Court  was  competent  to entertain the dispute relating to award of retrenchment com- pensation,  the order made by the Labour Court must  be  set aside. One more contention raised at the Bar by Mr. Chagla for  the Company may be considered.  It was urged that the obligation to  pay retrenchment compensation in the event of  liability arising must in law be deemed to be taken over by the Board. In  The  Board of Directors of the South  Arcot  Electricity Distribution  Company Ltd. v. N. K. Mohammad Khan,  etc.(1), to which we have already made a reference, it was  contended on  behalf of the Electricity Company that the liability  to pay retrenchment cornpensation did not fall on the licensee, but  on  the  Madras Government.  This  Court  held,  having regard  to  the  scheme  of the  Act  that  if  retrenchment compensation  is  payable, it is  the  original  undertaking which  remains liable, and not the undertaking  which  takes over the business.  Counsel however relied upon ss. 6 and  7 of the Indian Electricity Act, 1910, in support of his  plea that  the liability to pay retrenchment  compensation  rests upon the (1) [1969] 2 S.C.R. 902. 14Sup.  Cl/69-4 520 undertaking which takes over the undertaking.  Section 6  of the Indian Electricity Act, 1910, provides :               "(1)  Where a license has been granted to  pay               person, not being a local authority, the State               Electricity Board shall---               (a)   in the case of a license granted  before               the  commencement  of the  Indian  Electricity               (Amendment)  Act, 1959, on the  expiration  of               each  such  period  as  is  specified  in  the               license; and               (b)               have the option of purchasing the  undertaking               and  such  option shall be  exercised  by  the               State  Electricity  Board  serving  upon   the               licensee a notice in writing of not less  than               one  year requiring the licensee to  sell  the               ’Undertaking  to  it  at  the  expiry  of  the               relevant  period  referred  to  in  this  sub-               section.               ln  the  present  case  notice  was  given  of               termination of the license after the expiry of               the  period  of the original license  and  the               Board   took  over  the  undertaking  of   the               Company.  Section 7 of the Indian  Electricity               Act provides :               "Where   an   undertaking   is   sold    under               section .... 6 then upon the completion of the               sale  or on the date on which the  undertaking               is delivered to the intending purchaser  under               sub-section (6) of section 6               (i)   the   undertaking  shall  vest  in   the               purchaser  ..........  free  from  any   debt,               mortgage or similar obligation of the licensee               or attaching to the undertaking :               Provided  that  any  such  debt,  mortgage  or

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             similar   obligation  shall  attach   to   the               purchase   money  in  substitution   for   the               undertaking;               (ii)  the rights, powers, authorities,  duties               and  obligations  of the  licensee  under  his               license   shall  stand  transferred   to   the               purchaser  and such purchaser shall be  deemed               to be the licensee :               Provided that where the undertaking is sold or               delivered to a State Electricity Board or  the               State  Government, the license shall cease  to               have further operation." 521 It  is  clear  that  when  the  undertaking  vests  in   the purchaser, any debt mortgage or similar obligation  attaches to  the purchase money in substitution of  the  undertaking. The  liability to pay retrenchment compensation is a debt  : if  it  arises on transfer it will attach  to  the  purchase money  payable  to  the  Company  in  substitution  for  the undertaking.  Sections 6 and 7 of the Indian Electricity Act do not support the case of the Company that the liability is enforceable  against  the  Board after  it  takes  over  the undertakings. The  provisions of ss. 57 and 57A of the Indian  Electricity (Supply)  Act,  1948, also do not assist the  case  of  the, Company.  Sections 57 & 57A of the Electricity (Supply) Act, 1948, deal with the licensee’s charges to consumers and  the Rating  Committees.   By  the Sixth  Schedule  dealing  with financial  principles and their application, it is  provided by cl.  TV that certain amount shall be appropriated towards Contingencies  Reserve  from the revenues of  each  year  of account.  By cl.  V of the Sixth Schedule it is provided :               "(1)  The Contingencies Reserve shall  not  be               drawn upon during the currency of the  licence               except  to  meet  such charges  as  the  State               Government may approve as being-               (a)   expenses or loss of profits arising  out               of  accidents, strikes or circumstances  which               the management could not have prevented;               (b)   expenses  on replacement or  removal  of               plant  or works other than expenses  requisite               for normal maintenance or renewal;               (c)   compensation  payable under any law  for               the time being in force and for which no other               provision is made.                (2)  On the purchase of the undertaking,  the               Contingencies Reserve, after deduction of  the               amounts  drawn under sub-paragraph (1),  shall               be handed over to the purchaser and maintained               as such Contingencies Reserve :               Provided   that  where  the   undertaking   is               purchased   by   the  Board   or   the   State               Government, the amount of the Reserve computed               as above shall, after further deduction of the               amount of compensation, if any, payable to the               employees  of the outgoing licensee under  any               law  for  the time being in force,  be  handed               over to the Board or the State Government,  as               the case may be." 522 Clause  V  only  provides  for  the  appropriation  of   the Contingencies  Reserve : it requires an undertaking to  hand over  the  Contingencies Reserve to the purchaser.   If  any amount  of compensation is payable to the employees  of  the outgoing licensee under any law for the time being in force,

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it  is  chargeable  to the Contingencies  Reserve.   If  the retrenchment  compensation  becomes  properly  due  to   the employees of the Company, it would, by virtue of cl.  V sub- cl.  (2) proviso, be charged upon the Contingencies  Reserve and the balance alone would be handed over to the purchaser. It  was urged that the Contingencies Reserve has  been  paid over to the purchaser.  There is, however, no finding by the Labour Court in that behalf.  If it be found in  appropriate proceedings that retrenchment compensation is payable to the workmen  and  the Contingencies Reserve out of which  it  is payable  has been handed over to the Board, the  charge  for payment  of that amount may attach to that amount.  On  that matter we need express no opinion at this stage. Finally it was contended-and that contention relates only to the cases of 56 workmen in the Lucknow undertaking-that  the workmen who had not availed themselves of earned leave  were ,entitled  to compensation equal to thirty days wages.   But we  do not think that any such compensation  is  statutorily payable.   So  long  as  the Company  was  carrying  on  its business,  it  was  obliged to give  facility  for  enjoying earned  leave to its workmen.  But after the Company  closed its business, it could not obviously give -any earned  leave to   those  workmen,  nor  could  the  workmen  claim   -any compensation  for not availing themselves of the leave.   In the  absence of any provision in the statute  governing  the right to compensation for earned leave not availed of by the workmen before closure, or transfer of an undertaking, we do not think that any such compensation is payable. On  the  view taken by us that the Labour Court  was  incom- petent  to  determine the question as to  liability  to  pay retrenchment compensation, these appeals must be allowed and the petitions under s. 6-H(2) filed by the respondents  must be   dismissed.   There  will  be  no  order  as  to   costs throughout. G.C.                      Appeals allowed. 523