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PETITIONER: TULSI CO-OPERATIVE HOUSING SOCIETY, HYDERABAD.  ETC.  ETC.

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH & ORS.

DATE OF JUDGMENT:       14/09/1999

BENCH: K.T.Thomas, M.Srinivasan

JUDGMENT:

SRINIVASAN, J.

     There  are  three sets of appeals.  Civil Appeal  Nos. 6986-87  of  1994  are filed by Tulsi  Co-operative  Housing Society,   Hyderabad  (hereinafter  referred   to   as   the ‘Society’).  Civil Appeal Nos.  6988-6991 of 1994 are by the State  of  Andhra  Pradesh (hereinafter referred to  as  the ‘Government’).   Civil Appeal Nos.  6992-6993 of 1994 are by Syed  Azam (hereinafter referred to as the ‘landowner’).  2. The Society entered into an agreement in April 1975 with the land owner for purchase of an extent of 24 acres of land and paid  in  advance a sum of Rs.20,000/-.  In June  1975,  the Govt.  issued a Notification under Section 4 (1) of the Land Acquisition  Act  (hereinafter referred to  as  ‘Acquisition Act’)  for  acquiring  an extent of 18.03 acres out  of  the subject-matter  of these proceedings for purposes of Housing Project  under  HUDCO Scheme.  The Notification included  an extent  of 2 acres belonging to another person with which we are  not  concerned.   The Government also  invoked  urgency clause  under  Section  17 (4) of the  Acquisition  Act  and dispensed  with  enquiry under Section 5A of the  said  Act. The   acquisition  proceedings  were  at  the  instance   of Municipal  Corporation  of  Hyderabad.    The  Urband   Land (Ceiling  & Regulations) Act, 1976 (hereinafter referred  to as  the  ‘Ceiling Act’) came into force on  17.2.1976.   The land  owner and the Society filed an application in May 1976 for  grant  of exemption from the provisions of the  Ceiling Act under Section 20(1)(b) of the said Act.  It was followed by  a  similar application in June 1977.  In April 1978  the Government  issued  a  Notification under Section 6  of  the Acquisition  Act.   In  October 1978  the  applications  for exemption  filed  under  the   Ceiling  Act  were  rejected. Towards  the  end of August 1979 further  proceedings  under Section  9  of  the  Acquisition   Act  were  taken  by  the Government.   Meanwhile,  a fresh application for  exemption under  the Ceiling Act was filed in December 1978.  That was partly  granted by the Government to the extent of 14000 sq. mtrs.   of land.  Another application was filed in May  1980 for  grant of exemption of all the lands from the provisions of  the Ceiling Act.  That was granted in September 1980  in GOMS No.  4093.  3.  The Notifications under the Acquisition Act  were  challenged  in two writ petitions -  one  by  the Society  and the other by the land owner.  By interim orders passed  by the High Court, further proceedings were  stayed. However,   on  28.1.1982  both   the  writ  petitions   were

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dismissed.   Two  appeals  were  filed.   The  miscellaneous petition  for  stay  of further proceedings  in  acquisition pending  the  appeals  was dismissed by  Division  Bench  on 4.2.82.   The  Government  took possession of the  lands  on 12.2.1982.   4.   It  should  be  mentioned  here  that  the proceedings  under the Acquisition Act were for the  benefit of Bagh Amverpet Welfare Society (hereinafter to be referred to as ‘BAW Society’).  The said BAW Society got impleaded as party  in  the  writ  petitions  in  which  the  acquisition proceedings were challenged.  The writ appeals were referred to  a  Full Bench which allowed the same by  judgment  dated 2.8.83.    The   acquisition   proceedings   were   quashed. Aggrieved  by the said judgment BAW Society obtained Special Leave  and filed Civil Appeal Nos.  5784-85 of 1983.  5.  In June,  1983  the Government cancelled the exemption  granted under  the Ceiling Act by GOMS No.  5964.  The landowner and the  Society filed writ petitions 5498 and 6500 of 1983.  6. The  Civil Appeals filed by BAW Society came up for  hearing on 7.8.85 and the following order was passed:

     "Mr.   P.P.  Rao commenced his arguments at 12.45 P.M. and argued till 1.00 P.M.  Thereafter Court asked Mr.  Divan to  raise preliminary objections and Shri Divan argued  from 2.00  P.M.  to 2.25 P.M.  Thereafter Mr.  P.P.  Rao  resumed his arguments.

     After hearing him for a shortwhile the Court adjourned the  matter  to  16.8.85 in order to enable the  parties  to explore  the possibility of a settlement on the basis that a part  of  the  land sought to be acquired is  released  from acquisition and members of Bagh Amverpet Society may be able to build on a part of the land and owners may also keep some part of the land.  We would request the concerned officer of the  Municipal Corporation of Hyderabd to take initiative in this  matter  for  bringing the parties at  the  negotiating table  and  help them so that on the above basis or  on  any other  basis which may be acceptable to the parties so  that settlement may be arrived at".

     7.   When the matters came up again on August 23, 1988 this  court  passed  an order holding that  the  Acquisition proceedings  were valid and the Writ Petitions filed by  the landowner  and the society challenging the same were rightly dismissed  by  the  Civil Judge.  This court held  that  the appellate judgment of the Full Bench of the High Court could not  be sustained and the Acquisition proceedings had to  be revived.   In  the  same order, the court  referred  to  the suggestions  made  on the earlier ocassion on  7.8.1985  for effecting  a settlement between the parties and set out  the subsequent events in the following words:-

     "Pursuant  to the view expressed by the court, the two societies  have  filed  terms of settlement,  which  are  on record.   The State Government of Andhra Pradesh which  also has  filed  independent appeals against the  same  appellate judgment of the High Court has agreed to accept the terms of settlement  and  their  counsel states that fact  to  us  in Court.   While other terms are acceptable, one of the  terms regarding  the  valuation  of the land to be  determined  by Government  requires  alteration.  Learned counsel  for  the appellant  too has agreed to offer at the rate of Rs.3  lacs per acre and that term is acceptable to the writ petitioners respondents  as also the landowner.  In view of the fact the parties have agreed to the said amount of Rs.3 lacs per acre

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as  the  value of the land, under acquisition, the terms  in the  settlement  for fixation of the compensation  shall  be substituted  by  the  offer  made  by  Mr.   Iyer  for   the appellant.   All parties agree to these terms being  altered by  us.  Mr.  Iyer has further agreed that the entire amount of  compensation for 9 acres and 1-1/2 gunthas, which  under the terms of settlement would be available to the appellants shall  be  paid  at  the rate of Rs.3  lacs  per  acre  (all liabilities  included)  within three months hence.   Failing payment  of this amount within the time undertaken, interest at  15% payable on the amount shall be payable.  This  order shall not be effective until counsel for the State of Andhra Pradesh  takes instructions and files a memorandum within  a week  from today that Government including the Urban Ceiling authorities  accept  this  arrangement.    After  the  State indicates  its ratification, the matter shall be placed  for further  directions on 31st August, 1988 in the Chamber  for further directions".

     8.   The matter was posted on 31.8.1988 and the  Court passed the following order:-

     "When  we  made  the order on 23rd August,  1988,  the letter  of  Secretary, Housing, Municipal  Administration  & Urban  Development  Deptt.   Govt of  Andhra  Pradesh  dated 15.2.88  was  not  placed before us.  We find,  that  letter specifically refers to the proceedings before this Court and the  terms of compromise and indicate Government’s  reaction and  response thereto.  Counsel for the parties suggest that we  should  modify our direction of August 23, 1988,  taking the compromise terms on record and proceed to dispose of the dispute.  Mr.  TVSN Chari who has just appeared on behalf of Govt.   of  Andhra  Pradesh says that he may  be  given  one week’s  time to obtain instructions from the Govt.  In these circumstances,  we  adjourn the appeals to  13th  September, 1988 to be taken up in Chamber at 1.30 p.m.  ".

     9.   In the meanwhile, the Writ Petition filed by  the land owner challenging the cancellation of exemption granted under  the  Ceiling Act was dismissed by the High  Court  on 30.6.1988.   He  filed S.L.P.(C) No.  1679 of 1989  in  this Court.   The other Writ Petition filed by the Society namely Writ  Petition  (C) No.  6500 of 1983 was withdrawn to  this Court  to be heard along with Civil Appeal Nos.  5784-85  of 1983 and S.L.P(C) No.  1679 of 1989.  That was taken on file as  Transfer  Case  No.  29 of 1989.  All the  matters  were heard  together and the final order was passed on  17.8.1990 after  setting  out  the facts and extracting  the  relevant portions  of  the  earlier order dated 7.8.1985,  the  court said:

     "This Court, however, gave time to the counsel for the State  of  Andhra  Pradesh to take instructions  as  to  the application  of  the  Urban Land Ceiling  Act  as  exemption granted  under Section 20 had been withdrawn in June,  1983. The  State  of Andhra Pradesh thereafter did not accept  the compromise  by  taking the stand that proceedings under  the Urban  Land Ceiling Act were pending and in view of the fact that there was no exemption, the property was liable to vest in Government under the Act as surplus land".

     Again  after  extracting a portion of the Order  dated 23.8.1988 the Court said thus:

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     "This  order virtually disposed of the appeals but  as the  parties were negotiating a settlement the Court did not record a formal disposal of the disputes.  If the settlement does  not  fructify,  the effect of our  decision  that  the acquisition  proceedings  are to revive, would be  that  the claim to the land by Tulsi Cooperative Housing Society would come  to  an end.  In that event, at the most  that  Society would  only  be  entitled  to such compensation  as  may  be awardable  in  law.   If the acquisition proceeds  the  Bagh Amverpet Welfare Soceity and the Municipal Corporation would have to work out their mutual rights.  Apart from these, the two  writ  petitions  challenging   the  withdrawal  of  the exemption  by  order dated 23.6.1983 would also have  to  be disposed of on the merits.  The owner’s application has been dismissed  upon  the  High Court taking the  view  that  the matter  was before this Court and, therefore, the High Court would  not  entertain the dispute.  The challenge  by  Tulsi Cooperative  Housing Society against the said withdrawal was before the High Court for adjudication.  In view of the fact that  the owner’s writ petition was dismissed not on  merits but  on  other considerations, we are of the view  that  the said  dismissal  should  be vacated and that  writ  petition should  be heard along with Writ Petition No.  6500/83 as  a common  question  arises for determination.  We,  therefore, set  aside  the order of the High Court dated 13th of  June, 1988,  and  direct  that  the said writ  petition  shall  be disposed of afresh on merits.

     We  are of the view that the entire litigation  should go  back  to the High Court for appropriate  disposal.   The transferred  writ petition, therefore, shall also go back to the  High Court and shall be dealt with as Writ Petition No. 6500  of 1983.  The two petitions challenging the withdrawal of  exemption  shall be clubbed together and be heard.   The proposals  undertaken relating to a settlement in regard  to the  18 acres and 3 gunthas of land may be considered by the High  Court  in  the  light of  all  relevant  material  and circumstances.  If the High Court is of the opinion that the matter  should be settled and the entire land of the  owners amounting  to  18  acres  and 3 gunthas  should  be  divided between  the  two  Societies, it will be free to  do  so  if Government  also  agrees  thereto.  Since  that  arrangement would  be with the consent of the State Government it  would in  such  an event be open to the High Court to nullify  the acquisition.   The  observations  which  we  have  made   at different  stages during the pendency of the proceedings  in this  Court may not be taken to be expression of opinion  on the merits and the High Court would be free to deal with the matter in its own discretion and in accordance with law.

     In  the event of the settlement not coming through the acquisition  proceedings would continue under the law and be concluded by the Land Acquisition Officer in accordance with law.   In the event of the acquisition working out, the  two writ petitions against the withdrawal of exemption would not be  sustainable  as the land would vest in Government  as  a result  of acquisition.  It would be open to the  Government of  the acquiring authority to take into account the  effect of the laws of urban ceiling.

     The  civil  appeals  are remitted to  the  High  Court limited to the consideration of the proposals for settlement in  the  light of the observations hereinabove.   Otherwise, they  must be taken to have been concluded in this Court  on our finding that acquisition proceedings are valid and shall

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be entitled to continue.  The special leave petition of Azam is  disposed  of with a direction that the writ petition  in the  High  Court  shall be re-heard.  The  transferred  writ petition  is remitted to the High Court to be disposed of as Writ  Petition  No.6500  of 1983.  The hearing of  the  writ petition  would  depend upon the fate of the  settlement  as indicated above".

     10.   After  remand,  the High Court by  its  judgment dated  21.11.1992  dismissed the two Writ Appeals under  the Acquisition  Act  and disposed of the two writ  peti-  tions under  the  Ceiling Act with the following directions:   "1) The  Land Acquisition proceedings covered by the Sec.   4(1) notification  issued  in  G.O.Rt.  No.  68 dated  4.6.75  in respect  of  Ac.18-03  gunthas of land shall revive  and  be completed  as  expeditiously as possible  preferably  within three  months  from today, the beneficiaries being  the  374 members  of  the Bagh Amverpet Welfare Association who  have already remitted a total sum of Rs.40,20,649.04.

     2)  The  compensation  amount   the  land  owners  are entitled  to  shall be limited only to  Rs.25,49,131.75  and nothing more.

     3)  M/s.   Tulsi  Co-operative Housing Society  is  at liberty to work out its rights vis-a-vis the land owners.

     4)   The  applications  filed   under  Sec.20  of  the U.L.C.Act  seeking exemptions from the operation of the  Act and  now  pending  with the Government since 1976  shall  be disposed of as indicated supra".  11.  Aggrieved by the said judgment,  the Society has filed Civil Appeal Nos.   6986-87 of  1994.   The  Government  has  filed  Civil  Appeal  Nos. 6988-91  of 1994 while the Land Owner has filed Civil Appeal NOs.   6992-93  of 1994.  All the above appeals  were  heard together.   12.  Mr.  D.D.Thakur, the learned senior counsel for  the Society contended that the High Court has failed to decide  the  crucial question arising in this  case,  though this  Court remanded the matter for that purpose.  According to  him  the  facts and circumstances of the case  proved  a complete  concluded tripartite compromise among the Society, the  Government and BAW Society.  He took us through some of the  documents  which came into existence after  this  Court passed  the Order dated 7.8.85 and adjourned the matter  for effecting  a  settlement.  He also relied upon the  memo  of compromise  and  the  petition filed in this  Court  by  BAW Society  for granting sanction to the compromise arrived  at between  the  parties.   It was contended that  the  records established  that the Government had also agreed to the said compromise  whereby the lands which were the  subject-matter of  the acquisition were to be divided into two halves,  one to be taken by the Society and the other by the BAW Society. He  argued  that even if this Court holds that there was  no express  agreement  on the part of the Government, the  same could  be  inferred  from the available records.   Hence  it should  be  held  that there was a concluded  compromise  to which  the  Government was a party by implication.   Learned counsel  also invoked the doctrine of legitimate expectation and contended that the same should be applied in the present case  and  the Court should not allow the Government  to  go back  upon the concluded agreement.  13.  We are uenable  to accept  any of the aforesaid contentions.  The Order  passed by  this  Court on 17.8.90 is itself sufficient to  negative the  above arguments.  In fact, the said order precludes the Society   from  contending  that   there  was  a   concluded

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compromise.  If there was such a compromise it ought to have been  pressed into service before this Court and if the same had  been accepted, there would have been no necessity for a remand.  On the other hand, the following observation in the Order  of  this  Court  shows  clearly  that  there  was  no concluded  compromise and this Court proceeded only on  that footing:   "If  the  High Court is of the opinion  that  the matter  should  be  settled and the entire  land  of  owners amounting  to  18  acres  and 3 gunthas  should  be  divided between  the  two  societies, it will be free to  do  so  if Government  also agrees thereto".  The next sentence in  the order  of  this  Court  reads   as  follows:-  "Since   that arrangement  would  be  with  the   consent  of  the   State Government  it  would in such an event be open to  the  High Court  to  nullify  the acquisition".  14.   The  above  two observations show that if a compromise was to be effected it was  only to be brought into existence after the said  order of  this Court and only if the Government consented thereto. Admittedly, the Government did not express any consent after the  said  order  of  this  Court and  on  the  other  hand, vehemently  opposed  the  proposed  settlement  between  the parties.    The  contention  that   there  was  a  concluded compromise to which the Government was party is untenable in view  of  the aforesaid observations in the order of  remand made by this Court on 17.8.90.  We have no hesitation at all to  hold  that the view expressed by the High Court in  this regard  is  correct and there was no necessity for the  High Court to decide to the question whether there was a complete concluded  compromise.  15.  In view of the said position we consider  it  unnecessary  to deal with  the  contention  of learned  counsel based on the provisions of Order 23 Rule  3 C.P.C.   and Rule 24 of the Andhra Pradesh High Court Rules. Nor  is it necessary to refer to Section 13 of the  Contract Act  relied  on  by the learned counsel.  There is  also  no warrant  in  this case to invoke the doctrine of  legitimate expectation.   16.   The  learned counsel  for  the  Society contended  that  in  any  event the sale in  favour  of  the Society  of  an extent of 5 acres of land  comprising  lands other   than   the  subject-   matter  of  the   acquisition proceedings  was valid and should be upheld.  That  question is wholly extraneous to the present proceedings and does not arise  for  our consideration.  In these proceedings we  are concerned   only  with  the   validity  of  the  acquisition proceedings  and the validity of the order of the Government cancelling the exemption granted under the provisions of the Ceiling  Act.   17.   Learned  counsel  contended  that  the cancellation   of  exemption  under   the  Ceiling  Act  was unsustainable  and at any rate it was bad with reference  to the extent of 5 acres of land which did not form part of the subject-matter  of  acquisition under the  Acquisition  Act. There  is  no merit in this contention.  The High Court  has considered  in detail the question whether the  cancellation of  exemption  under the Ceiling Act was valid or not.   The High  Court has found that there was ample justification for cancellation  of the exemption.  It has been found that  the land-owner  as  well  as  the   Society  had  violated   the conditions  subject to which exemption was granted.  As  the High  Court  has dealt with the matter at length and  upheld the  cancellation of exemption, it is unnecessary for us  to repeat  the reasoning of the High Court.  We do not find any justification whatsoever to interfere with the conclusion of the  High Court that the cancellation of exemption was valid and  that the writ petitions filed by the land-owner and the Society  were  liable  to  be   dismissed.   18.   The  next contention  of learned counsel for the Society was that  the

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land   acquired   under  the   Acquisition  Act  should   be distributed  equitably  not merely among the members of  BAW Society but also among the members of the appellant Society. He took exception to the direction contained in the judgment of  the High Court that the beneficiaries of the proceedings were 374 members of the BAW Society who had already remitted a   total  amount  of   Rs.40,20,649.04.   This   particular contention urged by the learned counsel is also supported by learned  counsel  for the State Government which  has  filed Civil  Appeal  Nos.6988-91/94.   In   fact,  learned  Senior Counsel  Mr.   P.A.  Chaudhary appearing for the  Government raised  a  contention  that  the lands  acquired  should  be utilised  for public purposes other than those for which the lands  were  acquired.  He argued that the lands  should  be kept  as water tank and be utilised as such.  19.  While  we find  justification  in  the contention put forward  by  the learned  counsel  for  the Society that the High  Court  has exceeded  its  jurisdiction in giving a direction  confining the  benefit  of  the  acquisition proceedings  to  the  374 members  of  the  BAW Society, we are unable to  accept  the extreme  contention urged by the learned senior advocate for the  Government  that  the land should be  permitted  to  be utilised  for  purposes  other than those for which  it  was acquired.   Once  we uphold the validity of the  proceedings for  acquisition under the Acquisition Act, it has to follow that  the  lands  have to be utilised for the  purposes  for which they were acquired.  We would set aside Direction No.1 contained  in  the penultimate para of the judgment  of  the High Court and substitute it with a direction that the lands acquired  under  the  Acquisition  Act  should  be  properly utilised  by the Government in order to achieve the  purpose for which they were acquired.  The Government may nominate a suitable  Committee comprising at least three Secretaries to the  Government for the purpose of carrying out the  objects of the acquisition in an appropriate manner.

     20.   Mr.   Gopal Subramaniam, learned senior  counsel for the land owner addressed his arguments against Direction No.2  given by the High Court in the impugned judgment.   By the  said  direction  the  High  Court  has  held  that  the compensation  amount  to  which the land owner  is  entitled shall  be limited only to Rs.25,49,131.75 and nothing  more. Learned   counsel  submitted  that   the  validity  of   the acquisition proceedings having been upheld, the Court has no jurisdiction  to fix the compensation ignoring the  specific procedure  prescribed  in the Acquisition Act.  It was  also his  contention  that the High Court arrived at  the  figure arbitrarily  on a wrong premise that there were some special equities in favour of the members of the BAW Society and the price  of the land should be fixed at Rs.25 per sq.  yd.  It was pointed out by him that there was no material before the High  Court  for fixing the market value of the land on  the date  of  the  notification  under   Section  4(1)  of   the Acquisition  Act  and  in  any event,  the  parties  had  no opportunity  to place the relevant evidence before the Court to enable it to fix the market value.  21.  In our view, the contention  is  well  founded and  unanswerable.   Once  the proceedings  under the Acquisition Act have been held to  be valid,  the  prescribed procedure in the Act for fixing  the compensation  payable  to  the land owner should  have  been followed and the High Court could not usurp the functions of the hierarchy of authorities constituted under the Act.  The two  reasons given by the High Court for taking up the  task of  fixing  the  compensation  upon   itself  are  that  the litigation  should not be allowed to drag on any further and

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that  there are special equities in favour of the members of the  BAW Society.  Neither reason is sustainable.  The  fact that  the  proceedings have been pending for long would  not justify  the Court to exceed its jurisdiction.  The question whether  there are special equities in favour of the members of  the  BAW  Society  and whether such  equities  would  be relevant  at the time of fixing the market value of the land under  the provisions of the Acquisition Act are matters  to be  decided by the concerned authorities in accordance  with the  procedure prescribed in the Act.  Hence the  conclusion of  the  High Court fixing the compensation for the land  at Rs.25,49,131.75  and the direction that the land owners  are not entitled to anything more has to be upset.  22.  Learned counsel  also pointed out the facts and circumstances in the case  which speak against the contentions urged by Mr.  D.D. Thakur.   It  is unnecessary for us to refer to them  as  we have  already dealt with the said contentions and found that they  are not sustainable.  23.  Mr.  Gopal Subramaniam next contended  that the High Court is wrong in holding that  the Government  can proceed under the provisions of the  Ceiling Act  as  the  latter are over-riding and  will  have  effect notwithstanding  any  other provision of law.  According  to him  once  the land had vested in the Government  under  the provisions  of the Acquisition Act, before vesting under the Ceiling  Act  could  take  place, there is  no  question  of withdrawing  the  proceedings under the Acquisition Act  and proceeding  further under the provisions of the Ceiling Act. It  was contended that the High Court has mis-understood the ruling  of this Court in Dattatraya Shankarbhat Ambalgi  and others  versus  State  of Maharashtra and  others  AIR  1989 Supreme  Court  1796 and pointed out that in the said  case, the  land had vested in the Government under the Ceiling Act pursuant  to the final statement under Section 9 of the said Act.   It was submitted that in the present case such  stage under   the  Ceiling  Act  had   not  reached.    There   is considerable  force  in  this   contention  of  the  learned counsel.   But it is unnecessary for us to pronounce on  the said  contention in view of the categoric statement made  by the  learned senior advocate for the Government that he  has obtained  written instructions from the Government that  the compensation  in  the present case would be paid  under  the provisions  of the Acquistion Act and the provisions of  the Ceiling Act would not be invoked therefor.  24.  As a matter of  fact,  the  judgment  of the High Court  appears  to  be somewhat  inconsistent in this respect.  The High Court  has upheld  the cancellation of exemption under the Ceiling  Act and dismissed the writ petitions filed by the land-owner and the Society.  The High Court has also upheld the validity of the  land acquisition proceedings and has gone to the extent of  holding  that the beneficiaries of the acquisition  were 374  members of the BAW Society.  The High Court has further held that the compensation amount paybale to the land owners shall  be  limited to Rs.25,49,131.75.  In  that  situation, there  was  no necessity for the High Court to  express  its opinion  that  the  provisions of the Ceiling Act  were  not excluded  by the acquisition proceedings and that they  were over-riding.   The  conclusion  of the High  Court  on  that question  is wholly unnecessary for the prupose of this case and  we set aside the same.  We make it clear that we do not express  any  opinion on the question of law in the  present case  in  view of the statement made by the  learned  senior advocate for the Government and recorded as above.  25.  The High  Court  has  chosen  to  issue  a  direction  which  is Direction  No.4 that the applications filed under Section 20 of  the Ceiling Act seeking exemption from the operation  of

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the  Act and pending with the Government since 1976 shall be disposed  of  as  indicated  in the  judgment.   We  do  not understand  how  such  a direction could be  issued  in  the present  case  which is between the concerned parties.   The direction  relates obviously to parties who were not  before the  Court in the present case.  It is for the Government to consider  applications for exemption and dispose of the same in  accordance  with law.  26.  We have already adverted  to the contention put forward by learned senior counsel for the Government  in C.A.  Nos.6988-91/94 and said that it was not possible  to accept the extreme contention.  Learned counsel for   the  BAW  Society  urged   that  the  procedings   for acquisition  were exclusively for the benefit of the members of  the said society and they had deposited the price of the land  as demanded by the Municipal Corporation several years back.   It  was argued that the lands could not be given  to any person other than the members of the said Society.  Even in the order passed by this Court on 17.8.1990 remanding the matter  to  the  High Court, it was made clear that  if  the acquisition  proceeded,  the BAW Society and  the  Municipal Corporation  would work out their mutual rights.  Hence,  it is  unnecesary  for us to express any opinion on  the  claim made  by  the  BAW Society.  As observed already by  us  the Government  shall take appropriate proceedings by appointing a   suitable  Committee  to   utilise  the  lands   acquired appropriately for the purposes for which they were acquired.

     27.   In the result, the Civil Appeals are disposed of with the following directions:  (I) The directions contained in the judgment of the High Court are set aside;

     (II)  The land acquisition proceedings covered by  the Notification  under  Section  4(1) of  the  Acquisition  Act issued in G.O.Rt.  No.68 dated 4.6.75 in respect of 18 acres 03  guntas  of land stand revived and shall be completed  as expeditiously  as  possible within a period of three  months from  today;   (III) The concerned  authorities  constituted under  Acquisition Act shall decide the compensation payable to  the land owner in accordance with the provisions of  the Act.;   (IV)  The  Government  shall  nominate  a  Committee comprising  at least three Secretaries to the Government for distributing  the  acquired land equitably  among  deserving persons   in  order  to  carry   out  the  purposes  of  the acquisition  and  to  balance the equities  between  various persons  whether they belong to one or the other society  or are  not  members  of  either  society.;   (V)  M/s.   Tulsi Cooperative  Housing  Society is at liberty to work out  its rights as against the land owner in appropriate proceedings; (VI)  Applications  under  Section  20 of  the  Ceiling  Act seeking  exemption from the operation of the Act said to  be pending  with the Government since 1976 shall be disposed of in  accordance  with  law as expeditiously as  possible  and preferably within a period of three months from today.