REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 6158 OF 2002

Tukaram Maruti Chavan …….Appellant(s)

VERSUS

Maruti Narayan Chavan (Dead) by LRs. & Ors. .Respondent(s)

J U D G M E N T

TARUN CHATTERJEE, J.

1. This is an appeal by special leave against the judgment

and  order  dated  9th of  June,  1999  of  the  High  Court  of

Judicature  at  Bombay  in  Writ  Petition  no.  4600  of  1983,

whereby the High Court had affirmed the decision of the courts

below.

2. The relevant facts leading to the filing of this appeal, as

emerging  from the  case  made  out  by  the  appellant  may  be

summarized as follows:

3.  The dispute arose out of the provision of the Bombay

Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1948 (hereinafter referred

to  as  “the  Act”)  relating  to  the  land  being  Gat  No  44,

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measuring  5  Hectares  and  24  Acres  in  village  Malangaon,

Kavathe,  Mahankal  Tahsil  of  Sangli  District  in  the  state  of

Maharashtra  (in  short  “the  disputed  land”).  Late  Smt.

Narmadabai who was a widow, was the original landowner of

the  disputed  land.  She  died  in  1964  leaving behind  her  two

sons  Ramchandra  and  Laxman  Bhau  Sutar.  On 1st of  April,

1957, i.e. on the Tiller’s Day, the Appellant was in cultivation

of  the  disputed  land.  The original  tenant  named Maruti  died

subsequently in 1994 during the pendency of the Writ Petition

in the High Court of Judicature at Bombay. The original tenant

had initiated proceedings under Section 32G of the Act before

the Additional Tahsildar, Kavathe Makhanlal, and the case was

decided in his favour with the purchase price of the disputed

land being fixed. Thereafter, one of the heirs of the deceased

landowner Narmadabai, named Laxman, preferred an appeal to

Appellate Authority against the said order. After the matter was

remanded  back  to  the  Additional  Tehsilder,  again  an  order

affirming  the  previous  position  was  passed  in  favour  of  the

tenant  under  Section 32 G. This  time, the other heir  of Late

Smt.  Narmadabai,  namely  Ramchandra,  challenged  the  said

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order before the Sub-Divisional-Officer, Miraj, and he again by

his order dated 31st of March, 1978, remanded the matter to the

Tahsildar for a detailed enquiry and decision on the following

points:

(1) “The clear title of the disputed land of the applicant

Ramchandra should be enquired.

(2)The point of giving notice u/s 32-F of the Act to the

landlord and the Agricultural Lands Tribunal should

be enquired as per the provisions under Section 32-F

of the Act.”

4. When the matter came up before the Tahsildar, he passed

an Order holding the 2nd Respondent as the sole owner of the

disputed  land.  The  purchase  of  the  disputed  land  by  the

Appellant was therefore declared to be ineffective for want of

notice under Section 32- F and the disputed land was ordered

to be disposed of under Section 32 P of the Act. Thereafter, the

Appellant preferred a revision before the Maharashtra Revenue

Tribunal but the same was dismissed. Being aggrieved by the

decision  of  the  Tribunal,  the  Appellant  filed  a  Writ  Petition

before the Bombay High Court on 28th of December, 1983. The

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Bombay High Court by its impugned judgment and order dated

16th of  April,  1999,  dismissed  the  said  Writ  Petition  on  the

ground that the Respondent (Ramchandra) was the sole owner

of  the  disputed  land  in  pursuance  of  the  letters  of

administration obtained by him from the Civil Court. It is this

decision of the High Court, which is impugned in this appeal in

respect of which the Writ Petition was filed.  

5. During the pendency of the Writ Petition before the High

Court, Respondent No 2 executed a sale deed of the disputed

land and though he was duty bound to inform the Court about

this deed, he did not inform the same to the Court.  

6. The main issue that  was  framed by the  High Court  in

deciding  the  above-mentioned  Writ  Petition  was  whether

giving  of  notice  under  Section  32  F  was  mandated  for  the

tenant and whether on failure of giving such notice, the tenant

had lost  the  right  of  purchase  and whether  the  orders  of  the

Tahsildar, the Appellate Court i.e. the Sub Divisional Officer

and  the  Revisional  Court  i.e.  the  Maharashtra  Revenue

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Tribunal were liable to be interfered with. It was against this

background that the High Court had held that section 32 F is

mandatory in nature and there has to be a strict compliance of

it. The High Court went on to say that inspite of the fact that

the tenant  had  initiated  proceedings  under  section  32  G and

even if he had paid some instalments towards the price of the

land, the same cannot be considered as substantial compliance

resulting  in  dispensation  of  the  mandatory  requirement  of

section 32 F. Therefore, considering the fact that the tenant had

failed in his duty to issue a written notice to the owner of the

land i.e. Respondent No. 2, as required under Section 32 F, he

has  lost  his  right  to  purchase  the  disputed  land.  The  Writ

Petition  was  therefore  dismissed  by the  High  Court.  Feeling

aggrieved  by  the  aforesaid  decision  of  the  High  Court,  this

Special Leave Petition was filed which, on grant of leave, was

heard in presence of the learned counsel for the parties.  

7. We have heard the  learned counsel  for  the parties  and

examined the impugned judgment of the High Court and also

the  orders  passed  by the  Tahsilder,  Appellate  Court  and  the

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Revisional  Court.  We  find  that  the  High  Court  noticed  the

provision of Section 32 F of the Act, in so far as it is relevant,

which reads as follows:  

“(1)  Notwithstanding  anything  contained  in  the preceding sections,-

(a)where the landlord is a minor, or a widow, or a  person  subject  to  any  mental  or  physical disability,  the  tenant  shall  have  the  right  to purchase  such  land  under  section  32  within one year from the expiry of the period during which such landlord is entitled to terminate the tenancy under section 31 [and for enabling the tenant  to  exercise  the  right  of  purchase,  the landlord shall send an intimation to the tenant of the fact that he has attained majority, before the  expiry  of  the  period  during  which  such landlord  is  entitled  to  terminate  the  tenancy under section 31]:

[Provided that where a person of such category is a member of a joint family, the provisions of this sub-section shall not apply if at least one member of  the  joint  family  is  outside  the  categories mentioned  in  this  sub-section  unless  before  the 31st day of March, 1958 the share of such person in  the  joint  family  has  been separated  by  metes and  bounds  and  the  Mamlatdar  on  inquiry  is satisfied that the share of such person in the land is  separated,  having  regard  to  the  area, assessment, classification and value of the land, in the same proportion as the share of that person in the entire joint family property and not in a larger proportion].

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(b)--------------  (omitted,  as  it  is  not  relevant  for our purpose).

 (1A) A tenant  desirous  of  exercising  the  right conferred on him under sub- section (1) shall give an intimation  in  that  behalf  to the landlord and the Tribunal in the prescribed manner within the period specified in that sub-section.”

8. The High Court further went on to refer Section 31 (3) of

the Act, which so far as it is relevant reads as follows:

“ (3) Where a landlord is a minor, or a widow, or a person subject of mental or physical disability, then such notice may be given [and an application for possession under section 29 may be made,]-

(i) by the minor within one year  from the date on which he attains majority;

(ii) by the successor-in title of a widow within one year from the date on which her interest in the land ceased to exist;

(iii) within  one  year  from the  date  on  which  mental  or  physical disability ceases to exist; and  

[Provided that where a person of such category is a member of a joint family, the provisions of this

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sub-section shall not apply if at least one member of  the  joint  family  is  outside  the  categories mentioned  in  this  sub-section  unless  before  the 31st day of March, 1958 the share of such person in  the  joint  family  has  been separated  by  metes and  bounds  and  the  Mamlatdar  on  inquiry,  is satisfied that the share of such person in the land is  separated  having  regard  to  the  area, assessment, classification and value of the land, in the same proportion as the share of that person in the  entire  joint  family  property,  and  not  in  a larger proportion.]”     

9. We have examined the aforesaid provisions of the Act on

which the High Court had placed strong reliance. In our view,

the  interpretation  given  by the  High  Court  in  the  impugned

judgment of the aforesaid provisions cannot be faulted with. It

must  be said that  the High Court  in  its  impugned judgment,

correctly  noticed  that  sub-section  (3)  of  section  31  provides

that  the landlord under disability and intending to exercise a

right  under  this  chapter  shall  give  a  notice  terminating  the

tenancy and if the landlord is a widow then the notice can be

given by the  successor-in-title  of  the widow within  one year

from the date on which her interest in the land ceases to exist.

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In  the  present  case  when  the  widow  Narmadabai  died,  she

ceased to have interest  in the land and therefore the right  of

Ramchandra, as her successor-in-interest, to give notice under

section 31 to the tenant  gets  extended for one year from the

death of Narmadabai, i.e. till the 12th of January, 1965.

10. The  learned  counsel  on  behalf  of  the  Appellant

contended that if Section 31 and 32 F are read together, then

the tenant  is  not  required  to  give  any notice  to  the landlord

because neither Narmadabai nor her successor-in-interest ever

gave  any  notice  to  the  tenant  under  Section  31  of  the  Act.

Counsel for the Respondent on the other hand contended that

Section 32 F is a complete section in itself and the provision of

the earlier sections cannot influence or have over riding effect.

He  therefore  contended  that  whatever  be  the  right  of  the

landlord under section 31, the same gets separated by virtue of

the provisions of section 32 F. This contention was negated by

the counsel for the Appellant arguing that section 32 F cannot

be said  to have over riding effect  on all  the earlier  sections.

Against this backdrop, the High Court arrived at the following

findings:-

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“ Sub-section (2) of section 32 F provides that the provisions of section 32 to 32 E (both inclusive) and section 32 G to 32 R (both inclusive) shall so far as may be applicable, apply to such purchase. As  against  this,  section  32  F  begins  with  the wording  ‘Notwithstanding  anything  contained in the  preceding  sections…’.  Both  these  sections namely, section 32 F(1) and 32 F(2) if interpreted in proper prospective and harmoniously  keeping in view the object of section 32 F, then it becomes clear that it could be said that sub-section (2) of section 32 F is an exception to sub-section (1) of section  32  F but  at  the  same  time  it  has  to  be borne in mind that exception carved out by sub- section (2) is limited to the sections referred to in it, namely, section 32 to 32 E (both inclusive) and 32 G to 32 R (both inclusive). Since section 31 is not included in sub-section (2) of section 32 F and since  section  32  F  in  sub-section  (1)  provides ‘Notwithstanding  anything  contained  in  the preceding  sections’,  then  it  has  to  be  held  that right given to the landlord under section 31 has nothing to  do with the right  given  to  the  tenant under section 32 F for purchasing the land and consequently it has to be held that a tenant in this case was under legal obligation or statutory duty to give notice of his intention to purchase the land as contemplated under section 32 F.

The High Court further went on to observe:

“…..if section 32 F is held to be mandatory in its character then there has to be a strict compliance thereof.  Secondly,  that  the  tenant  had  initiated proceedings  under section 32 G, that  order was set aside by the SDO in the appeal and the matter was remanded for fresh enquiry in respect of the

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two points  referred  to  above.  Therefore,  even  if the tenant had initiated proceedings under section 32 G and even if he had paid some installments and  the  price  of  the  land,  the  same  cannot  be considered as substantial compliance resulting in dispensation  of  the  mandatory  requirement  of section 32 F….”

11. Having heard the learned counsel for the parties and after

examining the judgment under Appeal as well as the orders of

the other authorities,  and other materials on record including

the depositions of the parties before them, we are of the view

that this appeal deserves to be dismissed for the reasons set out

herinafter:   

12. In our view, the High Court correctly pointed out that the

provisions of Section 32 F are independent in nature and are

separate from the provisions under Section 31 of the Act. The

exception mentioned under Section 32 F (1) to subsection (2) is

limited to the sections referred to in it, i.e., from Section 32 to

32  E  (both  inclusive)  and  32  G  to  32  R  (both  inclusive).

Further the expression “Notwithstanding anything contained in

the preceding sections” under sub-section (1) of Section 32 F

are of paramount importance. Considering the fact that Section

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31 is not included in the sections mentioned under sub-section

(2)  of  Section  32  F,  and  the  expression  “Notwithstanding

anything  contained  in  the  preceding  sections”  under  sub-

section (1) of Section 32 F, we are of the view that the right

given to the landlord under section 31 has nothing to do with

the right given to the tenant under Section 32 F for purchasing

the land and consequently it has to be held that the appellant in

this case was under a legal obligation or statutory duty to give

notice of his intention to purchase the land as required under

Section 32 F.  We also agree with the view of the High Court

that even if the proceedings were initiated under Section 32 G

by the tenant initially, he cannot claim to  be exempted from

complying with the mandatory requirement of serving a notice

to  the  landlord  as  contemplated  under  Section  32  F  which

mandated  under  the  Act  and  commands  strict  compliance

thereof.

13. In the case of  Anna Bhau Magdum since deceased by

his LRs v. Babasaheb Anandrao Desai [1995 (5) SCC 243],

this Court held that there is no automatic purchase of a land by

a tenant in cases where the landlord happens to be, inter alia, a

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widow and the right  of purchase can be effective only when

exercised in accordance with the provisions  of section 32 F,

i.e., by giving a notice in writing within a period of one year

from the date on which the right of the landlord to terminate the

tenancy comes to  an end after  the  death of  a  widow. In  the

present  case,  therefore,  the  Appellant  was  duty  bound  to

comply  with  the  mandatory  requirement  to  serve  a  notice

intending to purchase the disputed land under Section 32 F to

the landlord as well as to the Tribunal.  In the case of  Appa

Narsappa  Magdum  since  deceased  by  his  LRs  v.  Akubai

Ganapati Nimbalkar and Ors [1999 (4) SCC 443],  this Court

held  that  the  intimation  to  be  provided  by the  tenant  under

Section 32 F (1) (a) has to be given according to the provisions

laid down in the said section. This Court, in the said case, had

negated the contention that the concerned Act, being a welfare

legislation,  enacted  for  the  benefit  of  the  tenants,  should  be

construed in a liberal manner. The Court in its judgment stated

in  paragraph  no.  4  that  “We cannot  accept  this  submission

because language of the Sections 32F and 31 is quite clear and

the period of one year will have to be counted in accordance

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with  the  said  provisions  and  not  from  the  date  of  the

knowledge of the tenant. The provision of law being clear, we

cannot  in  such a  case,  grant  relief  on  the  basis  of  equity.”

Again  in  Sudam  Ganpat  Kutwal  v.  Shevantabai  Tukaram

Gulumkar  [2006  (7)  SCC  200],  relying  on  counsel  for  the

parties in their submissions, this Court has clearly summarized

the position of law. The paragraphs relevant to this case are 23

(c) to 23 (e) which have been laid down herein:  

“23 (c) A landlord has a right to give notice and make  an  application  for  possession  after terminating  the  tenancy,  if  he  wanted  the  land bonafide  for  personal  cultivation,  provided  the notice  was  served  on  the  tenant  on  or  before 31.12.1956  (with  copy  to  the  Mamlatdar)  and application for possession  under  section 29 was filed on or before 31.03.1957.

(d)  A  landlord  widow  also  entitled  to  make  an application  for  possession  under  sub-section  (1) of section 31 of the Act. Sub-section (3) of section 31,  which  is  an  enabling  provision,  extends  the time within which the widow can seek possession under  section  31  (1)  of  the  Act,  beyond 31.12.1956. As a result,  where the landlord is a widow, then the notice required under sub-section (1) of section 31 may be given and the application for possession under section 29 may be made by her so long as her interest in the land exists. Such notice can also be given by the successor-in-title of  the  widow within  one  year  from the  date  on

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which the interest of the widow in the land ceases to exist.  

(e) Where the landlord is a widow [and she does not exercise her right under section 31 (1) of the Act],  the  right  to  purchase  under  the  deemed purchase is postponed till the expiry of the period during which such (disabled) landlord is entitled to terminate the tenancy under section 31 (3). The tenant  desirous  of  exercising  such  right  shall, however, give an intimation in that behalf to the landlord  and  the  Tribunal  within  one  year thereafter, as required under section 32 F (1-A).

Consequently, where the landlord, being a widow as on 1.4.1957, does not choose to terminate the tenancy  for  personal  cultivation,  the  tenancy continues during her lifetime and on the death of the  widow,  her  successor-in-title  will  have  the right  to  terminate  the  tenancy  within  one  year from  the  date  of  the  death  of  the  widow.  The tenant has the right to purchase such land, under section 32 within one year from the expiry of the period during which such successor-in-title of the widow is given the right to terminate the tenancy under  section  31 (3)  by giving  an intimation  as required under section 32 F (1-A).”

14. It is pertinent to mention here that the above-mentioned

case has been cited by the Appellants to contend before us that

the required notice under section 32 F is not mandatory in its

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nature. However we do not agree with this argument advanced

by the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the Appellants.

The required notice is  not  mandatory only in  a case  when a

widow land lady has already exercised her right under section

31 (1), i.e. when during her life time, a notice is served to the

tenant  that  the  landlady  requires  the  land  bonafide.  Once  a

notice  under  section  31  (1)  is  served  by   such  a   widow

landlady, the further benefit of section 31 (3) is not available.

Paragraph No. 23 (f) at page no. 210 of the above-mentioned

case  and  paragraph  no.  27  of  the  same  are  of  relevance  to

illustrate our point.:

“23.(f)  Where  a  landlord,  who  is  a  widow, exercises  her  right  of  termination  and  secures possession  of  part  of  the  tenanted  land  for personal  cultivation  under  section  31  (1)  of  the Act, then there is no question of her successor-in- title giving a notice of termination within one year from  the  date  on  which  the  widow’s  interest ceases  to  exist.  When  section  31  (3)  ceases  to apply, section 32 F also will not apply and there is no  need  for  the  tenant  to  give  any  intimation under section 32 F (1-A).

“27. Learned counsel for the respondent relied on the decisions of this Court in Amrit Bhikaji Kale v. Kashinath Janardhan Trade, Anna Bhau Magdum v.  Babasaheb  Anadrao  Desai,  Appa  Narsappa

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Magdum  v.  Akubai  Ganapati  Nimbalkar  and Balchandra  Anantrao  Rakvi  v.  Ramchandra Rukaram to contend that the tenant has to issue a notice  under  section  32  F  within  the  period prescribed and if  he fails to  do so,  he loses  the right  to purchase the land and the landlord will become  entitled  to  the  same  absolutely.  These were all cases where the landlord under disability had not sought possession for personal cultivation under  section  31  (1)  and  where  admittedly, sections  31  (3)  and  32  F  applied  and consequently, there was an obligation on the part of the tenant to send an intimation under section 32 F (1-A). None of the cases related to a widow landlord who had terminated the tenancy during her lifetime and taken possession of a portion of the  tenanted  land.  Therefore,  the  said  decisions will not apply”.

15. The above-mentioned proposition clearly establishes the

fact that with regard to Section 31 (1), once a notice has been

served under that provision, the further benefit  of Section 31

(3) cannot be obtained by the legal heirs of the widow. But, in

case when Section 31 has not been availed of by the widow as

we  can  see  in  the  present  dispute,  Section  31  (3)  would

definitely apply.

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16. The learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant

has argued before us that the Appellant could not serve a notice

to the landowner since he was not sure about the title of the

disputed land owing to a dispute between the two sons of Late

Smt. Narmadabai who were claiming the title of the disputed

land.  We cannot accept this contention of the Appellant. The

order passed by the Tahsildar,  Kavathe Mahankal, lays down

the fact that Shri Ramchandra, Respondent No 2 in this case,

had produced a certified copy of the Judgment and order dated

28th of April, 1966, passed by the Joint Civil Judge Sr. in Misc.

Application No 25 of 1965 in which it has been declared that

Shri Ramchandra is the owner of the disputed land on the basis

of the will executed by his mother Late Smt. Narmadabai. The

appellant also in his deposition admitted that:  

“The owner of the said land was Smt. Narmadabai Bhau Sutar. Narmadabai died before 10/12 years. Ramchandra Bahu Sutar filed suit  on the basis of will, and got transferred the land of Narmadabai in his name”.

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17. The original  tenant,  even after  the  second  remand had

clearly admitted before the same court in his statement dated

16th of March, 1981, that Shri Ramchandra alone had become

the sole owner of the disputed land by virtue of the decision of

the Civil Court on the strength of the will. Going by the above

mentioned records, we are of the firm view that the Appellant

had a complete knowledge about the title of the disputed land

in  question.  Therefore  his  submission  that  he  had  no

knowledge about the real owner, cannot be accepted.

18. Further for the sake of argument even if we assume that

the Appellant had no knowledge about the title of the disputed

land,  nothing  prevented  him from serving  a  notice  as  to  his

intention of purchasing the land to both the brothers contesting

for the disputed  land or  either  one of them according to  the

provisions  of  Section  32  F.  This  Court,  in  the  case  of  Teja

Singh and Others v. State of Punjab and Another [1995 (4)

SCC 540], has observed that in the matter of land acquisition,

service of notice on one of the co-owners is necessary and will

therefore  be  construed  as  service  on  all  the  co-owners.  The

appellant  has argued that  he had on more than one occasion

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conveyed about his willingness to purchase the land to both the

brothers and that his intention to do so was known by both of

them.  However,  it  does  not  absolve  him  from  the  duty  of

providing a written notice in terms of Section 32 F of the Act.

Moreover, the Appellant himself admitted before the Tahsildar,

Kavathe Mahankal, that he had not served any written notice to

either of the two brothers mentioning his intention. This can be

identified  from the  statement  of  the  Appellant  on  the  8th of

October, 1976 and the 16th of March, 1981 whereby he stated:

“Narmadabai died before 10-12 years. I have not served

the notice on the owners. I have informed them orally regarding

the  purchase  from time to  time.  I  have  not  served notice  in

writing. There were disputes amongst the brothers. Because of

that I could not serve the notice regarding the purchase of the

land as per section 32 (F). Due to no knowledge of law I am

not aware of the service of the notice”.

19. For  the  reasons  aforesaid,  we are  of  the  view that  the

High Court  was  justified  in  passing  the  impugned  judgment

and there is no infirmity in the impugned order for which we

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can interfere with the order of the High Court. Since we have

already held that the service of the notice under Section 32F

was mandatory and by failure to serve such a notice under the

said  section,  the  Appellant  had  lost  his  right  to  claim  the

disputed land.  

20. Accordingly the Appeal is  dismissed. There will  be no

order as to costs.

…………………………J. [TARUN CHATTERJEE]

…………………………J.  [AFTAB ALAM]

NEW DELHI September 15, 2008.

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