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PETITIONER: TRIBHUBAN PARKASH NAYYAR

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: THE UNION OF INDIA

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 10/10/1969

BENCH: DUA, I.D. BENCH: DUA, I.D. SHELAT, J.M. VAIDYIALINGAM, C.A.

CITATION:  1970 AIR  540            1970 SCR  (2) 732  1969 SCC  (3)  99  CITATOR INFO :  RF         1973 SC1461  (97)  RF         1984 SC1801  (1,2,3)  R          1989 SC1019  (7)

ACT: Displaced  Persons  (Claims)  Act,  1950-Displaced   Persons (Claims) ’Supplementary Act, 1954-Section 5(1)(b)-Revisional Powers  of  Chief  Settlement  Commissioner-If  extends   to matters  which had become final under the 1950 Act-Scope  of power--Displaced    Persons   (Verification    of    Claims) Supplementary Rules, 1954-Rule 18, cl. (iv)-If can be  cons- trued ejusdem generis.

HEADNOTE: The  appellant,  a  displaced  person  from  West  Pakistan, submitted his claim under the Displaced Persons (Claims) Act of  1950  in respect of the property left by him  there  The Claims  Officer  verified  the claim for Rs.  8  lacs.   The Claims  Commissioner, in revision, raised the value  of  the verified claim to Rs. 10 lacs.  The Settlement Commissioner, exercising  the  revisional powers of the  Chief  Settlement Commissioner   under   the   Displaced   Persons    (Claims) Supplementary Act, 1954, reduced the claim of Rs. 10 lacs to Rs.  15,000.   In a writ petition filed by the  appellant  a single  Judge  of the High Court quashed the  order  of  the Settlement Commissioner holding that there were clear errors of  law on the fact of the record.  It was left open to  the department  to  reconsider the matter as to  evaluation  and come  to a proper conclusion on evidence.  A Letters  Patent Bench  reversed the order of the single Judge and  dismissed the:  writ  petition.   In  appeal  to  this  Court  it  was contended   that   :  (i)  the  order  of   the   Settlement Commissioner  was vitiated by errors of law on the  face  of the record; (ii) the Settlement Commissioner exercising  the power  of  the  Chief  Settlement  Commissioner  under   the Supplementary  Act had no jurisdiction to revise  the  order made by the Claims Commissioner exercising revisional  power under the Act of 1950; (iii) the power of revision conferred on  the Chief Settlement Commissioner by section 5(1)(b)  of the Supplementary Act was restricted to the verification  of

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the claim and its valuation was outside its purview and (iv) the power was circumscribed within the four-corners of  rule 18  of  the  Displaced  Persons  (Verification  of   Claims) Supplementary Rules, 1954.  Allowing the appeal, HELD  :  (i)  The  learned single Judge  was  right  in  his conclusions.  The order and the material on record show that the  Settlement Commissioner had, at more places  than  one, based  his  conclusions  on pure  conjectures  and  surmises without  there  being any legal evidence on  the  record  to support them. (ii) The   language   used  in  Section   5(1)(b)   of   the Supplementary Act is unambiguous and it clearly empowers the Chief Settlement Commissioner, subject to any rules that may be  made, to revise any verified claim and make such  orders in relation thereto as he thinks fit.  On a plain reading of the section in the light of the definition of the expression "verified  claim"  and  the  statutory  scheme,  the   Chief Settlement  Commissioner’s special power of  revision  would extend’  to suo motu revision of the verified  claims  which had become final under the Act of 1950 Is a result of orders made by the Claims Commissioner on revision.  The use of the words  "revised  any verified claim"’ seem  prima  facie  to extend the power of revision also to verified claims bearing the stamp of scrutiny by ’the Chief Settlement Commissioner. There being no doubt as to the mean- 733 ing of s. 5(1)(b) the preamble cannot be used to control  or qualify its unambiguous language. [737 A-F] (iii)     The definition of verified claim in s. 2(f) of the Supplementary Act speaks of the final order and it  includes valuation.   The  Claims Officer under the Act has  also  to value   the  claim  and  the  final  order  embraces,   both verification of title and valuation. [738 G-H] (iv) The  categories  contained in clauses (i) to  (iii)  of rule 18 do not form a genus or a class with the result  that the  expression "other sufficient reason" occurring  in  cl. (iv) of this rule would not attract the ejusdem generis rule for  its  construction.  But assuming that the  first  three clauses constitute a class or kind of objects or genus,  the grounds  given by the Settlement Commissioner are  analogous to cl. (iii) which speaks of gross and material irregularity and disparity in the evaluation of the claim. [741 H] [The case was remitted to the Chief Settlement  Commissioner for a fresh decision in accordance with law.]

JUDGMENT: CIVIL  APPELLATE  JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal  No.  1568  of 1966. Appeal  from the judgment and order dated September 9,  1964 of the Punjab High Court, Circuit Bench at Delhi in  Letters Patent Appeal No. 2-D of 1963. K.   L.  Gosain,  K. L. Mehta, D. N. Bhasin,  S.  K.  Mehta. Inderjeet Gulati and Sona Bhatiani, for the appellant. B. Sen and S. P. Nayar, for the respondent. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by Dua,  J. The appellant, a displaced person from Lahore,  now in  West  Pakistan, submitted his claim in  respect  of  the immovable  property  left  by  him  there.   The  claim  was submitted  under  the provisions of  the  Displaced  Persons (Claims) Act.  XLIV of 1950 (hereafter called the  principal Act).   The  property  in respect of  which  the  claim  was submitted  was valued by the appellant at Rs. 10  lacs.   It consisted of a building 21/2 storeyed high with 12 shops and

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a well as also some platform etc. in Landa Bazar, in Lahore. The  Claims  Officer  verified this claim for  Rs.  8  lacs. Against this order a revision was taken by the appellant  to the Claims Commissioner who on May 1, 1953 in a brief  order raised the value of the verified claim to Rs. 10 lacs.   The relevant part of that order reads as under               "I have gone through the order of the  learned               Claims Officer and I find that he has given  a               queer argument to allow Rs. 8,00,000/- to  the               claimant.   By every method tried by  him  the               assessment  went beyond Rs. 10,00,000/- and  I               think he ought to have allowed Rs. 10,00,000/-               as  claimed  by  the claimant  I  enhance  the               assessment  and  allow  Rs.  10,00,000/to  the               claimant." 734 We  would assume that the Claims Commissioner had been  duly delegated  the  power of the Chief  Claims  Commissioner  to revise  the order of the Claims Officer, because no  dispute was  raised on this point.  On the strength of the  verified claim  the appellant purchased two properties in Delhi at  a public auction; one of them is situated in Daryaganj and the other in New Rajinder Nagar.  On November 8, 1957 Shri M. S. Chaddha,  Settlement Commissioner, exercising power  of  the Chief  Settlement  Commissioner issued to  the  appellant  a notice  under the Displaced Persons  (Claims)  Supplementary Act,  1954 calling upon him to show cause why the  order  of the Claims Commissioner dated May 1, 1953 be not revised and varied.   On  May  23, 1958 the  said  officer  reduced  the appellant’s  claim  of  Rs. 10 lacs to  Rs.  15,000/-.   The appellant  then filed a writ petition under Art. 226 in  the Punjab  High Court challenging the order reducing the  value of  his claim.  A learned Single Judge on November  1,  1962 allowed   the  writ  petition  holding  that   the   learned Settlement  Commissioner exercising the power of  the  Chief Settlement Commissioner had proceeded to deal with the value of  the  property  on  wholly  conjectural  grounds.   In  a detailed  order  the  learned  Single  Judge  came  to   the conclusion  that  the Settlement Commissioner had  not  only ignored  important  evidence  but  had  also  held   certain documents  to be forged without any evidence in  support  of the  finding.  In the opinion of the learned  Single  Judge, therefore, there were clear errors of law on the face of the record  rendering the order of the  Settlement  Commissioner open to challenge in writ proceedings in the High Court.  On this  view  the order was set aside and  quashed.   It  was, however, observed that it would be open to the department to reconsider  the entire matter as to valuation and come to  a proper conclusion on evidence. The respondent took the matter on appeal to a Division Bench under  the  Letter  Patent  and  the  Letters  Patent  Bench reversed the order of the learned Single Judge holding  that on a reading of the order of the Settlement Commissioner  it could  not  be said that his finding was based on  no  legal evidence.   The appeal was accordingly allowed  and  setting aside the order of the learned Single Judge, the appellant’s writ petition was dismissed.  The appellant has come to this Court on appeal with certificate. On  behalf  of  the appellant two main  points  were  raised before  us.  It was contended, in the first  instance,  that Shri M. S. Chaddha, while exercising the power of the  Chief Settlement  Commissioner, had no jurisdiction to revise  the order  made  by  the  Claims  Commissioner  exercising   the revisional power of the Chief Claims Commissioner under  the principal Act.  Secondly,

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735 it  was  contended  that  there was a  clear  error  of  law apparent on the face of the record with the result that  the learned  Single  Judge was fully justified in  quashing  the order  of the Settlement Commissioner, and that the  Letters Patent  Bench  was in error in allowing the  appeal.   While developing this ground of attack the counsel also  submitted that  in  exercising the power of  revision  the  Settlement Commissioner  could not interfere with conclusions  of  fact and that he had, therefore, exceeded his jurisdiction in  so doing. In order to examine the first submission we have to turn  to the  provisions  of the Principal Act and of  the  Displaced Persons  (Claims)  Supplementary Act 12 of  1954  (hereafter called  the Supplementary Act).  The principal Act,  enacted with  the  object  of providing  for  the  registration  and verification  of claims of displaced persons in  respect  of immovable  property in Pakistan, was brought on the  statute book  on May 18, 1950 and was initially to remain  in  force for a period of two years only.  Its life was extended by  a further period of one year by means of an amendment in 1952. On  the  expiry  of the third  year  the  Displaced  Persons (Claims)   Supplementary  Ordinance  No.  3  of   1954   was promulgated  pending the passage, by the Parliament  of  the bill which later emerged in the shape of Supplementary  Act. The Ordinance was enforced on January 18, 1954.  The supple- mentary  Act was enacted, as its preamble shows, to  provide for  the disposal of certain proceedings pending  under  the principal Act and for matters connected therewith.  We  have specifically  referred to the preamble because on behalf  of the appellant strong reliance was placed on the preamble  in support  of  his  construction  of  ss.  4  and  5  of   the supplementary  Act, which deal with the revisional power  of the Chief Settlement Commissioner appointed under this  Act. It  is not disputed at the bar that this Act  was  primarily designed  to  finalise the disposal of  certain  proceedings pending  under the principal Act at the time of its  expiry. According to the appellant the words "for matters  connected therewith"  in the preamble are intended to have the  effect of  restricting the ambit of its provisions  exclusively  to the  proceedings actually pending on the date of the  expiry of  the principal Act, whereas, according to the  respondent these  words  demand a liberal construction so as  to  bring within the fold of the Act all proceedings initiated for the registration of claims, notwithstanding the fact that  final order  of verification and valuation had already  been  made thereon.  The respondent also placed strong reliance on  the language  used  in  s.  5 which, he  argued,  is  plain  and unambiguous  and  its  ambit cannot  be  restricted  by  the Preamble.  That section reads as under 736 "Special power of revision in respect of cases decided under Act XLIV of 1950.               5. (1)     Notwithstanding anything  contained               in  the  principal Act, the  Chief  Settlement               Commissioner               (a)   may, on an application for revision made               to him within time by any person aggrieved  by               the  decision of the Claims Officer, call  for               the record of the case and make such order  in               the case as he thinks fit.               "Explanation-For the purposes of this  clause,               an application for revision shall be deemed to               be or to have been made within time, if-               (i)   such  application  was  not  barred   by

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             limitation  on  the appointed  day  under  the               rules  made  under the principal  Act  and  is               filed  within one month from the  commencement               of this Act; or               (ii)  such  application had been filed  before               the appointed day and was not, on the date  on               which it was filed barred by limitation  under               the rules made under the principal Act;               (b)   may,  on his own motion, but subject  to               any  rules  that may be made in  this  behalf,               revise any verified claim and make such  order               in relation thereto as he thinks fit.               (2)   No  order  varying the decision  of  the               Claims Officer or revising any verified  claim               which  prejudicially affects any person  shall               be made without giving an opportunity of being               heard." This  special power of revision was conferred on  the  Chief Settlement Commissioner in addition to the ordinary power of revision  conferred  by  the proviso to S.  4(3)  which  was similar  to  the power of revision conferred  on  the  Chief Claims Commissioner, under the principal Act.  The suo  motu power   to   revise  verified  claims,  according   to   the appellant’s  learned counsel, was designedly vested  in  the Chief Settlement Commissioner, he ,being the final authority under  the  supplementary Act.  But this power,  argued  the counsel,  was not intended to extend to  proceedings,  which could  not be considered to be pending under  the  principal Act.  This argument was sought to be founded on the Preamble of  the supplementary Act.  A verified claim which had  been subjected to scrutiny by the Chief Claims Commissioner and 737 bore that officer’s seal under the principal Act,  according to  the appellant’s counsel, could not be described to be  a matter  pending  under the principal Act and a  revision  of such a claim could not be held to be a matter connected with a pending proceeding. The  object and purpose of a preamble to a statute  is  well settled  and  at  the bar before us  there  was  no  serious dispute on this point.  A preamble is a key to open the mind of  the  legislature  but it cannot be used  to  control  or qualify  precise and unambiguous language of the  enactment. It  is  only when there is/ a doubt as to the meaning  of  a provision  that  recourse  may be had  to  the  preamble  to ascertain  the  reasons  for the  enactment  and  hence  the intention  of  the  Parliament.   If  the  language  of  the enactment is capable of more than one meaning then that  one is  to be preferred which comes nearest to the ;purpose  and scope of the preamble.  In other words, Preamble may  assist in  ascertaining  the meaning but it does not  affect  clear words  in  a statute.  The courts are thus not  expected  to start with the preamble for construing a statutory provision nor  does  the  mere  fact  that  a  clear  and  unambiguous statutory  provision goes beyond the preamble give rise,  by itself, to a doubt on its , meaning. Now the language used in s. 5(1)(b) of the supplementary Act is unambiguous and it clearly empowers the Chief  Settlement Commissioner,  subject  to any rules that may  be  made,  to revise  any verified claim and make such orders in  relation thereto  as he thinks fit.  A verified claim, as defined  in s. 2(f) of the Supplementary Act, means any claim registered under  the principal Act in respect of which a  final  order has  been  passed under that Act.  Now it is  difficult  to’ contend  that on a plain reading of s. 5(1)(b) in the  light of  the definition of the expression "verified  claim",  the

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Chief  Settlement  Commissioner  had no power  suo  motu  to revise a claim on which a final order had been passed  under the principal Act by the Chief’ Claims Commissioner.  It may be pointed out that according to the statutory scheme, under s.  5(1) (a) of the Supplementary Act an aggrieved party  is entitled  to apply to the Chief Settlement Commissioner  for revision  of decisions of the Claims Officers and  there  is adequate  provision  for safeguarding the interests  of  the aggrieved  parties  from any possible injury  by  reason  of lapse  of  time.   The difference in the  language  used  in clauses  (a) and (b) of s. 5(1) throws sufficient  light  on the  legislative intent.  The use of the words  "revise  any verified  claim"  seems prima facie to extend the  power  of revision  also  to  verified claims  bearing  the  stamp,/of scrutiny  by  the Chief Settlement  Commissioner.   Had  the Parliament   intended  this  power  to  be  restricted,   as suggested on behalf of the appellant, 738 then it would have expressed such intention in clear  words. The  statutory  scheme also supports this view.   Under  the proviso to  S. 4(3)  the Chief Settlement  Commissioner  has suo motu power of   revision  from  the  decisions  of   the settlement Officers and under s.   5(1)(a) he has the  power of revision on applications by aggrieved     parties    from the decisions of Claims Officers.  But under s.   5 (1)  (b) the  suo  motu  power of revision does  not  extend  to  all decisions but is confined only to verified claims though  in this respect it takes within its fold all such claims and is not  restricted  to the claims verified only by  the  Claims Officers.  On a plain reading of s. 5(1)(b), therefore,  the Chief  Settlement Commissioner’s special power  of  revision would  seem  to  us to extend to suo motu  revision  of  the verified  claims which had become final under the  principal Act  as  a  result  of  orders  made  by  the  Chief  Claims Commissioner  on revision., Neither any statutory  bat’  nor any  precedent has been cited against the exercise  of  this power;  nor  has any principle been brought  to  our  notice which  would induce us to restrict the plain language of  s. 5(1)(b). The  submission that an order made on a revision can  in  no case be subjected to further revision, is also  unacceptable on the statutory scheme and language.  No constitutional bar to  further scrutiny of such orders on revision was  pointed out.   It  may  in this connection be, borne  in  mind  that verification  of  claims under the  principal  Act  involved proof in regard to title to, and value of, property left  by the  displaced persons in West Pakistan; and this had to  be completed  within a period of, originally, two  years  which was  later extended by one year.  The best evidence in  this respect  was  only available in West Pakistan, and it  is  a matter  of  common  knowledge that it was not  easy  for  an average  displaced person to secure such evidence.   Chances of errors in verification and valuation of claims, in  these circumstances, being Not too few, the highest authority  was advisedly  in  larger public’ interest vested  with  a  wide power to review and reassess such verified claims. It  was then contended that the power of revision  under  s. 5(1)(b)  is restricted to the verification of the claim  and its  valuation is outside its purview.  This  contention  is difficult to accept.  It is true that "claim" as defined  in the principal Act broadly speaking means the assertion of  a right  to  ownership of, or to any  interest  in,  immovable property.  But the Claims Officer under that Act has also to value   the  claim  and  the  final  order   embraces   both verification  of  title and valuation.   The  definition  of

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"verified claim" in s. 2(f) of the supplementary Act  speaks of the final order and it includes valuation. This  takes us to the submission that the power of  revision of the Chief Settlement Commissioner is circumscribed within the 739 four corners of r. 18 of the Displaced Persons (Verification of Claim) Supplementary Rules, 1954.  This rule, of  course, specifically controls the exercise of the power of  revision conferred  by s. 5(1)(b) and this is not disputed.  Rule  18 is in the following terms :               "Special  revision  of verified  claims  under               clause (b) of sub-section (1) of section 5.               18.   The  Chief Settlement Commissioner  may,               while   exercising  the  powers   of   special               revision  conferred  on him by clause  (b)  of               sub-section  (1)  of section 5, call  for  the               record of any verified claim and may pass  any               order in revision in respect of such  verified               claim  in such manner as he thinks fit, if  he               is satisfied that such order should be  passed               on one or the other of the following  grounds,               namely:-               (i)   the  discovery  of  any  new  matter  or               documentary evidence which after the  exercise               of due diligence was not within the  knowledge               of or could not be produced by the claimant at               the time when the claim was verified; or               (ii)  correction    of   any    clerical    or               arithmetical  mistake apparent on the face  of               the record; or               (iii) gross   or  material   irregularity   or               disparity in the valuation of the claim; or               (iv)  any other sufficient reason               Provided    that    the    Chief    Settlement               Commissioner shall not entertain or take  into               consideration      any     application      or               representation made to him under this rule  by               any   claimant   if   such   application    or                             representation  is made after the 30th   day  of               April, 1954." It  was  contended  that  the grounds  on  which  the  Chief Settlement  Commissioner revised the verified claim  do  not fall  within  the  first three clauses of  this  rule.   The fourth clause, according to Shri Gosain’s argument, must  be read  ejusdem generis and so read this clause would also  be inapplicable  to  the  case.  Reliance in  support  of  this argument was placed on M.M.B. Catholicos and another v.  The Most.  Rev.  Mar Poulose and others(1), a case dealing  with the  power of review under Order 47 rule 1 Civil  P.C.,  the language of which, according to the appellant’s counsel,  is completely identical with that of rule 18.. (1) [1955] 1 S.C.R. 520. L5SupCI(NP)/70-2 740 Let  us examine the language of these two provisions.   Rule 18 has already been reproduced.  Order 47 r. 1(c) Civil P.C. which alone is relevant for our purpose is in the  following terms.               "Rule   1.  Any  person  considering   himself               aggrieved               (a)               (b)               (c)   by  a  decision on a  reference  from  a

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             Court  of  Small  Causes  and  who,  from  the               discovery  of  new  and  important  matter  or               evidence  which,  after the  exercise  of  due               diligence,  was  not within his  knowledge  or               could not be produced by him at the time  when               the  decree  was passed or order made,  or  on               account  of some mistake or error apparent  on               the  face  of  the record, or  for  any  other               sufficient reason, desires to obtain a  review               of  the  decree passed or order  made  against               him, may apply for a review of judgment to the               Court  which  passed the decree  or  made  the               order.               (2)   .   .   .   .   .   .   . From a plain reading of these two provisions the  difference in their language is quite obvious.  Clauses (i) and (ii) of r. 18 are certainly similar to cl. (c) of Order 47 r. 1, but clause (iii)   of r. 18 is wholly different from cl. (c)  of r. 1 of Order 47.It is   difficult to hold these clauses  to be similar in kind or to have a  common genus.   The  former seems  not only to take within its fold gross  and  material irregularity  in the valuation of the claim, which  to  some extent  resembles  one of the grounds  on  which  revisional power as contemplated by S. 115 Civil P.C. can be exercised, but  also to include cases where there is disparity  in  the valuation  of the claim.  Quite clearly this clause is  much wider  in  scope  than Order 47 r. 1  (c).   The  expression "other sufficient cause" occurring in cl. (iv) of r. 18  has therefore  to  be  construed in this  context.   When  in  a statute  there  are general words following  particular  and specific words, the general words are sometimes construed as limited to things of the same kind as those specified.  This rule  of interpretation generally known as  ejuedem  generis rule  has  been  pressed  into  service  on  behalf  of  the appellant.   This  rule  reflects an  attempt  to  reconcile incompatibility  between the specific and general words,  in view of the other rules of interpretation, that all words in a statute are given effect if possible, that a statute is to be  construed as a whole and that no words in a statute  are presumed to be superfluous.  Ejusdem generis rule being  one of  the rules of interpretation, only serves, like all  such rules,  as an aid to discover the legislative intent; it  is neither final nor conclusive and is attracted only when  the specific words enumerated, constitute a class, 741 which is not exhausted and are followed by general terms and when  there  is no manifestation of intent to  give  broader meaning to the general words. The  first  three  categories contained in  r.  18,  in  our opinion, do not form a genus or a class with the result that clause  (iv) would not attract the ejusdem generis rule  for its construction.  But assuming that they constitute a class or  kind of objects or genus, it appears to us that  grounds given by the Settlement Commissioner are analogous to clause (iii)  which  speaks of gross and material  irregularity  or disparity  in the valuation of the claim.   This  submission must, therefore, be rejected. We  now  come to the merits of the order of  the  Settlement Commissioner.   After  going  through  the  order  and   the material  on  the record, to which our  attention  has  been drawn, we are satisfied that the Settlement Commissioner has at  more  places  than one based  his  conclusions  on  pure conjectures  and  surmises  without there  being  any  legal evidence on the record to support them.  We do not  consider it  necessary  to  exhaustively deal with  the  argument  in

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support  of the errors of law on the face of the record  for the  purpose of considering the alleged infirmities  in  the order  of the Settlement Commissioner.  The  learned  Single Judge  has dealt with this question at length and we are  in agreement  with  his conclusions.  We may only add  that  we have  also looked at the original documents  which  appeared suspicious to the Settlement Commissioner, but we are unable to  find  any  circumstance  which  could  be  said  to   be suspicious or abnormal so as to give rise to any  reasonable doubt  about  their genuineness.  The  respondent’s  learned counsel also expressed his inability to bring to our  notice any  material  throwing suspicion  on  the,  genuineness  of these  documents.  Indeed the learned counsel was frank  en- ough  to express his inability to support the view taken  by the  Letters  Patent  Bench  or  to  find  fault  with   the conclusions  of the learned Single Judge, whose order  seems to be unexceptionable.  We accordingly allow the appeal  and setting aside the order of the Letters Patent Bench  restore that of the Single Judge.  It was agreed at the bar that  as directed by the Single Judge the case should go back to  the Chief  Settlement  Commissioner  for  a  fresh  decision  in accordance with law.  That this case can be remitted back to the  Chief Settlement Commissioner in these proceedings  was not  disputed before us.  We should, however, make it  clear that  this  order  is not to be  construed  to  contain  any expression of opinion on merits on the evidentiary value  of the  material on the record on the question of valuation  of the claim.  The appellant is entitled to his costs.                                   Appeal allowed R.K.P.S. 742