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PETITIONER: TREOGI NATH

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: THE INDIAN IRON & STEEL CO.  LTD.

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 03/08/1967

BENCH: BHARGAVA, VISHISHTHA BENCH: BHARGAVA, VISHISHTHA SHELAT, J.M.

CITATION:  1968 AIR  205            1968 SCR  (1)  97

ACT: Industrial   Disputes  Act,  1947  (14  of  1947),  s.   33C (2)--Labour Court not specified for computing money value of the     benefit    claimed    by    workmen     under     s. 33C(2)--Jurisdiction.

HEADNOTE: Under  an award in an industrial dispute, it was  held  that the  appellants-workmen were entitled to half wages  from  a certain date to the date they resumed duty.  After the final disposal of the companies’ appeal, the workmen were  allowed to  resume  duties.  Thereafter, a dispute arose as  to  the amount to which the workmen were entitled.  The workmen,  by separate  applications, applied to the Second Labour  Court, West  Bengal  for determination of the amounts due  to  them under  s. 33C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.   The companies  challenged the jurisdiction of the Second  Labour Court  on the ground that the court had not  been  specified for  the  purpose  of determining the amount  at  which  the benefit  claimed by the workmen was to be computed in  terms of  money  under  s. 33C(2) of  the  Act.   The  preliminary objection  was accepted by the Second Labour Court,  against which the workmen filed a writ petition.  This petition  was accepted  by the High Court, but in appeal, the  High  Court dismissed the petition. HELD: The appeal must fail. The mere fact that a Labour Court has been constituted under s.  7(1)  of  the Act, for the purpose  of  adjudication  of Industrial   Disputes  as  well  as  for  performing   other functions that may be assigned to it under the Act does  not mean that the court is automatically specified as the  Court for  the purpose of exercising jurisdiction under s.  33C(2) of  the  Act.  Section 33C(2) confers jurisdiction  only  on those  Labour  Courts which are specified  in  this  behalf, i.e.,  such Labour Courts which are specifically  designated by  the  State Government for the purpose of  computing  the money value of the benefit claimed by a workman.  The Second Labour Court, West Bengal, was never specified by any  order of the State Government as one of those Labour Courts  which was to exercise the powers or discharge the functions  under s. 33C(2). [10OC-E]. Though  the Civil Courts are constituted under s. 13 of  the

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Bengal, Agra and Assam Civil Courts Act, the power of  those courts to take cognizance of civil suits, and decide them is conferred  by  the Code of Civil Procedure.  It  is  not  by virtue of their constitution under s. 13 of the Bengal, Agra and  Assam Civil Courts Act that the Courts take  cognizance (of  civil suits and decide them.  Section 33C (2),  in  the matter  of  applications  made  by  individual  workmen,  is therefore, not comparable with s. 13(2) of the Bengal,  Agra and  Assam  Civil  Courts Act, but in fact,  lays  down  the requirement which must be satisfied before the Labour  Court can  take cognizance of the matter raised before it  by  the applications  of the workman    section 33C(2) would,  thus, serve  the  purpose in the case of Labour  Courts  which  is served by the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure  re- lating to cognizance in respect of Civil Courts. [102B-D] 98

JUDGMENT: CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 370 of 1967. Appeal  from the judgment and order dated July 22,  1963  of the Calcutta High Court in Appeal from Original Order No. 58 of 1963. E.   Udayaratnan and A. P. Chatterjee, for the appellants. H.   R. Gokhale and D. N. Mukherjee, for respondents Nos. 1-3. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by Bhargava,  J.-On an industrial dispute referred to  it,  the Fifth  Industrial  Tribunal of West Bengal  gave  an  award, which  was published on September 19, 1955, under  which  41 persons, including the 30 appellants who had been  dismissed from service by the two Companies, which are respondents 1 & 2 in this appeal, were directed to be reinstated in service. Under  the  award, it was held that  these  appellants  were entitled  to half their salary from October 2, 1953  to  the date. of their actual resumption of duty.  According to  the appellants,  they  were not allowed to resume  duty  by  the Companies, even though they offered to do so.  The Companies did  not admit that there was any such offer and went up  in appeal  to  the Labour Appellate Tribunal  and  obtained  an order  of stay of implementation of the award from it.   The Labour Appellate Tribunal dismissed the appeal, where  after the Companies came in further appeal to this Court, and this Court  also granted stay of the implementation of the  award during  the  pendency  of  that  appeal.   After  the  final dismissal  of the appeal by this Court, the appellants  were allowed  to resume their duty.  Thereafter, a dispute  arose as to the amount to which the appellants were entitled under the award until the date of resumption of duty by them.  The appellants, by separate applications, applied to the  Second Labour Court, West Bengal, for determination of the  amounts due to them under section 33C(2) of the Industrial  Disputes Act. 1947 (No. 14 of 1947) (hereinafter referred to as  "the Act").   The  Companies challenged the jurisdiction  of  the Second  Labour Court on the ground that that Court  had  not been specified for the purpose of determining the amount  at which  the benefit claimed by the workmen is to be  computed in  terms  of  money  under S.  33C(2)  of  the  Act.   This preliminary  objection  was accepted by  the  Second  Labour Court  which  held that it had no jurisdiction to  make  any order on the applications presented by the appellants.   The appellants  then filed a petition under Article 226  of  the Constitution  in the High Court of Calcutta challenging  the correctness of the view taken by the Second Labour Court.  A

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learned single Judge of that Court came to the decision that the Second Labour Court had jurisdiction to take proceedings on the applications of the appellants under s. 33C(2) of the Act, and 99 consequently,  issued,  a writ of  certiorari  vacating  the order made by the Second Labour Court and a writ of mandamum directing  the Second Labour Court to decide on  merits  the applications  presented  on behalf of the  appellants.   The Companies  then  went before a Division Bench by  a  Letters Patent  Appeal  and,  in that appeal, the  decision  of  the learned  single Judge was set aside and that of  the  Second Labour Court was restored.  The appellants have now come  up to  this  Court by special leave against this order  of  the Division  Bench of the Calcutta High Court by which  it  has been  held that the Second Labour Court had no  jurisdiction to deal with these applications of the appellants. For  convenience, the provisions of sub-ss. (1) and  (2)  of section 33C of the Act, as they stood at the relevant  time, are reproduced below: -               "33C.    Recovery  of  money  due   from   the               Employer-(1)  Where  any  money is  due  to  a               workman from an employer under a settlement or               an  award or under the provisions  of  Chapter               VA, the workman may, without prejudice to  any               other mode of recovery, make an application to               the appropriate Government for the recovery of               the  money due to him, and if the  appropriate               Government  is satisfied that any money is  so               due,  it  shall issue a certificate  for  that               amount  to the Collector who shall proceed  to               recover  the  same in the same  manner  as  an               arrear of land revenue.               (2)Where any workman is entitled to receive               from the employer any benefit which is capable               of  being  computed  in terms  of  money,  the               amount   at  which  such  benefit  should   be               computed may, subject to any rules that may be               made  under  this Act, be determined  by  such               Labour  Court  as  may be  specified  in  this               behalf by the appropriate Government, and  the               amount  so  determined  may  be  recovered  as               provided for in sub-section (1)." The  language of Sub-s. (2) of s. 33C is perfectly clear  in laying  down that the computation in terms of money  of  the benefit  claimed by a workman is to be made by  such  Labour Court as may be specified in this behalf by the  appropriate Government  and, consequently, the only question that  falls for determination is whether it can be held that the  Second Labour  Court, to which applications were presented  by  the appellants,  bad been specified as "the Court" to  make  the determination  under s. 33C(2).  It was conceded by  counsel for both parties that there was no general or specific order mentioning the Second Labour Court, West Bengal as the 100 Court  specified  for purposes of making  the  determination under s. 33C(2).  On behalf of the appellants, it was  urged that  the  Second  Labour  Court  should  be  held  to  have jurisdiction to deal with these applications, because it was constituted under s. 7(1) of the Act and every Labour  Court constituted  under  the Act would be competent to  make  the determination  under  s. 33C(2) by virtue of  the  provision contained in that sub-section itself. Section 7(1) of the Act lays down that:-               "The    appropriate   Government    may,    by

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             notification   in   the   Official    Gazette,               constitute  one or more Labour Courts for  the               adjudication  of industrial disputes  relating               to any matter specified in the Second Schedule               and for performing such other functions as may               be assigned to them under this Act." The submission which was made before the High Court was that the matter which was raised by the applications presented on behalf  of  the  appellants related to one  of  the  matters specified  in  the  Second  Schedule,  because  the   Second Schedule  at  Item No. 6 contained the  entry  "all  matters other  than  those  specified in  the  Third  Schedule"  and determination  of  money  value of a benefit  claimed  by  a workman  is  not one of the matters specified in  the  Third Schedule.   This  contention was rejected by  the  appellate Bench  of the High Court.  It was not sought to  be  pressed before us by learned counsel for the appellants when it  was pointed  out to him that even if it be held that the  matter raised  by the appellants him their applications related  to one  of those enumerated in the Second Schedule, that  would be  immaterial, because, tinder s.7(1) of the Act, a  Labour Court  is  constituted for the purpose  of  adjudication  of industrial disputes relating to those matters, and it cannot possibly  be  contended that these disputes  raised  by  in- dividual  workmen for determination of amounts due  to  them under  the award constituted industrial disputes.  In  fact, this  Court,  in  the Central Bank of  India  Ltd.  v.  P.S. Rajagopalan etc.,(1) clearly held that proceedings under  s. 33C  of the Act are in the nature of  execution  proceedings and  are  not  meant  to include  in  them  proceedings  for adjudication  of  industrial  disputes  which  can  only  be competently  decided by a Labour Court on reference  by  the appropriate Government under s-10(1) of the Act.  It was  in view of this clear legal position that the counsel appearing for  the appellants relied on the second part of  s.7(1)  of the  Act,  under which Labour Courts  are  constituted  "for performing  such other functions as may be assigned to  them under this Act". Labour  Court,  West  Bengal, having  been  constituted  for performing  such other functions also as may be assigned  to it under the (1)[1964] 3 S.C.R. 140. 101 Act,  it should be held that it was competent to decide  the dispute  raised  by these applications  of  the  appellants, because this function of deciding the applications had  been assigned  to it by s. 33C(2) of the Act.  The submission  of learned  counsel  was  that s. 33(C)(2) should  be  read  as containing a general assignment to all Labour Courts of  the function of determining the money value of a benefit claimed by a workman under that provision.  We are unable to  accept this interpretation.  The language of s. 33C(2) itself makes it clear that the appropriate Government has to specify  the Labour Court which is to discharge the functions under  this sub-section.   The use of the expression "specified in  this behalf" is significant.  The words "in this behalf" must  be given  their full import and effect.  They clearly  indicate that  there  must  be a  specification  by  the  appropriate Government  that  a  particular Court is  to  discharge  the function  under s. 33C(2) and, thereupon, it is  that  Court alone  which  will have jurisdiction to proceed  under  that provision.   The  more  fact that a Labour  Court  has  been constituted  under  s. 7(1) of the Act for  the  purpose  of adjudication   of  industrial  disputes  as  well   as   for performing other functions that may be assigned to it  under

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the  Act  does  not mean that that  Court  is  automatically specified  as  the  Court  for  the  purpose  of  exercising jurisdiction  under  s.  33C(2) of  the  Act.   S.  33(C)(2) confers  jurisdiction only on those Labour Courts which  are specified in this behalf, i.e., such Labour Courts which are specifically  designated  by the State  Government  for  the purpose of computing the money value of the benefit  claimed by a workman.  The Second Labour Court, West Bengal, was  in fact,  never specified by any order of the State  Government as  one  of  those Labour Courts which is  to  exercise  the powers or discharge the functions under s. 33C(2). In this connection, learned counsel appearing for the appel- lants  wanted  to  draw an analogy with section  13  of  the Bengal,  Agra and Assam Civil Courts Act XII of 1887,  under which  a  State  Government  may,  by  notification  in  the Official  Gazette,  fix and alter the local  limits  of  the jurisdiction  of  any Civil Court under that  Act.   It  was urged  by  him  that  this  provision  was  similar  to  the provision contained in s. 7(1) of the Act.  Section 13(2) of the Bengal, Agra and Assam Civil Courts Act thereafter gives the  power to the District Judge, in cases where same  local jurisdiction  is assigned to two or more Subordinate  Judges or  to two or more Munsifs, to assign to each of  them  such civil  business  cognizable  by  the  Subordinate  Judge  or Munsif,  as the case may be, as, subject to any  general  or special  orders  of the High Court, he thinks fit.   It  was suggested  that  s.33C(2) of the Act makes  a  provision  in respect of Labour Courts of the same nature as the provision made  by s.13(2) of the Bengal, Agra and Assam Civil  Courts Act  in respect of Subordinate Judges or Munsifs, and  since Subordinate Judges and Munsifs can exercise jurisdiction  by virtue of s.   13(1)  of that Act to decide civil suits,  it should be held that Labour 102 Courts, by virtue of their constitution under s.7(1) of  the Act,  get  the  jurisdiction to  decide  applications  under s.33C(2) also, and the specification of Courts mentioned  in that  sub-section is only for the purpose of deciding  which Labour Court should exercise jurisdiction where there may be more  than  one  Labour Court.  We do not  think  that  this comparison is correct or justified.  Though Civil Courts are constituted  under s.13 of the Bengal, Agra and Assam  Civil Courts Act, it has to be remembered that the power of  those Courts to take cognizance of civil suits and decide them  is conferred  by  the Code of Civil Procedure.  It  is  not  by virtue of their constitution under s.13 of the Bengal,  Agra and  Assam Civil Courts Act that the Courts take  cognizance of  civil  suits and decide them.  Section  33C(2),  in  the matter  of  applications  made by  individual  workmen,  is, therefore,  not comparable with s.13(2) of the Benaal,  Agra and  Assam  Civil Courts Act, but, in fact,  lays  down  the requirement which must be satisfied before the Labour  Court can  take cognizance of the matter raised before it  by  the applications  of the workmen.  Section 33C(2)  would,  thus, serve  the  purpose in the case of Labour  Courts  which  is served  by  the provisions of the Code  of  Civil  Procedure relating  to  cognizance in respect of.  civil  courts.   S. 33C(2),   by   its  language,  makes  it  clear   that   the jurisdiction under that provision is to be exercised only by those  particular Courts which are specified in that  behalf by  the State Government and, in fact, confers  jurisdiction on only those Courts and not on all Labour Courts, which may have been constituted under s.7(1) of the Act. It  was  also urged- by learned counsel before  us  that  we should  give  a liberal construction to  the  provisions  of

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s.33C(2) so as to ensure that the benefits of that provision are  not  denied  to a workman even if  a  State  Government neglects  to specify a Labour Court in that behalf.   We  do not think that there is any force in this submission.   When a provision has been made in s.33C(2) for specification of a Labour  Court in that behalf by the appropriate  Government, it is presumed that that Government will carry out its  duty and  will  make  the necessary  specification.   Even  under s.7(1)  of  the  Act,  the  power  is  granted  to  a  State Government  to  constitute Labour Courts, and if  the  State Government   neglects  to  constitute  Labour  Courts,   the provisions   of   s.33C(2)   would   automatically    become ineffective.   This  would  be  no  ground  for  giving   an interpretation  to  s.7(1)  which would  do  away  with  the necessity  of the Labour Court being constituted by a  State Government.   It may also be incidentally mentioned that  in West  Bengal  the State Government had made  Rules  in  1958 under s.38 of the Act and Rule 74 was as follows: -               "74.   Application  for  recovery  of  dues-An               application   under  section  33C   shall   be               delivered    personally   or   forwarded    by               registered post in triplicate to the Secretary                                    103               to  the  Government  of  West  Bengal  in  the               Department  of Labour or to such  officers  to               whom powers have been delegated under  section               39 of the Industrial Disputes Act." This Rule lays down that all applications under s.33C are to be  delivered  to the Secretary to the  Government  of  West Bengal  in the Department of Labour, or to such officers  to whom  powers may have been delegated under s.39 of the  Act. The purpose of the application being sent to the  Government is  clear.   If  the  application  is  under  s.33C(1),  the Government is to take action on that application itself  and is to realise the money claimed in that application.  On the other hand, if the application happens to be under s.33C(2), the purpose of delivery of that application to the Secretary to  the Government clearly would be that, on  that  applica- tion, the Government would specify the Labour Court which is to  deal  with that application.  It appears that,  in  some States,  the appropriate Government has. by general  orders, specified  Labour  Courts  for  the  purpose  of  exercising jurisdiction  under  s.33C(2). So far as the  Government  of West  Bengal  is  concerned, it did not  issue  any  similar general  order,  and the intention of Rule 74 was  that  any workman wishing to obtain relief under s.33C(2) should apply to  the State Government when the Government  would  specify the  Labour  Court  for the purpose  of  dealing  with  that application.  This position has been further clarified by  a subsequent  amendment of Rule 74 under which it  is  clearly provided  that  where any work. man is entitled  to  receive from  the  employer any benefit which is  capable  of  being computed in terms of money, the workman concerned may  apply to  the  State  Government in the prescribed  Form  for  the specification  of a Labour Court for determining the  amount of  his dues.  It is true that this Rule 74 did not in  this form exist at the relevant time, with which we are concerned in  the  pro sent case, but we agree with the Bench  of  the Calcutta High Court that Rule 74, as it stood at that  time, was also intended to lay down that a workman claiming relief under  s.33C(2)  must present his application to  the  State Government, whereupon the State Government would specify the Labour Court which was to deal with it under s.33C(2) of the Act. For  the reasons given above, we hold that the  decision  of

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the Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court is correct and must be upheld.  The appeal fails and is dismissed, but,  in the  circumstances  of  this case, we make no  order  as  to costs. Y.  P.                                                Appeal dismissed. 104