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PETITIONER: THOTA SESHARATHAMMA AND ANR.

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: THOTA MANIKYAMMA (DEAD) BY LRS. AND ORS.

DATE OF JUDGMENT23/08/1991

BENCH: KASLIWAL, N.M. (J) BENCH: KASLIWAL, N.M. (J) RAMASWAMY, K.

CITATION:  1991 SCR  (3) 717        1991 SCC  (4) 312  JT 1991 (3)   506        1991 SCALE  (2)434

ACT:     Hindu Succession Act, 1956---Section 14(1),  (2)--Appli- cation and object of--Whether life estate of a widow under a will becomes absolute estate.     Hindu  Succession  Act, 1956--Section  14(1),  (2)--Con- struction-Whether retrospective--Acquisition of property  by female       Hindu-Methods--Widow’s        estate--Legatee’s entitlement---Whether   restrictive  convenant   stands   as impediment to section 14(1).     Will--Widow’s  estate--Restrictions--Right  to   mainte- nance--Preexisting   right   over  the   property--’Res   ad rem’--Obliteration of testamentary succession with  restric- tive  conditions w.e.f. 17.6.1956 by Hindu  Succession  Act, 1956--Effect of. C.A. 630 of 1981

HEADNOTE:     Plaintiff’s  case  was  that as the  defendant  and  her husband had no issue they brought up the plaintiff as  their foster  son from the age of eight years and  thereafter  the plaintiff  continued  to live with them and was  brought  up treating him as their own son.     Defendant’s  husband ’died on 14.1.1932 and  before  his death he executed a will bequeathing the suit properties  in favour of his wife, for her life with a vested remainder  in favour of the plaintiff.     Both  the  parties lived together with  perfect’  under- standing ’but after some time there was misunderstanding and the defendant assumed hostile attitude towards the plaintiff and began to claim the suit property as her absolute proper- ty.     The plaintiff claimed absolute right in the suit proper- ties after the lifetime of the defendant and challenged  the right of the defendant to execute any will in respect of the suit properties. The defendant  took the plea that her husband died issueless and 718 intestate and did not exeCute any will at any time.  Neither she nor her husband brought up the plaintiff as their foster son  nor did they educate him. The defendant had brought  up her nephew from his childhood and performed his marriage. On

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account of love and affection for him and his children,  the defendant executed a registered will on 26.10.69 bequeathing all her properties in his favour.     The Trial Court held the will dated 14.1.1932 proved and decreed the plaintiff’s suit.     The First Appellate Court upheld the Judgment and decree of the Trial Court.     The  defendant  preferred a second appeal  in  the  High Court. During the pendency of the Second Appeal in the  High Court the plaintiff died and his legal representatives  were brought on record. The High Court allowed the second appeal.     The legal representatives of the plaintiff came to  this Court by grant of Special Leave. S.L.P. (C) No. 438/1979.     Married life between ’0’ and his wife, ’M’ was not happy and cordial. ’o’ executed a registered will dated  21.3.1921 bequeathing all his properties including the suit properties in  favour of his mother and sister for their  lifetime  and thereafter in favour of ’R’ and ’D’--two sons of his  sister and  their issues. In the said will reference was  made  re- garding the conduct of’M’ in deserting him and in any  event if she changed her mind and agreed to live under the protec- tion  of  the legatees she was allowed to enjoy  the  income from  item  I  of the suit properties and  that  she  should construct  a  house in item referred to in the will  and  to live there during her lifetime and after her death the  said Item  I  and the house site with the house shall go  to  his sister’s sons.     ’0’  died in 1922 and thereafter the legatees under  the will entered into possession of all the properties. ’M’  put obstruction to the legatees in getting possession.     ’M’ filed a suit in 1923 praying for a declaration  that the  will made by her husband was not valid and as  such  be cancelled  and for possession and mesne profits and  in  the alternative  she claimed for maintenance both past  and  fu- ture. 719     In  the said suit the parties entered into a  compromise and a compromise decree was passed on 5.3.1924.     Uuder the terms of the said compromise the execution  of the  will was accepted and the same was made subject to  the terms of the compromise decree. Under the compromise  decree it  was  agreed  that ’M’ would enjoy items 1  &  2  of  the properties  mentioned in the will and also 50 cents of  land during her lifetime. She would also have an enjoyment of the house site during her lifetime without any right of  aliena- tion.     ’D’  died unmarried in 1930 but during his  lifetime  he sold  his interest in the properties in favour of  ’R’,  his brother,  who  died in 1962. On his  death  the  petitioners being  his sons and daughters claimed to have become.  enti- tled for all their father’s properties including the  rights in  the suit property. ’M’ during her life time  executed  a settlement deed in favour of the respondents giving absolute rights in the suit properties.     The  petitioners filed a suit against M and the respond- ents  for declaration that the settlement deed  executed  by ’M’ will not enure beyond the lifetime of ’M’. ’M’  took,the plea  that the limited interest given to her under the  com- promise  decree had become enlarged into absolute  right  by virtue of Section 14(1) of the Act.      The Trial Court decreed the suit and it was affirmed in first appeal.      ’M’  having  died, the respondents preferred  a  second appeal in the High Court. The High Court allowed the  second

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appeal against which. the petitioners filed the S.L.P. S.L.P. (C) No. 2113 of 1980      ’R’did not have any issue from ’A’ and ’S’, his  wives. He  being attached with the petitioner, executed a  will  on 2.7.1945 bequeathing his properties in favour of his  second wife  ’S’  for her lifetime and  thereafter,  absolutely  in favour of the petitioner. A provision was also made for  the payment of Rs.68 and a direction to make available 18 kalams of  paddy  in favour of ’A’ for her lifetime.  In  order  to ensure the payment of the maintenance and delivery of  paddy a  charge was also created over the properties to  go  ulti- mately in favour of the petitioner. As  the petitioner was a minor at that time the second  wife was 720 appointed  as  his guardian. ’R’ died on 8.7.45  and  subse- quently  his first wife ’A’ was awarded 50 kalams  of  paddy and a sum of Rs.250 in cash per annum by way of maintenance.     On  appeal  the High Court modified the  decree  of  the Trial Court and enhanced the maintenance to Rs.480 per annum and  directed the petitioner, the legatee under the will  to give  one building for the residence of ’A’.  Thereafter  in 1951  ’A’  sought the recovery of possession of one  of  the buildings.  The Executing Court allotted to her the  eastern house backyard and the shops, against which the second  wife preferred an appeal to the High Court.     A compromise was entered into between the parties in the High  Court.  According to the terms of compromise  ’A’  was permitted to occupy the eastern house together with the  two shops  but the backyard portion was not given. Later on  ’S’ was  removed  from the guardianship of the  petitioner,  and natural father was appointed as his guardian.     The respondents were brother’s grandsons of ’A’ who died on  2.2.1966, had settled the suit properties in  favour  of one ’C’ claiming title to the same in pursuance to a compro- mise in A.A.O. 567 of 1950. ’R’ another respondent initially took on lease the properties from ’C’ and later on purchased the eastern half of the building and backyard portion.     The  petitioner,  challenging the  transactions  on  the grounds that ’A’ was given a right of residence only in  the building  and  the same lasted till her  lifetime  and  such right  could never be enlarged into an absolute right;  that the  settlement  deed made by her in favour of ’C’  and  the sale made by ’C’ in favour of ’R’, a respondent were invalid and no title could be conveyed by ’A’ in their favour, filed a  suit  for recovery of possession of the  suit  properties with mesne profits.     The  Trial’  Court held that ’A’ was  not  the  absolute owner  of the suit properties as contemplated under  Section 14(2)  of  the  Act and decreed the suit in  favour  of  the plaintiff.     Single Judge of the High Court dismissed the appeal.  On a Letters Patent Appeal the Division Bench of the High Court allowed the appeal and dismissed the suit.     The  plaintiff-petitioner  has filed  the  S.L.P.  under Article 136 of the Constitution of India. 721 Whether, the life estate given to a widow under the will  of her Hindu husband beome san absolute estate under the provi- sions  of the Succession Act was the controversy  raised  in these cases. The  contention raised was that if a female  Hindu  acquires any  property  under  a will which gives  her  a  restricted estate in such pro- perty then provisions of sub-section (2) will override, the provisions of sub-section (1) of  Section

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14 of the Act which makes a female Hindu as full owner.   Dismissing the appeal and the S.L.Ps. this Court, HELD:  PER N.M. KASLIWAL, J. on his behalf and on behalf  of K. RAMASWAMY, J. 1. Sec. 14(2) of the Act is in the nature of a proviso or an exception to Sec. 14 and comes into operation only if acqui- sition  in any of themethods indicated therein is  made  for the first time without there being any pre-existing right in the  female Hindu to the property. If the case  falls  under the  provisions  of Sec. 14(1) of the Act  then  the  female Hindu  shall  he held to he full owner of the  property  and sub-section  (2)  of Section 14 will only  apply  where  the property  is acquired without there being  any  pre-existing right of the female Hindu in such property. [730D-E] 2. Sub-section (2) of Sec. 14 will he construed more in  the nature of a proviso or an exception to sub-s. (1) of Sec. 14 of  the  Act. This view lends support to the object  of  the section which was to remove the disability on women  imposed by  law  and to achieve a social purpose by  bringing  about change in the social and economic position of women in Hindu society. [730E-F] Mst. Karmi v. Arnru and Ors., [1972] 4 SCC 86; Badri Pershad v.Smt.  Kanso Devi, [1970] 2 SCR 95; V. Tulsamma &  Ors.  v. Sesha   Reddy (dead) by L.Rs., [1977] 3 SCR 261;  Bai  Vajia (dead)  by L.Rs. v.  Thakorbhai Chelabhai & Ors.,  [1979]  3 SCR 291;’ Jagannath Pillai v.  Kunjithapadam Pillai &  Ors., [1987] 2. SCC 572; Gopal Singh & Ant.  v. Dill Ram (dead) by L.Rs.  & Ors., [1988] 1 SCC 47; Gulwant Kaur  and Others  v. Mohinder Singh and Others, [1987] 3 SCC 674 and Jaswant Kaur v. Major Harpal Singh, [1989] 3 SCC 572, referred to. PER K. RAMASWAMY. J.          1.  The  Act revolutionised the status of  a  Hindu female; used 722 s.14(1)  as a tool to undo past injustice to elevate her  to equal status with dignity of person on par with man;  extin- guished  pre-existing limitation of woman’s estate, or  wid- ow’s estate known to Shastric law removed all the fetters to blossom  the  same into full  ownersip.  The  discrimination suffered by Hindu female under Shastric law was exterminated by  legislative fiat. The social change thus envisaged  must be endeavoured to be given full vigour,thrust and  efficacy. [739F-G]     2.  Section  14(1) enlarges the restricted  estate  into full  ownersip when the Hindu female has pre-existing  right to maintenance etc. Subsec. (2) operates When the grant  was made  for  the first time under the document  with  no  pre- existing  right. Sub sec. (2) therefore, must be read as  an exception  or a proviso to sub-sec. (1). Both  the  sub-sec- tions read with the explanation to be pragmaticably  consid- ered as a constituent integral scheme. [739G-740A]     3. S. 14 is not retroactive in its operation. Devolution of  the property under the will would take effect after  the demise of the testator and the legatee would be bound by the terms  of  gift over etc. The stranger legatee  cannot  take shelter under subsequent change of law to enlarge the opera- tion of restrictive covenant to claim absolute ownership  in the property bequeathed to her. But socio-economic amellora- tion under the Act engulfs an instrument under the sweep  of s.  14(1) thereof, it extinguishes the pre-existing  limited estate or restrictive condition and confer absolute and full ownership of the property possessed by a Hindu female as  on the date when the Act had come into force, namely, June  17, 1956.  The courts are not giving retrospective operation  to

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s.  14(1)  or to the instrument. The courts  only  would  be applying the law to the facts found as on the date when  the question  arose  to find whether  legatee  has  pre-existing vistage of title under law; and the nature of possession  of the  property held by her and whether the legatee would  get the benefit of s. 14(1) of the Act. There need be no express recital  even in the will of the enjoyment of  the  property devised  under the will in lieu. or maintenance ass  limited owner  for  her life. Even if ’so mentioned, it would  be  a reflection or restatment of the law existing as in 1932 when the will was executed. [740G-741C]     4.  A legatee under a testamentary disposition is  bound by the restrictive covenants contained therein. But distinc- tion should be maintained between an ordinary legatee and  a legatee/Hindu  female coupled with vistage  of  pre-existing title  to  the property but with a limited estate  known  to Shastric law. [740F-G] 723     5. As per existing law as in 1932 the widow as a legatee was  entitled to widow’s estate and she remained in  posses- sion  of  the  date of the Act came into force  and  was  in enjoyment  of the income derived therefrom for her life.  No one  had a right to interdict it. The restrictive  covenant, therefore, does not stand an impediment to s. 14(1) to  have full  play  to extinguish the same and enlarge  the  limited estate of widow into an absolute ownership. [741D-E]     6. The restrictions contained in the will, though  fails both  under sub-sec. (2) as well as sub-sec. (1) of  s.  14, the  right  to maintenance being a pre-existing  right  over property "res ad rem" s. 14(1) would apply’ The testamentary succession  with  a  restrictive conditon in  the  will  was obliterated. She became absolute owner on or after June  17, 1956. [ 741E-F]     Sir  Main Henry: Earlier History of Institutions, at  P. 339; E.S. Shivaswamy lyer: Revolution of Hindu Women, [1935] Edn.  P. 64; Manu Smriti, Chapter III verses 55-57,  Chapter IX verses 18, 149, 45, 416, 299, Chapter XI verse 67; Mahat- ma Gandhiji’S (article) Young India, dated October 17. 1929; Ravindra  Nath Tagore, (his speech in 1913 reprinted in)  To the  women, P. 18. The Position of Woman in Hindu  civilisa- tion, 1955 Edn. By Altaken, referred to.        State  of  Madras v.  Srimati  Charnpakam  Doraira/an, [1951]  SCR  525; C.B. Muthatmma v. Union of India  &  Ors., [1980] 1 SCR 668; Air India v. Nergesh Meerza & Ors., [1982] 1  SCR 438; Pratap Singh v. Union of India, |19851 Suppl.  2 SCR 773; Seth Badri Prasad v. Smt. Kanso Devi, [1969] 2  SCR 586;  V. Tulasamma v. Sesha Reddy (dead) by L.Rs., [1977]  3 SCR 261; Bai Vajia (dead) by L.Rs. v. Thakorbhai Chelabhai & Ors.,  [1979] 3 SCR 291; Jagannathan Pillai v.  Kunithapadam Pillai  &  Ors., [1987] 2 SCR 1070; Gulwant Kaur &  Anr.  v. Mohinder  Singh  & Anr., [1987] 3 SCR 576;  Maharaja  Pillai Lakshmi  Ammal  v. Maharaja Pillal  Thillanayakom  Pillai  & Anr., [1988] 1 SCR 730; Jaswant Kaur v. Major Harpal  Singh, [1989]  3 SCC 572; Munshi Singh v. Smt. Sohan Bai (dead)  by L.Rs.,’[1989]  2  SCR  1012; Pearey Lal  v.  Rameshwar  Das, [1963] Suppl. 2 SCR 834; Karmi v. Amru, AIR 1971 SC 745  and Kalawatibai v. Soiryabai & Ors., [1991] 3 SCC 410,  referred to.

JUDGMENT:     CIVIL  APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No.  630  of 1981.                  ,     From  the  Judgment and Decree dated 24.8. 1979  of  the

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Andhra Pradesh High Court in Second Appeal No. 358 of 1977. WITH S-L-.P-Nos. 438/79 & 2113/80. 724     T.S.  Krishnamurty lyer, G. Narasimhalu, G.S.  Narayana, K. Ram Kumar, Mrs. Anjani, Mrs. J. Ramachandran, T.T. Kunhi- kannan,  S. Srinivasan and A.T.M. Sampath for the  appearing parties. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by     KASLIWAL,  J.  In  the above appeal  and  Special  Leave Petitions question has been raised about the ambit and scope of  Sec. 14(1) and 14(2) of the Hindu Succession  Act,  1956 (hereinafter referred to as the ’Act’). Before adverting  to the  legal question, it would be proper to narrate in  short the facts of each case. Civil Appeal No. 630 of 1981     Thota  Madhav  Rao, the plaintiff filed a  suit  against Thota  Manikyamma  on  the allegation  that  the  plaintiffs father  Yellamanda and the defendant’s husband Late  Venkata Subbayya were brothers. As the defendant and her husband had no  issue they brought up the plaintiff as their foster  son from  the  age of eight years and thereafter  the  plaintiff continued to live with them and was brought up treating  him as  their  own son. Venkata Subbayya died on  14.1.1932  and before  his  death he executed a will bequeathing  the  suit properties  in favour of his wife Smt. Thota Manikyamma  for her life with a vested remainder in favour of the plaintiff. Both  the parties lived together with perfect  understanding but  after  some  time there was  misunderstanding  and  the defendant assumed hostile attitude towards the plaintiff and began to claim the suit property as her absolute  property.. The  defendant also executed a registered will  on  26.10.69 bequeathing  the suit properties in favour of one  Ramisetti Koteswar  Rao. The plaintiff in these circumstances  claimed absolute right in the suit properties after the lifetime  of the  defendant and challenged the right of the defendant  to execute  any  will in respect of the  suit  properties.  The defendant took the plea that her husband died issueless  and intestate and did not execute any will at any time.  Neither she nor her husband brought up the plaintiff as their foster son  nor did they educate him. The defendant had brought  up Ramisetti  Koteswar Rao, who is her nephew, from his  child- hood  and  performed his marriage. On account  of  love  and affection for him and his children, the defendant executed a registered  will on 26.10.69 bequeathing all her  properties in  his  favour..  The  Trial  Court  held  the  will  dated 14.1.1932 proved and decreed the plaintiffs suit. The  First Appellate Court upheld the Judgment and decree of the  Trial Court. The defendant preferred a second’ appeal in the  High Court. During the pendency of the Second Appeal in the 725 High Court the plaintiff died and his legal  representatives were  brought  on record. The High Court by  Judgment  dated 24.8.1979  allowed the second appeal and dismissed the  suit with  costs  throughout. The legal  representatives  of  the plaintiff have come to this Court by grant of special leave. The  question involved is whether the life interest  in  the property acquired by Thota Manikyamma under the will execut- ed  by  her husband and continued to be  in  her  possession became her absolute property under Sec. 14(1) of the Act. Special Leave Petition (C) No. 438 of 1979     One  Meenammal is the wife of Ovi Reddiar. Married  life between Ovi Reddiar and his wife. was not happy and cordial. Ovi  Reddiar  executed a registered will exhibit  A-4  dated 21.3.1921 bequeathing all his properties including the  suit

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properties  in  favour of .his mother and sister  for  their lifetime  and thereafter in favour of Ramalinga Reddiar  and Dhanush  Koti Reddiar, the two sons of his sister and  their issues.  In the said will reference was made regarding  the’ conduct  of Meenammal in deserting him and in any  event  if she changed her mind and agreed to live under the protection of  the  legatees she was allowed to enjoy the  income  from item I of the suit properties and that she should  construct a  house in item referred to in the will and to  live  there during  her lifetime and after her death the said Item   and the  house site .with the house shall go to the  above  men- tioned Ramalinga Reddiar and Dhanush Koti Reddiar.     Ovi  Reddiar  died in 1922 and thereafter  the  legatees under  the will entered into possession of all  the  proper- ties.  Smt.  Meenammal put obstruction to  the  legatees  in getting possession.     There was some criminal litigation between Smt.  Meenam- mal  and the legatees under Sec. 145 Cr.P.C. which  resulted in favour of the legatees (exhibit A-1). Smt. Meenammal then filed a suit in 1923 praying for a declaration that the will made  by her husband was not valid and as such be  cancelled and for possession and mesne profits and in the  alternative she  claimed  for maintenance both past and future.  In  the said  suit the parties entered into a compromise and a  com- promise  decree was passed on 5.3.1924, vide (exhibit  A-1). Under the terms of said compromise the execution of the will was  accepted and the same was made subject to the terms  of the  compromise decree. Under the compromise .decree it  was agreed  that Smt. Meenammal would enjoy items 1 & 2  of  the properties  mentioned in the will and also 50 cents of  land during her lifetime. She would also have an enjoyment of the 726 house site during her lifetime without any right of  aliena- tion.’  Dhanush Koti died unmarried in 1930 but  during  his lifetime  he sold his interest in. the properties in  favour of Ramalinga Reddiar. Ramalinga Reddiar died in 1962. On his death  the petitioners before this Court being the sons  and daughters of Ramalinga Reddiar Claimed to have become  enti- tled  for all the properties of Ramalinga Reddiar  including the  rights in the suit property. smt. Meenammal during  her lifetime  executed  a settlement deed in favour of  the  re- spendents  before this Court giving absolute rights  in  the suit  properties. The petitioners before this Court filed  a suit against Smt. Meenammal and the respondents for declara- tion  that  the settlement deed (exhibit A-10)  executed  by Smt.  Meenammal will not enure beyond the lifetime  of  Smt. Meenammal.  Smt. Meenammal contested the suit and  took  the plea  that the limited interest given to her under the  com- promise  decree had become enlarged into absolute  right  by virtue of Section 14(1) of the Act. The Trial Court  decreed the suit and it was. affirmed in first appeal. Smt.  Meenam- mal having died., the respondents in this Court preferred  a second appeal in the High Court of Judicature at Madras. The High Court allowed the Second Appeal and dismissed the  suit filed  by the petitioners. The petitioners in these  circum- stances  have  filed the S .L.P. under Article  136  of  the Constitution of India, S.L.P. (C) No. 2113 of 1980     The  suit  properties as well as some  other  properties originally  belonged  to one Ramalinga Udayar.  He  had  two wives, namely, Alamolu and Saraswati. the first wife Alamolu was  living  away from her husband. Ramalinga did  not  have any issue from both the wives. Ramalinga being attached with one Siva Subramania the petitioner before us executed a will on  2.7. 1945 ,bequeathing his properties in favour  of  his

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second  wife  Saraswati  for her  lifetime  and  thereafter, absolutely  in  favour of Siva Subramania. A  provision  was also  made for the payment of Rs.68 and a direction to  make available  18 kalams of paddy in favour of Alamolu  for  her lifetime. In order to ensure the payment of the  maintenance and  delivery  of paddy a charge was also created  over  the properties  to  go ultimately in favour of  Siva  Subramania Udayar.  As Siva Subramania Udayar was a minor at that  time the  second wife Smt. Saraswati was appointed as his  guard- ian.  Ramalinga  died on 8.7.45 and subsequently  his  first wife  Alamolu  was awarded 50 kalams of paddy and a  sum  Of Rs.250 in cash perannum’by way of maintenance. On appeal the High  Court modified the decree of the Trial Court  and  en- hanced the maintenance to Rs.480 per annum 727 and  directed Siva Subramania the legatee under the will  to give  one building for the residence of Alamolu.  Thereafter in 195 1 Alamolu sought the recovery of possession of one of the  buildings  and the Executing Court alltted to  her  the eastern house backyard and the shops. The second wife saras- wati  preferred  an appeal to the High   Court  against  the above order of the executing court. A compromise was entered into between the parties in the High Court. According to the terms  of  compromise Alamolu was permitted  to  occupy  the eastern  house together with the two shops but the  backyard portion was not given. Alamoler however remained in  posses- sion of that portion as well, where some coconut trees  were standing.  Lateron Saraswati was removed from the  guardian- ship  of  Siva  Subramania Udayar, and  natural  father  was appointed  as  his guardian. Alamolu died on  2.2.1966.  The respondents  before us are brother’s grandsons  of  Alamolu. Alamolu  settled the suit properties in favour of one  Chan- drashekhar Udayar claiming title to the same in pursuance to a compromise in A.A.O. 567 of 1950. Ramayya Mudaliar another respondent before us initially took on lease the  properties from  Chandrashekhar and lateron purchased the eastern  half of the building and backyard portion. Siva Subramania Udayar challenged  these transactions on the grounds  that  Alamolu was given a right of residence only in the building and  the same lasted till her lifetime and such right could never  be enlarged into an absolute right. The settlement deed made by her in favour of Chandrashekhar Udayar and the sale made  by Chandrashekhar  in  favour of Ramaiah were  invalid  and  no title  could  be conveyed by Alamolu in their  favour.  Siva Subramania  Udayar  as  such filed a suit  for  recovery  of possession  of the suit properties with mesne  profits.  The Trial Court held that Alamolu was not the absolute owner  of the  suit properties as contemplated under Section 14(2)  of the  Act.  The  suit as such was decreed in  favour  of  the plaintiff  Siva Subramania Udayar. Learned Single  Judge  of the  High  Court dismissed the appeal. On a  Letters  Patent Appeal  the  Division Bench of the High  Court  allowed  the appeal and dismissed the suit. The plaintiff Siva Subramania Udayar has filed the S.L.P. under Article 136 of the Consti- tution of India.     The controversy raised in these cases is almost  settled by  a  number of decisions of this Court.  However,  Learned counsel  for the appellant in the appeal as well as  Learned counsel  for the petitioners in the Special Leave  Petitions have raised an argument, placing reliance on Mst. Karrni  v. Amru and Ors., [1972] 4 SCC 86 that the life estate given to a  widow  under  the will of her husband  cannot  become  an absolute estate under the provisions of the Hindu succession Act, as 728

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such  we  consider it proper to deal with this case  in  the light  of other cases decided by this Court. Section  14  of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 reads as under:               14"(1)  Any  property possessed  by  a  female               Hindu,  whether acquired before or  after  the               commencement of this Act, shall be held by her               as  full  owner thereof and not as  a  limited               owner.               Explanation--In  this sub-section,  "property"               includes  both movable and immovable  property               acquired  by a female Hindu by inheritance  or               devise,  or  at  a partition, or  in  lieu  of               maintenance  or arrears of maintenance, or  by               gift  from any person. Whether a  relative  or               not,  before. at or after her marriage, or  by               her  own skill or exertion, or by purchase  or               by prescription, or in any other manner  what-               soever, and also any such property held by her               as stridhana immediately before the  commence-               ment of this Act.                         (2) Nothing contained in sub-section               (1)  shall apply to any property  acquired  by               way  of  gift  or under a will  or  any  other               instrument  or  under a decree or order  or  a               civil court or under an award where the  terms               of  the gift, will or other instrument or  the               decree. order or award prescribe a  restricted               estate in such property". The contention raised is that if a female Hindu acquires any property under a will which gives her a restricted estate in such property then provisions of sub-section (2) will  over- ride, the provisions of subsection (1) of Section 14 of  the Act which makes a female Hindu as full owner. In Badri Prashad v. Smt. Kanso Devi, [1970] 2 SCR 95 a Bench of  three Judges considered the question in detail.  In  the above case a Hindu having self acquired properties, died  in 1947 leaving five sons and a widow. On a dispute between the parties an Arbitrator was appointed in 1950. The  Arbitrator gave  an  award and a decree was passed in terms  of  award. Under  the award the widow was given widow’s estate. It  was held  that the widow inherited the property under Section  3 (1)  of  the Hindu Women’s Right to Property Act,  1937  and was   in  possession of it within the meaning  of  the  word possession in Scetion 14(1) of the Act and when by an  award her  share  was  separetaed by metes and  bounds,  she  also acquired the property within 729 the meaning of that section. It was held that she had become full  owner of the property in her possession under  Section 14(i) on the coming into force of the Hindu Succession  Act, even though previously she was a limited owner.      It  was  clearly held in the above  case  that  Section 14(2) of the Act is in the nature of a proviso or an  excep- tion  to  Section  14(1) and comes into  operation  only  if acquisitiOn in any of the methods indicated therein is  made for  the  first time without there  being  any  pre-existing right  in the female Hindu to the property. The  Bench  con- sisted of Hon. J.C. Shah, V. Ramaswamy and A.N. Grover, JJ.      The  case of Mst. Karmi v. Amru and Others, (supra)  on which  reliance has now been placed by Learned  Counsel  for the appellant and petitioners was also decided by a Bench of three Judges Hon. J.C. Shah, K.S. Hegde and A.N. Grover, JJ. It  may be noted that two Hon’ble Judges, namely, J.C.  Shah and A.N. Grover were common to both the cases. In Mst. Karmi v.  Arnru  and Others, one Jaimal died in 1938  leaving  his

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wife  Nihali. His son Ditta pre-deceased him.  Appellant  in the above case was the daughter of Ditta and the respondents were  collaterals  of Jaimal. Jaimal first executed  a  will dated  18.12.1935 and by a subsequent will dated  13.11.1937 revoked the first will. By the second will a life estate was given  to  Nihali and thereafter the property  was  made  to devolve  on  Bhagtu and Armu collaterals. On  the  death  of Jaimal  in  1938, properties were mutuated in  the  name  of Nihali  Nihali  died in 1960/61. The  appellant  Mst.  Karmi claimed right on the basis of a will dated 25.4.1958 execut- ed by Nihali in her favour. It was held that the life estate given to a widow under the will of her husband cannot become an absolute estate under the provisions of the Hindu Succes- sion Act. Thereafter, the appellant cannot claim the to  the properties  on the basis of the will executed by  the  widow Nihali in her favour. It is a short Judgment without advert- ing to any provisions of Sections 14(1) or 14(2) of the Act. The  Judgment  neither  makes any mention  of  any  argument raised in this regard nor there is any mention of the earli- er  decision in Badri Pershad v. Smt. Kanso  Devi,  (supra). The decision in Mst. Karmi & Anr. cannot be considered as an authority  on the ambit and scope of Sections 14(1) and  (2) of the Act.      The  controversy regarding sub-Section (1) and  (2)  of Section 14 of the Act again came up for consideration in  V. Tulsamrna & Ors. v. V. Sesha Reddy (dead) by Lrs., [1977]  3 SCR  261.  This case was also, decided by a Bench  of  three Judges.  In this case the controversy now raised  before  us was considered in detail. All the earlier cases were 730 considered  including  Badri  Prasad  v.  Smt.  Kanso  Devi, (supra) and the ratio of this case was followed and approved in  V. Tulsamma’s case. Hon’ble Bhagwati, J. who  wrote  the leading judgment dealt with the question in detail and after applying  the mind to the controversy decided the same in  a well  considered manner. V. Tulsamma’s case again  was  dis- cussed in extenso and followed in Bai Vajia (dead) by L. Rs. v. Thakorbhai Chelabhai & On., [1979] 3 SCR 291, by a  Bench of three Judges. The same view has been consistently adopted in  long series of cases of this Court and to mention a  few of  them  are Jagannathan Pillai v. Kunjithapadam  Pillai  & Ors.,   [  1987] 2 SCC 572; Gopal Singh & Anr. v.  Dill  Ram (dead)  by L.Rs. & Ors., [1988] 1 SCC 47; Gulwant  Kaur  and Others  v. Mohinder Singh and Others, [ 1987] 3 SCC 674  and Jaswant Kaur v. Major Harpal Singh, [ 1989] 3 SCC 572.     A  mention of all the above cases shows that this  Court in a long series ’of cases has taken a consistent view  that Sec.  14(2) of the Act is in the nature of a proviso  or  an exception to Sec. 14 and comes into operation only if acqui- sition  in any of the methods indicated therein is made  for the first time without there being any pre-existing right in the  female Hindu to the property. If the case  falls  under the provisions of Sec. 14(1)of the ACt then the female Hindu shall  be  held to be full owner of the  property  and  sub- section (2) of Section 14 will only apply where the property is  acquired  without there  being  and  pre-exisitingisting right  of the female Hindu in such property. Thus we a  firm and  reiterate that sub-section (2) of Sec. 14 will be  con- strued  more in the nature of a proviso or an  exception  to sub-s. (1) of Sec. 1 of the Act. This view lends support  to the object of the section which was to remove the disability on  women imposed by law and to achive a social  purpose  by bringing about change in the social and economic position of women in Hindu society.       In the result we find no force in all the above  cases

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and are dismissed with cost.     K.  RAMASWAMY, J. ’I have had the advantage to read  the draft judgment of my learned brother. I fully agree with the resoning  and conclusions. The repeated attempts  to  reopen the  ratio  in  Tulasamma’s case, in  particular,  from  its proponent i.e. Sri Krishna  Murthy lyar made me to tread the route through which I reached the same result thus:     Sir Main Henry in his "Earlier History of  Institutions" at p. 339 stated that, "the degree in which personal immuni- ty and proprietory 731 capacity  of women are recognised in a particular  state  or community  is  a test of the degree of the  advance  of  its civilisation.  It  is, therefore, clear that the  esteem  in which  woman is held, the status occupied by her in  society and the treatment meted out to her are regarded as index  to the  degree of civilisation and culture attained in a  coun- try. Manu in his Smriti, Chapter III Verses 55 to 57  stated that  where  women are honoured and adorned there  Gods  are pleased,  but  where women are not honoured no  sacred  fire yields  rewards.  What is the status held by  women  in  the Hindu  society is a matter of history reflected  from  Vedic culture, Smrities, the Shastric law, the statutory privision and  ultimately converged and recognised in the supreme  law of the land, i.e. egalitarian socialist Indian Constitution.     E .S. Shivaswamy lyer in his "Revolution of Hindu Women, " 1935 ,Edn. p. 64 stated that the ideals of the society  as to  womanhood includes not merely the relations  of  husband and wife or mother and children or the other intimate  rela- tionship of family life, but also the notions we find  about her  capacity, her character, her claim to  equality,  inde- pendence and freedom for developing, her rights to  personal ownership  and  control of property, to the  choice  of  her vocation and other rights as well as duties as member of the society.  Status  and rights of Hindu woman  fluctuated  and swung  like  a pendulum with ups and downs  from  period  to period starting from 4000 B.C. uptodate. However esteem  for women remained constantly high in the society.     In Vedic society woman enjoyed equal status  economical- ly,  socially and culturally with men, vide p.  335,339  and 409  of  The Position of Woman in Hindu  Civilization,  1955 Edn.  by  Altakar. He stated that  initiation  to  education upanayanam  was  performed in Vedic period to the  girls  as well  as boys. Women studied the Vedas, even composed  Vedic rhymes. They participated in public life freely. Vishvavara, Apala, Lopamudra and Shashayasi are only few examples in the initial  Vedic period. Thereafter Ghosha, Maitrai and  Gargi occupied price of place for equality in intellectual  excel- lence and equal status with men. Selfishness and male  chau- vanism  made  woman to gradually degrade and were  given  no voice  even in the settlement of their marriages or  so  on. She  was  denied  participation in  public  affairs.  Though Yajnavalkya  was  a  proponent to her  economic  status  but ultimately  Manu  Smriti took firm hold and  in  Chapter  IX Verse  18, Manu stated that woman had no right to study  the Vedas.  Thereby, denied the right to education,  fundamental human right to acquire knowledge and cultural and  intellec- tual  excellence.  In Chapter IX Verse 149, he  stated  that woman must not seek. separation from father, husband or 732 son  and bondaged her for ever. In Chapter IX Verse 45,  the husband  was declared to be one with the wife that the  wife can  seek no divorce but allowed immunity to a male to  dis- card  an  unwanted  wife. All through the  ages  till  Hindu Marriage  Act  was  made a male was  allowed  polyandry.  In

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Chapter  IX Verse 4 16, he stated that a wife, a son  and  a slave are declared to have no property and if they  happened to  acquire  it would belong to male under whom  she  is  in protection. Thus she was denuded or her right to property or incentive  to decent and independent living and made  her  a dependent  only to rare children and bear the burdens.  When she  becomes a widow, she was declared to have only  mainte- nance  and  if in possession of her  husband’s  property  or coparcenery, to be a widow’s estate with reversionery  right to  the heirs of last male holder. Fidality was a  condition precedent  to receive maintenance. In Chapter IX Verse  299, he  prescribed  corporeal punishment to a wife  who  commits faults,  should be beaten with a rope or a split bamboo.  If she was murdered it was declared to be an Upapattaka that is a  minor offence vide Chapter XI Verse 67. I did not  adhere to literal translation but attempted to portray their  sweep and  deep incursion on social order. Thus laid firm  founda- tion to deny a Hindu female of equality of status.  opportu- nity  and  dignity of person with no  independent  right  to property and made her a subservient, socially, educationally and culturally. Widows were murdered by inhuman Sati and now by bride burnings.     Gautam Budha gave her equality of status and  opportuni- ty.  Efforts  of social reformers like Raja Ram  Mohan  Rai, Kandukuri Veeresalingam and a host of other enlightened made the British Rulers gradually to make statute law, given  her right to separate residence and maintenance and a right over property of her husband or joint family for maintenance  and a charge by a decree of court. Mahatma Gandhiji, the  father of the nation, in Young India on October 17, 1929 had  writ- ten  thus:  "I am uncompromising in the matters  of  women’s rights.  In my opinion she should live under no legal  disa- bility,  no suffering by men, we should treat the  daughters and sons on the footing of perfect equality". Shri  Ravindra Nath  Tagore, the Noble laureate in his speech in  1913  re- printed  in "To the Women" at page 18 stated "that women  is the champion of man, gifted with equal mental capacity.  She has  a right to participate in any minutest activity of  men and she has equal right of freedom and liberty with him".     The  Constitution  of India accords  socio-economic  and political  justice,  equality of status and  of  opportunity assuring the dignity of person with stated freedoms. Article 14 guarantees equality. In other 733 words  frowns  upon discrimination on  any  ground.  Article 15(1)  abolishes  discrimination  and  removed   disability, liability or restriction     on grounds of sex and ensures equality of status.  Arti- cle  29(2) gives equal right to education. In  the  earliest decision this Court upheld it in State of Madras v. Srimathi Champakam Dorairajan, [1951] SCR 525. Article 16(1)  accords equality of opportunity in public service for an appointment or  employment  to  an office or post under  the  State  and prohibits  gender discrimination. Marriage as  a  disability for  appointment  to  Indian foreign  service  was  declared unconstitutional  in C.S. Muthammav. Union of India &  Ors., [1980] 1 SCR 668. Pregnancy as a disqualification to contin- ue in public employment was held to be an affront to equali- ty  of status, dignity of person and equal opportunity  vio- lating Articles 14 and 16(1) in Air India v. Nergesh  Meerza & Ors., [1982] 1 SCR 438. It abhors or is loathe to  civili- ty.  These  are  few classic  illustrations.  Article  15(3) treats  women as a class, mitigates the rigour  of  absolute equality  enshrined in Art. 14 and its species Art. 15(1)  & 16(1) and enjoins the State to make any special provision to

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remedy  past injustice and to advance their  status,  soeio- econmic and political. Article 21 assures protection of life which includes right to livelihood. Article 38(1)  obligates the  State to promote the welfare of the people by  securing social  order in which socio-economic and political  justice shall  inform  all the institutions of  the  national  life. Subarticle (2) thereof further enjoins the State to minimise the inequalities in income and to eliminate inequalities ,in status  by  providing facilities and  opportunities  to  all individuals. Women should have adequate means of  livelihood on par with men, Art. 39(a); should have equal pay for equal work,  Art. 39(d); health and strength of working women  are not  abused. Economic necessity is not a sanctuary to  abuse her person or she should not be forced to an unsuited avoca- tion, Art. 39(e); State shall provide just and human  condi- tions  of  work and maternity relief [Art. 42].  Article  46 mandates the State to promote with special care the economic and  educational  conditions of the weaker sections  of  the people.  It also enjoins to protect them from social  injus- tice and all forms of exploitation.     To  enliven  and alongate this  constitutional  goal  to render  socioeconomic justice, to relieve Hindu female  from degradation,  disabilities, disadvantages  and  restrictions under  which Hindu females have been languishing  over  cen- turies  and to integrate them in national and  international life,  Bharat Ratna Dr. Baba Saheb Ambedkar, the  first  Law Minister  and  rounding father of the  Constitution  drafted Hindu  Code  Bill.  The Hindu, Marriage  Act,  Adoption  and Maintenance  Act; Minority and Guardianship Act and  Succes- sion Act 1956, for short 734 ’the  Act’ became a part of this package. They  ensue  equal status  and  socio-economic justice to Hindu  female.  In  a socialist democracy governed by rule of law, law as a social engineering should bring about transformation in-the  social structure. Whenever a socio-economic legislation or the rule or instruments touching the implementation of welfare  meas- ures  arise  for  consideration,  this  historical  evidence furnishes as the foundation and all other relevant  material would be kept at the back of the court’s mind.     Section  14(1)  of the Act declares that  any  property, movable  or immovable, possessed by a female Hindu shall  be held by her as full owner thereof and not as a limited owner irrespective  of  the time when the  acquisition  was  made, i.e., whether it was before or after the Act. Undoubtedly as contended by Sri Krishna Murty Iyer, a Hindu male has  free- dom  of testamentary disposition of his property or by  con- tract  and s. 14(1) stand an impediment in his way.  Freedom of  contract  would yield place to public  policy  envisaged above.  Its  effect must be tested on the  envil  of  socio- economic justice, equality of status and to oversee  whether it  would  subserve the constitutional  animation  or  frus- trates.  Art. 15(3) relieves from the rigour of  Art.  15(1) and  charges the State to make special provision  to  accord to-women socioeconomic equality. The court would, therefore, endeavour  to  find  whether terms  of  the  disposition  or clauses  in the instruments, will etc.. enumerated in s.  14 would permeate the aforestated constitutional conscience  to relieve the Hindu female from the Shastric bondage of limit- ed  estate. Both sub-sections (1) and (2) of s.  14  attract the  conferment of restricted estate had by a  Hindu  female under  an instrument, i.e. gift, will, decree or order of  a Civil  Court or an award. Section 14 and the impugned  docu- ment  must be read harmoniously as an integral  scheme.  The disability  attached  to Hindu female by  Shastric  Law  was

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removed  by  statutory provisons in  Hindu  Succession  Act. Section  14(1)  thereof was thought to be a tool  to  remove disabilities  or restrictions imposed by Customary or  Shas- tric  Law on Hindu women. s. 14(1) declares  in  unequivocal terms that the property whether movable or immovable held by a Hindu female acquired either before or after the Act shall be  her  absolute property, abolishing  the  limited  estate known  to Shastric law. Hindu women as a class are  declared as  class  I heirs entitling to intestate  succession  to  a 0Hindu  Male. This Court in Pratap Singh v. Union of  India, [1985] Suppl. 2 SCR 773 held that s. 14 of the Act does  not discriminate  on grounds of sex and is intra vires  of  Art. 15(3).  The  preferential treatment accorded,  thereby,  was held to be not .violative of Arts. 14 and 15(1). Sub-section (2)  of  s. 14 of the Act attempts to denude the  object  of sub-section (1) and 735 emasculates its efficacy. It should, therefore, be’ read  as an  exception or a proviso to sub-section (1) of s. 14.  The interpretation of the’ proviso or an exception should not be to  allow.  to ’eat away the vital veins of  full  ownership accorded by sub-section (1) of s. 14 when this Court  upheld the  validity  of s. 14(1) on the envil  of  Art;  15(3)what should be the message thus intended to convey? It would mean that the court would endeavour to give full effect tO legis- lative and constitutional vision of socio-economic  equality to female ’citizen by granting full ownership of property to a  Hindu  female. As a fact Art. 15(3) as a fore  runner  to common  code  does animate ’to ’make law  to  accord  socio- economic  equality to every female citizen of  India,  irre- spective of religion, race cast or region.     In Seth Badri Preasad v. Smt. Kanso Devi, [.1969] 2  SCC :586  in   an injunction suit against  the  respondent,  the appellant  ,contended that the respondent was given  limited estate  in a decree passed in an award and that,  therefore, s. 14(2) applies. Negating that contention, this court  held that sub-sec. (2) of s. 14 is more in the nature of a provi- so or an exception to sub-sec. (1). It can come into  opera- tion only if the acquisition is in any of the methods  indi- cated  in sUb sec. (2).without there being any  pre-existing right  in  the  female Hindu who is  in  possession  of  the property.  I  Section 14(1) removes the  disability  of  the woman.  ’It was accordingly held that though she  came  into possession by virtue of decree passed in an award as limited estate,  she acquired the absolute ownership under  sub-sec. (1) of s. 14.     Section  14 was subject of critical consideration in  V. Tulasamma v.V. Sesha Reddy (dead) by L.Rs., [1977] 3 SCR 261 and  its  ratio has become a Tulsidalam to Hindu.  women  as locus  classicus  giving forward thrust.  to  constitutional goal  according full ownership in the property,  movable  or immovable,. held by: her as full owner thereof; redeemed her from  the  shackles of women estate known to  Shastric  law. Fazal  Ali,  J. undertook extensive survey into  sources  of Hindu Law and found’that Hindu widow’s right to  maintenance is  a personal obligation of the husband and he has  a  duty to-maintain  her  even if he has no property. Her  right  to maintenance  would  become an-eqUitable charge on  her  hus- band’s property though no charge was created by a decree  of civil court as "jus ad rem", i.e. right over property though not  right to property "jus in rem" and any person who  suc- ceeds to the property carries with it a legal obligation  to maintain the wife from her husband’s estate. Only .bona fide purchaser  for  value without notice alone was  relieved  of this Obligation; The right to maintenance is a  pre-existing

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right preceding Hindu Women’s Right to Property and 736 Separate  Residence Act, 1946. Section 14(1) recognises  her preexisting right. Any property acquired by Hindu female  by inheritence  or  device  or at a partition or.  in  lieu  of maintenance  or arrears of maintenance or by gift  from  any person  Whether  relative or not, before, at  or  after  her marriage, or by her own skill or,exertion, or by purchase or by prescription or in any other manner whatsoever, and  also suCh  property held by her as stridhana  immediately  before the commencement of this Act, movable or immovable  property shall  be  held by her as full owner thereto and  not  as  a limited owner. Subsection (2) thereto shall be construed  as an  exception or a proviso which cannot be read to  ,emascu- late  the purpose enunciated under sub-section  (1).  There- fore, the property held by her or property given to her at a partition, or under a compromise decree, gift, or in lieu of maintenance  .and held by her,on the date when the  ACt.came into  force,  namely, June 17, 1956 shall  be  her  absolute property as full owner. Bhagwati J. (as he then was)  speak- ing for himself and Gupta, J. while pointing out the  faulty drafting of s. 14, held that s. 14(1) seeks to do away  with the traditional limitation of her power of disposition which were  regarded under the Hindu law as inherent all  her  es- tate. The words "possessed of" means as the state of  owning or having in one’s hand or power which need not be actual or physical  possession or personal occupation of the  property by the Hindu female. It may be actual or constructive or  in any  form recognised by law. Sub-section (1) of s.  14cannot be  interpreted  in a manner which would deprive  the  Hindu woman  of the protection sought to be given to her  by  sub- section  (1). The social purpose of the law-would  be  frus- trated and reformist zeal underlying the statutory  provison would  be chilled. It was not the intention of the  legisla- ture in enacting sub-section (2) which must be construed  as an  exception or a proviso to sub-section (1). No  provision should be construed in isolation and be read in the  context so as to . make a consistent enactment of the whole statute. Sub-section  (2) must be read in the context of  sub-section (1) of s. 14 and if so read sub-section (2) must be confined to  cases where the Hindu female acquires the  property  for the  first time as a grant without any preexisting right  to the property under a will or by way of gift. or in-any other instruments  or a decree or order of the civil court  or  an award,  the terms of-which prescribe a restricted estate  in the property. Subsection (2) must be read as an exception or proviso  to sub-section (1) so as to leave aS large a  scope for  operation as possible to sub-section (1) of s.  14.  It was, therefore, held that the property given to Tulasmma  in a  compromise  decree in lieu of her  maintenance  with  re- stricted  estate  known as widow’s estate in Hindu  law  was enlarged and she became an absolute owner under the Act. She had the right to 737 alienate the property in favour of the others.     An  attempt  to reopen the ratio was  thwarted  by  this Court  in Bai Vajia (dead) by L.Rs, v. Thakorbhai  Chelabhai &.Ors.,  [1979]  3 SCR 291 while reaffirming  the  ratio  of Tulasamma’s  case  as correct law, this Court  further  held that limited ownership is sine quo non for the applicability of sub-section (1) of s. 14 of the Act. When a widow holds a property for her enjoyment, as long as she lives, no body is entitled to deprive her or to deal with the property in  any manner, to her detriment. The property is for the time being beneficially  Vested  in  her and she  has  the  occupation,

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control  and usufruct of it to the exclusion of all  others. SUch  relationship  to property falls  squarely  within  the meaning  of expression of "limited owner" as under S.  14(1) of the Act. In that context approved the dictum of Bhagwati, J. that s. 14(1) aimed to achieve a social purpose. to bring about  change "in the social and economic position of  women ’in Hindu Society", It was a step to accord equality of sex, elevating  women from subservient position in  the  economic field to higher pedestal with full ownership untrammelled by artificial  limitation  of Women’s estate  created  by  male dominence to subjugate her.   ’ .     In  Jagannathan  Pillai v. Kunithapadam Pillai  &  Ors., [1987]  2  SCR 1070 this Court held that  if,  the  question arises as to what was the .nature of the widow’s interest in the  property and a challenge was made during her life  time or  after  her death, all that has to be shown by  the  con- cerned  Hindu female was that she had acquired the  property and  that She was possessed of the property at the point  of time when her title was called into question. The  ’question then  was  whether she became full owner? In that  case  the widow as a limited owner sold the property but later on  re- purchased  the self same property and was in  possession  at the date when the question of holding the property and"’ the nature of the right held by her had arisen. It was held that she was in possession as limited owner and after the Act she became full owner, and not limited owner of the property. It was further held that’ the legislative intent is  abundantly ’loud  and  clear. To erase the injustice  .and  remove  the legal shackles by abolishing the concept of limited  estate, or the women’s or widow’s estate once and for all. To  obvi- ate hair-splitting, the legislature ’has made it  abundantly clear  that  whatever be the property possessed by  a  Hindu female,  it will ’be, Of her absolute ownership and  not  of limited  ownership, notwithstanding the  position  obtaining under the traditional Hindu law.    In Gulwant Kaur & Anr. v. Mohinder Singh & Anr., [1987] 3 738 SCR  576 construing a letter written by the  husband  giving the property for wife’s maintenance, this court laid that s. 14  is aimed at removing restrictions or limitations on  the right of a female Hindu to enjoy, as a full owner,  property possessed by her so long as her possession is traceable to a lawful  origin,  that is to say, if she has a vestige  of  a title.  It  makes  no difference whether  the  property  was acquired’ by inheritance or’devise, etc. The right to  main- tenance  is not a grant made for the first time without  any pre-existing right. Even if the instruments are silent as to the nature of the interest given to the widow in the proper- ty  and did not, in so many terms, prescribe that she has  a limited  interest’in  the property, she would have  no  more than a limited interest in the property under the Hindu  law as  it  stood’prior to the’ enactment of the  Act.  Hence  a provision in the instrument prescribing that she would  have only  a  limited interest in the property, would  be  merely recording the true legal position and would not attract  the applicability  of  sub-sec. (2), but would  be  governed  by sub-sec.  (1) of s. 14. The conclusion was, therefore,  held inescapable  that where the property is allotted to a  widow under  an instrument, decree, etc.for her maintenance,  sub- sec. (2) of s. 14 had no application.     In  Maharaja  Pillai Lakshmi Ammal  v.  Maharaja  Pillai Thilanayakom Pillai & Anr., [19881 1 SCR 780 under a  parti- tion  deed,  limited  . estate in lieu  of  maintenance  was created  and this court held that the deed or any other  ar- rangement  by which the husband gives property to  his  wife

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for  maintenance need not specifically say thatit was  given in  lieu of maintenance. The right to maintenance is a  per- sonal  obligation  of  the husband. If the wife  is  put  in possession of the property with the right to take the income for  her maintenance, it must be presumed that the  property was given to her in lieu of maintenance attracting s.  14(I) and  the’  limited ownership ripened  into  full  ownership. Accordingly  it  was ’held that s. 14(1)  attracted  to  the facts in that case.     In Jaswant Kaur v. MajOr Harpal Singh, [1989] 3 SCC  572 under  a will executed by the husband the widow was given  a life  estate which was held to be enlarged into an  absolute estate attracting s. 14(1),but not s. 14(2) as Hindu  female acquired property under the instrument. Her-title was trace- able to her antecedent over her widow’s estate by gift  deed of  1954 to the appellant, one of her daughters.  The  widow died  in  1968.The appellant filed a  suit  for  injunction, based  on gift deed, against the respondent, another  Sister claiming exclusive right, title and interest in the property and also pleaded adverse possession. The respondent filed  a cross  suit for partition into two shares and  claimed  half share pleading that their mother was not in possession of 739 property  on  the  date when the Act came  into  force.  The appellant.  acquired only limited ownership of their  mother and  on  her death as a reversioner of her  father  she  was entitled to partition. The High Court ultimately upheld  the respondent’s  contention  and held’ that the widow  did  not acquire  absolute  estate under s. 14(1).  Being  a  limited owner, what was conveyed by her to the appellant was only  a limited  estate and the appellant would not get the  benefit of  full ownership as she herself was not the limited  owner under-sec.  14(1). On demise of the .mother as  reversioner, the respondent was entitled to file the. suit for partition. The appellant did not acquire title by adverse possession as she was a co-owner and there .was no right. Therefore,  sub- sec. (2) of s. 14 would not attract.     Munshi Singh v. Smt. Sohan Bai (dead)by L.Rs., [1989]  2 SCR.  1012  was a case where limited owner gifted  away  the property,  and  was parted with possession and the  plea  of repurchase  was negatived by all the courts. So  this  court held  that s. 14( 1)’ does not apply. In Pearey Lal  v.  Ra- meshwar  Das, [1963] Suppl. 2 SCR 834 in construing  a  will vis-a-vis ss. 75, 82, 86 of the Indian Succession Act,  1925 this Court held that the limited estate is not enlarged into an  absolute ’estate. In Karme v. Amru, AIR 1971 SC 745  the attention of this Court to s. 14(1) was not drawn nor had an occasion  to  angulate in this perspective.  Therefore,  the ratio therein is of little assistance to the appellant.     In Kalawatibai v. Soiryabai & Ors., [1991] 3 SCC 410 the mother of the parties, a Hindu widow gifted adverse  posses- sion as against the other co-owner unless it was so asserted and acquiesced by the respondent. Therefore, the decree  for partition  was upheld and the suit for injunction  was  dis- missed. The ratio therein does not assist the appellant. Thus  I  hold that’ the Act revolutionised the status  of  a ’Hindu  female; used s. 14(1) as a tool to undo past  injus- tice  to elevate her to equal status with dignity of  person on  par  with man; extinguished pre-existing  limitation  of woman’s  estate,  or widow’s estate known  to  Shastric  law removed all the fetters to blossom the same into full Owner- ship.  The  discrimination sufferred by Hindu  female  under Shastric  law  was: exterminated by  legislative  fiat.  The social change thus envisaged must be endeavoured to be given full vigour, thrust and efficacy. Section 14(1) enlarges the

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restricted estate into full ownership when the Hindu  female has  pre-existing  right to maintenance  etc.  Sub-sec.  (2) operates  when the grant was made for.the first  time  Under the  document  with  no pre-existing  right.  Sub-sec-  (2), therefore, must be ., 740 read as an exception or a proviso to sub-sec. (1). Both  the sub-sections  read with the explanation to be  pragmaticably considered as a constituent integral scheme. The Court would sit  in  the armed chair of the testator, or its  maker  and summon to its aid the attending circumstances to execute the instrument;  the  relationship  of the parties  and  to  see whether the Hindu female acquired the property with  vestige of pre-existing right and the will,-gift deed, order, decree or an award of the civil court or in any of the forms’ known to law  was executed in recognition thereof or  entitled  under the  existing  law. If the finding is positive  her  limited estate, though created with restrictive covenants in instru- ment  or an omission to expressly so mentioned in full  par- ticulars  thereof  in the instrument in that regard  are  of little  consequence. Her limited estate gets blossomed  into full  ownership under-sec. 14(1) with a right  to  bequeath, gift  over, alienation or to deal in any manner.  recognised by  law. If on the other hand the Hindu female acquires  for the  first time the tittle therein as a grant with  restric- tive estate under the instrument  with no pre-existing title or  right, sub-section (2) of s. ’14 gets attracted and  the restrictive.  covenants. contained in the  instrument  would bind her. She remains-to be a limited owner in terms  there- of. The subsequent alienee or transferee acquires no  higher right  thereunder than the legatee etc. The  reversioner  to the  last male holder is not bound by such transfer  and  is entitled  to succeed the estate, on her demise, in terms  of the  instrument. It is too late in the ’day to  take  retro- grade step to reopen Tulasamma’s ratio.     In Civil Appeal No. 630 of 1981 of Thota Madhav Rao, Sri Narsimhalu,  his learned counsel contended that Thota  Mani- kyamma, the respondent, having come into posses’sion and  in enjoyment of the lands bequeathed under a will with a vested reminder in the appellant, her rights are circumscribed.  by the  restrictions contained in the ’will and s.  14(1)  does not apply. He also contended that by application of s. 14(1) to  the instruments executed anterior to the Act amounts  to giving  retrospective  operation  of s. 14(1).  We  find  no substance  in  either contention. It is settled law  that  a legatee  under  a testamentary disposition is bound  by  the restrictive  convenants contained therein.  But  distinction should  be  maintained  between an ordinary  legatee  and  a legatee/Hindu  female coupled with vistage  of  pre-existing title  to  the property but with a limited estate  known  to Shastric law as reflected in the impugned deed etc. Undoubt- edly  s. 14 is not retroactive in its operation.  Devolution of  the property under the will would take effect after  the demise of the testator and the legatee would be bound by the terms  of gift over etc. The .stranger legatee  cannot  take shelter under subsequent change of law to enlarge the opera- tion of restrictive covenant to claim absolute ownership  in the property bequeathed to her.    741 But  socio-economic  amelioration under the Act  engulfs  an instrument  under the sweep of s. 14(1) thereof,  it  extin- guishes  the  pre-existing  limited  estate  or  restrictive condition  and  confer absolute and full  ownership  of  the

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property possessed by a Hindu female as on the date when the Act  had come into force, namely, June 17, 1956. The  courts are  ’not giving retrospective operation to s. 14(1)  or  to the instrument. The courts only would be applying the law to the  facts round as on the date when the question  arose  to find whether legatee has pre-existing vistage of title under law;  and the nature of possession of the property  held  by her  and  ’whether the legatee would get the benefit  of  s. 14(1)  of the Act. There need be no express recital even  in the will of the enjoyment of the property devised under  the will in lieu of maintenance as a limited owner for her life. Even  if so mentioned, it would be a reflection or  restate- ment  of the law existing as in 1932 when the will was  exe- cuted.  The  respondent, admittedly, being a  widow  of  the testator  who. under Shastric law, was obligated to  provide maintenance  to his wife, and it being personal  obligation, the property  bequeathed was in lieu of maintenance for  her life.  She was in enjoyment of the property and the  benefi- cial  interest therein stood vested in her. As per  existing law  as in 1932 the widow as a legatee was entitled to  wid- ow’s  estate and she remained in possession on the  date  of the  Act came into force and was in enjoyment of the  income derived therefrom for her life. No one had a right to inter- dict it. The restrictive covenant, therefore, does not stand an  impediment to s. 14(1) to have full play  to  extinguish the  same  and enlarge the limited estate of widow  into  an absolute ownership. The restrictions contained in the  will, though  falls  both under sub-sec. (2) as well  as  sub-sec. (1), of s. 14, the right to maintenance being a pre-existing right  over property "red ad rem" s. 14(1) would apply.  The testamentary succession with a restrictive conditions in the will  was  obliterated. She became an absolute owner  on  or after  June  17, 1956. Accordingly I have no  hesitation  to hold  that, though the will created a restrictive  covenant, s. 14(2) does not apply. Section 14(1) enlarged the  widow’s limited estate held by Manikyamma into an absolute ownership as  full owner with a right to disposition  by  testamentary instrument or otherwise. As regards the claim in S.L.P.  No. 2113 of 1980 is concerned, admittedly the decree was granted with  restrictive  covenant  to remain in  possession  of  a portion of the house and enjoyment for life and by operation of the ratio in Tulasiamrna’s case the restrictive  covenant has  enlarged into absolute estate. The appeal  and  special leave petitions are accordingly dismissed with costs. V.P.R.                            Appeal and Petitions                                            dismissed. 742