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PETITIONER: THE UNION OF INDIA

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: RAM KANWAR AND OTHERS

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 29/08/1961

BENCH: SUBBARAO, K. BENCH: SUBBARAO, K. GAJENDRAGADKAR, P.B. HIDAYATULLAH, M.

CITATION:  1962 AIR  247            1962 SCR  (3) 313  CITATOR INFO :  RF         1972 SC1935  (9)  RF         1973 SC 569  (13)  RF         1979 SC1459  (67)  RF         1980 SC1632  (31)  R          1984 SC1503  (9,10)

ACT: Letters Patent Appeal-Limitation for filing-Requisition  and de-Requisition of building-Indian Limitation Act, 1908 (9 of 1908),  s.29  (2) Art. 151-Punjab High Court Rules,  r.  4De once of India Rules, r. 75A-Requisitioning and  Acquisition- any of Immovable Property Act, 7952 (30 of 1952), ss. 3,  24 (2)Requisitioned  Land  (Continuance of  Powers)  Act,  1947 (XIIII of 1947).

HEADNOTE: A building belonging to the respondents was requisitioned by the Government of India under r. 75-A (1) of the Defence  of India  Rules originally for the purpose of occupation  by  a certain   officer  of  the  Indian  National   Airways   and afterwards by the officers of the Central Government.  After the building was vacated by the said officers it was put  in the  possession of Tribeni Kala Sangam which was  a  private dance  and  music school.  The respondent’s  appeal  to  the Central Government for de-requisitioning the building having failed be filed a petition for mandamus for that purpose  in the  High Court which was allowed.  The  appellant’s  appeal under  the  Letters Patent filed within 30  days  under  the rules of the High Court but beyond 20 days as prescribed  by the Limitation Act from the judgment of the single judge was dismissed  as  barred by time and also on  the  merits.   On appeal by special leave. Held, that r. 4 of the High Court Rules which allows Letters Patent  appeals to be filed within 30 days from the date  of the judgment of the single judge is a special law within the meaning  of s.29(2) of the Limitation Act and  such  appeals may  be filed within the said period of 30 days and  not  20 days as prescribed by Art. 151 of the First Schedule of  the Limitation Act Punjab Co-operative Bank Ltd. v. social Liquidators,  A.I.R. 1941 Lah. 57, approved.

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Held, further, that under s.24(2) of the Requisitioning  and Acquisitioning  of  Immovable  Property  Act,  1952,   which repealed the Requisitioned Land (Continuance of Powers) Act, 1947,  a fiction was created to the effect  that  properties requisitioned  under the earlier Act should be deemed to  be requisitioned  under  s.3  of the Act.  The  effect  of  the fiction  was that the requisition made under r. 75-A of  the Defence  of India Rules was a requisition tinder s.3 of  the 1952 Act, that is, the 314 purpose mentioned in r. 75-A shall be deemed to be a  public purpose  of the Union within the meaning of s.3 of the  Act. In  the present case as the building in question  was  being used  for  a  purpose  other than  that  for  which  it  was originally  requisitioned under r. 75-A it was liable to  be de-requisitioned.

JUDGMENT: CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 322 of 1960. Appeal  by special leave from the judgment and  order  dated November 21, 1957, of the Punjab High Court (Circuit  Bench) at Delhi in L.P.A. No. 4 of 1955. M.   C. Setalvad, Attorney-General of India, B.   Sen, R. H. Dhebar and T. M. Sen, for the appellant. A.V.  Viswanatha  Sastri  and  Sardar  Bahadur,  for  the respondents Nos.  1 to 6. S.N.  Andley,  Rameshwar  Nath and P.L.  Vohra,  for  the respondent No. 7. 1961.   August 29.  The Judgment of the Court was  delivered by SUBBA  RAO,  J.-This appeal by special  leave  is  preferred against  the  judgment of a division bench  of  the  Circuit Bench of the Punjab High Court at Delhi confirming that of a single  Judge of that High Court issuing a writ of  mandamus against   the  Union  of  India  directing  it  to   restore possession of the flat requisitioned by the said  Government to the respondents. One Babu Ram was the owner of Flat No. 5, Aggarwal Building, Connaught  Circus,  New Delhi; respondents 1 to  6  are  his sons-and  widow.   By  an order dated April  14,  1943,  the Government of India requisitioned the said flat under  r.75- A(1) of the Defence of India Rules for a period of one  year from  April 15, 1943. to April 14, 1944.  The said flat  was put  in the occupation of one Hardie of the Indian  National Airways.   The period of requisition was extended from  time to  time, and finally by an order dated April 2,  1946,  the flat  was requisitioned from April 15, 1946,  until  further orders                             315 of  the  Central Government.  After Mr. Hardie  vacated  the flat, it was allotted to other officers.  Babu Ram requested the Government from time to time to de-requisition the  said flat  for  his  personal use.  He represented  that  he  was suffering  from heart trouble and was  continuously  keeping indifferent  health, that two of his sons had  got  married, and that in those circumstances it had become impossible for him  to  continue to live in their small house in  a  narrow lane  ; but the Government of India rejected his request  on the  ground that on surrender by the officers of the  Indian National  Airways  it  would be required  for  allotment  to Central Government officers.  Babu Ram died on October,  24, 1951.  It appears that four or five months in 1947 the  flat was  vacant and thereafter it was occupied by refugees  from

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West  Pakistan.   It  was afterwards given  to  the  present respondent No. 7, Triveni Kala Sangam.  On November  4,1952, respondent  No.  1  again requested the  Government  to  de- requisition the flat mainly on the ground that the said flat was not in use of the officers of the Central Government but was  put in possession of Triveni Kala Sangam, which  was  a private  dance and music school.  As no reply was  given  to that  request, the said respondent sent a reminder  on  June 26, 1953, and to that he received a reply to the effect that "the matter is receiving attention and further communication will  follow  in  due course." On September  16,  1953,  the Government  informed  the  first respondent  that  he  could execute a lease deed in favour of the Government in  respect of  the  said  flat.   As the appellants  did  not  put  the respondents  in  possession of the said flat,  they  had  no alternative but to file a petition for a writ of mandamus in the  High  Court  of  Punjab.  The  petition  was  heard  by Falshaw, J., and the learned Judge issued a writ of mandamus on  October  19, 1954, directing the appellants to  put  the respondents  in  possession of the flat.  Against  the  said order, on November 26, 1954, the appellants filed a  Letters Patent appeal in the Circuit 316 Bench  of  the Punjab High Court at Delhi.  The  appeal  was filed  within 30 days from the date of the said order  after excluding  the time taken for obtaining certified copies  of the  necessary documents but more than 20  days  thereafter. The appeal was heard by a division bench of the said.   High Court  consisting of the Chief Justice and Mehar  Singh,  J. The  learned  Judges held that the appeal was filed  out  of time  and that there was not sufficient reason for  excusing the  delay.  They also went into the merits of the case  and agreed  with Falshaw, J., that a case had been made out  for issuing  a  writ.   With  the result  that  the  appeal  was dismissed.  Hence the present appeal. Learned  Attorney-General,  appearing  for  the  appellants, contends,  that  the Letters Patent appeal, it  having  been filed  within  30  days from the date  of  the  judgment  of Falshaw, J., was within time, and that, in any view,  having regard to the fluid state of the law on the question whether the and prescribed by the Limitation Act or the rule by  the High  Court would govern that appeal, there  Was  sufficient cause for excusing the delay.  On the merits he argues  that the  requisition made under r.75-A of the Defence  of  India Rules (hereinafter called the Rules) was continued  unders.3 of the Requisitioned Land (Continuance of Powers) Act,  1947 (Act  No.  17 of 1947) (hereinafter called  the  1947  Act), whereunder the appropriate Government was given the power to use or deal with a requisitioned land in such manner as  may appear  to it to be expedient, that in exercise of the  said power  the  said  Government  put  Triveni  Kala  Sangam  in possession  of  the  same, and that  under  s.24(2)  of  the Requisitioning and Acquisitioning of Immovable Property Act, 1952 (hereinafter called the 1952 Act), the said requisition shall  be deemed to be property requisitioned under  s.3  of the  said  Act  and that under the  said  section  the  said purpose  must  be deemed to be a public purpose,  being  the purpose  of the Union and, as that purpose did not cease  to exist,                             317 the  respondents are not entitled to ask for  de-requisition of the said flat. Mr.  A.  V.  Viswanatha  Sastri,  learned  counsel  for  the respondents,  seeks to sustain the order of the  High  Court both on the question of limitation as well as on merits.

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Three questions fall to be considered in this appear, namely (1)  what  is  the period of limitation  prescribed  for  an appeal against an order of a Single Judge of the Punjab High Court  to a division bench of the same High Court ?  (2)  if the appeal was preferred out of time, was there a sufficient cause for excusing the delay in preferring the appeal ?  (3) are the respondents now legally entitled to ask the  Central Government  to  de-requisition the said premises  under  the 1952 Act ? To  appreciate the first contention it is necessary to  read the  relevant provisions of the Limitation Act, the  clauses of the Letters Patent and the rules made by the High Court.                      The Indian Limitation Act, 1908.               "Section  29. (2) Where any special  or  local               law   prescribes  for  any  suit,  appeal   or               application  a period of limitation  different               from  the  period prescribed therefor  by  the               First  Schedule, the provisions of  section  3               shall apply, as if such period were prescribed               therefor in that Schedule......"  The First Schedule               Description of appeal    Period of  Time from                                         of          which                                        limitation  period                                                     begains                                                    to run               151. From a decree or order of any of the High               Courts of Judicature at Fort William, 318 Madras and Bombay,     Twenty     The date of or of the High Court     days      the decree or order of Punjab in the exercise of its original jurisdiction. LETTERS PATENT FOR THE HIGH COURT OF LAHORE. Clause 27.  And WE do further ordain that it shall be lawful for the High Court of Judicature at Lahore from time to time to make, rules and orders for regulating the practice of the Court and for the purpose of adopting as far as possible the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, being an Act, No. V of 1908, passed by the Governor-General in Council and the provisions  of  any  law  which has been  or  may  be  made, amending  or  altering the same,  by  competent  legislative authority for India, to all proceedings in its testamentary, intestate and matrimonial jurisdiction respectively. Clause  37.  And We do further ordain and declare  that  all the  provisions of these Our Letters Patent are  subject  to the   legislative   powers  of   the   Governor-General   in Legislative  Council,  and also of the  Governor-General  in Council under section seventy-one of the Government of India Act,  1915;  and also of the Governor-General  in  cases  of emergency under section seventy-two of that Act, and may  be in all respects amended and altered thereby. Rules and Orders of the High Court of Punjab. Rule 4: No memorandum of appeal preferred under clause 10 of the  Letters Patent shall be entertained if presented  after the  expiration  of 30 days from the date  of  the  judgment appealed from, unless the admitting Bench in its discretion, for   good  cause  shown,  grants  further  time   for   the presentation.                             319 It  is clear from the aforesaid provisions that while  under Art.  151  of  the Limitation Act a period  of  20  days  is prescribed  for  preferring an appeal from an order  of  the High  Court  of  Punjab  in the  exercise  of  its  Original

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Jurisdiction,  under r. 4 of High Court Rules for an  appeal under cl. 10 of the Letters Patent a period of limitation of 30  days  is  provided.  If Art. 151  applies,  the  Letters Patent  appeal in the present case was clearly barred.   But if  r. 4 could be invoked, then the appeal was  well  within time.   The combined effect of the provisions may be  stated thus: Under cl. 27 of the Letters Patent, the High Court  of Judicature   of  Lahore  has  the  power  to  make  a   rule prescribing  the period of limitation in respect of  appeals from  orders made by that Court in exercise of its  Original Jurisdiction to a division bench of that High Court.   Under el.  37  thereof, the provisions of the Letters  Patent  are subject to the legislative powers of the Governor-General in Legislative  Council  and,  therefore,  any  rule  made   in exercise of a power conferred under the Letters Patent  must necessarily  be subject to the provisions of the  Limitation Act which is a law made by the Legislative Council.  Article 151   of  the  Limitation  Act  prescribes  the  period   of limitation  of 20 days for preferring an appeal  against  an order  made  by the High Court in exercise of  its  original jurisdiction,  and if there is no other limitation  on  that section,  r. 4 of the High Court Rules must give way to  the said Article.  But s. 29(2) of the Limitation Act limits the scope  of that section, for it says that where a special  or local  law  prescribes  for an appeal  a  period  prescribed therefore in the said Schedule, the provisions of s. 3 shall apply  as  if such period were prescribed therefor  in  that Schedule,  that  is,  if there is a  special  or  local  law prescribing  a period of limition, it will be deemed  to  be the period of limitation prescribed by the First Schedule to the  Limitation Act in respect of an appeal covered by  that rule.   To state it differently, if r. 4 is a  special  law, the Limitation Act itself must be deemed to 320 prescribe the period of limitation mentioned under that rule for the class of cases covered by the said rule, and to that extent  the  rule  derogates  from Art.  151  of  the  First Schedule  to the Limitation Act.  Article 151 must  be  read subject to the special law.  In this view, the argument that cl. 37 of the Letters Patent makes the rule made by the High Court  subject  to the Limitation Act and,  therefore,  that Art.  151  shall prevail over r. 4 has  no  force.   Briefly stated,  the  legal position is this: Under el.  27  of  the Letters  Patent,  the High Court has power to  make  a  rule prescribing  the period of limitation for a  Letters  Patent appeal  against an order of a single Judge made in  exercise of  the  original  jurisdiction of the High  Court,  and  by reason  of  cl.37 thereof, the said rule is subject  to  the provisions  of  the Limitation Act; but the  Limitation  Act itself  saves  the  operation of the said  rule.   With  the result that r. 4 applies to such an appeal, whereas Art. 151 of the Limitation Act will govern appeals not covered by  r. 4  or  appeals,  from orders made by other  High  Courts  in exercise of their original jurisdiction, if no rule  similar to r. 4 is made by the said High Court or High Courts. In  the premises the only question to be decided is  whether r. 4 is a special law within the meaning of s. 29(2) of  the Limitation  Act.   Rule  4  is made by  the  High  Court  in exercise  of the legislative power conferred upon  the  said High Court under cl. 27 of the Letters Patent.  As the  said rule  is a law made in respect of special cases  covered  by it,  it would certainly be a special law within the  meaning of s. 29(2) of the Limitation Act. This  view was accepted by the Punjab High Court  in  Punjab Co-operative  Bank  Ltd.  v.  Official  Liguidators,  punjab

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Cotton  Press Company, Ltd. (in liquidation) (1).  There,  a full bench of that High Court held that the statutory  rules framed by the (1)  A.I.R. 1941 Lahore 57 (F.  B.). 321 High  Court  under cl. 27 of the Letters  Patent  under  the authority  delegated to it by His Majesty who, in turn,  was acting  under  the  powers  conferred  on  him  by  Act   of Parliament,  are a "special law".  We agree with this  view. It  is not necessary to deal with other decisions  cited  at the  Bar,  for in none, of them the scope of s.  29  of  the Limitation Act was considered.  Indeed, Mr. A.V.  Viswanatha Sastri  has  not contended that r. 4 is not  a  special  law within  the meaning of s. 29 of the Limitation Act.  If  so, it  follows that under r. 4 an appeal could be filed  within 30  days from the date of the order of Falshaw, J., and  the appeal  having  been filed on the twenty-third day,  it  was well within time. In  this  view,  the second question does  not  fall  to  be considered in this appeal. On  merits, the question turns upon the construction of  the relevant provisions of the Defence of India Rules, the  1947 Act  and the 1952 Act.  For easy reference  and  comparison, the relevant provisions may be read at one place.               The Defence of India Rules               Rule  75-A.  (1)  If in  the  opinion  of  the               Central  Government or the Provincial  Govern-               ment it is necessary or expedient so to do for               securing the defence of British India,  public               safety,  the  maintenance of public  order  or               efficient prosecution of the war, or for main-               taining supplies and services essential to the               life of the community, that Government may  by               order  in  writing  requisition  any  property               movable  or  immovable,  and  may  make   such               further orders as appear to that Government to                             be  necessary or expedient in  connection  wit h               the requisitioning.                x x x x x x                (2)  Where  the  Central  Government  or  the               Provincial  Government has requisitioned.  any               property under sub-rule (1) that Government               322               may  use  or deal with the  property  in  such               manner  as may appear to it to  be  expedient,               and  may  acquire it by serving on  the  owner               thereof,  or ",here the owner is  not  readily               traceable  or the ownership is in dispute,  by               publishing  in the official Gazette, a  notice               stating   that  the  Central   or   Provincial               Government, as the case may be, has decided to               acquire it in pursuance of this rule. ,               The   Requisitioning  and  Acquisitioning   of               Immovable Property Act, 1952 (XXX of 1952)               Section   24.  (1)  The   Requisitioned   Land               (Continuance  of  Powers) Act, 1947  (XVII  of               1947),  the  Delhi Premises  (Requisition  and               Eviction)  Act,  1947 (XLIX of 1947)  and  the               Requisitioning and Acquisitioning of Immovable               Property  Ordinance,  1952 (III of  1952)  are               hereby repealed.               (2)  For the removal of doubts, it  is  hereby               declared  that any property which  immediately               before such repeal was subject to  requisition

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             under  the  provisions of either of  the  said               Acts  or  the  said Ordinance  shall,  on  the               commencement  of  this Act, be  deemed  to  be               property requisitioned under section 3 of this               Act, and all the provisions of this Act  shall               apply accordingly.               Section  3. (1) Where the competent  authority               is  of opinion that any property is needed  or               likely  to be needed for any  public  purpose,               being  a  purpose of the Union, and  that  the               property   should   be   requisitioned,    the               competent authority-               (a)   shall  call upon the owner or any  other               person  who  may  be  in  possession  of  ’the               property  by  notice  in  writing   specifying               therein the purpose of the requisition to show               cause, within fifteen days               323               of  the date of the service of such notice  on               him,   why   the   property   shall   not   be               requisitioned ;                x x x x                Section 6. (1) The Central Government may  at               any time release from requisition any property               requisitioned under this Act and shall, as far               as possible, restore the property in as good a               condition  as it was when  possession  thereof               was taken subject only to the change caused by               reasonable  wear  and  tear  and  irresistible               force :               Provided that where the purpose for which  any               requisitioned  property was being used  ceased               to exist, the Central Government shall, unless               the  property  is  acquire  under  section   7               release that property, as soon as may be, from               requisition. The Defence of India Rules were issued under the Defence  of India Ordinance, 1939, which was repealed by the Defence  of India  Act,  1939,  but the said rules were  kept  alive  by virtue  of the provisions of s. 21 of the said  Act.   Under r.75-A  of  the  said  Rules, the  power  to  requisition  a property was conditioned by the purposes for which it  could be  so requisitioned, though it was left to  the  subjective satisfaction  of  the Government to decide  whether  it  was necessary  or  expedient to do so.  After  requisition,  the Central Government was authorized to deal with the  property in  such manner as might appear to it to be expedient.   The expediency  in  the  context can  only  mean  expediency  in relation to the purposes for which the property was requisi- tioned.   The wide import of the word "expedient" in  Sub-s. (2) must necessarily be limited to the purposes under sub-s. (1) as otherwise we would be attributing to the  Legislature an  intention  to  confer  a  power  on  the  Government  to requisition  a property on false pretenses.  Act 17 of  1947 was  enacted  to  provide for  the  continuance  of  certain emergency 324 powers in relation to land which, when the Defence of  India Act  expired, was subject to requisition effected under  the rules made under that Act.  "Requisitioned land" was defined to  mean an immovable property which at the commencement  of the  said Act was subject to any requisition effected  under the  said  rules.  Under s. 3  thereof  notwithstanding  the expiration  of the said Act and the rules  made  thereunder, the  requisitioned  land  was continued  to  be  subject  to

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requisition  until  the  expiry  of the  said  Act,  and  it authorized  the appropriate Government "to use or deal  with any requisitioned land in such manner as may appear to it to be  expedient".  The object of the Act was only to  continue the. requisition after the expiry of the life of the Defence of India Act and not to enlarge the powers of the Government in   respect   of   the  requisitioned   land.    The   land requisitioned under the Ordinance continued to be subject to the  requisition.  The expression "continue" clearly  brings out the idea that the scope of the section was only to  give a  further lease of life to the order which otherwise  would have  expired.   The  words  "may  use  or  deal  with   any requisitioned land in such manner as may appear to it to  be expedient"  were only a repetition of the words in  r.  75-A (2)  of the Rules conferring authority on the Government  to do certain things in respect of requisition ; and the  scope of  the authority under s.3 of the 1947 Act must be  similar to that under r.75-A(2) of the Rules.  Under s.24 (1) of the 1952  Act,  the  1947 Act was repealed.   Under  sub-s.  (2) thereof, it was provided that on the commencement of the Act the  properties which were subject to requisition under  the provisions of the earlier Act shall be deemed to be property requisitioned  under s.3 of the Act and that all the  provi- sions of the Act shall apply accordingly. Relying  upon the deeming clause, it is contended  that  the requisition  of  the land and the user of the  same  by  the Government  under  the  1947 Act should be deemed  to  be  a requisition made, under 325 S.   3  of  the 1952 Act, for a public  purpose,  being  the purpose  of the Union, and as that purpose, namely  user  by the Triveni Kala Sangam, had not ceased, the appellants were not bound to de-requisition under s. 6 of the Act.  But  the fiction  created by s. 24 (2) of the Act would operate  only upon  the requisition already made.  The fiction  could  not validate any illegal act of the Government.  Therefore,  the question  is what was the effect of the earlier  requisition under  the  Rules  as well as under the 1947  Act.   If  the requisition  originally made was for purposes  mentioned  in r.75  of the Rules and continued under s.3 of the  1947  Act only  for the said purposes, under s. 3 of the 1952 Act  the requisition of the property made for the said purposes would be  deemed to be a requisition for a public purpose being  a purpose  of the Union.  But the validity of the  requisition could  be judged on the basis of the  pre-existing  statutes and  not on the basis of the provisions of the  sections  of the  1952  Act.   The result is that the  requisition  of  a property made for public purposes under r.75-A of the  Rules would  be deemed to be a requisition under s. 3 of  the  Act and  all the provisions of the Act would apply  accordingly. It is said that under the Rules a requisition need not  have been made for a public purpose ; but the express  provisions of r, 75-A of the Rules negative this Contention.  Though no notice stating the purpose is contemplated under r. 75-A  of the Rules, the requisition could have been made only for the four public purposes mentioned in r. 75-A of the Rules.   We have pointed out that the requisition for the said  purposes only  continued under the 1947 Act.  The purposes for  which it  was requisitioned must, therefore, be deemed to  be  the purposes mentioned in r. 75-A of the Rules.  Even if s. 5 of the Act was excluded on the ground that no notice was issued under  r. 75-A of the Rules the proviso to s. 6 of  the  Act would be attracted.  Under that proviso, where the  purposes for which 326

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any  requisitioned property was being used ceased to  exist, the  Central Government shall release the property, as  soon as  may be, from requisition.  In the present case,  on  the facts  it is manifest that the flat was not used for any  of the purposes for which it was requisitioned for a number  of years  ;  and indeed, when the Act came into force,  it  was used  only  for locating the Triveni Kala Sangam,  which  is clearly,  not  one of the purposes for which  the  flat  was requisitioned.  If so, it must be held that the purpose  for which the property was requisitioned ceased to exist and the respondents  have acquired a right to be put  in  possession thereof under the said proviso. Even  so,  the learned Attorney-General  contends  that  the purpose  for which the building is now utilised, namely  for the  Triveni  Kala Sangam, is a public  purpose’  being  the purpose of the Union, within the meaning of s. 3 of the Act, and,  therefore,  the respondents are not entitled  for  de- requisition under the proviso to s. 6 of the Act. It  is argued that every Union purpose is a public  purpose. The  argument  proceeds  that  under  the  Constitution  the Parliament may make laws with respect to any of the  matters enumerated  in  List  I  of  the  Seventh  Schedule  to  the Constitution, and also in respect of any matters  enumerated in List III thereof, that under Art. 73 the executive  power of  the  Union  extends  to  the  said  matters  and   that, therefore,  the requisition of property made for any of  the purposes  connected  with such matters,  whether  in  regard thereof laws were made or not, would be a requisition for  a public  purpose,  being a purpose of the Union,  within  the meaning of B. 3(1) of the 1952 Act.  In support of this con- tention  reliance is placed upon the decision of this  court in  The  State  of Bombay v. Ali Gulshan (1).   There  is  a fallacy underlying this argument.  The (1)  [1955] 2 S. C. R. 867. 327 effect of the fiction is that the requisition made under  r. 75-A  of the Rules is a requisition under s. 3 of  the  1952 Act,  that  is,  if the requisition was  made  for  purposes mentioned in r. 75-A of the Rules, it would be deemed to  be one  for a public purpose, being the purpose of  the  Union, within  the meaning of s. 3 of the 1952 Act.  The  criterion is not, therefore, whether a particular purpose for which  a building was used when the Act came into force was a  public purpose, being the purpose of the Union, within the  meaning of  s..3 of the 1952 Act, but whether it  was  requisitioned for  one of the purposes mentioned in r. 74-A of the  Rules. If  those purposes ceased to exist, the proviso to s.  6  of the  1952  Act  made it obligatory  for  the  Government  to release  the  property.  As the flat was being  used  for  a purpose other than that for which it was requisitioned,  the respondents  were entitled to be put in possession  thereof. In  this view, we do not propose to express our  opinion  on the  validity  of  the  contention  raised  by  the  learned Attorney-General based upon the decision of this Court. In the result the appeal fails and is dismissed. Costs  will be governed by the order dated 11-8-61. Appeal dismissed. 328