http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 1 of 7  

PETITIONER: THE STATE OF VINDHYA PRADESH(NOW MADHYA PRADESH)

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: MORADHWAJ SINGH AND OTHERS

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 24/02/1960

BENCH: WANCHOO, K.N. BENCH: WANCHOO, K.N. SINHA, BHUVNESHWAR P.(CJ) IMAM, SYED JAFFER SARKAR, A.K. SHAH, J.C.

CITATION:  1960 AIR  796            1960 SCR  (3) 106

ACT:        Jagirs,  Abolition of-Constitutional validity  of  enactment        Vindhya  Pradesh Abolition of Jagirs and Land  Reforms  Act,        1952  (XI of 1952), SS. 22(1), 37, Schedule cl.  (4)(e)-Code        of  Civil  Procedure (Act V of 1908), S.  9-Constitution  of        India, Art. 31 A.

HEADNOTE: These appeals raised the question of constitutional validity of the Vindhya Pradesh Abolition of jagirs and Land  Reforms Act,  I952 (XI Of 1952).  Applications were made before  the judicial Commissioner under Art. 226 of the Constitution  on the  ground  that  various  provisions  of  the  Act  placed unreasonable restrictions on the exercise of the fundamental rights   guaranteed  by  the  Constitution.   The   judicial Commissioner  held that the Act, excepting S. 22(1),  s.  37 and   cl.   (4)(e)  of  the  Schedule  to   the   Act,   was constitutionally  valid.   The State appealed  against  that part  of  the  order which  declared  the  three  provisions unconstitutional and one of the petitioners appealed against the order declaring the rest of the Act constitutional. Held, that the appeal of the State must be allowed and  that of the petitioner dismissed. It was not correct to say that S. 22 of the Act, which  lays down  the  scheme for giving, effect to S. 7(a) of  the  Act which  permits  the  jagirdars to remain  in  possession  of certain lands even after the abolition of their jagirs, is a piece of colourable legislation and, therefore, ultra  vires the   Legislature.    That  section  cannot   be   said   to discriminate as between jagirdars on the one hand and  other occupants  of land, to whom s. 28(1) applies, on the  other, since they belong to distinct and different classes. 107 Even  assuming that they belong to the same class and S.  22 is discriminatory, that section is protected by Art. 31A  of the Constitution. The  question  as to colourable legislation’ is  really  one relating to legislative competency and there can be no doubt that the Vindhya Pradesh Legislature was perfectly competent

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 2 of 7  

to enact the impugned provisions under Entry 18, List II  of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution. K.   C. Gajapati Narayan Deo v. The State of Orissa.  [1954] S.C.R.  i  and  Raghubir Singh v. The State  of  Ajmer  (Now Rajasthan). [1959] SuPP1. (1) S.C.R. 478, relied on. There  was no substance in the contention that s. 37 of  the Act is repugnant to s. 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure  and consequently ultra vires the State Legislature.  The Vindaya Pradesh Legislature had undoubtedly the power under Entry 3, List II of the Seventh Schedule to make a provision like  s. 37 Of the Act and, once it did so, the last part of s. 9  of the  Code  would  apply and the jurisdiction  of  the  Civil Courts  would be barred by s. 9 of the Code read with S.  37 of the Act. Nor  was it correct to say that cl. (4)(e) of  the  Schedule deprives  the jagirdar of his proprietory  interest  without compensation.  Although he may have to pay rent for the land remaining with him, no revenue for such land was any  longer payable  by  him and the revenue is taken  into  account  in assessing compensation. The  entire Act, therefore, falls within the  protection  of Art.  31A of the Constitution and, in view of the  decisions of  this  Court,  its  constitutional  validity  is   beyond question. Case-law referred to.

JUDGMENT:        CIVIL  APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeals Nos. 40 to  110        of 1955.        Appeals from the judgment and order dated November 12, 1953,        of   the  former  Judicial  Commissioner’s  Court,   Vindhya        Pradesh, Rewa, in Misc.  Applications (Writ) Nos. 51 to  119        and 121 of 1953.        C.   K.  Daphtary, Solicitor-General of India, M.  Adhikari,        Advocate-General  for the State of Madhya Pradesh and I.  N.        Shroff,  for the appellant (in C.As. Nos. 40 to 109  of  55)        and respondent (in C.A. No. 110/55).        K.   B.  Asthana, S. N. Andley, J. B. Dadachanji,  Rameshwar        Nath and P. L. Vohra, for the respondents (in C.As. Nos. 40,        51,  52,  54,  65 and 100155) and  appellant  (in  C.A.  No.        110/55).        1960.   February,  24.   The  Judgment  of  the  Court   was        delivered by        108        WANCHOO,   J.-These  seventy-one  appeals  on   certificates        granted  by  the Judicial Commissioner  of  Vindhya  Pradesh        arise  out  of  seventy  petitions under  art.  226  of  the        Constitution   filed  before  that  Court  challenging   the        constitutionality of the Vindhya Pradesh Abolition of Jagirs        and  Land Reforms Act, No. XI of 1952,  (hereinafter  called        the Act).  They were disposed of by a common judgment by the        Judicial  Commissioner.   We  shall also  dispose  of  these        appeals,  by a common judgment.  Seventy (Nos. 40  to  109),        out  of these appeals, are by the State ’of Vindhya  Pradesh        (now Madhya Pradesh) while one (No. 110) is by the Brijindar        Singh, a jagirdar.        The  case  of the petitioners in the Court of  the  Judicial        Commissioner  was  that  the  Act  was  unconstitutional  as        various provisions in it placed an unreasonable  restriction        on the exercise of the fundamental rights guaranteed to  the        petitioners  under  Part  III  of  the  Constitution.    The        -Judicial Commissioner held that the Act was constitutional,        except for three provisions thereof, namely, S. 22(1), s. 37

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 3 of 7  

      and  cl.  (4) (e) of the Schedule to the Act.   The  seventy        appeals  by the ’State are with respect to this part of  the        order  declaring  these three  provisions  unconstitutional.        The  appeal of Brijindar Singh is against that part  of  the        order by which the rest of the Act was held constitutional.        We  shall  first deal with the appeal  of  Brijindar  singh.        Learned  counsel for Brijindar Singh was unable-and  in  our        opinion  rightly-to challenge the constitutionality  of  the        Act as a whole in view of art. 31-A of the Constitution  and        the  decisions  of  this  court in The  State  of  Bihar  v.        Maharajadhiraja  Sir Kameshwar Singh (1), Visweshwar Rao  v.        The State of Madhya Pradesh (2) Raja Suriya Pal Singh v. The        state  of U.P. (3), K. C. Gajapati Narayan Deo v. The  State        of Orissa (4), Thakur Amar Singhji v. The State of Rajasthan        (5),  Raja Bhairebendra Narayan Bhup v. "he State  of  Assam        (6), Sri Ram Ram Narain v. The state of Bombay (7), Raghubir        Singh v. The State of Ajmer (now Rajasthan) (8) and Atma Ram        v. The State of Punjab (9), relating to similar  legislation        in the        (1) [1952] S.C R. 889.        (2) [1952] S.C R. 1020.        (3) [1952]  S.C.R. 1056.        (4) [1954] S.C.R. i.        (5) [1955] 2 S.C.R. 303.        (6) [1956] S.C.R. 303.        (7) [1939] SUPPL. (1)S.C R. 499        (8) [1959] Suppl. (1) S.C.R.  478        (9) [1959] Suppl. (1) S.C.R. 748.        109        States  of  Bihar,  Madhya Pradesh,  Uttar  Pradesh  Orissa,        Rajasthan,  Assam,  Bombay,  Ajmer and Punjab.   It  is  not        necessary therefore to examine the provisions of the Act  in        detail.  In the circumstances, Appeal No. 110 is  dismissed;        but as it was not pressed we think it right that the parties        should bear their own costs of this appeal.        Now we turn to the appeals by the State.  The object of  the        Act  is  to  resume jagir-lands.  Sec. 5  provides  for  the        appointment  of  a date for the resumption of any  class  of        jagir-land  by notification and power is given to the  State        Government  to fix different dates for different classes  of        jagir-lands.   Sec. 6 provides for the consequences of  such        resumption.  Sec. 7, however lays down that  notwithstanding        anything  contained  in s. 6, certain lands will  remain  in        possession of jagirdars and cl. (a) thereof is material  and        may be quoted here-        " The jagirdar shall continue to remain in possession of his        sir  and  khudkasht  to  the  extent  and  subject  to   the        conditions and restrictions specified in Ch. IV.  "        Sec. 10 and the subsequent sections appearing in Ch.  III of        the  Act provide for compensation and the Schedule  provides        the  manner  in which the compensation  shall  be  computed.        Then  comes  Ch.   IV, which deals with  sir  and  khudkasht        lands.  See. 20 provides for an application by the  jagirdar        for  allotment  of land for personal cultivation.   See.  21        provides for an enquiry by the Tahsildar on such application        in the prescribed manner, and the allotment of land and  the        issue  of a patta thereof to the jagirdar having  regard  to        the remaining provisions of the Chapter.  Then comes s.  22,        which may be quoted in full-        "  (1)  A jagirdar shall be allotted all sir  and  khudkasht        lands  which he was cultivating personally for a  continuous        period  of  three years immediately preceding  the  date  of        resumption.        "  (2) A jagirdar whose jagir-lands have been resumed  under        this Act-

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 4 of 7  

      (a)  who  is  not allotted any sir or khudkasht  land  under        sub-section (1), or        110        (b)  who had been allotted any such land which is less  than        the  minimum  area,        may if he applies in this behalf, be allotted any other  sir        or khudkasht land in his personal cultivation at the date of        resumption or where there is no such land or sufficient area        of  such  land any unoccupied cultivable waste land  in  the        jagir-land subject to availability of such land, so that-        (i)  in  a  case  falling  under cl.  (a),  the  total  area        allotted  to  him  under this sub-section is  equal  to  the        minimum area, and        (ii) in  a case falling under cl. (b), the area allotted  to        him  under this sub-section together with the area  allotted        under sub-section (1) is equal to the minimum area.        Explanation-In  this  sub-section,  the  expression  minimum        means  ten  per cent. of the total cultivated  land  in  the        jagir-land  at the date of resumption or 30 acres  whichever        is greater:        Provided  that in no case the minimum area shall exceed  250        acres."        Chapter  V deals with rights of tenants, grove  holders  and        occupants  in  jagir-land and confers  certain  benefits  on        them.   Chapter  VI  provides  for  the  machinery  and  the        procedure  for  carrying out the purposes of the  Act.   The        last  section  (42) gives power to the State  Government  to        make rules to carry out the purposes of the Act.        The learned -Judicial Commissioner has held that s.    22(1)        is a colourable piece of legislation.  The scheme of   s. 22        is  to  give effect to s. 7(a) by which certain  lands  were        allowed  to  remain  in  the  possession  of  the  jagirdar.        Section  22(1)  lays down that all sir and  khudkasht  lands        which a jagirdar was cultivating personally for a continuous        period  of  three years immediately preceding  the  date  of        resumption shall be allotted to him by the Tahsildar.   Sub-        section (2) provides for those cases where there is no  land        which  can  be allotted to a jagirdar under  sub-s.  (1)  or        where the land, which can be allotted to him under  sub-sec-        tion  (1)  is less than the minimum area as defined  in  the        section.   In such a case the jagirdar can be  allotted  any        other sir or khudkasht land in his personal culti-        111        vation  at  the date of resumption upto  the  minimum  area.        Where,  however, the minimum is not reached even after  such        allotment, the jagirdar can be allotted under sub-s. (2) any        unoccupied  cultivable  waste land in the jagir  subject  to        availability of such land upto that area.  The minimum  area        means  ten  per cent. of the total cultivated  area  in  the        jagir  at  the date of resumption or 30 acres  whichever  is        greater  subject to the proviso that in no case the  minimum        area  shall  exceed 250 acres.  In other words,  s.  22  (1)        provides  that in the first instance the jagirdar  will  get        all his sir and khudkasht land which he had been cultivating        for three years continuously before the date of  resumption.        If,  however, there is no such land or if the land  of  this        kind allotted to a jagirdar is less than the minimum area he        will  be  entitled to further allotment out of  the  sir  or        khudkasht  land in his possession for less than three  years        to make up the minimum area.  Lastly if the minimum area  is        not made up even by allotment of such land which has been in        the jagirdar’s possession for less than three years he  will        be entitled to allotment of unoccupied cultivable waste land        subject to availability of such land to make up the  minimum        area;  but  the provisions of sub-s. (2) are  subject  to  a

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 5 of 7  

      minimum  of 250 acres.  We have not been able to  understand        how  these  provisions can be called a piece  of  colourable        legislation.  The learned Judicial Commissioner seems to  be        of  the  view that as a period of  three  years’  continuous        cultivation is made a condition of allotment under s. 22(1),        there   is  discrimination  between  jagirdars   and   other        occupants of land in whose case s. 28(1) provides that every        person  who is entered in the revenue record as an  occupant        of any jagir-land at the date of resumption, shall be deemed        to be pattadar tenant in respect of such land which shall be        assessed   at  the  village  rate.   The  learned   Judicial        Commissioner  was not unconscions of the provisions of  art.        31-A  which  lays  down that no such  legislation  would  be        struck  down on the ground of discrimination under art.  14.        He  however thought that this was an extra  condition  which        had  been imposed so that the jagirdar might.be deprived  of        as much sir and khudkasht land as possible subject        112        to  the  minimum  and  that this  was  done  to  create  in-        convenience  to the jagirdars whom the legislature  did  not        like.   He  therefore  thought  that  such  legislation  was        altogether  outside  the power of the  legislature  and  was        invalid as a colourable piece of legislation.        In the first place we cannot see how any discrimination  can        arise  in  circumstances like this, for  the  jagirdars  are        obviously one class while the occupants of lands other  than        jagirdars  belong  to another class.  Secondly, even  if  it        could  be  held that jagirdars and other occupants  of  land        stood  in the same class and there was discrimination  under        s. 22(1) as compared to s. 28(1), such discrimination  could        not  be a ground for striking down s. 22(1) in view  of  the        specific  constitutional  provision in art.  31-A.   It  was        because  of  -this  difficulty  that  the  learned  Judicial        Commissioner  did not strike down s. 22(1) on the ground  of        discrimination  but held that it was a colourable  piece  of        legislation.  What is a colourable piece of legislation  has        been  laid down by this Court in K. 0. Gajapati Narayan  Deo        v. The State of Orissa (1).  It was pointed there that :-        "The question whether a law was a colourable legislation and        as  such void did not depend on the motive or bona fides  of        the  legislature in passing the law but upon the  competency        of the legislature to pass that particular law, and what the        courts have to determine in such cases is whether though the        legislature  has purported to act within the limits  of  its        powers,  it has in substance and reality transgressed  those        powers,  the transgression being veiled by what appears,  on        proper examination, to be a mere pretence or disguise.   The        whole  doctrine of colourable legislation is based upon  the        maxim  that  you  cannot do indirectly what  you  cannot  do        directly."        Applying  this  principle  it is obvious  that  the  Vindhya        Pradesh legislature in this case had full competence to make        this  provision  under  Entry 18, List  II  of  the  Seventh        Schedule.  There is no question here of transgressing  those        powers  and  veiling the transgression under a  pretence  or        disguise.   We do not think it was proper for  the  Judicial        Commisisioner to        (1)  [1954] S.C.R. (1)        113        ascribe motives to the legislature as he seems to have  done        by   saying  that  the  provision  was  made  for   creating        inconvenience to a class whom the legislature did not  like.        Nor do we think that there is any force in the argument that        art.  31-A  has no application to  provisions  dealing  with        allotment of land, for ss. 7 and 22 of the Act work out  the

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 6 of 7  

      scheme   of  acquisition  of  estates  and  are   incidental        provisions  which are equally protected under  that  Article        along  with the main provisions contained in ss. 5 and 6  of        the  Act;  (see Raghubir Singh v. The State  of  Ajmer  (now        Rajasthan) (1).  The provisions of s. 22 as a whole  provide        a  scheme for carrying out the intention of the  legislature        expressed  in  s.  7(a) of the Act and are  in  our  opinion        perfectly constitutional.        We  now turn to s. 37 of the Act.  That section  appears  in        the procedural part of the Act and is as follows:-        "  (1)  No civil court shall have  jurisdiction  to  settle,        decide or deal with any question which is, by or under  this        Act,  required to be settled, decided or dealt with  by  the        Tahsildar,   the  Deputy  Commissioner,  the   Land   Reform        Commissioner, or the Board    of Revenue.        (2)  Except as otherwise provided in this Act no order of  a        Tahsildar,   a   Deputy  Commissioner,   the   Land   Reform        Commissioner,  or the Board of Revenue under this Act  shall        be called in question in any court."        Sub-s.  (1)  thus takes away the jurisdiction of  the  civil        court  to  decide any matter which under the Act  is  to  be        decided by the Tahsildar, the Deputy Commissioner, the  Land        Reform  Commissioner  or the Board of Revenue.   Sub-s.  (2)        provides  that no order passed by any of  these  authorities        shall  be  called  in question in any  court.   The  learned        Judicial  Commissioner has held this section invalid on  the        ground  that  it.is repugnant to s. 9 of the Code  of  Civil        Procedure, inasmuch as it takes away the jurisdiction of the        civil  court which it has under that section.  Sec.  9  lays        down  that the civil courts shall have jurisdiction  to  try        all  suits of a civil nature excepting suits of which  their        cognizance is either expressly or impliedly barred.        (1)  (1959] Suppl (1) C.R. 478        114        Sec.  9 therefore gives jurisdiction to civil courts to  try        all  suits  of  a civil nature  excepting  those  which  are        expressly  or  impliedly  barred  by  any  other  law.   The        provision  of s. 37 is an express bar to the  matters  dealt        with in the Act being agitated in civil courts.  The learned        Judicial  Commissioner seems to think that s. 9  takes  away        the  power of the legislature of a Part State  like  Vindhya        Pradesh  to  legislate with respect to the  jurisdiction  of        courts.   The power to the legislature is given by Entry  3,        List 11 and cannot be affected by s. 9 of the Code of  Civil        Procedure.   As a matter of fact s. 9 recognises that  if  a        competent legislature passes a law barring the  jurisdiction        of  a  civil court, the jurisdiction of the civil  court  to        take cognizance of such suit, even though of a civil nature,        is ousted.  It was in our opinion unnecessary to go into  s.        22 of the Government of Part C States Act, No. XLIX of  1951        and  compare  it with art. 254 of the Constitution  in  this        connection.   Sec. 37 does not in any way affect s.  9.  All        that  it  provides  is  that  civil  courts  shall  have  no        jurisdiction to hear certain matters of a civil nature;  and        s.  9 expressly recognizes that if such a provision is  made        by  any  law,  the jurisdiction of  the  civil  courts  will        disappear.   There  is thus no question  of  any  repugnancy        between s. 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure and s. 37 of the        Act.   The  legislature  in this case had power  to  make  a        provision like s. 37 and once it did so, the last part of s.        9  will apply and the jurisdiction of the civil courts  will        become barred by virtue of s. 9 read with s. 37 of the  Act.        The  decision of the Judicial Commissioner there. fore  that        s.  37  is  ultra vires the powers of  the  Vindhya  Pradesh        legislature is not correct.

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 7 of 7  

      Lastly we come to el. (4) (e) of the Schedule.  The Schedule        provides  for the method of computing compensation.   Clause        (3)  lays  down the manner in which the gross  income  of  a        jagirdar shall be arrived at.  Clause (4) lays down how  net        income  will be arrived at after making certain  deductions.        One  of these deductions is in sub-cl. (e) of  this  Clause,        which is as follows:-        "Where  the  jagirdar is allotted any sir. or  khudkasht  or        other land or any grove under this Act an        115        amount equal to the valuation of rent for such land or grove        for the basic year at the current settlement rates (less the        land  revenue paid by him in respect of such land and  grove        in the basic year to be ascertained in such manner as may be        prescribed)."         This  sub-clause is in fact a contra entry to  sub-cl.  (b)        (i) of cl. (3).  The method of calculation provided by these        two  clauses  is that the gross income is first  arrived  at        without taking into account the land which remains with  the        jagirdar  under s. 7 (a).  Thereafter in order to arrive  at        the net income for the purpose of compensation the rent  for        sir  and khudkasht land which remains with the  jagirdar  is        taken  into account and its value determined under  el.  (3)        (b) (i) minus the revenue payable in respect thereof.   This        is then deducted from the gross income, for the reason  that        this land remains, with the jagirdar.  The learned  Judicial        Commissioner  thinks  that the arithmetical result  of  this        provision  is that so far as these lands are  concerned  the        landlord  has lost his proprietary interest and has  to  pay        rent  to  the  government,  but at the  same  time  gets  no        compensation.  it  should however be noted that  though  the        landlord  may  have  to  pay rent in  future  for  the  land        remaining  with him, he does not pay any revenue  which  was        payable  by  him so far with respect to such land.   In  the        circumstances,  it cannot be said that he has been  deprived        of the proprietary interest without any compensation, for he        is  relieved of the charge of paying land revenue which  has        also  been taken into account in arriving at the net  assets        for  that  purpose,  and  that is all  that  he  can  expect        considering that the land remains in his possession for  all        other  purposes.  We are therefore of opinion that there  is        nothing unconstitutional in el. (4) (e) of the Schedule.        We  therefore  dismiss Appeal No. 110 but order  parties  to        bear  their own costs.  We allow Appeals Nos. 40 to 109  and        hold  that s. 22 (1), s. 37 and cl. (4) (e) of the  Schedule        are  valid and constitutional.  As the respondents in  these        appeals  have not seriously contested them we order  parties        to bear their own costs.                Appeal No. 110 dissmissed.                Appeals Nos. 40 to 109 allowed.        116