30 November 1960
Supreme Court
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THE STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH Vs THE GWALIOR SUGAR CO., LTD.,AND OTHERS(AND CONNECTED APPEA

Bench: B.P. SINHA, CJ,S.K. DAS,A.K. SARKAR,N. RAJAGOPALA AYYANGAR,J.R. MUDHOLKAR
Case number: Appeal (civil) 98-99 of 1957


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PETITIONER: THE STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: THE GWALIOR SUGAR CO., LTD.,AND OTHERS(AND CONNECTED APPEAL)

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 30/11/1960

BENCH:

ACT: Cess-Levy on sugar cane ordered by erstwhile Ruler-Consti- tutional validity-Constitution of India, Arts. 14, 265, 373.

HEADNOTE: In order to put the sugar industry on a stable footing,  for which  it was necessary to develop the cane area, the  Ruler of  the erstwhile Gwalior State by an order dated  27-7-1946 sanctioned  the  levy of cess of one anna per maund  on  all sugar  cane purchased by the respondent company.   When  the Government  of Madhya Bharat, which was the successor  state of  the former Gwalior State, made a demand for  payment  of the  cess, the respondent filed a petition before  the  High Court of Madhya ,Bharat challenging the legality of the levy on  the grounds (1) that the order dated 27-7-1946 was  only an  executive  order  and not a law under Art.  265  of  the Constitution  of  India and that, therefore,  there  was  no authority  for the imposition of the cess after January  26, 1950, and (2) that the levy was discriminatory and  violated Art. 14 inasmuch as while the respondent was made liable  to pay  the  cess the other sugar factories in the  State  were exempt.   It was found that at the time when cess was  first levied  there  was  no sugar factory  in  existence  in  the Gwalior State other than that of the respondent. Held, that (i) the Ruler of an Indian State was an  absolute monarch  in which there was no constitutional limitation  to act   in  any  manner  he  liked,  he  being   the   supreme legislature,  the supreme judiciary and the supreme head  of the  executive.  I Consequently, the order  dated  27-7-1946 issued  by  the  Ruler of Gwalior State amounted  to  a  law enacted by him and became an existing law under Art. 372  of the  Constitution of India.  The levy of cess was  therefore by authority of law within the meaning of Art. 265; Madhaorao  Phalke  v. The State of Madhya Bharat,  [1961]  1 S.C.R. 957, followed. (2)  the levy of cess did not contravene Art. 14 because (a) the object was cane development in the particular area and a geographical  classification based upon  historical  factors was  a  permissible mode of classification, and  (b)  a  tax could  not  be struck down as discriminatory unless  it  was found  that  it was imposed with a deliberate  intention  of differentiating between 620 (ii) where the order is passed by the Sub-divisional  Animal Husbandry  Officer,  under  sub-rule (5),  to  the  District Animal Husbandry Officer and (iii) where the order is passed by the authority  prescribed under  sub-rule (1) to the Sub-divisional  Animal  Husbandry Officer,  if  there is one; if not, to the  District  Animal

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Husbandry Officer; (b)  The appeal shall not be decided against  the  appellant unless  he has been given a reasonable opportunity of  being heard." The  argument on behalf of the petitioners is that they  are "Kassais"  by  profession  and they  earn  their  living  by slaughtering  cattle  only  (not goats or  sheep  which  are slaughtered  by  "Chiks"); that they  have  the  fundamental right to carry on their profession and trade; and that s.  3 of   the   Act   read  with  r.   3   imposes   unreasonable restrictions--restrictions  not  in  the  interests  of  the general public-on their fundamental right and therefore they are  not  saved by cl. (6) of Art. 19 of  the  Constitution. Some of these arguments were considered by this Court in Md. Hanif Quareshi v. The State of Bihar (1) and it was  pointed out  that  the test of reasonableness should be  applied  to each  individual statute impugned and no abstract  standard, or  general pattern, of reasonableness can be laid  down  as applicable  to  all cases.  It referred to the  decision  in State of Madras v. V. G. Row (2) and repeated what was  said therein  that "the nature of the right alleged to have  been infringed,  the  underlying  purpose  of  the   restrictions imposed,  the  extent and urgency of the evil sought  to  be remedied  thereby, the disproportion of the imposition,  the prevailing conditions at the time, should all enter into the judicial  verdict." ’Another consideration which has  to  be kept  in mind is that "the legislature is the best judge  of what is good for the community,. by whose suffrage it  comes into existence...................... (See The State of Bihar v.  Maharajadhiraja Sir Kameshwar Singh of  Darbhanga  (3)). But the ultimate responsibility for determining the validity of the law must rest with the (1) [1950] S.C.R. 629.           (2) [1952] S.C.R. 597. (3) [1952] S.C.R. 889. 621 Court and the Court must not shirk that solemn duty cast  on it  by the Constitution.  We must, therefore,  approach  the problem  before us in the light of the principles laid  down by this Court. The  most  pertinent question is-having regard  to  all  the relevant circumstances, is the age of 25 years laid down  in s.   3  a  reasonable  restriction  on  the  right  of   the petitioners in the interests of the general public ? We  are unable to say that it is.  Apart from the affidavits made on behalf of the petitioners and the respondent State, a  large volume  of authoritative and expert opinion has been  placed before us which shows beyond any doubt that a bull,  bullock or  she-buffalo does not remain useful after 14 or 15  years and  only  a few of them live up to the age of 25.   In  the Report of the Cattle Preservation and Development Committee, published by the Ministry of Agriculture, it is  recommended by the Committee that the slaughter of animals over 14 years of  age  and  unfit  for work as also  animals  of  any  age permanently  unable  to work owing to injury  or  deformity, should  be allowed.  In the Report on the Marketing of  Meat in India (published by the Ministry of Food and Agriculture) there  is  a  reference to a draft Bill  circulated  by  the Ministry  of  Agriculture  (page 112 of  the  Report)  which contains  a  clause that animals over 14 years  of  age  and unfit  for work may be slaughtered on a certificate  from  a Veterinary  Officer.   In  the Report on  the  Marketing  of Cattle in India, again published by the Ministry of Food and Agriculture, occurs the following passage as to the price of animals with reference to their age: "Young  draught animals up to the age of 4  years-being  raw

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and untrained-fetch comparatively low prices.  Between 4 and 8 years of age, the animals are in the prime of their  youth and tender best service, and fetch maximum prices.  From the 8th  year onwards old age sets in, and a graded  decline  is observed  in their capacity to work and consequently  prices depreciate considerably." . In  a Food and Agricultural Organisation study of cattle  in India and Pakistan (Zebu Cattle of India and 79 622 Pakistan,  page  94) it is stated that the  active  breeding life  of  a  bull is estimated to be  about  10  years.   In Black’s Veterinary Dictionary (edited by W. C. Miller and G. P.  West, fifth edition) it is stated that  pedigree  ,bulls may reach 12 or 14 years of age before being discarded;  and cattle seldom live longer than 15 or 16 years, and when they do,  their  age is usually of no immediate  importance.   In another  publication of the Ministry of  Agriculture  called ’Problems  of Cattle Insurance’ under Indian conditions,  it is  stated  that the life of cattle  is  comparatively  much shorter,  the maximum age being only about 15 years.   There is an interesting chart relating to the determination of age in  cattle  in a publication called ’Cattle  Development  in Uttar Pradesh’ by R. L. Kaura, Director of Animal Husbandry; that  chart shows that at II years incisors  appear  smaller due  to wearing out; at 12 years space appears  between  the teeth,  and  after 12 teeth wear out  constantly  and  roots remain  far  apart from one another.  As  against  all  this expert opinion the respondent State has relied on the  chart embodying some useful data about domestic animals,  prepared by  Major A. C. Aggarwala, Director of Veterinary  Services, Punjab,   and  R.  R.  Gulati,  Superintendent,   Veterinary Department,  Jullandur, which shows the sterility age  of  a buffalo at 15 and average age at 25, and of a cow  sterility at 15 and 16 years and average life 22 years.

JUDGMENT: ORIGINAL JURISDICTION: We are clearly of the view that the almost unanimous opinion of experts is that after the age of 15, bulls. bullocks  and buffaloes  are  no longer useful for breeding,  draught  and other purposes and whatever little use they may have then is greatly offset by the economic disadvantages of feeding  and maintaining  unserviceable cattle-disadvantages to which  we had referred in much greater detail in Md.  Hanif Quareshi’s case  (1).  Section 3 of the Bihar Act in so far as  it  has increased the age limit to 25 in respect of bulls,  bullocks and  she-buffaloes, imposes an unreasonable  restriction  on the  fundamental  right of the  petitioners,  a  restriction moreover which cannot be said to be in (1)  [1959] S.C.R. 629. 623 the  interests of the general public, and to that extent  it is  void.  We may here repeat what we said in Chintaman  Rao v. The State of Madhya Pradesh (1): "The  phrase  ’reasonable  restriction’  connotes  that  the limitation  imposed  on a person in enjoyment of  the  right should  not be arbitrary or of an excessive  nature,  beyond what  is required in the interests of the public.  The  word ’reasonable’ implies intelligent care and deliberation, that is,   the  choice  of  a  course  which   reason   dictates. Legislation  which  arbitrarily or excessively  invades  the right   cannot   be   said  to  contain   the   quality   of

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reasonableness  and  unless  it  strikes  a  proper  balance between  the  freedom guaranteed in Art.  19(1)(g)  and  the social  control permitted by clause (6) of Art. 19, it  must be held to be wanting in that quality." As  to  r. 3 the grievances of the  petitioners  are  these. Under  the rule the prescribed authority for the purpose  of s.  3 of the Act consists of the Veterinary Officer and  the Chairman or Chief Officer of a District Board,  Municipality etc.   Unless  both  of  them  concur,  no  certificate  for slaughter  can  be  granted.  It is  pointed  out  that  the Chairman  or  Chief  Officer  would be a  layman  not  in  a position  to  judge the age or usefulness  of  cattle.   The result  would  be  that the animal in  respect  of  which  a certificate  is  required  may  have  to  be  shown  to  the Veterinary  Officer as also the Chairman or  Chief  Officer, who  may not be staying at the same place as the  Veterinary Officer.   If the two differ, the matter has to be  referred to  the  Sub-divisional  Animal  Husbandry  Officer.    This procedure, it is contended, will involve the expenditure  of so  much money and time that it will not be  worthwhile  for the  petitioners to ask for a certificate, or having  got  a certificate,  to slaughter the animal.  An animal  which  is above  15 or which has become useless generally  costs  much less  than a young, serviceable animal.  If the  petitioners have  to incur all the expenditure which the procedure  laid down  by  r. 3 must necessarily cost them,  then  they  must close  down their trade.  As to the right of appeal from  an order refusing to grant a (1) [1950] S.C.R. 759,763. 624 certificate,  it  is  contended  that  that  right  is  also illusory for all practical purposes.  To take the animal  to the  Deputy  Director of Animal Husbandry  or  the  District Animal  Husbandry  Officer  or the  Sub-divi  sional  Animal Husbandry Officer, as the case may be, and to keep and  feed the animal for the period of the appeal and its hearing will cost more than the price of the animal itself. We  consider that these grievances of the  petitioners  have substance, and judged from the practical point of view,  the provisions  of r. 3 impose disproportionate restrictions  on their  right.   It  is  difficult  to  understand  why   the Veterinary   Officer,  who  has  the   necessary   technical knowledge, cannot be trusted to give the certificate and why it should be necessary to resort to a complicated  procedure to  resolve  a possible difference of  opinion  between  two officers, later followed by a still more expensive appeal. We,  therefore,  hold r. 3 also to be bad in so  far  as  it imposes  disproportionate restrictions indicated  above,  on the right of the petitioners. (2) We now proceed to consider the Uttar Pradesh  Prevention of Cow Slaughter (Amendment) Act, 1958.  After the  decision of  this Court in Md.  Hanif Quareshi v. The State of  Bihar (1)  an  Ordinance  was  passed  called  the  Uttar  Pradesh Prevention  of  Cow Slaughter (Amendment)  Ordinance,  1958. This  Ordinance was later repealed and replaced by the  Act. The  petitioners say that in the Bill as originally  drafted the age limit below which slaughter was not permissible  was put at 15 years; but the Select Committee increased it to 20 years.  It will probably be best, for clearness sake, to set forth not the whole provisions of the Act, for that would be too lengthy, but those which form most directly the  subject matter on which the controversy turns.  Section 3 of the Act reads (omitting portions not relevant for our purpose)- "S.  3(1)  Except as hereinafter provided, no  person  shall slaughter or cause to be slaughtered or offer or cause to be

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offered for slaughter- (a).......................................... (1)  [1959] S.C.R. 629. 625 (b)  a  bull or bullock, unless he has obtained  in  respect thereof  a  certificate  in  writing,  from  the   competent authority of the area in which the bull or bullock is to  be slaughtered, certifying that it is fit for slaughter... (2)  No bull or bullock, in respect of which  a  certificate has   been  issued  under  sub-section  (1)(b)   shall   be’ slaughtered  at any place other than the place indicated  in the  certificate or within twenty days of the date of  issue of the certificate. (3)  A certificate under sub-section (1)(b) shall be  issued by  the competent authority, only after it has, for  reasons to  be  recorded in writing, certified that(a) the  bull  or bullock is over the age of twenty years; and (b)  in the case of a bull, it has become permanently  unfit and  unserviceable for the purpose of breeding and,  in  the case  of  a  bullock, it has become  permanently  unfit  and unserviceable  for the purposes of draught and any  kind  of agricultural operation: Provided  that the permanent unfitness  or  unserviceability has not been caused deliberately. (4)  The  competent  authority  shall,  before  issuing  the certificate  under sub-section (3) or refusing to issue  the same, record its order in writing.  Any person aggrieved  by the  order of the competent authority, under  this  section, may,  within  twenty days of the date of the  order,  appeal against  it  to the State Government, which  may  pass  such orders thereon as it may deem fit. (5) The State Government may, at any time, for the  purposes of satisfying itself as to the legality or propriety of  the action  taken under this section, call for and  examine  the record  of any case and may pass such orders thereon  as  it may deem fit. (6)  Subject to the provisions herein contained  any  action taken under this section, shall be final and conclusive  and shall not be called in question." On  behalf of the petitioners it has been argued that  s.  3 imposes a number of unreasonable restrictions.  Firstly,  it is urged that the age-limit with regard to bulls or bullocks is put too high, viz. at 20 years.  This is an 626 aspect  which we have already considered in relation to  the Bihar Act.  What we have said about the age s limit in  that connexion applies equally to the Uttar Pradesh Act.  The 8th Live-stock  Census, 1956 shows  that in Uttar Pradesh  bulls and bullocks over 3 years of age, not in use for breeding or work,  numbered  as many as 126,201 in 1956 as  compared  to 162,746 in 1951.  The Municipal Manual, Uttar Pradesh,  Vol. 1,  contains  a  direction that for  slaughter  of  animals, bullocks  and male buffaloes in good state of  health  below ten  years  of  age should be  included.   Secondly,  it  is pointed   out  that  not  being  content  with   fixing   an unreasonably high age-limit, the impugned provision  imposes a double restriction.  It says that the animal must be  over twenty  years in age and must also be permanently unfit  and unserviceable;  and in the case of a bullock, the  unfitness must  be  for "any kind of agricultural operation"  and  not merely  for  draught purposes.  The result  of  this  double restriction,  it  is stated, is that even if the  animal  is permanently  unserviceable and unfit at an earlier  age,  it cannot be slaughtered unless it is over twenty years in age. Before  a certificate can be given, the animal  must  fulfil

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two  conditions as to (1) age and (2)  permanent  unfitness. We   consider  this  to  be  a   demonstrably   unreasonable restriction.   In Md.  Hanif Quareshi’s case (1) this  Court had  said  that a total ban on the slaughter  of  bulls  and bullocks after they had ceased to be capable of breeding  or working  as draught animals was not in the interests of  the general  public.   Yet  this is exactly  what  the  impugned provision  does by imposing a double restriction.   It  lays down  that even if the animal is permanently  unserviceable, no certificate can be given unless it is more than 20  years in  age.  The restriction will in effect put an end  to  the trade of the petitioners. Thirdly, the impugned provision provides (1) that the animal shall  not be slaughtered within 20 days of the date of  the issue  of the certificate and (2) that any person  aggrieved by  the order of the competent authority may appeal  to  the State Government within 20 days.  It is to be noted that the right of appeal is not (1)  [1939] S.C R. 629. 627 confined to a refusal to grant a certificate as in the Bihar Act,  but the right is given to any person aggrieved by  the order of the competent authority.  In other words, even when a  certificate  is given, any person, even a member  of  the public,  who feels aggrieved by it may prefer an appeal  and hold  up the slaughter of the animal for a long time.   From the practical point of view these restrictions really put  a total ban on the slaughter of bulls and bullocks even  after they  have ceased to be useful, and we must hold,  following our decision in Md.  Hanif Quareshi’s case (1) that s. 3  of the  Uttar Pradesh Act in so far as it imposes  unreasonable restrictions on the right of the petitioners as to slaughter of bulls and bullocks infringes the fundamental right of the petitioners and is to that extent void. (3)  Now,  we  come  to the  Madhya  Pradesh  Act.   Several provisions  of  this Act have been challenged before  us  as imposing unreasonable restrictions on the fundamental  right of  the  petitioners.  Section 4 deals with  prohibition  of slaughter   of   agricultural   cattle.    The    expression ’agricultural  cattle’  means  an animal  specified  in  the schedule:  it means cows of all ages; calves of cows and  of she-buffaloes;   bulls;  bullocks;  and  male   and   female buffaloes.   As we have stated earlier, we are concerned  in these cases with the validity of the restrictions placed  on the  slaughter of bulls, bullocks and buffaloes.  Now, s.  4 is in these terms: "S. 4(1) Notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force or in any usage or custom to the contrary,   no  person  shall  slaughter  or  cause  to   be slaughtered or offer or cause to be offered, for slaughter- (a)  cows, calves of cows, or calves of she-buffaloes, or (b) any other agricultural cattle unless he has obtained  in respect  of such cattle a certificate in writing  issued  by the Competent Authority for the area in which the cattle  is to be slaughtered that the cattle is fit for slaughter. (1)  [1959] S.C.R.29. 628 (2) No certificate under clause (b) of sub-section (1) shall be issued by the Competent Authority .unless the  Veterinary Officer after examining the cattle certifies that- (a) the cattle is over twenty years of age and is unfit  for work  or  breeding or has become  permanently  incapacitated from  work or breeding due to age, injury, deformity  or  an incurable disease; and (b) the cattle is not suffering from any disease which makes

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its meat unwholesome for human consumption. (3)  The  Competent  Authority  shall,  before  issuing   or refusing  to issue a certificate under this section,  record its order in writing.  Any person aggrieved by the order  of the Competent Authority under this section, may, within  ten days of the date of the order, prefer an appeal against such order to the Collector of the district or such other officer as may, by notification, be authorised in this behalf by the State  Government, and the Collector or such  other  officer may pass such orders thereon as he thinks fit. (4)  Subject to the orders passed in appeal, if  any,  under sub-section (3), the order of the Competent Authority  shall be final and shall not be called in question in any Court." Section 5 places a restriction as to the place and time  for slaughter  and the objection taken before us relates to  the time  rather  than to the place of slaughter.   It  says  in effect that no cattle in respect of which a certificate  has been issued under s. 4 shall be slaughtered within ten  days of the date of issue of the certificate and where an  appeal is preferred against the grant of such certificate, till the time such appeal is disposed of. The provision of appeal  is contained  in  sub-s. (3) of s. 4 of the Act which  we  have quoted earlier.  That sub-section lays down that any  person aggrieved  by  the order of the  Competent  Authority,  may, within  ten days of the date of the order, prefer an  appeal against  the order to the Collector of the district or  such other officer as may, by notification, be authorised in this behalf by the State Government. 629 Section  6  imposes  a  restriction  on  the  transport   of agricultural cattle for slaughter and reads: "S.  6. No person shall transport or offer for transport  or cause  to  be transported any agricultural cattle  from  any place  within the State to any place outside the State,  for the  purpose  of  its  slaughter  in  contravention  of  the provisions of this Act or with the knowledge that it will be or is likely to be, so slaughtered." Section 7 prohibits the sale, purchase or disposal otherwise of certain kinds of animals.  It reads-. "S.  7. No person shall purchase, sell or otherwise  dispose of  or  offer to purchase, sell or otherwise dispose  of  or cause  to be purchased, sold or otherwise disposed of  cows, calves  of cows or calves of shebuffaloes for  slaughter  or knowing  or having reason to believe that such cattle  shall be slaughtered." Section  8  relates to possession of flesh  of  agricultural cattle  and  is  in  these  terms:  "S.  8.  Notwithstanding anything  contained in any other law for the time  being  in force,  no person shall have in his possession flesh of  any agricultural  cattle  slaughtered in  contravention  of  the provisions of this Act." Section  10  imposes  a penalty for a  contravention  of  s. 4(1)(a) and s. 11 imposes penalty for a contravention of any of the other provisions of the Act. On  behalf of the petitioners it has been pointed  out,  and rightly  in our opinion, that cl. (a) of sub-s. (2) of s.  4 of the Act imposes an unreasonable restriction on the  right of the petitioners.  That clause in its first part lays down that the cattle (other than cows and calves) must be over 20 years  of age and must also be unfit for work  or  breeding; and  in the second part it says, "or has become  permanently incapacitated  from  work or breeding due  to  age,  injury, deformity or an incurable disease." It is a little difficult to  understand  why  the two parts  are  juxtaposed  in  the section.   In any view the restriction that the animal  must

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be over 20 years of age and also unfit for work or  breeding is an excessive or unreasonable restriction as we have 80 630 pointed out with regard to a similar provision in the  Uttar Pradesh  Act.   The second part of the clause would  not  be open to any objection, if it stood by itself.  If,  however, it  has  to be combined with the agelimit mentioned  in  the first part of the clause, it will again be open to the  same objection;  if the animal is to be over 20 years of age  and also   permanently  incapacitated  from  work  or   breeding etc.,then  the  agelimit is really meaningless.   Then,  the expression  ’due  to age’ in the second part of  the  clause also loses its meaning.  It seems to us that cl. (a) of sub- s.  (2)  of  s. 4 of the Act as drafted is  bad  because  it imposes  a disproportionate restriction on the slaughter  of bulls, bullocks and buffaloes it is a restriction  excessive in  nature and not in the interests of the  general  public. The  test  laid down is not merely permanent  incapacity  or unfitness  for  work or breeding but the test  is  something more than that, a combination of age and unfitness’  Learned Counsel  for  the  petitioners  has  placed  before  us   an observation contained in a reply made by the Deputy Minister in  the  course  of the debate on the  Bill  in  the  Madhya Pradesh  Assembly (see Madhya Pradesh Assembly  Proceedings, Vol.  5 Serial no. 34 dated April 14, 1959, page 3201).   He said that the age fixed was very much higher than the one to which any animal survived.  This observation has been placed before  us  not  with a view to  an  interpretation  of  the section,  but  to show what opinion was held by  the  Deputy Minister  as  to  the proper agelimit.   On  behalf  of  the respondent  State  our attention has been drawn  to  a  book called  The  Miracle of Life (Home Library  Club)  in  which there is a statement that oxen, given good conditions,  live about  40  years.   Our attention has  also  been  drawn  to certain  extracts from a Hindi book called Godhan by  Girish Chandra  Chakravarti  in which there are statements  to  the effect that cows and bullocks may live up to 20 or 25 years. This  is  an aspect of the case with which we  have  already dealt.   The question before us is not the maximum age  upto which bulls, bullocks and buffaloes may live in rare  cases. The  question before us is what is their  average  longevity and at what age 631 they  become  useless.  On this question we think  that  the opinion  is  almost  unanimous, and the  opinion  which  the Deputy Minister expressed was not wrong. Section  5 in so far as it imposes a restriction as  to  the time  for slaughter is again open to the same  objection  as has been discussed by us with regard to a similar  provision in the Uttar Pradesh Act.  A right of appeal is given to any person aggrieved by the order.  In other words, a member  of the  public, if he feels aggrieved by the order  granting  a certificate for slaughter, may prefer an appeal and hold  up for  a  long  time the slaughter of  the  animal.   We  have pointed   out  that  for  all  practical  purposes  such   a restriction  will  really  put an end to the  trade  of  the petitioners  and  we are unable to accept a  restriction  of this kind as a reasonable restriction within the meaning  of cl. (6) of Art. 19 of the Constitution. Section  6 standing by itself, we think, is not open to  any serious  objection.  It is ancillary in nature and tries  to give  effect  to  the  provision  of  the  Act   prohibiting slaughter of cattle in contravention of the Act. Section 7 relates to the prohibition of sale, purchase etc.,

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of  cows  and  calves and inasmuch as a  total  ban  on  the slaughter  of cows and calves is valid, no objection can  be taken to s. 7 of the Act.  It merely seeks to effectuate the total ban on the slaughter of cows and calves (both of  cows and   she-buffaloes).   Section  8  is  also  ancillary   in character and if the other provisions are valid no objection can  be taken to the provisions of s. 8. Sections 10 and  11 impose  penalties  and their validity  cannot  be  seriously disputed. However,  we  must say a few words about s. 12  of  the  Act which has also been challenged before us.  Section 12 is  in these terms: "S.  12.   In  any trial for  an  offence  punishable  under section 11 for contravention of the provision of sections 5, 6 or 7 of this Act the burden of proving that the slaughter, transport  or  sale  of  agricultural  cattle  was  not   in contravention of the provisions of this Act shall be on  the accused." The argument is that s. 12 infringes the fundamental 632 right  of the petitioners inasmuch as it puts the burden  of proof on an accused person not only for his own knowledge or intention  but  for  the knowledge  or  intention  of  other persons.   We do not think that this contention is  correct. The  accused  person, so far as ss. 5 and 7  are  concerned, must be the person who has slaughtered the animal or who has purchased,  sold  or otherwise disposed of the  animal  etc. Therefore,  the only question will be his knowledge and  the legislature  was competent to place the burden of  proof  on him.  So far as s. 6 is concerned, it specifically refers to the  knowledge of the person who has transported or  offered for  transport or caused to be transported any  agricultural cattles from any place within the State to any place outside the State.  Therefore, when the section talks of  knowledge, it talks of the knowledge of that person who has transported or  offered  for transport etc.  The knowledge of  no  other person  comes into the purview of s. 6. We are,  therefore,’ of  the  view that s. 12 is not invalid on the  ground  sug- gested by the petitioners. Therefore,  the  result of our examination  of  the  various provisions of the Act is that the impugned provisions in cl. (a) of sub-s. (2) of s. 4, in sub-s. (3) of s. 4 relating to the  right of appeal by any person aggrieved by  the  order, and  in  s.  5 relating to the  time  of  slaughter,  impose unreasonable and disproportionate restrictions which must be held to be unconstitutional. As  to the Madhya Pradesh Agricultural  Cattle  Preservation Rules,  r.  3 says "that an application  for  a  certificate under s. 4 shall be made to the competent authority," and r. 4  says  that on receipt of the application,  the  competent authority  shall by an order direct the person  keeping  the animal  to  submit  it for  examination  by  the  Veterinary Officer Rule 5 reproduces the provisions of cls. (a) and (b) of sub-s. (2) of s. 4 and in so far as we have held that the provision   in   el.  (a)  of  sub-s.  (2)  of   s.   4   is unconstitutional, the rule must also fall with it. There  is  one other aspect of these cases  which  has  been emphasized before us, to which a reference must 633 now  be  made.   It  is open to  the  legislature  to  enact ancillary  provisions to give effect to the main  object  of the Act, namely, the prevention of slaughter of animals like bulls, bullocks or buffaloes which are still useful for  the purposes  for which they are generally used.  It is  pointed out  that acts innocent in themselves may be prohibited  and

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the restrictions in that regard would be reasonable, if  the same were necessary to secure efficient enforcement of valid provisions.  For example, it is open to the legislature,  if it feels it necessary, in order to reduce the  possibilities of  evasion  to a minimum, to enact provisions  which  would give effect to the main object of the legislation.  We  have not ignored this aspect and have kept in mind the undisputed right  of  the  legislature to decide  what  provisions  are necessary  to  give  effect  to  the  main  object  of   the legislation.  In these cases the petitioners have complained that  the main object of the impugned provisions is not  the prohibition of slaughter of animals which are still  useful; the  impugned  provisions as they are worded  really  put  a total ban on the slaughter of bulls, bullocks and  buffaloes and  for  all  practical purposes they put  a  stop  to  the profession and trade of the petitioners.  We have held  that this   complaint  is  justified  in  respect  of  the   main provisions in the three Acts. We, therefore, allow the three writ petitions and direct, as we directed in Md.  Hanif Quareshi’s case (1) the respondent States not to enforce the Acts or the rules made  thereunder in  so  far  as they have been declared  void  by  us.   The petitioners  will be entitled to their costs of the  hearing in this Court. Petitions allowed. (1) [1959] S.C.R. 629. 634