REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 6142       OF 2008 ARISING OUT OF

SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION (CIVIL) NO. 1583 OF 2007

THE SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF HORTICULTURE, CHANDIGARH & ANR. … APPELLANTS

VERSUS

RAGHU RAJ … RESPONDENT

J U D G M E N T C.K. THAKKER, J.

1. Leave granted.

2. The  present  appeal  is  filed  by  the

Department  of  Horticulture,  Chandigarh  and

another  (appellants  herein)  against  the

judgment and the decree passed by the Court of

Senior  Sub  Judge  with  Enhanced  Appellate

Powers, Chandigarh on January 30, 1980 in Civil

Appeal No. 41 of 1979 and confirmed by the High

Court on April 26, 2006 in Second Appeal No.

2473 of 1980 as also an order, dated September

01, 2006 rejecting an application to recall the

said order.

3. Shortly stated the facts of the case

are  that  Raghu  Raj-respondent  herein,  was

appointed  by  the  Executive  Engineer,

Horticulture Division, Chandigarh as ‘beldar’

on purely temporary basis. Initial appointment

was made in 1969 and after sometime, he was

discontinued.   Again,  fresh  appointment  was

given in 1972. It was expressly stated when the

respondent was appointed that his services were

liable to be terminated at any time without

notice or reason. According to the appellant,

the services of the respondent were not found

to be satisfactory and accordingly his services

were terminated on September 18, 1976.  

4. The  respondent  raised  an  industrial

dispute.  The  parties,  however,  settled  the

matter on February 15, 1977 pursuant to which

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the respondent was reinstated in service with

effect from February 19, 1977. The respondent-

workman was placed on probation for a period of

six months. According to the appellants, again

the services of the respondent were found to be

unsatisfactory.  His services were, therefore,

terminated by an order dated August 12, 1977.

5. This  time,  the  respondent-workman,

instead of moving Industrial Forum, approached

a  Civil  Court  by  instituting  a  suit  in  the

Court  of  Sub  Judge,  Chandigarh.  It  was

registered as Case No. 153 of 1977. The learned

Judge, by a judgment and decree, dated May 25,

1979,  dismissed  the  suit  filed  by  the

plaintiff.  The  Court  held  that  the  impugned

order  of  termination  of  services  of  the

plaintiff was “perfectly valid and legal” and

that the order was passed in accordance with

terms and conditions of the appointment order.

6. Being aggrieved by the decree passed

by  the  trial  Court,  the  respondent-workman

preferred  Civil  Appeal  No.  41  of  1979.  The

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Court  of  Sub-Judge  with  Enhanced  Appellate

Powers(appellate Court) allowed the appeal, set

aside the decree passed by the trial Court and

held  that  what  was  stated  in  the  order  of

termination  was  that  the  work  as  well  as

conduct of the respondent was unsatisfactory.

Imputation  of  unsatisfactory  conduct  would

amount to ‘stigma’. Since no notice was issued

to the employee, nor any explanation was sought

from him, nor an opportunity of being heard was

afforded, the order was liable to be set aside

being  violative  of  principles  of  natural

justice.  Accordingly, the  order was  declared

null and void and inoperative and a decree was

passed  holding  that  the  respondent-plaintiff

was deemed to be in service and was entitled to

all benefits of salary, increments and other

allowances.  The amount comes to few lakhs of

rupees.

7. Aggrieved  and  dissatisfied  with  the

decree  of  the  lower  appellate  Court,  the

appellants  herein  preferred  a  second  appeal

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under  Section  100  of  the  Code  of  Civil

Procedure, 1908. The appeal was registered as

Regular Second Appeal No. 2473 of 1980 and was

admitted on November 11, 1980. By a judgment

and order dated April 26, 2006, the appeal was

dismissed on merits.  

8. The judgment itself recites;  

“None for the appellants”.  9. On behalf of the respondent, however,

an advocate appeared.  The appeal was dismissed

with  costs  and  the  judgment  and  the  decree

passed  by  the  learned  Senior  Sub-Judge

(appellate court) was confirmed.

10. The appellants, on September 13, 2006,

filed an application for recall of the order,

dated April 26, 2006 dismissing the appeal with

a prayer to rehear the matter. But the said

application  was  also  dismissed  by  the  High

Court on October 1, 2006. Both the orders are

challenged in the present appeal.

11. On January 19, 2007, the Special Leave

Petition  was  posted  for  admission  hearing.

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Notice was issued. In the notice itself it was

stated  that  it  was  issued  on  the  limited

question as to why the order passed by the High

Court should not be set aside and the matter be

remitted to the High Court for fresh disposal

in accordance with law after hearing both the

parties. The respondent was served who appeared

through an advocate and also filed a counter-

affidavit. The matter was ordered to be placed

for final hearing and accordingly it has been

placed before us.

12. We have heard learned counsel for the

parties.

13. The learned counsel for the appellant

submitted  that  the  High  Court  committed  an

error of law and of jurisdiction in dismissing

the appeal filed by the appellants herein in

absence  of  the  advocate  and  without  hearing

him. It was submitted that the Second Appeal

was  filed  in  1980.  It  was  admitted  and  was

pending for final disposal. For more than two

decades, it did not come up for hearing. In

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2006, the appeal was placed for final disposal.

The learned advocate for the appellants could

not remain present and the High Court dismissed

the appeal on merits. As soon as the appellant

came  to  know  about  ex-parte dismissal  of

appeal, an application to recall the order was

filed but it was also rejected by the Court. It

was,  therefore,  submitted  that  the  orders

passed  by  the  High  Court  deserve  to  be  set

aside.

14. It  was also contended that the High

Court could not have dismissed the appeal on

merits in absence of the advocate. The appeal

was admitted in 1980. In accordance with the

provisions of the Code, at the most, the appeal

could  have  been  dismissed  “for  appellants’

default”  and  not  on  merits.  On  that  ground

also, the impugned orders are vulnerable.

15. It  was  submitted  by  the  learned

counsel,  that  the  appellants  had  engaged  an

advocate.  They  were,  therefore,  under  the

impression that the lawyer will take care of

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the case and will appear as and when the appeal

will be called out for hearing. Even if it is

assumed that there was default on the part of

the advocate in not appearing at the time of

hearing, the appellant should not suffer. For

that reason also, the appeal should be allowed

and rehearing should be ordered.  

16. The counsel also submitted that Civil

Court had no jurisdiction in the matter and the

case, could not have entertained, dealt with

and  decided  by  granting  reinstatement  and

payment  of  back-wages  which  was  really  an

‘industrial dispute’. The decrees passed by the

Courts  below  are,  therefore,  without

jurisdiction.

17. The  counsel  submitted  that  even  on

merits, the order terminating the services of

the  respondent-workman  was  legal,  valid  and

lawful.  The workman was not found ‘suitable’

and,  hence,  his  services  were  terminated  in

accordance  with  terms  and  conditions  of  the

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order of appointment and no fault can be found

against it.

18. On  all  these  grounds,  the  counsel

submitted that the orders passed by the High

Court against the appellants are liable to be

set aside by remitting the matter to the High

Court  for  fresh  disposal  in  accordance  with

law.

19. The  learned  counsel  for  the

respondent-employee,  on  the  other  hand,

supported  the  decree  passed  by  the  lower

appellate  Court  and  confirmed  by  the  High

Court. It was urged that the appeal was ordered

to be placed for final hearing and it was on

Board. Appearance of the learned advocates for

the parties was shown.  The counsel for the

appellant  did  not  remain  present.  The  High

Court  was,  therefore,  fully  justified  in

proceeding with the matter and in dismissing

it.  

20. The respondent has filed an affidavit

in this Court wherein it was mentioned that the

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arguments were heard on April 19, 2006 and the

judgment  was  reserved  which  was  pronounced

after one week  i.e. on April 26, 2006. There

was  inaction, negligence  and carelessness  on

the  part  of  the  appellant  for  which  the

respondent-workman should not suffer. Since no

ground, much less sufficient ground, was made

out for recalling of the order, the application

was rightly rejected by the High Court.  

21. Even  on  merits,  the  lower  appellate

Court was right in allowing the appeal filed by

the  respondent-employee and  in declaring  the

order null and void being stigmatic in nature.

It was, therefore, submitted that the appeal

deserves to be dismissed.

22. Having heard learned counsel for the

parties  and giving  anxious considerations  to

the  rival  contentions,  in  our  opinion,  the

appeal deserves to be allowed. We had called

for the records and proceedings of the case and

perused them. From the record, it is clear that

the second appeal was admitted on November 11,

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1980 and was pending for final hearing. Orders

were passed from time to time between 2004 and

2006.  

23. The order dated April 19, 2006, passed

by the Court reads as under;

R.S.A. No. 2473 of 1980  Present:-  None for the appellant.

Ms. Alka Sarin, Advocate for the respondent

***  Arguments heard.

Order reserved.

April 19, 2006 Sd/- Judge

(emphasis supplied)

24. From  the  above  order,  it  is  amply

clear  that  on  19th April,  2006  when  the

arguments were heard, none was present for the

appellants.  

25. Then,  on  April  25,  2006,  the  Court

passed the following order:

R.S.A.No. 2473 of 1980

Present : None.

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In  this  RSA,  which  was  put  up before  the  undersigned  for  the first time on 19th April, 2006, it has  transpired  that  the substantial  question  of  law  had not been framed.

List the appeal for re-hearing for 26.4.2006. April 25, 2006     Sd/-

  Judge

(emphasis supplied)

26. On  April 26, 2006, again the matter

was placed on the board and as stated above, it

was dismissed in absence of the appellants or

their counsel.

27. Now,  it  cannot  be  gainsaid  that  an

advocate has no right to remain absent from the

Court when the case of his client comes up for

hearing. He is duty bound to attend the case in

Court or to make an alternative arrangement.

Non-appearance  in  Court  without  ‘sufficient

cause’ cannot be excused. Such absence is not

only unfair to the client of the advocate but

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also unfair and discourteous to the Court and

can never be countenanced.

28. At  the  same  time,  however,  when  a

party engages an advocate who is expected to

appear at the time of hearing but fails to so

appear, normally, a party should not suffer on

account  of  default  or  non-appearance  of  the

advocate. 29. In  Rafiq & Anr. V. Munshilal & Anr.,

(1981) 2 SCC 788, the High Court disposed of

the  appeal  preferred  by  the  appellant  in

absence of his counsel. When the appellant came

to know of the fact that his appeal had been

disposed  of  in  absence  of  the  advocate,  he

filed an application for recall of the order

dismissing  the  appeal  and  to  permit  him  to

participate in the hearing of the appeal. The

application was, however, rejected by the High

Court, inter alia, on the ground that there was

no  satisfactory explanation  why the  advocate

remained  absent.  The  aggrieved  appellant

approached this Court.

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30. Allowing the appeal setting aside the

order passed by the High Court and remanding

the  matter  for  fresh  disposal  in  accordance

with law, this Court stated;

“The  disturbing  feature  of  the case  is  that  under  our  present adversary  legal  system  where  the parties generally appear through their advocates,  the  obligation  of  the parties  is  to  select  his  advocate, brief  him, pay the fees demanded by him  and  then  trust  the  learned advocate to do the rest of the things. The  party  may  be  a  villager  or  may belong to a rural area and may have no knowledge  of  the  court's  procedure. After engaging a lawyer, the party may remain  supremely  confident  that  the lawyer will look after his interest. At  the  time  of  the  hearing  of  the appeal, the personal appearance of the party  is  not  only  not  required  but hardly  useful.  Therefore,  the  party having done everything in his power to effectively  participate  in  the proceedings can rest assured that he has neither to go to the High Court to inquire as to what is happening in the High Court with regard to his appeal nor is he to act as a watchdog of the advocate  that  the  latter  appears  in the matter when it is listed. It is no part  of  his  job.  Mr.  A.K.  Sanghi stated that a practice has grown up in the  High  Court  of  Allahabad  amongst the  lawyers  that  they  remain  absent when  they  do  not  like  a  particular Bench. Maybe he is better informed on

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this matter. Ignorance in this behalf is our bliss. Even if we do not put our seal of imprimatur on the alleged practice  by  dismissing  this  matter which may discourage such a tendency, would  it  not  bring  justice  delivery system  into  disrepute.  What  is  the fault  of  the  party  who  having  done everything in his power and expected of  him  would  suffer  because  of  the default of his advocate. If we reject this  appeal,  as  Mr.  A.K.  Sanghi invited  us  to  do,  the  only  one  who would suffer would not be the lawyer who did not appear but the party whose interest  he  represented.  The  problem that  agitates  us  is  whether  it  is proper  that  the  party  should  suffer for the inaction, deliberate omission, or  misdemeanour  of  his  agent.  The answer obviously is in the negative. Maybe  that  the  learned  advocate absented  himself  deliberately  or intentionally. We have no material for ascertaining  that  aspect  of  the matter.  We say nothing more on that aspect  of  the  matter.  However,  we cannot be a party to an innocent party suffering injustice merely because his chosen advocate defaulted. Therefore, we allow this appeal, set aside the order  of  the  High  Court  both dismissing the appeal and refusing to recall that order. We direct that the appeal  be  restored  to  its  original number  in  the  High  Court  and  be disposed of according to law.”

 (emphasis supplied)

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31. In  Smt.  Lachi  Tewari  &  Ors.  v.

Director of Land Records & Ors, 1984 Supp. SCC

431, rule nisi was issued by the High Court in

the petition filed in 1976. After seven years,

the matter was placed for hearing of rule nisi

in 1983. It was the first day of reopening of

Courts  after  holidays.  The  petitioner  had

engaged three advocates. None of them, however,

was available when the matter was called out.

The  High  Court  dismissed  the  petition  and

discharged  rule  since none appeared to press

the petition for the petitioner. An application

was  moved  on  behalf  of  the  petitioner  for

recalling of the order and restoration of the

petition  which  was  rejected.  The  petitioner

came to this Court.  32. Setting aside the order and remanding

the matter to the High Court for fresh disposal

and reiterating the law laid down in  Rafiq,

this Court said;      “The  mere  narration  of facts would  suffice  to  focus  attention  on what point is involved in this appeal.

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The petitioner obtained rule nisi in 1976  and waited for seven years for its being heard. Suddenly one day the High  Court  consistent  with  its calendar fixed the matter for hearing on April 21, 1983. The petitioner had taken  extra  caution  to  engage  three learned Counsels. We fail to see what more can be expected of him. Further we fail to understand what more steps should  have  taken  in  the  matter  to avoid being thrown out unheard”.

33. In Mangi Lal & Ors. v. State of M.P.,

(1994) 4 SCC 564, an appeal against conviction

recorded by the trial Court was dismissed by

the High Court for non-appearance of counsel

for the appellant due to ‘strike’ by lawyers.

This Court held that dismissal of appeal by the

High  Court  was  improper.  The  appeal  was

directed to be restored to file and be heard on

merits.  [see  also  Tahil  Ram  Issardas

Sadaranganj  &  Ors.  v.  Ramchand  Issardas

Sadaranganj & Anr., 1993 Supp(3)SCC 256].

34. From the case law referred to above,

it is clear that this Court has always insisted

advocates to appear and argue the case as and

when it is called out for hearing. Failure to

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do  so  would  be  unfair  to  the  client  and

discourteous to the Court and must be severely

discountenanced. At the same time, the Court

has also emphasized doing justice to the cause

wherein it is appropriate that both the parties

are  present  before  the  Court  and  they  are

heard. It has been noted by the Court that once

a party engages a counsel, he thinks that his

advocate  will  appear  when  the  case  will  be

taken up for hearing and the Court calls upon

the counsel to make submissions. It is keeping

in view these principles that the Court does

not proceed to hear the matter in absence of

the counsel.  

35. In the circumstances, in our opinion,

the submission of the learned counsel for the

appellants has substance that the High Court

ought not to have decided the appeal in absence

of the appellants’ counsel.

36. In  the  present  case,  the  learned

advocate,  appearing  for  the  appellants,  has

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filed an affidavit in support of the recall

application.  In para 1, it was stated;

   “That  the  above  named  Regular Second Appeal was pending before this Hon’ble Court for regular hearing and was listed on various dates from time to time but could not be decided for one  reason  or  the  other  and  was thereafter even de-listed.  Lastly, on perusal of the cause list, it has been noticed  that  the  aforesaid  Regular Second Appeal was added in the regular matters on 17.04.2006 at Serial No.304 before  the  Hon’ble  Bench  of  Mr. Justice S.D. Anand at page 240 of the Regular  Cause  List.   Alongwith  the case at page 240 of the cause list, the names of the earlier counsels for the  appellants  as  well  as  of  the respondent were mentioned and the name of  the  present  counsel  for  the appellant  was  mentioned  on  the  next page  i.e.  at  page  241  of  the  cause list and therefore, the listing of the matter  escaped  the  notice  of  the counsel  for  the  appellant. Consequently, the matter was heard by this Hon’ble Court in the absence of the  counsel  for  the  appellant  on 19.04.2006.   Even  on  19.04.2006 (Wednesday),  it  is  only  the  serial number of the aforesaid case i.e. Sr. No.304 was mentioned in the Cause List for  taking  up  for  hearing  and therefore  even  on  19.04.2006,  it escaped the knowledge of the counsel for  the appellant in the absence of giving of details of the case and the name of the counsel.  It is only when the  respondent  asked  for  the implementation of the judgment passed

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by this Hon’ble Court that the counsel for  the  appellant  immediately thereupon inspected the cause list and noticed  the  aforesaid  facts  and applied for the certified copy of the judgment on 07.09.2006 which is yet to be received and after getting the un- certified  copy  of  the  judgment,  is filing the present application for the recalling of the same.”

37. In para 2, the deponent stated;

“That  the  non  appearance  of  the appellants/applicants  and  their counsel before this Hon’ble Court when the  matter was taken up for regular hearing was totally un-intentional and for the reasons explained above which are totally bona fide.  Otherwise, the appellants have a good case on merits as  the  Regular  Second  Appeal  is against the judgment of reversal and in  view  of  the  law  settled  on  the point  to  the  effect  that  the  Civil Court has no power to grant back wages with  reinstatement  as  the  specific remedy for the grant of the same is provided under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.  Although, a specific issue to this effect was framed before the courts  below  yet  the  same  some  how escaped the knowledge of this Hon’ble Court  and  the  counsel  for  the respondent  also  failed  to  point  out the  same in the interest of justice and for fair play.  In fact this was the substantial question of law before this  Hon’ble  Court  which  remains undecided.  Even under Order 41 Rule 17, the appeal in the absence of the appellant ought to have been dismissed

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in default instead of being decided on merits.  Therefore, it would be in the interest of justice, if the judgment dated 26.04.2006 is recalled and the appeal is readmitted for hearing.”

38. We  have  already  extracted,  various

orders passed by the High Court from time to

time. It is clear from the order dated April

19,  2006  that  at  the  time  of  hearing  of

arguments,  the  learned  counsel  for  the

appellant was not present. The arguments were

heard, i.e., the arguments on behalf of the

respondent-workman were heard and the order was

reserved. But, in the subsequent order dated

April 25, 2006, the learned Judge who had heard

the matter on April 19, 2006 noticed that a

substantial question of law had not been framed

while admitting the appeal. The learned Judge,

therefore, ordered listing of the appeal for

rehearing on April 26, 2006 and accordingly,

the matter was posted for hearing on April 26,

2006.

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39. On that day, i.e. on April 26, 2006,

the learned Judge framed substantial question

of  law  and  heard  learned  counsel  for  the

respondent-workman.  Learned  counsel  for  the

appellant was not present. It is thus clear

that substantial question of law was framed by

the  Court  during  the  course  of  hearing  of

Second Appeal for the first time on April 26,

2006.  

40. On the facts and in the circumstances

in their totality, in our opinion, even though

the learned counsel for the appellant was not

present, it would have been appropriate, had

the High Court granted an opportunity to the

learned counsel for the appellant to make his

submissions by adjourning the matter.

41. It was also urged that the appeal was

admitted  in  1980  and  was  pending  for  final

hearing.   Such  appeal  could  not  have  been

dismissed  on  merits  in  absence  of  learned

counsel for the appellant. In this connection,

reference may be made to Order XLI of the Code

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which  lays  down  procedure  for  hearing  of

‘Appeals from Original Decrees’. Rules 1 to 4

deal with ‘Form of Appeal’, grounds to be taken

in  ‘Memorandum  of  Appeal’  ‘Application  for

Condonation of Delay’, etc. Rules 5 to 8 relate

to  ‘Stay  of  Proceedings  and  of  Execution’.

Whereas Rules 9 to 15 provide for ‘Procedure on

Admission of Appeal’, Rules 16 to 29 deal with

‘Procedure  on  Hearing’.  Once  an  appeal  is

admitted, Rules 16 onwards of Order XLI would

apply.  Rule  17  provides  for  ‘Dismissal  of

Appeal  for  Appellant’s  Default’.   It  reads

thus;

17.  Dismissal  of  appeal  for appellants' default

  (1) Where on the day fixed, or on any other day to which the hearing may be adjourned, the appellant does not appear  when the appeal is called on for  hearing,  the  Court  may  make  an order that the appeal be dismissed.

Explanation—Nothing  in  this  sub-rule shall be construed as empowering the Court  to  dismiss  the  appeal  on  the merits.

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   (2) Hearing appeal ex parte.—Where the  appellant  appears  and  the respondent does not appear, the appeal shall be heard ex parte.     

  (emphasis supplied)

42. Explanation  to Rule 17 of Order XLI

was inserted by the Code of Civil Procedure

(Amendment)  Act,  1976.  Before  insertion  of

Explanation to Rule 17, there was difference of

opinion among various High Courts whether an

appellate Court had right to dismiss an appeal

on merits if the appellant fails to appear.

Taking  note  of  cleavage  of  opinion,  the

provision of amended and Explanation was added.

43. In Objects and Reasons it was stated;

   Clause 90—Sub-clause (viii).—When an Appellate Court does not dismiss an appeal summarily, it should fix a date for  the  hearing  of  the  appeal.  The procedure  therefore  is  provided  in Rule 17 which provides that where on the day fixed, or on any other day to which  the  hearing  may  be  adjourned, the appellant does not appear when the

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appeal is called on for hearing, the Court  may  make  an  order  that  the appeal is dismissed. In this rule the word  ‘may’  shows  that  apart  from dismissal of the appeal for default, the Court can pass other orders. One such order could be adjournment of the appeal. There is, however, a conflict of decision on the question whether, if the appellant does not appear, the Appelalte  Court  can  dispose  of  the appeal  on  the  merits.  The  Allahabad High Court has held that a decision on the  merits  is  permissible.  But  the other  High  Courts  have  taken  a different view. – Having regard to the conflict  of  decisions,  Rule  17  is being made more explicit by adding an Explanation thereto to the effect that dismissal of an appeal on merits would not be permissible”.   

(emphasis supplied)

44. It is true that in the instant case,

the appeal before the High Court was not an

Appeal from Original Decree (First Appeal), but

an  Appeal  from  Appellate  Decree  (Second

Appeal).  But Rule 1 of Order XLII which deals

with  Appeals  from  Appellate  Decrees  (Second

Appeals)  lays  down  procedure  and  expressly

states that the Rules of Order XLI shall apply

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so  far  as  may  be  to  Appeals  from  Appellate

Decrees.  Prima  facie,  therefore,  it  appears

that once an appeal is admitted and is placed

for hearing i.e. hearing on merits, it can be

dismissed for default but cannot be decided on

merits  in  absence  of  appellant  (or  his

advocate).

45. In view of the fact, however, that in

our opinion, on the facts in their entirety,

the High Court ought not to have proceeded to

decide the appeal, we hold that the impugned

order of the High Court is liable to be set

aside.  In view of this conclusion, we clarify

that we may not be understood to have expressed

final opinion one way or the other as regards

interpretation of Rule 17 of Order XLI read

with Rule 1 of Order XLII.

46. Since  the  order  passed  by  the  High

Court  deserves  to  be  set  aside  on  a  short

ground and the matter is remitted to the High

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Court  for  fresh  disposal  in  accordance  with

law, we refrain from expressing any opinion one

way or the other on merits of the matter as

well. As and when the matter will be placed for

hearing before the High Court, the Court will

pass  an  appropriate  order  after  hearing  the

parties.

47. For the foregoing reasons, the appeal

is allowed. The orders passed by the High Court

dismissing the Second Appeal as also dismissing

the Recall Application are hereby set aside and

the matter is remanded to the High Court for

fresh  disposal  in  accordance  with  law  after

hearing the parties.  

48. Since  the  respondent-workman  was

required to appear in this Court pursuant to

the notice issued by the Court and had to incur

expenses, in our opinion, ends of justice would

be met if the appellants are directed to bear

costs  of  the  respondent-workman  which  is

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quantified at Rs.20,000/-. The said amount will

be paid by the appellants herein by a crossed

bank draft in favour of the respondent-workman

within four weeks from today. The said fact

will then be brought to the notice of the High

Court by the appellant and only thereafter the

High Court will proceed to hear the matter.

49. The  appeal is allowed to the extent

indicated above.  

………………………………………………J. (C.K. THAKKER)

NEW DELHI, ………………………………………………J. OCTOBER 17, 2008. (D.K. JAIN)

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