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PETITIONER: THE RAJASTHAN STATE ROAD TRANSPORTCORPORATION & ANR. ETC.ETC

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: KRISHNA KANT ETC.ETC.

DATE OF JUDGMENT03/05/1995

BENCH: JEEVAN REDDY, B.P. (J) BENCH: JEEVAN REDDY, B.P. (J) SEN, S.C. (J) NANAVATI G.T. (J)

CITATION:  1995 AIR 1715            1995 SCC  (5)  75  JT 1995 (4)   348        1995 SCALE  (3)440

ACT:

HEADNOTE:

JUDGMENT:                     J U D G M E N T B.P.JEEVAN REDDY.J.      Leave granted in all Special Leave Petitions.      The respondents  in these  appeals are the employees of the  appellant-corporation,   viz.,  Rajasthan   State  Road Transport  Corporation.Pursuant  to  disciplinary  enquiries held against  them on  charges of misconduct, their services were terminated.  They filed  civil suits  for a declaration that the  order terminating  their services  is illegal  and invalid and  for a  further declaration  that they  must  be deemed to  have continued  and are  still continuing  in the service  of   the   Corporation   with   all   consequential benefits.The Corporation  resisted the  suits on  the ground inter alia  that the  Civil court  had  no  jurisdiction  to entertain the  suits.The Trial  court decreed  the suits  as prayed for.  Appeals as also Second appeals preferred by the Corporation were dismissed by the learned District Judge and High Court.      When these  appeals came  up for hearing before a Bench of  two   learned  Judges   of  this  Court,  the  apellant- Corporation  relied   upon  the   principles  enunciated  in Paragraphs 23  and 24 of the judgment in Premier Automobiles Limited etc.  v. Kamlekar  Shantaram Wadke  of Bombay & Ors. etc.  (1976  (1)  S.C.C.496)  and  in  particular  upon  the decision in Jitendra Nath Biswas v. M/s. Empire of India and Ceylone Tea  Co. &  Anr. (1989 (3) S.C.C.582). The Bench was of the  opinion, agreeing with the decision in Jitendra Nath Biswas,  that   the  Civil  Court  had  no  jurisdiction  to entertain the  present suits  but in view of the order dated October 18,  1989 in  S.L.P.(C) No.9386 of 1988 (rendered by two-Judge  Bench   of  this  Court)  holding  a  civil  suit concerning a  similiar dispute to be maintainable, the Bench thought it appropriate that the appeals are heard by a Bench of three  Judges.  It  is  pursuant  to  their  order  dated

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September 23,  1993 that  these  appeals  have  been  placed before this Bench.      The appellant-Corporation  has been  constituted  under the Road Transport Corporations Act, 1950. It is a statutory Corporation. Though  Section 45 of the said Act empowers the Corporation to  frame regulations prescribing the conditions of service  of its  employees, no such regulations have been framed insofar as the employees answering the description of "workman" as  defined in  Section  2(s)  of  the  Industrial Disputes Act,  1947, are concerned. They are governed by the certified Standing  Orders framed  under and  in  accordance with the  Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act, 1946. These Standing  Orders inter  alia define  "misconduct"  and prescribe the  procedure  for  conducting  the  disciplinary proceedings against such employees.      The Corporation  says that  the disciplinary enquiries, which resulted  in the  dismissal of  the  respondents  were conducted perfectly  in accordance with the Standing Orders, whereas the  case of the respondents/plaintiffs is that they were conducted  in violation  of the  Standing  Orders.  The precise question  in these appeals is whether a suit of this nature is  maintainable in  a Civil  Court. The  Corporation says that it is not. According to them the respondent’s only remedy was  to approach  the Labour  Court for  the  reliefs sought for by them in the suit.      Section 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure says that "the courts shall  (subject to  the provisions  herein contained) have jurisdiction  to try all suits of a civil nature except the suits  of which  their cognizance is either expressly or impliedly barred."  The question is whether by virtue of the provisions of  the Industrial  Disputes Act  read  with  the Standing Orders aforesaid, the Civil Court’s jurisdiction to take cognizance of such suits is barred? This question calls for a  brief reference  to the  relevant provisions  of  the Industrial Disputes  Act as well as the Standing Orders Act, 1946.      The Industrial  Disputes Act  (the Act)  was enacted to make provision  for  the  investigation  and  settlement  of industrial disputes  and for  certain  other  purposes.  The statement of objects and reasons appended to the Bill (which became the Act) stated inter alia, "(T)he bill also seeks to re-orient the  administration of  the conciliation machinery provided in  the Trade  Disputes Act.  Conciliation will  be compulsory in  all disputes  in public  utility services and optional in  the case  of other  industrial  establishments. With a  view  to  expedite  conciliation  proceedings,  time limits  have   been  prescribed  for  conclusion  thereof  - fourteen days  in the  case of  conciliation officer and two months in  the case  of Board of Conciliation, from the date of notice  of strike.  A settlement arrived at in the course of conciliation proceedings will be binding for such periods as may be agreed upon by the parties and where no period has been agreed  upon, for  a  period  of  one  year,  and  will continue to  be binding  until revoked  by a  three  months’ notice by either party to the dispute."      Section 2  defines certain expressions occurring in the Act. The  expression  "industrial  dispute"  is  defined  in clause (k) in the following words:      "(K)  ’industrial   dispute’  means   any  dispute   or      difference between  employers and  employers or between      employers and  workmen, or between workmen and workmen,      which  is   connected  with   the  employment  or  non-      employment or  the terms  of  employment  or  with  the      conditions of labour, of any person;"      The expression  "workman" is  defined  in  clause  (s),

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while the  expression "employer"  is defined  in clause (g). Sections 4  to 7  provide  for  appointment/constitution  of Conciliation Officers,  Boards of  Conciliation,  Courts  of Enquiry and Labour Courts while Sections 7-A and 7-B provide for  constitution   of  Tribunals  and  National  Tribunals. Section 9-A  provides that  any change  in the conditions of service applicable  to any  workman in  respect  of  matters specified in  the Fourth  Schedule shall be effected only in accordance with  the procedure  prescribed by it. Section 10 is relevant for our purposes since it provides for reference of disputes  to Boards,  courts or Tribunals.It provides for the government  referring an industrial dispute to specified authorities for  adjudication, where  it is  of the  opinion that an industrial dispute exists or is apprehended. Section 10-A provides  for  voluntary  reference  of  an  industrial dispute to  arbitration. Section 11 prescribes the procedure and powers  of the  Courts and  Tribunals while Section 11-A confers upon the Labour Court and Tribunals an express power to substitute the punishment awarded in the domestic enquiry if it  is satisfied  that such a course is called for in the circumstances of  a given  case.   Section 12 prescribes the duties of  conciliation officers.  It says  that  "where  an industrial   dispute   exists   or   is   apprehended,   the conciliation officer may, or where the disputes relates to a public utility  service and notice under Section 22 has been given, shall hold conciliation proceedings in the prescribed manner." The  duty of  such officer  is  to  bring  about  a settlement as  far as  possible and  if  he  fails  in  that effort, to  make a  report to the government. The government is thereupon  empowered to  refer the dispute to appropriate Tribunal or Court for adjudication. Sub-section (6) provides that a  report under  Section 12  shall be  submitted within fourteen  days  of  the  commencement  of  the  conciliation proceedings unless  of course  extended by agreement between the parties to the dispute. Section 14 provides that a court shall decide  a matter  referred to  it within six months of the  commencement   of  enquiry.   Section  15  directs  the authorities to  decide the  matters expeditiously and within the period  specified in  the order of reference. Section 16 provides for  submission of the award by the Tribunal/Court, while  Section  17  provides  for  its  publication  by  the Government in  the prescribed  manner.  Sub-section  (2)  of Section 17  then says  "subject to the provisions of Section 17-A, the  award published  under   Sub-section (1) shall be final and  shall not  be called  in question by any court in any manner whatsoever". Section 18 provides for a settlement between the  parties to  an industrial dispute while Section 19 provides for certain matters incidental thereto. Chapter- V prohibits strikes and lock-outs.  Chapter - VA and Chapter V-B contain  several  provisions  of  a  substantive  nature regulating retrenchment  and lay-off  of workmen, closure of industrial establishments and other related matters. Chapter - VI  deals with  penalties.   Section 29  provides that any person who  commits a  breach of  any award which is binding upon him  shall be punishable with imprisonment or with fine or with  both  as  provided  therein.  Chapter-VII  contains certain miscellaneous provisions. Section 33- C provides for recovery of  money due  from an employer to a workman in the manner provided  thereby. The forum prescribed is the Labour Court. For  the purpose  of these  appeals, it  may  not  be necessary to  refer to  the five  schedules appended  to the Act.      The Industrial  Employment (Standing  Orders) Act, 1946 was enacted by Parliament to require employers in industrial establishments  to   define  formally   the  conditions   of

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employment under  them with sufficient precision and to make them  known  to  the  workers.  The  Act  applies  to  every industrial establishment  wherein 100  or more  workers  are employed or  were employed  on any  day of  the preceding 12 months. Clauses  (c), (d)  and (e)  define  the  expressions "certified    officer",     "employer"    and    "industrial establishment".   The expression  "workman" carries the same meaning as is assigned to it in the Industrial Disputes Act. Section  3   makes  it   obligatory  upon  every  industrial establishment to frame Standing Orders in respect of matters set out  in the  Schedule to  the Act and submit the same to the certified  officer who shall, after making the necessary enquiry, certify the same, on being satisfied that they have been  framed   in  accordance   with  the   Act.  Upon  such certification, the  Standing Orders become binding upon both the employer  and the  employees. They  are required  to  be published  in  the  manner  prescribed  by  the  Act.  Model Standing Orders  have been  framed which are to be effective till the  certified Standing  Orders are  made and published under the Act. Failure to submit or frame Standing Orders by the employer  is made punishable by Section 13 while Section 13-A prescribes  the forum  for determination  of  questions arising with respect to the application or interpretation of the certified Standing Orders. Section 13-A reads as follows :      "13-A.-Interpretation, etc.,  of standing  orders.   If      any  question   arises  as   to  the   application   or      interpretation of a standing order certified under this      Act, any employer or workman [or a trade union or other      representative body  of  the  workmen]  may  refer  the      question to  any one  of the  Labour Courts constituted      under the  Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, and specified      for the  disposal of such proceeding by the appropriate      Government by notification in the Official Gazette, and      the Labour  Court to which the question is so referred,      shall after  giving the parties an opportunity of being      heard, decide  the question  and such decision shall be      final and binding on the parties."      The schedule  to the  Act specifies  the matters  which      have to be provided for in the Standing Orders.      Rules have  been  made  called  ’Industrial  Employment Standing Orders (Central) Rules, 1946.      The nature  of the  Standing Orders and the meaning and scope of Section 13-A:      With a view to clear the ground, we may deal with these two issues  debated before  us at some length. The first one relates  to  the  nature  and  character  of  the  certified Standing Orders.  We may  indicate  the  relevance  of  this discussion.  Sri   Jitender  Sharma,   learned  counsel  for respondents-workmen  submits  that  the  certified  Standing Orders have  statutory force and their violation enables the Civil Court  to decree reinstatement in service and that bar of Section 14 of the Specific Relief Act does not operate in such a  case. He relies upon the holding in Sukhdev Singh v. Bhagat Ram  (1975 (3)  S.C.R.618). The  appellant’s counsel, however, dispute  this proposition.  Bereft of authority, we find it  difficult to  agree with  Sri Sharma. The certified Standing   Orders    are    not    in    the    nature    of delegated/subordinate legislation.  It is  true that the Act makes it  obligatory upon  the employer  (of  an  industrial establishment  to   which  the   Act  applies   or  is  made applicable) to  submit draft  Standing Orders  providing for the several  matters prescribed  in the  Schedule to the Act and it  also  provides  the  procedure  -  inter  alia,  the certifying  officer   has  to  examine  their  fairness  and

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reasonableness -  for certification  thereof. Yet it must be noted that  these are  conditions of  service framed  by the employer - the employer may be a private corporation, a firm or an individual and not necessarily a statutory Corporation - which  are approved/certified  by the prescribed statutory authority, after hearing the concerned workmen. The Act does not say  that on  such certification,  the  Standing  Orders acquire statutory  effect or  become part of the statute. It can  certainly   not  be   suggested  that   by  virtue   of certification,     they      get     metamorphosed      into delegated/subordinate  legislation.  Though  these  Standing Orders are  undoubtedly binding  upon both  the employer and the employees  and constitute  the conditions  of service of the employees,  it appears  difficult to  say, on principle, that they have statutory force. The decisions of this Court, however, read  differently though  some dissonance  is to be found among them. In Baqalkot Cement Co.Ltd. V. R.K.Pathan & Ors. (1962  Suppl.(2) S.C.R.697),  the question  was whether the certifying  officer had  the power  to add  a  condition prescribing the  procedure for  applying for  leave and  the authority competent  to sanction it. The Court held that the officer did  possess  such  a  power.  In  that  connection, Gajendragadkar, J.  speaking for  the Bench, referred to the object and scheme of the enactment and observed:      "That is  why the  Legislature took  the view  that  in      regard to  industrial establishments  to which  the Act      applied, the  conditions of employment subject to which      industrial labour  was employed, should be well-defined      and should be precisely known to both the parties. With      that object,  the Act  has made relevant provisions for      making Standing Orders which, after they are certified,      constitute the  statutory terms  of employment  between      the industrial  establishments in  question  and  their      employees. That is the principal object of the Act."      In Buckingham  and Carnatic  Co.Ltd V. Venkatiah & Anr. (1964 (4)  S.C.R.265) the service of the respondent-employee was terminated under and as provided by the Standing Orders. The order  of termination was interferred with by the Labour Court, whose  award was  affirmed by the Letter Patent Bench of the  High Court. The appellant’s contention was that once it has  acted in  accordance with  the Standing  Orders, the Labour Court  had no  jurisdiction to  interfere with it. In that connection,  Gajendragadkar,J. speaking  for the Bench, observed:      "The certified  Standing Orders  represent the relevant      terms and conditions of service in a statutory form and      they are binding on the parties atleast as much, if not      more, as  private contracts embodying similar terms and      conditions of service".      In The  Workmen of  Dewan Tea  Estate  &  Ors.  v.  The Management  (1964  (5)  S.C.R.548)  the  contention  of  the management was  that Standing  Order  8(a)(i),  having  been certified before insertion of the definition of "lay-off" by Section 2(kkk)  in the  Industrial Disputes  Act, should  be construed  in  the  light  of  the  said  definition.  While rejecting the said argument, Gajendragadkar,J. observed thus with respect to the nature of the Standing Orders:      "It will  be recalled  that the  Standing Orders  which      have been  certified  under  the  Standing  Orders  Act      became part  of the  statutory terms  and conditions of      service  between   the  industrial   employer  and  his      employees. Section  10(1) of  the Standing  Orders  Act      provides that  the Standing  Orders  finally  certified      under this  Act shall  not, except on agreement between      the employer and the workmen, be liable to modification

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    until the  expiry of  six months from the date on which      the Standing  Orders or  the last  modification thereof      came into operation. If the Standing Orders or the last      modification  thereof   came  into  operation.  If  the      Standing Orders  thus become  the part of the statutory      terms and  conditions of  service, they will govern the      relations between  the parties unless, of course,it can      be shown  that any provision of the Act is inconsistent      with the said Standing Orders."      In Workmen  and Buckingham  & Carnatic Mills, Madras V. Buckingham and  Carnatic Mills,  Madras (1970  (1) L.L.J.26) Vaidialingam, J.,  speaking  for  a  Bench  of  two  learned Judges, stated:      "(T)he labour  court has  observed  that  the  standing      orders of  the company  which have been certified under      the Industrial  Employment (Standing Orders) Act, 1946,      though binding  on the employer and the workers have no      statutory force  and, in  consequence, they  are merely      directive and  not mandatory.  It has  further observed      that any  non-compliance of  the standing  orders whill      not render an enquiry bad, for that reason.           We may straightaway say that these observations of      the labour  court are  erroneous. The  labour court has      misunderstood the  decisions  of  this  Court  on  this      point. This  Court has held that standing orders, which      have been  certified under  the  Industrial  Employment      (Standing  Orders)   Act,  1946,  become  part  of  the      statutory terms  and conditions  of service between the      industrial employer  and his  employees and  that  they      will govern  the relations  between the  parties - vide      workers of  Dewan Tea  Estates &  Ors. v. Their Manager      (1964 (1) LLJ 358)."      In  D.K.Yadav  v.  J.M.A.  Industries  Ltd.  (1993  (3) S.C.C.259) K.Ramaswamy, J. has observed:      "It is  settled law that certified standing orders have      statutory force  which do  not  expressly  exclude  the      application of the principles of natural justice."      It is  evident from  a perusal  of the  above decisions that while  the first  decision referred  to  the  certified Standing Orders  as constituting  " the  statutory terms  of employment". they  were described  as "conditions of service in a statutory form" and as "binding on the parties at least as much, if not more, as private contracts embodying similar terms and conditions of service" in the second decision. The third  decision,   reiterated  the   holding  in  the  first decision. So  far as  the two  last-mentioned decisions  are concerned, it  is obvious,  they only purport to set out the purport of  the earlier  decisions. Vaidialingam,J. used the very expression  "part of the statutory terms and conditions of service",  while K.Ramaswamy,J.  stated more emphatically that "certified  standing orders  have statutory  force". It must, however,  be said  that in  the decision  rendered  by Ramaswamy,J., the question as to the nature and character of the  certified   Standing   Orders   did   not   arise   for consideration; the  said observation  was  made  in  another context. The  concensus of these decisions is: the certified Standing Orders constitute statutory terms and conditions of service. Though we have some reservations as to the basis of the above dicta as pointed out supra, we respectfully accept it both  on the  ground of stare decisis as well as judicial discipline.  Even  so,  we  are  unable  to  say  that  they constitue "statutory  provisions" within  the meaning of the dicta in  Sukhdev Singh  where it was held: "(T)he employees of these  statutory bodies  have a statutory status and they are entitled  to declaration  of being  in  employment  when

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their dismissal  or removal is in contravention of statutory provisions". Indeed,  if it  is held that certified Standing Orders constitute  statutory provisions  or  have  statutory force, a  writ petition would also lie for their enforcement just as in the case of violation of the Rules made under the proviso to  Article 309  of the Constitution. Neither a suit would be necessary nor a reference under Industrial Disputes Act. We  do not  think the  certified Standing Orders can be elevated to  that status.  It is  one thing to say that they are  statutorily   imposed  conditions  of  service  and  an altogether different  thing  to  say  that  they  constitute statutory provisions themselves.      So far  as the meaning and ambit of Section 13-A of the Standing Orders  Act is  concerned, a  good amount of debate took place  before us.  Certain decisions of the High Courts have also  been brought  to our notice. The Section provides that "if  any question  arises  as  to  the  application  or interpretation of  a Standing  Order  certified  under  this Act," any  employer or  workman or their union may refer the question  to  "  the  Labour  Court  constituted  under  the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 and specified for the disposal of  such   proceedings  by  the  appropriate  Government  by notification in  the official gazette". The determination of the Labour  Court is  made final and binding on the parties. The  contention  of  Sri  Altaf  Ahmed,  learned  Additional Solicitor  General  is  that  any  and  every  violation  of Standing Order  entitles the  workman to  appoach the Labour Court directly  under this  provision and  obtain relief. He submits that  the  Labour  Court  is  empowered  under  this provision  to   adjudicate  disputes   between  workmen  and employer arising  from the  certified  Standing  Orders  and grant such relief as is appropriate in the circumstances  of the case.  We are  afraid, we  cannot give  effect  to  this submission. Acceptance  of the  said submission  would  mean that Section  13-A creates a parallel forum for adjudication of  the  very  questions  which  the  Labour  Court  or  the Industrial Tribunal  has been  empowered to adjudicate under the  Industrial  Disputes  Act  and  that  too  without  the requirement of a reference by the Government. While we agree that language  of Section  13-A is not very clear, it cannot certainly be understood as creating a forum for adjudication of industrial  disputes  involving  the  application  and/or interpretation of  the Standing Orders. That is the function of the Courts and Tribunals constituted under the Industrial Disputes Act.  The limited  purpose of  Section 13-A  is  to provide a  forum for  determination of  any question arising "as to  the application  or interpretation" of the certified Standing Orders  as such, in case either the employer or the employee(s) entertain  a doubt  as to their meaning or their applicability. Probably  it was  thought that  a decision of the appointed  forum  on  the  said  question  would  itself facilitate the  resolution of an industrial dispute, whether existing  or  apprehended.  So  far  as  the  Labour  Court, Industrial Tribunal  or other  adjudicatory bodies under the Industrial Disputes Act are concerned, it is agreed on hands - and  we endorse  it -  that where a dispute is referred to any of  them they  are undoubtedly  competent to go into and decide questions  as to the application or interpretation of the certified  Standing Orders insofar as they are necessary for  a  proper  adjudication  of  the  question  or  dispute referred.      The scope of "Industrial Dispute".      The  expression  "Industrial  Dispute"  is  defined  in Section 2(k)  to mean any dispute or differeence (i) between employers and employers; (ii) between employers and workmen;

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and (iii) between workmen and workmen, provided such dispute is connected  with the  employment, non-employment, terms of employment or conditions of labour of any person. It is well settled by  several decisions  of this  court that a dispute between the  employer and  an individual  workman  does  not constitute an  industrial dispute  unless the  cause of  the workman is  espoused by  a body of workmen [See Bombay Union of Journalist  v. "The  Hindu" (1961 (2) L.L.J.436 (SC)]. Of course, where  the dispute  concerns the body of the workers as a  whole or  to a  section thereof,  it is  an industrial dispute. It  is precisely  for this  reason that Section 2-A was inserted  by Amendment  Act 35  of 1965. It says, "where any employer  discharges, dismisses, retrenches or otherwise terminates  the  services  of  an  individual  workman,  any dispute or  difference between that workman and his employer connected  with,   or  arising   out  of,   such  discharge, dismissal, retrenchment or termination shall be deemed to be an industrial  dispute notwithstanding that no other workman nor any  union of  workmen is  a party  to the  dispute". By virtue of  this provision,  the  scope  of  the  concept  of industrial dispute  has been widened, which now embraces not only  Section  2(k)  but  also  Section  2-A.  Section  2-A, however,  covers   only  cases   of  discharge,   dismissal, retrenchment or  termination otherwise  of  services  of  an individual workman and not other matters, which means that - to give  an example  - if  a  workman  is  reduced  in  rank pursuant to  a domestic  enquiry, the  dispute raised by him does not  become an industrial dispute within the meaning of Section 2-A.  (However, if  the union  or  body  of  workmen espouses his  cause, it  does become an industrial dispute.) We have  given only one instance; there may be many disputes which would  not fall within Section 2(k) or Section 2-A. It is obvious  that in  all such cases, the remedy is only in a Civil Court  or by  way of  arbitration according to law, if the  parties  so  choose.  The  machinery  provided  by  the Industrial Disputes  Act  for  resolution  of  disputes  (in short, Sections 10 or 12) does not apply to such a dispute.      Secondly, where a right or obligation is created by the Industrial Disputes  Act, it  is agreed  by all  sides  that disputes relating  to such  right or  obligation can only be adjudicated by  the forums  created  by  the  Act.  This  is Principle No.3 in Premier Automobile.      The core question:      We may  now indicate  the area  of dispute. It is this: where a  dispute between  the employer and the employee does not involve  the recognition  or enforcement  of a  right or obligation created  by the Industrial Disputes Act and where such dispute  also amounts  to an  industrial dispute within the meaning  of Industrial  Disputes Act,  whether the Civil Court’s jurisdiction  to entertain  a suit  with respect  to such dispute  is barred?  To put  it nearer  to the facts of these appeals,  the question  can be  posed thus:  Where the dispute between  the employer  and the  workman involves the recognition,  application   or  enforcement   of   certified Standing Orders,  is the  jurisdiction of the Civil Court to entertain a  suit with  respect to  such dispute  is barred? This question  involves the perennial problem concerning the jurisdiction of the Civil Court vis-a-vis Special Tribunals, a subject  upon which the decisions of this Court, let alone other courts,  is legion.  We do  not, however,  propose  to burden this  judgment with  all of them. We shall refer only to those  which have  dealt with the question in the context of Industrial  Disputes Act.  By way of introduction though, we may  refer to  the summary  of principles  enunciated  in Dhulabhai v.  State of  M.P. (1968 (3) SCR 662 = AIR 1969 SC

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78). They are the following:      "(1) Where  the statute  gives a finality to the orders      of the special tribunals the Civil Court’s jurisdiction      must be held to be excluded if there is adequate remedy      to do  what the  Civil courts  would normally  do in  a      suit. Such  provision, however,  does not exclude those      cases where  the provisions  of the particular Act have      not been  complied with  or the  statutory tribunal has      not acted in conformity with the fundamental principles      of judicial procedure.      (2) Where  there is  an express bar of the jurisdiction      of the  court, an  examination of  the  scheme  of  the      particular Act  to find the adequacy or the sufficiency      of the  remedies provided  may be  relevant but  is not      decisive to  sustain  the  jurisdiction  of  the  Civil      court.           Where  there   is   no   express   exclusion   the      examination of  the remedies  and  the  scheme  of  the      particular Act  to  find  out  the  intendment  becomes      necessary  and   the  result  of  the  inquiry  may  be      decisive. In  the latter case it is necessary to see if      the statute  creates a special right or a liability and      provides  for   the  determination   of  the  right  or      liability and  further lays  down  that  all  questions      about the  said right and liability shall be determined      by the  tribunals so  constituted, and whether remedies      normally associated  with actions  in civil  courts are      prescribed by the said statute or not.      (3) Challenge  to the  provisions of the particular Act      as ultra  vires  cannot  be  brought  before  Tribunals      constituted under  that Act. Even the High Court cannot      go into  that question  on a revision or reference from      the decision of the Tribunals.      (4)   When    a   provision    is   already    declared      unconstitutional  or   the  constitutionality   of  any      provision is  to be  challenged, a suit is open. A writ      of certiorari may include a direction for refund if the      claim is  clearly within  the time  prescribed  by  the      Limitation Act  but it  is not  a compulsory  remedy to      replace a suit.      (5) Where  the particular Act contains no machinery for      refund of  tax collected  in excess  of  constitutional      limits or illegally collected a suit lies.      (6) Questions  of the  correctness  of  the  assessment      apart from  its constitutionality  are for the decision      of the  authority and  a civil suit does not lie if the      orders of  the authorities  are declared to be final or      there is  an express prohibition in the particular Act.      In either case the scheme of the particular Act must be      examined because it is a relevent enquiry.      (7) An exclusion of the jurisdiction of the civil court      is not  readily to  be inferred  unless the  conditions      above set down apply."      Dhulabhai, it  must be  remembered, concerned a dispute arising under  a sales  tax enactment. Most of the decisions referred to  therein  concerned  taxing  enactments.  Having regard to  the facts  of that case, therefore, it would fall under principle No.2 enunciated therein.      Premier Automobiles  was decided  by a Bench comprising A.Alagiriswami, P.K. Goswami and N.L.Untwalia, JJ. The Court found  that   the   dispute   concerned   therein   involved adjudication of rights/obligations created by the Industrial Disputes Act  which means  that it fell under Principle No.2 in  Dhulabhai.   Even  so,   the  Court  considered  several decisions, English and Indian, on the subject and enunciated

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the following principles in Paras 23 and 24:      "23. To  sum  up,  the  principles  applicable  to  the      jurisdiction of  the civil  court  in  relation  to  an      industrial dispute may be stated thus:           (1) if  the dispute  is not an industrial dispute,      nor does  it relate  to enforcement  of any other right      under the Act the remedy lies only in the civil court.           (2)  If  the  dispute  is  an  industrial  dispute      arising out  of a  right or liability under the general      or common  law and  not under the Act, the jurisdiction      of the  civil court  is alternative,  leaving it to the      election of  the suiter  concerned to choose his remedy      for the  relief which  is competent  to be granted in a      particular remedy.           (3) If  the  industrial  dispute  relates  to  the      enforcement of  a right  or an obligation created under      the Act,  then the  only remedy available to the suitor      is to act an adjudication under the Act.           (4) If the right which is sought to be enforced is      a right  created under the Act such as Chapter V-A then      the remedy for its enforcement is either Section 33C or      the raising  of an  industrial dispute, as the case may      be.      24. We  may, however,  in relation  to  principle  No.2      stated above  hasten to add that there will hardly be a      dispute which  will be an industrial dispute within the      meaning of  Section 2(k) of the Act and yet will be one      arising out  of a  right or liability under the general      or common  law only  and not  under  the  Act.  Such  a      contingency, for  example, may  arise in  regard to the      dismissal of  an unsponsored  workman which  in view of      the provision of law contained in Section 2A of the Act      will be  an  industrial  dispute  even  though  it  may      otherwise  be  an  individual  dispute.  Civil  Courts,      therefore, will  have hardly  an occasion  to deal with      the type  of cases falling under principle No. 2. Cases      of   industrial   disputes   by   and   large,   almost      invariabley, are  bound to be covered by principle No.3      stated above."      It  is   the  Principle   No.2,  and  particularly  the qualifying statements  in Para  24, that  has given  rise to good amount of controversy. According to Principle No. 2, if the dispute  is an industrial dispute arising out of a right or liability  under the  general or common law and not under the Industrial  Disputes Act,  the jurisdiction of the Civil Court is  alternative and it is left to the person concerned either to  approach the  Civil Court  or to have recourse to the machinery  provided  by  Industrial  Disputes  Act.  But Principle No.2 does not stand alone; it is qualified by Para 24. Now  what does  Para 24  say? It says (i) in view of the definition  of   "industrial  dispute"   in  the  Industrial Disputes Act,  there will  hardly be  an industrial  dispute arising exclusively  out of  a right  or liability under the general or  common law. Most of the industrial disputes will be disputes  arising out  of a  right or liability under the Act.  (ii)   Dismissal  of  an  unsponsored  workman  is  an individual dispute  and not an industrial dispute (unless of course, it  is espoused by the Union of Workmen or a body of workmen) but  Section 2-A has made it an industrial dispute. Because of  this "civil  courts will have hardly an occasion to deal  with the  type of  cases  falling  under  principle No.2". By  and large,  industrial disputes  are bound  to be covered by  Principle No.3.  (Principle No.3 says that where the dispute  relates  to  the  enforcement  of  a  right  or obligation created  by the Act, the only remedy available is

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to get an adjudication under the Act.)      Before we  proceed to consider the effect and impact of Para  24   on  Principle  No.2  in  Para  23,  it  would  be appropriate to refer briefly to the decisions referred to in Para 26  of  the  said  judgment.  The  Court  approved  the following decisions: (i) Krishnan v. East India Distilleries and Sugar  Factories Ltd., Nellikuppam (1964 (1) L.L.J.217 : A.I.R.1964 Mad.81), a decision rendered by a Single Judge of the Madras  High  Court.  It  was  held  therein  that  "the jurisdiction of the civil court is ousted impliedly to try a case  which  could  form  subject-matter  of  an  industrial dispute  collectively   between  the   workmen   and   their employer." (ii)  Madura Mills  Company  Ltd.  v.  Guruvammal (1967 (2)  L.L.J.397 :  (1967) 2  Mad. L.J.287),  decided by Alagiriswami, J.,  (at that  time a Judge of the Madras High Court). It  was a case concerning the enforcement of a right created by  Industrial Disputes Act. (iii) The decision of a learned  Single  Judge  of  Mysore  High  Court  in  Nippani Electricity Company  (Private) Ltd.  (by its  director  V.R. Patravali) v.  Bhimarao Laxman  Patil (1969  (1)  L.L.J.268: 1968 Lab  IC 1571),  a decision of the Division Bench of the Bombay  High   Court   in   Pigment   Lakes   and   Chemical Manufacturing Co. Private Ltd. v. Sitaram Kashiram Konde [71 Bom LR  452: 1970  Lab IC  115 (Bom)]  and the decision of a learned  Single   Judge  of   the  Kerala   High  Court   in N.A.Madhavan v.  State of Kerala (1970 (1) L.L.J. 272) where it was held that the jurisdiction of the Civil Court to deal with matters  mentioned in  Chapter V-A is impliedly barred. (iv) The  decision of  a Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court in M/s. Austin Distributors Pvt. Ltd. v. Nil Kumar Das [1970 Lab  IC 323  (Cal.)], which  arose  from  a  suit  for recovery of  damages for  wrongful dismissal.  There was  no prayer for  reinstatement. The  High Court  held that  Civil Court’s jurisdiction  is not  barred, inasmuch  as the  only ground  upon   which  the  dismissal  was  impugned  was  in violation of  the contract  of service  governed by  general law. A  decision of  the Mysore High Court in Syndicate Bank v. Vincent  Robert Lobo [(1971) 2 L.L.J.46: 1971 Lab IC 1055 (Mys.)] to the same effect.      The Court  disapproved the decision of a learned Single Judge of  the Calcutta High Court in Bidyut Kumar Chatterjee v.  Commissioners   for  the  Port  of  Calcutta  [(1970)  2 L.L.J.148: 1971  Lab IC  708 (Cal.)]  to the  extent it went against the principles enunciated in Premier Automobiles.      Now,  coming   back   to   Principle   No.2   and   its qualification in  Para 24,  we must say that Para 24 must be read  harmoniously  with  the  said  principle  and  not  in derogation of  it -  not so  as to  nullify  it  altogether. Indeed, Principle  No.2 is  a reiteration  of the  principle affirmed in  several  decisions  on  the  subject  including Dhulabhai. Principle  No.2 is  clear whereas Para 24 is more in the  nature of  a statement of fact. It says that most of the industrial  disputes  will  be  disputes  involving  the rights and  obligations created  by the  Act. It, therefore, says that  there will hardly be any industrial dispute which will fall  under Principle  No.2 and that almost all of them will fall  under Principle  No.3. This  statement cannot  be understood as  saying that no industrial dispute can ever be entertained by or adjudicated upon by the Civil Courts. Such an understanding would not only make the statement of law in Principle No.2 wholly meaningless but would also run counter to the  well-established principles  on the subject. It must accordingly be  held that the effect of Principle No.2 is in no manner  whittled down  by Para  24. At  the same time, we must emphasise  the policy  of law underlying the Industrial

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Disputes Act  and the  host  of  enactments  concerning  the workmen made by Parliament and State legislatures. The whole idea has been to provide a speedy, inexpensive and effective forum for resolution of disputes arising between workmen and their employers.  The idea  has  been  to  ensure  that  the workmen do  not get  caught in the labyrinth of Civil Courts with their  layers upon  layers of appeals and revisions and the elaborate  procedural laws,  which the  workmen can  ill afford. The  procedures followed  by Civil  Courts,  it  was thought,  would   not  facilitate  a  prompt  and  effective disposal of  these disputes. As against this, the Courts and Tribunals created  by the  Industrial Disputes  Act are  not shackled by these procedural laws nor is their award subject to any  appeals or  revisions. Because of their informality, the  workmen   and  their   representatives  can  themselves prosecute or  defenn their cases. These forums are empowered to grant  such relief  as they  think just  and appropriate. They can  even substitute the punishment in many cases. They can  make  and  re-make  the  contracts,  settlements,  wage structures and  what not. Their awards are no doubt amenable to jurisdiction  of the High Court under Article 226 as also to the jurisdiction of this Court under Article 32, but they are extra-ordinary  remedies subject to several self-imposed constraints. It is, therefore, always in the interest of the workmen that disputes concerning them are adjudicated in the forums created  by the Act and not in a Civil Court. That is the entire  policy underlying  the vast  array of enactments concerning workmen.  This legislative  policy and intendment should necessarily  weigh with  the Courts  in  interpreting these enactments and the disputes arising under them.      Now let  us examine  the facts of the appeals before us in  the   light  of   the  principles   adumbrated   Premier Automobiles. The first thing to be noticed is the basis upon which the  plaintiffs-respondents have  claimed the  several reliefs in  the suit.  The basis  is the  violation  of  the certified  Standing   Orders  in  force  in  the  appellant- establishment. The  basis is  not the violation of any terms of contract  of service  entered into  between  the  parties governed by  the Law  of Contract. At the same time, it must be said,  no right  or obligation  created by the Industrial Disputes Act  is sought  to be  enforced in  the  suit.  Yet another circumstance  is that  the Standing  Orders Act does not itself  provide any  forum for the enforcement of rights and liabilities created by the Standing Orders. The question that arises  is whether  such a  suit falls  under Principle No.3 of  Premier Automobiles or under Principle No.2? We are of the opinion that it falls under Principle No.3. The words "under the  Act" in  Principle No.3  must, in our considered opinion, be  understood as  referring not only to Industrial Disputes Act  but also  to all  sister  enactments  -  [like Industrial Employment  (Standing Orders)  Act] which  do not provide a  special forum of their own for enforcement of the rights and  liabilities created  by  them.  Thus  a  dispute involving the  enforcement of  the  rights  and  liabilities created by the certified Standing Orders has necessarily got to  be  adjudicated  only  in  the  forums  created  by  the Industrial Disputes  Act provided,  of course,  that such  a dispute amounts  to an industrial dispute within the meaning of Sections  2(k) and 2-A of Industrial Disputes Act or such enactment says  that such dispute shall be either treated as an industrial  dispute or shall be adjudicated by any of the forums created  by the  Industrial Disputes  Act. The  Civil Courts have  no jurisdiction  to entertain  such  suits.  In other words,  a dispute arising between the employer and the workman/workmen  under,   or  for  the  enforcement  of  the

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Industrial  Employment  Standing  Orders  is  an  Industrial Dispute, if  it satisfies  the requirements  of Section 2(k) and/or Section  2-A of  the Industrial Disputes Act and must be adjudicated  in the  forums  created  by  the  Industrial Disputes Act  alone. This  would be  so, even if the dispute raised or  relief claimed  is based  partly  upon  certified Standing Orders and partly on general law of contract.      But then  it is  argued that  while a person can go and file a  suit straightaway,  he cannot  resort to  the forums under Industrial  Disputes Act  directly and  that access to these forums  is premised  upon the  appropriate  government referring the  dispute to  them. The  submission is no doubt attractive ex facie but not on deeper scrutiny. Firstly, the descretion to refer is not arbitrary. It has to be exercised to effectuate  the objects  of the  enactment. An  arbitrary refusal  to   refer  is  not  un-challengeable.  The  Courts normally lean  in favour  of making  a reference rather than the other  way. In  view of  the manner in which the several governments have  been acting  over the last several decades there seems  no basis  for the  apprehension that this power will be  exercised arbitrarily.  The circumstance  suggested cannot, therefore,  militate against  the view  taken by  us herein.      The view  taken by  us finds support in the decision of this Court  in Jitendra  Nath Biswas  (1989 (3)  S.C.R.640). That was  also a case where the conditions of service of the workmen were  governed by the certified Standing Orders. The Court held  that the  Civil Court  has  no  jurisdiction  to entertain such  a suit.  Indeed this  is  also  the  opinion expressed by  the Bench  which referred  these appeals  to a larger Bench. The Bench observed:      "The case  of the  respondents is  that the said action      has been  taken in contravention of the Standing Orders      framed  by   the  Corporation   under  the   Industrial      Employment (Standing  Orders) Act.  The  instant  cases      are, therefore,  governed by  the decision  in Jitendra      Nath Biswas  case (supra)  and in  accordance with  the      said decision  it must be held that the jurisdiction of      the civil  courts is  excluded. It  may be  stated that      from the  point of  view of the workmen also the remedy      of adjudication  available under  the Act would be more      beneficial to  them than  that of a civil suit inasmuch      as  the   civil  court   cannot  grant  the  relief  of      reinstatement which relief can be granted by the Labour      Court/Industrial Tribunal."      We are in respectful agreement with the said opinion.      Coming to the order dated October 18, 1989 in S.L.P.(C) No.9386 of  1988 made  by a Bench of two learned Judges, the important fact  to be  noticed is  that  in  that  suit,  no allegation of violation of the certified Standing Orders was made. The only basis of the suit was violation of principles of natural  justice. It  was,therefore,  held  that  it  was governed by  Principle No.2  in Premier Automobiles. In this sense, this  order cannot  be said to lay down a proposition contrary to  the one  in Jitendra  Nath Biswas.  We may also refer to  a decision  of this Court rendered by Untwalia,J., on behalf  of a  Bench comprising himself and A.P.Sen,J., in S.K.Konde v.  Pigment Lakes  and Chemical  Manufacturing Co. Private Ltd. (1979 (4) SCC 12). That was a case arising from a suit  instituted by  the workman  for a  declaration  that termination of his service is illegal and for reinstatement. In the  alternative, he  claimed compensation  for  wrongful termination.  The   jurisdiction  of  the  Civil  Court  was sustained by this Court on the ground that he has made out a case for  awarding compensation though the Civil Court could

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not  decree   reinstatement.  Though  the  report  does  not indicate the  basis put  forward  by  the  workman-plaintiff therein, the  Court found on an examination of all the facts and circumstances  of the case that "it is not quite correct to  say  that  the  suit  filed  by  the  appellant  is  not maintainable at  all in  a civil  court." Obviously it was a case where  the dispute  related to  enforcement  of  rights flowing from  general law of contract and not from certified Standing Orders. This decision cannot also be read as laying down a different proposition from Premier Automobiles.      The learned  counsel for  the respondents  invited  our attention  to  certain  decisions  of  the  High  Courts  to indicate how  the dicta  in  Premier  Automobiles  has  been understood. It may not be necessary to refer to them in view of the preceding discussion.      We may  now summarise  the principles  flowing from the above discussion: (1) Where  the dispute  arises from general law of contract, i.e., where  reliefs are claimed on the basis of the general law of  contract, a suit filed in civil court cannot be said to be  not maintainable, even though such a dispute may also constitute an  "industrial dispute"  within the  meaning  of Section 2(k)  or Section 2-A of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. (2)  Where,   however,  the  dispute  involves  recognition, observance  or   enforcement  of   any  of   the  rights  or obligations created by the Industrial Disputes Act, the only remedy is to approach the forums created by the said Act. (3) Similarly,  where the  dispute involves the recognition, observance or  enforcement of rights and obligations created by enactments  like Industrial  Employment (Standing Orders) Act, 1946  - which  can be  called  ’sister  enactments’  to Industrial Disputes  Act -  and which do not provide a forum for resolution of such disputes, the only remedy shall be to approach the  forums created  by the Industrial Disputes Act provided they  constitute  industrial  disputes  within  the meaning of  Section  2(k)  and  Section  2-A  of  Industrial Disputes Act  or where such enactment says that such dispute shall be  either treated  as an  industrial dispute  or says that it shall be adjudicated by any of the forums created by the Industrial  Disputes Act.  Otherwise, recourse  to Civil Court is open. (4) It  is not  correct to say that the remedies provided by the Industrial  Disputes Act  are not  equally effective for the reason that access to the forum depends upon a reference being made  by the appropriate government. The power to make a reference conferred upon the government is to be exercised to effectuate  the object  of the  enactment and  hence  not unguided. The rule is to make a reference unless, of course, the dispute  raised is a totally frivolous one ex-facie. The power conferred  is the  power to refer and not the power to decide, though  it may be that the government is entitled to examine whether  the  dispute  is  ex-facie  frivolous,  not meriting an adjudication. (5) Consistent  with the policy of law aforesaid, we commend to the  Parliament and  the State  Legislatures  to  make  a provision  enabling   a  workman   to  approach  the  Labour Court/Industrial  Tribunal  directly  -  i.e.,  without  the requirement of  a reference  by the  government - in case of industrial disputes covered by Section 2-A of the Industrial Disputes Act.  This would  go a  long way  in  removing  the misgivings with respect to the effectiveness of the remedies provided by the Industrial Disputes Act. (6) The  certified  Standing  Orders  framed  under  and  in accordance with  the Industrial  Employment (Standing Order)

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Act, 1946  are statutorily imposed conditions of service and are binding  both upon  the employers  and employees, though they do  not amount to "statutory provisions". Any violation of these Standing Orders entitles an employee to appropriate relief either  before the  forums created  by the Industrial Disputes Act  or the  Civil Court  where recourse  to  Civil Court is open according to the principles indicated herein. (7) The  policy of law emerging from Industrial Disputes Act and its  sister enactments  is  to  provide  an  alternative dispute resolution  mechanism to  the workmen,  a  mechanism which is  speedy, inexpensive, informal and un-encumbered by the plethora of procedural laws and appeals upon appeals and revisions applicable  to civil courts. Indeed, the powers of the Courts  and Tribunals  under the Industrial Disputes Act are far more extensive in the sense that they can grant such relief as  they think  appropriate in  the circumstances for putting an end to an industrial dispute.      Applying the  above principles,  we must  hold that the suits filed  by the  respondents in  these appeals  were not maintainable in  law. Even  so, the  question is  whether we should set  aside the  decrees passed in their favour by the Civil Courts.  So far  as Civil  Appeal No.3100  of 1991  is concerned,  this   Court  had,   while  granting  leave  (in S.L.P.(C) No.194  of 1991)  ordered on January 29, 1991 that "insofar  as   respondent  is   concerned,  he  (appellants’ counsel)  states   that  he   will  abide   by  the  decree. Application for  stay is  rejected". Therefore,  there is no question of  setting aside  the  decree  concerned  in  this appeal. However,  so far as the other appeals are concerned, the position  is slightly different. In Civil Appeal No.4948 of 1991  and in  civil appeals  5386,5387/95 arising  out of S.L.P.(C) Nos.10902  of 1992,  13152 of  1993 and  10263  of 1993, not only there is no such condition but this Court had granted stay  as prayed for by the appellant-Corporation. In two other  matters viz., in Civil Appeal No.9314 of 1994 and civil appeal  5389/95 arising  out of  S.L.P.(C) No.14169 of 1993 the only order is to issue notice. Having regard to the facts and  circumstances of  these matters,  we  modify  the decrees in  these matters  (except the  decree concerned  in Civil Appeal  No.3100 of  1991) by reducing the backwages to half.  The   decrees  in   all  other   respects  are   left undisturbed. These  orders are made in view of the fact that the position of law was not clear until now and it cannot be said  that   the  respondents  had  not  acted  bonafide  in instituting the suits. Appeals disposed of accordingly.      It is  directed that  the principles enunciated in this judgment shall  apply to  all pending  matters except  where decrees have  been passed by the Trial Court and the matters are pending  in appeal or second appeal, as the case may be. All suits  pending in  the Trial  Court shall be governed by the principles  enunciated herein  - as  also the  suits and proceedings to be instituted hereinafter.      There shall  be no  order as to costs in these appeals. Proceedings which have become final shall not be reopened by virtue of this Judgment.