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PETITIONER: THE PETLAD TURKEY RED DYE WORKS CO. LTD., PETLAD

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: THE COMMISSIONER OF INCOME-TAX,BOMBAY, AHMEDABAD

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 02/11/1962

BENCH: KAPUR, J.L. BENCH: KAPUR, J.L. DAS, S.K. SARKAR, A.K. HIDAYATULLAH, M. DAYAL, RAGHUBAR

CITATION:  1963 AIR 1484            1963 SCR  Supl. (1) 871  CITATOR INFO :  AFR        1965 SC1636  (1,12,15,ETC.,)  R          1970 SC2067  (14)  F          1976 SC1141  (5)  RF         1986 SC 421  (25)  C          1989 SC1298  (7)

ACT: Income   Tax-Reference  to  High  Court-Order  calling   for supplemental statement of case and allowing further evidence Validity-Appeal   against  the  order  to   Supreme   Court- Competence  Income-tax Act, 1922 (11 of 1922), ss.  66,  66A (2).

HEADNOTE: The  assessee company carried on the business of dyeing  and selling dyed yarn as Petlad in the erstwhile State of Baroda and its status during the relevant assessment years was that of  a non-resident.  In respect of sales made to  purchasers in what was British India the Income-tax Officer found  that the  sale  price was received by the company  at  Petlad  by means  of cheques, drafts and hundis which  were  admittedly sent  by  post.  These cheques etc., were sent back  by  the company either to its creditors in British India in  payment of its liabilities or to the credit of its accounts with its bankers in British India.  The assessee company claimed that as the sale price was received by it at Petlad, the  profits on  the  aforesaid  sales were not taxable  in  the  taxable territories.   The Appellate Tribunal held that the  cheques etc.,  which  were sent by the assessee to its  bankers  and creditors  were received by them as agents of  the  assessee and therefore the profits were received in British India and were liable to tax.  On an application made by the  assessee under  s.  66(1)  of the Indian Income-tax  Act,  1922,  the Tribunal  referred  the  question to the High  Court  as  to whether the profits or any part thereof were received by  or on behalf of the assessee company in British India.  In  the statement  of  the  case the Tribunal pointed  out  that  no attempt had been made at a previous stage to investigate  as to  whether  the post office had acted as the agent  of  the

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company  or of the buyers.  On September 23, 1955, the  High Court  passed an order calling for a supplemental  statement of the case and giving the parties liberty to adduce further evidence.    The  Tribunal,  after  recording  evidence   as directed by the High Court, sent a supplemental statement in which a finding was given that "in the circumstances of  the case and on the evidence and in the absence 872 of  correspondence  we  must necessarily  infer  an  implied request by the assessee to remit by post.......... On  April 21,  1960, the High Court answered the question referred  in the  affirmative  and against the assessee.  In  the  appeal filed  against  that judgment the  assessee  challenged  the validity of the order of the High Court dated September  23, 1955,  asking  for a supplemental statement  of  case  after taking  additional  evidence,  on the  ground  that  it  was without  jurisdiction.  For the Commissioner of  Income-tax, it  was contended that as no appeal had been  filed  against the  order of the High Court dated September 23,  1955,  the question  as  to  the validity of that order  could  not  be raised at the later stage. Held,  that the order of the High Court dated September  23, 1955,  calling  upon  the  Appellate  Tribunal  to  make   a supplemental  statement of the case was not a  final  order, nor  a judgment within the meaning of s. 66(3) or s.  66A(2) of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922, and was not appealable. Tata Iron & Steel Co. v. Chief Revenue Authority, (1923)  L. R.  50  r. A. 212, Delhi Cloth & General Mills Co.  Ltd.  v. Income-tax Commissioner, (1927 L. R. 541.  A. 421 and Sardar Syedna Paher Saifuddin Sahib v. State of Bombay’, [1958]  S. C.R. 1007, relied on. Held,  further,  that  though the High Court  had  power  to direct  a  supplemental  statement to be made,  it  was  not competent to direct additional evidence to be taken. Under  s.  66  of  the Act when  the  High  Court  finds  it necessary  to have a supplemental statement of the  case  in order to answer the question of law which is raised, it  can direct  such statement to be submitted with  such  additions and alterations as it may direct, but the statement must  be based on facts which are already on the record, and the High Court  cannot  ask for additional facts to  be  brought  in, because  those  would not be in regard to a  question  which arises  from  the  order  of the Tribunal  but  would  be  a statement  based  on  something which  was  not  before  the Appellate Tribunal when it passed its appellate order. The New Jehangir Vakil Mills v. The Commissioner of  Income- tax,  [1960]  1 S.C.R. 249, Mrs. Kusumben  D.  Mahadevia  v. Commissioner of Income-tax, Bombay, [1960] 3 S.C.R. 417  and Zoraster  &  Co.  v. Commissioner of  Income-tax,  [1961)  1 S.C.R. 210, followed.

JUDGMENT: CIVIL  APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeals Nos.  158  and 159 of 1962, 873 Appeals  from the judgment and order dated 21, 1960, of  the Bombay High Court in Income-tax Reference No. 16 of 1955. Purshottam  Tricumdas, R. J. Kolah and I. N. Shroff for  the appellant. Gopal Singh and R. N. Sachthey, for the respondent. 1962.  November 2. The judgment of the Court was   delivered by KAPUR,  J.-These two appeals pursuant to a  certificate  are

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from the decision of the High Court of Bombay in  Income-tax Reference No. 16 of 1955 answering the question referred  by the  Income-tax  Appellate Tribunal in the  affirmative  and against  the  assessee company.  The appellant in  both  the appeals  is  the assessee company and  the  Commissioner  of Income-tax is the respondent. The  facts  of these appeals are shortly as  follows  :  The assessee  company  was registered in  the  erstwhile  Baroda State and its status during the assessment years was that of a non-resident.  The relevant assessment years were  1941-42 and 1942-43 the previous years being the calendar years 1940 and 1941.  It carried on the business of dyeing and  selling dyed yam.  It effected sales of dyed yarn of the total value of  Rs. 14,22,996/- and Rs. 19,22,107 in the previous  years relevant  to  the  assessment  years  1941-42  and   1942-43 respectively.  The sales were made to purchasers both in the Indian  States  and in what was British India.   During  the previous year relevant to 1941-42 out of the total sales  of the  value  of  Rs. 14,22,996/-, Rs.  11,88,063/-  were  to merchants in British India and out of these some sales  were to  Calcutta  merchants which are not now in dispute  a  the balance amounting to Rs. 9,53,304/- were to 874 purchasers  in other parts of British India and  dispute  in regard to that year relates to the assessment on the profits of those sales.  Similarly in the previous year relevant  to 1942-43  out of the total sales of a sum of  Rs.  6,04,588/- were  made to purchasers in British India and assessment  in regard  to  profits  out of that sum  is  in  dispute.   The Income-tax Officer found that the sale price was received by the assessee company at Petlad in the erstwhile Baroda State by means of cheques, drafts and hundis in the years relevant to the two assessment years and it is not disputed that they were  sent by post.  These cheques, drafts and  hundis  were sent back by the assessee company either to its creditors in British India in payment of its liabilities or to the credit of  its  accounts with its bankers in  British  India.   The contention of the assessee company was that these sums  were received  by it at Petlad in the erstwhile Baroda State  and therefore the profits on these sales were not taxable in the taxable  territories in as much as they were received in  an Indian  State.   After  appeal was taken  to  the  Appellate Assistant  Commissioner appeal to the  Income-tax  Appellate Tribunal  which held that the cheques and hundis which  were sent  by the assessee company to its bankers  and  creditors were received by them as agents of the assessee company  and therefore  the  profits were received in British  India  and were liable to tax.  Against that order the assessee company applied under s. 66 of the Income-tax Act for a statement of the  case  to  the High Court.  On February  21,  1955,  the Appellate  Tribunal referred the following question  to  the High Court               "Whether the proportionate profits on the sale               proceeds  aggregating Rs. 9,53,304/-  for  the               assessment year 1941-42 and Rs. 6,04,588/- for               the assessment year 1942-43 or any part there-               of  were  received  by or  on  behalf  of  the               assesee company in British India?"                875 The Appellate Tribunal in the statement of the case remarked that  no  attempt  had  been made at  a  previous  stage  to investigate  as to whether the post office had acted as  the agent  of the assessee company or of the buyers.   The  High Court  on  September  23, 1955,  made  the  following  order calling for a supplemental statement :

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             "The same question arises on this reference as               in  the last reference (I.T. Reference No.  15               of 1955) and we want a supplemental  statement               of  the  case  on the same lines  as  we  have               indicated   in   the  last   reference.    The               supplemental  statement  of the case  will  be               confined  to the two amounts mentioned in  the               question  raised on this reference  viz.,  Rs.               9,53,304/- for the assessment year 1941-42 and               Rs. 6,04,585 for the year 1.942-43." The  parties  by this order were allowed to  adduce  further evidence.  Thereupon the case was sent hack to the Appellate Tribunal for a supplemental statement of the case and  after recording  evidence  as  directed  by  the  High  Court  the Tribunal gave the following findings :-               "Therefore  in the circumstances of  the  case               and  on  the evidence and in  the  absence  of               correspondence  we must necessarily  infer  an               implied  request by the assessee to  remit  by               post,  the parties having adopted  the  normal               accepted  commercial practice for  making  the               payment in such type of cases" The  High Court on April 21, 1960, answered the question  in the affirmative and against the assessee.  It also  observed that  the mode of payment accepted by the  assessee  company was that the payment had to be made by sending the  cheques, drafts  and hundis by post from British India and  it  coUld not Jr said that 876 there  was  no evidence before the  Appellate  Tribunal  for holding  that there was an implied request by  the  assessee company  to  the buyer to send the cheques  etc.,  by  post. Against that judgment and order these two ’appeals have been brought pursuant to a certificate by the High Court. For the appellant two contentions were raised (1) the  order of  the  High Court dated September 23, 1955, asking  for  a supplemental statement and allowing additional evidence  was without jurisdiction; (2) that on the statement of the  case the answer to the question submitted should have been in the negative  and in favour of the assessee.  A  third  question has been raised and that was by counsel for the  respondent, the  Commissioner  of Income-tax, that as no  objection  was taken  to  the calling for a supplemental statement  and  as that  order was not appeared  against, the question  whether the order was within jurisdiction of ’the High Court or  not cannot  be raised at this stage.  We shall first  deal  with the objection taken on behalf of the Commissioner of Income- tax  as  that  is of a preliminary  nature  and  relates  to jurisdiction.    The  nature  and  the  amplitude   of   the jurisdiction  of the High Court in regard to  cases  dialing with income-tax are contained in s.66 of the Income-tax Act. Sub-section  (1)  of  that  section  provides  that  if  any question  of  law arises out of the order of  the  Appellate Tribunal  and  it  is  required  by  the  assessee  or   the Commissioner to be referred to the High Court the  Appellate Tribunal shall draw up a statement of the case and refer  it to the High Court for its opinion.  If the Tribunal  refuses to  state  the  case then under sub-s. (2) of s.  66  on  an application  being made to it, the High Court can, if it  is not   satisfied  with  the  correctness  of  the   Appellate Tribunal’s  decision  ’require  the Tribunal to  draw  up  a statement  of the case and refer it to the High  Court.   By sub-s. (4) of s. 66 the High Court  877 may  if  not satisfied with the statement contained  in  the

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case  referred  to it refer the case back to  the  Appellate Tribunal for additions or alterations.  Under sub-s. (5)  of s.  66 the High Court is required to decide the question  of law  raised and to deliver its judgment  thereon  containing the grounds on which such decision is founded and thereafter a  copy  of  the judgment is to be  sent  to  the  Appellate Tribunal  which shall pass such orders as are  necessary  to dispose  of the case in conformity with the judgment of  the High  Court.  This shows that the jurisdiction of  the  High Court  is purely advisory.  On the advice being given to  it the Appellate Tribunal shall be guided by the decision given and  shall  make the assessment  accordingly,  the  ultimate result being that an assessment is made at an amount  which, in  conformity  with  the  opinion of  the  High  Court,  is considered  to  be  correct  and it is  then  that  the  tax liability  is definitely fixed or concreted.  ’The  judgment of  the High Court does not in any manner enforce  the  dis- charge  of that liability.  The Privy Council held that  the High  Court’s  judgment  is merely  the  expression  of  the opinion as to whether a certain question of law which arises during  the course of assessment has to be used one  way  or the other and that the word "’judgment" is not used in s. 51 of the Income-tax Act, now s. 66 of that Act, in its  strict legal and proper sense.  Tata Iron & Steel Co. v. Chief  Re- venue Authority (1).  Delhi Cloth & General Mills Co.   Ltd. v. Income-tax Commissioner (2).  In Tata Iron & Steel  Co’s. case(1)  appeal was taken to the Privy Council  against  the judgment  of  the High Court given under s.  51(3)  of the Income-tax  Act, now s. 66(5), on a certificate of the  High Court.   A  preliminary  objection was taken  in  the  Privy Council  that the appeal was incompetent as the decision  of the  High  Court on a reference made by  the  Chief  Revenue Authority  under s. 51 of the then Income-tax Act was not  a final  judgment within cl. 39 of the Letters Patent  of  the Bombay High Court.  The Privy (1) [1923] L.R. 50 I.A. 212, 223. (2) [1927] L.R. 54 I.A. 421. 878 Council held that where the case is stated for the,  opinion of  the High Court under the Income-tax Act tHE judgment  is merely  advisory and therefore it was not a  final  judgment within  the meaning of cl. 39 of the Letters  Patent.   This led to the enactment of what is now s. 66A of the Income-tax Act.   Even  after the introduction of  that  provision  the Privy Council held in Delhi Cloth & General Mills Co’s. case (1) that  section had no retrospective operation and  there- fore  it did not apply to those judgments under s. 51(3)  of the  then Income-tax Act which had become final at the  date when  it came into force and that appeal was competent  only if certified to be a fit one for appeal. Section 66A was introduced in the Income-tax Act by s. 8  of the  Indian  Income-tax  (Amendment) Act  (24  of  1926)  to provide for appeals against judgments of the High Courts  to the Privy Council and by the Adaptation Order of 1950 to the Supreme Court.  Sub-scction (2) of s. 66A provides :-               "An appeal shall lie to the Supreme Court from               any judgment of the High Court delivered on  a               reference  made under section 66 ’in any  case               which the High Court certifies to be a fit one               for appeal to the Supreme Court". No  appeal lies to the Supreme Court unless it falls  within that section, one of the requirements being a certificate of the High Court.  See also Delhi Cloth & General Mills  Co’s. case  (1).  We are not here concerned with Art. 136  of  the Constitution.  Under sub-s. (3) of s. 66A the provisions  of

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the Code of Civil Procedure have been made applicable in the case  of  appeals  under s. 66A "so far  as  may  be"  which confines  the  right of appeal under the statute  to  cases, mentioned in sub-s. (2).  Delhi Cloth & General Mills  Co’s. case  (1).   Before the enactment of s. 66A  no  appeal  was competent against a judgment under the (1)  [1927] L.R. 54 I.A. 421.  879 then s. 51(3) now s. 66(5) of the Income-tax ’Act.  The word "judgment"  under s. 51(3) as under the present s. 66(5)  of the Act is the decision of the High Court of the question of law referred to it and the grounds on which such decision is based.   It  is not used in the section in  its  strict  and proper  sense.   Tata Iron & Steel Co’s case(1).   An  order asking  for  a supplemental statement of the case  does  not fall within that definition and is therefore not  appealable under s. 66A(2). This Court in sea Premchand Satrandas v. The State of  Bihar (2),  which was a case under the Bihar Sales Tax Act and  in which the High Court refused to direct the Board of  Revenue to  state  a case and refer it to the High Court,  held  the order  of refusal not to be a final order within cl.  31  of the  Letters Patent of the Patna High Court inasmuch as  the jurisdiction  exercised by the High Court was  advisory  and standing  by  itself the order did not bind or  affect  tile rights of the parties.  The court relied on the decision  in Tata Iron & Steel Co’s. case (1).  At p.     805 Fazal  Ali, J., observed as follows:               "But  the High Court acquired jurisdiction  to               deal  with  the case by virtue of  an  express               provision  of  the Bihar Sales Tax  Act.   The               crux  of  the  matter therefore  is  that  the               jurisdiction  of the High Court was only  con-               sultative   and  was  neither   original   nor               appellate." Even  in  cases tried under the civil  jurisdiction  of  the courts it has been held that an order is final if it decides the rights of the parties in a civil proceeding but if after the  order  the proceedings have still to be  continued  and rights in dispute between parties have to be determined then the order is not final within Art. 133.  Jethanand & Sons v. State  of U. P. (3) and Sardar Syedna Taher Saifuddin  Sahib v.  The  State  of Bombay(4).  Considering  the  history  of legislation of S. 66A of the Income-tax Act and the fact (1) (1923) L.R.,50 I.A. 212, 223. (2) [1950] S.C.R. 799. (3) A.I.R. 1961 S.C. 794. (4)  [1958] S.C.R. 1007, 880 that the High Court was exercising its advisory jurisdiction and  that it passed an interlocutory order calling upon  the tribunal  to  make a supplemental statement of the  case  it cannot  be  said  that it was a judgment  against  which  an appeal  was competent under the provisions of s.  66A(2)  of the Income-tax Act. We  shall  next  deal with the question  whether  the  order passed asking for a supplemental statement with a  direction for  taking additional evidence was permissible to the  High Court  under  s.66(4) of the, Income-tax Act.  As  we,  have said the jurisdiction of the High Court is only advisory and is acquired by virtue of an express provision of the Income- tax Act and is limited to answering the questions stated  to the High Court for the purpose of soliciting its opinion  on those  questions and those questions must arise out  of  the order  passed in appeal by the Appellate Tribunal.  This  is

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clear  from  sub-ss.  (1) and (2) of  s.  66.   Under  those provisions the only question of law which can be referred to the  High  Court is any question of law arising out  of  the order of the Tribunal and thus if a question does not  arise out  of  the order of the Appellate Tribunal  it  cannot  be referred  to  the  High Court.  For the drawing  up  of  the statement  of  the  case the Tribunal has  before  it  facts admitted  or found and they form the basis of the  statement submitted to the High Court.  If necessary facts which  will lay  the  foundation of raising a question of  law  are  not there then there in no basis for reference of that  question to  the High Court because only on the basis of facts  found by the Tribunal or admitted before it can a question of  law arise.  Thus only on the basis of facts admitted or found on the  record can a statement of case be submitted.  When  the case  stated  comes to the’ High Court and  the  High  court finds it necessary to have a supple- mental statement of the case in order to answer question of law which is raised then it can direct such 881 statement   to  be  submitted  with  such   additions   ’and alterations  as  it  may  direct  but  the  statement   must necessarily  be  based  on facts which are  already  on  the record and the High Court cannot ask for additional facts to be  brought  in because these would not be in  regard  to  a question  which  arises from the order of the  tribunal  but would be a statement based on something which was not before the  Appellate Tribunal when it passed its appellate  order. Therefore although the High Court has the power to direct  a supplemental statement to be made it has no power to  direct additional evidence being taken.  It was so held in The  New Jahangir  Vakil Mills v. The Commissioner of  Income-tax(1). That  was  a  case  similar to the one  before  us  and  the question  for decision there was whether the  sale  proceeds had  been  received at Bhavnagar because the  cheques  etc., were  sent to Bhavnagar.  The High Court held that the  mere receipts of cheques by post at Bhavnagar was not  conclusive in the absence of a further finding whether the cheques were sent  by  post  by  request,  express  or  implied,  of  the assessee.   In  that  case  the  High  Court  asked  for   a supplemental   statement  of  the  case  and  also   allowed additional evidence to be given and this Court held that  s. 66(4)  did not empower the High Court to  direct  additional evidence  being  taken and that  additions  and  alterations mentioned in that sub-section related only to such facts  as already formed part of the record but had not been  included by the Appellate Tribunal in the statement of the case.   In a  latter case Mrs. Kummben D. Mahadevia v. Commissioner  of Income-tax, Bombay(2) the assessee received dividends out of the profits of a company which had accrued partly in British India  and  partly in Baroda State.  The  assessee  did  not bring  the income into British India and claimed benefit  of para  4 of the Merged States (Taxation  Concessions)  Order. The  Appellate Tribunal held that the income did not  accrue to  the  assessee in Baroda State but did  not  decide the question whether she was entitled to the (1) (1900] 1 S.C.R. 249. (2) [1960] 3 S.C.R 417, 882 benefit of Taxation Concessions Order.  The High Court  held that  the  Taxation Concessions Order did not apply  to  the assessee  but did not decide the question as to whether  the income  had accrued to the assessee in Baroda  State.   Thus the  Appellate  Tribunal raised one question  and  the  High Court answered another.  This Court held that the High Court

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had  exceeded  its jurisdiction in going out  of  the  point raised  by  the Appellate Tribunal and decided  a  different point of law and that s. 66, of the Income-tax Act empowered the  High Court to answer a question of law arising  out  of the  order of the Appellate Tribunal and it did  not  confer any  jurisdiction to decide a different question of law  not arising out of such order but it was possible that the  same question  of law may involve different facets and  the  High Court  could amplify the question to take in all the  facets but  the  question  must still be one  arising  out  of  the Appellate Tribunal’s order which was before the Tribunal  or was  decided  by  it.   It  could  not  decide  an  entirely different question. In  a later case Zoraster & Co. V. commissioner  of  Income- tax(1),  the  assessee supplied to  the  Central  Government F.O.R.  Jaipur  certain goods and payment  was  received  by cheques  which were also received at Jaipur.   The  assessee contended that the income was received at Jaipur outside the taxable  territories.  This contention was not  accepted  by the  Income-tax  Appellate  Tribunal.   The  assessee   then applied  for reference to the High Court under s.  66(1)  of the Income-tax Act and a question of law was referred to the High  Court.   The  High  Court remanded  the  case  to  the Appellate  Tribunal for a supplemental statement of case  to find whether cheques were sent to the assessee by post or by hand  and  what  direction, if any, had been  given  by  the assessee  firm  to the Government department.  It  was  held that  such a supplemental statement could be called for  and in the absence of anything expressly, (1)  [1961) 1 S.C.R. 210.  883 stated  in the order of the High Court to the  contrary,  it cannot  be said that the direction. given would include  the admitting of any fresh evidence as that had been  prohibited by  the  New Jehangir Vakil Mill’s case(1).  At p.  219  the Court observed :-               ,"It  follows  from this that the  enquiry  in               such cases must be to see whether the question               decided by the     Tribunal     admits     the               consideration  of the new point as an integral               or even an incidental part thereof.  Even  so,               the supplemental statement which the  Tribunal               is  directed  to submit must  arise  from  the               facts  admitted and or found by the  Tribunal,               and   should  not  open  the  door  to   fresh               evidence.") Another  case  where the scope of s. 66(1)  was  defined  is Commissioner Of Income-tax. v. Scindia Steam Navigation  Co. Ltd.(2).  It  was  there held that the  High.   Court  acted purely  in  its  advisory capacity  on  a,  reference  which properly  came before it, under S. 66(1) or,. (2).  It  gave advice  to the Appellate Tribunal but ultimately it was  for the  Tribual  to  give effect, to that  advice.   The  Court interpreted the words "any question of law arising out of  " in  sub-s. (1) of S. 66. supplemental statement of the  case was  also called for in commissioner of Income-tax v.  Ogale glass Works (3) but no additional evidence was ordered to be taken.  In that case no objection was taken to the order for a supplemental statement. Thus  it appears that the jurisdiction of the High Court  is advisory  under  s. 66 of the Income-tax  Act.   Under  that section  a  question of law can be referred  soliciting  its opinion  but the jurisdiction of the High Court is  confined to giving an opinion on that question of law arising out  of the order of the Appellate        Tribunal.   It   has    no

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jurisdiction to raise another question   or  to   answer   a different question. In order  to answer the question  raised in the statement (1) [1960] 1 S.C.R 249.           (2)[1962] 1 S.C.R. 788. (3) [1955] 1 S.C.R. 185, 884 of  the  case  the High Court may  ask  for  a  supplemental statement but that statement also is to be, confined to  the placing  of facts already on the record.’  The  supplemental statement  of the case may contain alterations or  additions as the High Court may direct but those facts must be already on  the  record as the High Court has no power  to  ask  for additional evidence to be taken.  Secondly, When the supple- mental statement of the case is directed to be submitted  it is  not  a judgment or a final order as  understood  in  its strict legal and proper sense nor a judgment in the sense it is  used in the Income-tax Act i.e., s.66(5) or s.  66A  (2) i.e.,  a  judgment which sets out reasons  for  the  opinion which the High Court gives on the question submitted to it. In  this view of the matter we are of the opinion  that  the High  Court  had no jurisdiction to direct the  Tribunal  to submit  a supplemental statement of the, case  after  taking additional evidence.  As was done in the New Jehangir  Vakil Mill’s (1) case the order of this Court is that the  appeals be allowed and the matter remitted to the High Court to give its  decision  on  the question of law  referred  to  it  as required under s.66(5) of the Act.  We express no opinion on the  question whether the High Court should, in this  case,, ask  for a supplemental statement of the case confined’:  to the  facts  already on the record.  That is a  matter  which should  be left to the High Court.  The respondent will  pay the  costs  of the appellant in this Court and in  the  High Court.                  Appeals allowed.  Cases remitted.  (1)  [1960] 1 S.C.r. 249. 885