13 May 1998
Supreme Court
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THE KERALA STATE COOPERATIVE, MARKETING FEDERATION LIMITED. Vs COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX

Bench: S.C. AGRAWAL,S.P. KURGUKAR,S. RAJENDRA BABU
Case number: Appeal Civil 506 of 1994


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PETITIONER: THE KERALA STATE COOPERATIVE, MARKETING FEDERATION LIMITED.

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX

DATE OF JUDGMENT:       13/05/1998

BENCH: S.C. AGRAWAL, S.P. KURGUKAR, S. RAJENDRA BABU

ACT:

HEADNOTE:

JUDGMENT:                             WITH                C.A.NOS. 15430/96, 2354-55/96                       J U D G M E N T Rajendra Babu, J.      We have  heard a  batch of  cases in which the question raised for  our consideration  is whether the assesses under the Income  Tax Act  which are  Co-operative  Societies  are entitled to deduction under Section 80P (2) (a) (iii) of the Income Tax  Act, 1961  in resoet  of the purchases made from member societies ?      For purposes  of convenience we shall set out the facts and decide  one of these cases, number. C.A.NO. 506 of 1994, filed by  the Kerala  State Cooperative Marketing Federation Limited and  apply the result there so in other matters. The society in  question is  registered  under  the  Kerala  Co- operative Societies  Act and is an assessee under the Income Tax Act,  1961 (hereinafter  referred to  as "the  Act")  in respect of  profits earned  by it  out of the purchases made from the  member societies.  The assessee  which is  an apex society  purchased   cashew  from  the  primary  cooperative societies who  are its  members. The total purchases made by it were to the extent of Rs. 33,23,71,339/- out of which the purchases  from  member  societies  was  in  a  sum  of  Rs. 95.02.851/. The  claim for exemption of this amount was made on the  basis that  it marketed  agricultural produce of its members. The  Income Tax  Officer  rejected  the  claim.  On appeal, the  Commissioner of  Income Tax  (Appeals) took the view that  the assessee  is entitled  to exemption under the aforesaid  provisions   in  respect   of  the   income  from procurement  of  cashew  nuts  from  the  member  societies. However he  made it  clear that the said exemption would not be applicable  for purchases  or supplies  made  by  primary societies or service societies which were not members of the assessee society.  The matter  was carried further in second appeal by  the Department  to the  Appellate Tribunal  which took the  view  that  the  assessee  would  be  entitled  to exemption under  the aforesaid  provisions of  the Act.  The assessee also  filed a second appeal claiming that the whole profit and  gains of  the business was entitled to deduction under Section  80-92 (a)  (iii) of  the  Act.  The  Tribunal

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dismissed both  sets of appeals. The Department sought for a reference on  the question  referred to  above to  the  High Court. The  High Court  held that  in view  of the  decision rendered by it earlier, the assessee was entitled to succeed and question referred to them should be answered against the revenue. However,  in view  of the decision of this Court in Assam  Co-operative   Apex  Marketing   Society   Ltd.   vs. Commissioner of  Income Tax  (Add1.) 201 I.T.R. 338, it held that the  assessee would  not be entitled to deduction under the said  provision in  respect of  purchases made  from its member societies  and thus answered the question referred to it in the negative against the assessee and in favour of the revenue. In  Assam Co-operative  Apex Marketing Society Ltd. vs. Commissioner  of Income  Tax  (Add1.),  this  Court  was concerned with the scope of Section 81 of the Income Tax Act which after  omitting the  portions of  the provisions  with which we are not concerned, read as follows :-      "81.     Income   of   co-operative      societies :-      Income-tax shall  not be payable by      a co-operative society-           (i) in  respect of the profits                and  gains   of  business                carried on  by it,  if it                is -----           (a) ....           (b) ....           (c) a  society engaged  in the                marketing     of      the                agricultural  produce  of                its      members;      or                ..........."      By Finance  Act No.  2 of  1967. Section 81 was deleted with effect  from 1.4.1968  and Section 80P was incorporated in  the  Act  with  effect  from  1.4.1968,  Section    80-P (2)(a)(iii) after omitting the portion with which we are not concerned, reads as follows :-      "80-P(1) Where,  in the  case of an      assessee   being   a   co-operative      society,  the  gross  total  income      includes any  income referred to in      sub-section  (2),  there  shall  be      deducted, in  accordance  with  and      subject to  the provisions  of this      section, the sums specified in sub-      section (2). In computing the total      income of the assessee.           (2) The  sums referred  to  in      sub-section  (1)   shall   be   the      following, namely :-           (a)  in  the  case  of  a  co-                operative society engaged                in--           (i) ........           (ii) .....           (iii)  the  marketing  of  the                agricultural  produce  of                its member ; or                ......."      Shri K.  Parasaran, learned Senior counsel on behalf of the appellants  submitted that  a proper  reading of section 80-P of  the Act and the scheme would make it clear that the exemption from  taxation so far as marketing of agricultural produce of  its members  would include the society which was marketing agricultural  produce of its members who are other

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societies  and   is  not  necessarily  confined  to  primary societies. He  submitted that  the view  expressed  by  this Court to  the contrary  in Assam  Cooperative Society’s case (supra) requires re-consideration. The basis upon which this Court took  that view  is that Section 81(1)(c) was intended to  encourage  basic  level  societies  engaged  in  cottage industries  in   marketing  agricultural  produce  of  their members  and  those  engaged  in  purchasing  and  supplying agricultural implements  etc to their members and so on. THE WORDS ‘agricultural  produce of its members’ will have to be understood  concerning  with  that  object  and  if  not  so understood even a co-operative society comprising of traders dealing in agricultural produce would become entitled to the exemption which  would never  have been the intention of the Parliament.   Agricultural    produce   produced    by   the agriculturists could  be  legitimately  called  agricultural produce in  his hands, but not in the hands of traders which would be  an agricultural commodity and, therefore, it would cease to be an agricultural produce and thus, this Court had negatived the claim of the assessee in that case.      Mr. Viswanatha  Iyer, learned  senior counsel  for  the Department submitted  that the  view taken  by this Court in Assam Cooperative  Society’s case  (supra) obes  not require any re-consideration  but on the other hand, in the light of the said decision, these appeals are liable to be dismissed.      The classes of societies covered by Section 80-P of the Act are as follows :- (a)  engaged in  business of  banking and  providing  credit      facilities to its members ; (b)  cottage industry ; (c)  society engaged  in marketing  agricultural produce  of      its members; (d)  engaged in produce of agricultural implements, seeds,      livestock or other articles intended for agriculture      for the purpose of supplying them to its member; (e)  a society  engaged in the processing without the aid of      power of the agricultural produce of its members; or (f)  a primary  society engaged  in supplying milk raised by      its members to a federal milk cooperative society.      We may  notice that  the provision is introduced with a view to  encouraging and  promoting growth  of  co-operative sector in  the economic life of the country and in pursuance of the declared policy of the Government. The correct way of reading the  different heads  of exemption enumerated in the section would  be to  treat each  as a separate and distinct head of  exemption. Whenever a question arises as to whether any particular  category of  an  income  of  a  co-operative society is  exempt from  tax what  has to be seen is whether income fell within any of the several heads of exemption. If it fell  within any  one head of exemption, it would be free from tax notwithstanding that the conditions of another head of exemption  are not  satisfied and such income is not free from tax  under  that  head  of  exemption.  The  expression "marketing" is  an expression  of wide  import. It  involves exchange functions  such as  buying  and  selling,  physical functions such  as storage,  transportation, processing  and other  commercial   activities  such   as   standardisation, financing, marketing  intelligence etc.  Such activities can be carried  on by  an Apex  Society rather  than  a  primary society.      So long as agricultural produce handled by the assessee belonged to  its members  it was  entitled to  exemption  in respect of  the profits  derived from  the marketing  of the same. Whether  the members  came by  the produce  because of their own  agricultural activities  or whether they acquired

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it by  purchasing it  from cultivators was of no consequence for the  purpose of  determining whether  the  assessed  was entitled to  the exemption.  The only condition required for qualifying the  assessee’s income for exemption was that the assessee’s business must be that of marketing, the marketing must  be  of  agricultural  produce  and  that  agricultural produce must  have belonged  to the  members of the assessee society before  they came up for marketing by it, whether on its own  account or  on account  of the  members themselves. Thus there  is no  scope to  limit the  exemption.  The  co- operative  societies   are  engaged   in  marketing   of  an agricultural produce  both of  its members as well as of non members. In  the latter case, there is no difference between a cooperative society or any other business organisation and so will  not be  entitled to  exemption.  The  exemption  is intended to  cover all  cases where a cooperative society is engaged in  marketing agricultural  produce of  its members. Section 80-P  does not  in effect  limit the  scope  of  the exemption to  agricultural produce  raised by  members alone but includes  agricultural  produce  raised  by  others  but belonging to cooperative societies. The contrast in the said provision is with reference to the marketing of agricultural produce of the members of the society of that purchased from non members.      A reading  of the provisions of Section 80-P of the Act would indicate  the manner in which the exemptions under the said provisions  are sought  to b  e extended.  Whenever the legislature wanted  to restrict  the exemption  to a primary co-operative society it was so made clear as it evident from clause (f)  referred to  above with  reference to a milk co- operative  society   that  a   primary  society  engaged  in supplying milk  is entitled  to such exemption while denying the same to a federal milk co-operative society, put no such distinction is  made with  reference to  a banking  business which provides trade facilities to its members. It is clear, therefore, that  the legislature did not intend to limit the scope  of   exemption  only   to  those  which  are  primary societies. If a small agricultural co-operative society does not have  any marketing facilities it can certainly become a member of  apex society  which may market the produce of its members. It  was submitted  on behalf of the Department that the  member   societies  themselves   do   not   raise   the agricultural produce.  The societies only market the produce raised  by   their  members  and  do  not  themselves  raise agricultural produce.  The language  adopted in Section 80-P (2)(a)(iii) with  which we  are  concerned  will  admit  the interpretation that  the society  engaged  in  marketing  of agricultural produce  of its members as agricultural produce "belonging to"  its members  which is not necessarily raised by such  members. Thus,  when the provisions of section 80-P of the Act admits of a wider exemption there is no reason to cut down  the scope  of the  provision as indicated in Assam Cooperative Apex Marketing Society’s case.      In an unreported decision C.I.T. Delhi vs. M/s National Agricultural  Cooperative   Marketing  Federation   Limited, Delhi.  I.T.R.  No.  241/75,  this  very  question  has  ben exhaustively considered by a Division Bench of High Court of Delhi speaking through Ranganathan, J. (who later on adorned this Court) observed as follows :-      "17 (i)   At  the outset one should      consider  the   plain  and  natural      meaning  of   the  words   "of  its      members". Dr.  Pal has  referred us      to the  dictionary meanings of this      proposition.  The   Shorter  Oxford

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    English Dictionary  (IIIrd Edn.  P.      1360) gives  the following  meaning      :-           "Derivation,  origin,  source,      starting  point,   indicating   the      person or  things  whence  anything      originates, comes,  is acquired  or      nought, in  the sense  belonging or      pertaining  to,   belonging  to   a      person."      "The   Webster’s    New   Twentieth      Century Dictionary (IInd End, 1979,      P. (1241)  describes the  following      implications to it ;           "derived   or   coming   from,      belonging to,  having to  do  with,      relating to, pertaining to.:      "According to Corpus Juris Secundum      (Vol. 76  0.85) the  word "of"  may      denote "novice,  such as  origin or      existence"., It  is also defined as      meaning "belonging  to"  pertaining      to, connected  with  or  associated      with".  It   is  also   defined  no      meaning "from, among by, concerning      in, or  over". It also means "owned      or manufactured  by" or it may mean      "residing or  resident in".  It has      been   held    equivalent   to   or      synonymous with  "for". It  is also      used as  a word  of  identification      and relation.  These meanings would      suggest the  necessity only of some      links  connection   or  association      between the  member and  the  goods      and  the  word  does  not,  in  its      ordinary    connotation,    involve      anything further.      "(ii)  If   the  above   word   had      appeared in  isolation, there would      have been,  we think, no difficulty      in attributing the above meaning to      it. The about raised by the revenue      is  based,  it  seems  to  us,  not      because the  word "of" is narrow in      its meaning  out by  attempting  to      restrict its  meaning by  reference      to the word which precedes it, thus      curbing the  natural expanse of the      expression  "of  its  members"  and      equating "produce  of"  to  produce      raised  by".  Not  only  does  this      interpretation   involve    reading      words into the statute that are not      there; we   think  that it attaches      an undue  significance top  what is      nothing more  than the  natural use      of  an  associate  word  familiarly      employed in  the context. In common      parlance,     one     speaks     of      "agricultural  produce"  to  denote      crops raised  in the  soil. This is      in contradistinction,  not only  to      agricultural   implements,    sees,      livestock   or    other    articles

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    intended   for   agriculture   vide      Section 81(1)(a)  and Section  80-P      (2)(a)(iv) - out also to industrial      and  other   types   of   products.      Clauses (a)  to  (f)    of  Section      81(1) and  Clauses (i)  to  (v)  of      Section  80-P   (2)(a)   refer   to      various aspects  of  activities  in      the rural sector and the use of the      word ‘produce’  is only intended to      restrict  the   exemption  in   the      clause that  is being considered by      us only to ‘crops’ and not to other      agricultural commodities,  articles      or  things.   The  word   ‘produce’      should not,  therefore, be  allowed      to  cast   it   shadow   over   the      preposition   succeeding   it   and      denude  and  denydrate  it  of  its      full potentiality.      "(iii) We  think that,  rather than      attempting to read the word ‘of’ in      the light  of the  words  preceding      it,  the  proper  emphasis  in  the      clause is obtained by reading it in      conjunction  with  the  words  that      follow it.  Here the  words ‘of its      members’ are  used to  bring out  a      contract with  agricultural produce      of persons  other than  members.  A      cooperative society  engaged in the      marketing of  agricultural  produce      can purchase  agricultural  produce      both from  its members  as well  as      from  outsiders.  If  it  purchases      from, sells  to or  otherwise deals      with outsiders  than such a society      is as  good as  any other  business      organisation and  an exemption  may      not be called for. The exemption is      intended   to    cases   where    a      cooperative society is intended for      a particular purpose by its members      and its  transactions  are  carried      out only with its members. In other      words the  contrast in  Section  81      (1)(c)   is    not   between    the      agricultural  produce   raised   by      members  and  agricultural  produce      raised by  others. The  contrast is      between    agricultural     produce      acquired    from     members    and      agricultural   produced   purchased      from outsiders.  It this  aspect is      kept in  mind there would appear to      be no  reason  why  the  word  ‘of’      should not  be given  its  ordinary      meaning   of    belonging   to   or      ‘pertaining to’."      "(iv)  It   is  a   clear  rule  of      statutory  construction   that,  in      trying   to   interpret   statutory      provision,  attention   should   be      given to  the setting  in which the      provision occurs and regard must be

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    had to  the language  of an  entire      group of connected provisions which      may form  an integral whole. Hence,      for understanding  the scope of the      exemption in  Section  81(1)(a)/80-      P(2)(a)  one  should  look  at  the      whole  scheme   of  the  provisions      contained in  Section 81, 82 and 93      of  the   1961   Act   till   their      amendment  in   1968  and   Section      10(29)  and  80-P  thereafter.  All      these provisions  correspond to one      subject  matter   dealt   with   in      Section 14(2)  to (b)  of the  1922      Act. If  we read all those Sections      together then  it will  be apparent      that there is no reason to restrict      the  scope   of  the  exemption  by      giving an  unduly narrow meaning to      the word  "of" in Section 81(1)(a).      For   instance   Section   81(1)(b)      grants an exemption in respect of a      society  engaged   in   a   cottage      industry. These words are very wide      and would  not  appear  to  confine      exemption only  to cases  where the      members  of   the  society  are  so      engaged. The  society could  engage      in a  cottage industry by employing      the services  of other  workmen and      by     purchasing     the     goods      manufactured by  persons other than      members. Similarly, the language of      clause (f)  is also  helpful  in  a      way. Though  it is  true  that  the      words "raised by" have been used in      that clause  because of  the nature      of the  society and  the nature  of      the   commodity    involved,    the      language permits  exemption to such      a  society   even  where  the  milk      supply to  it by  the members might      have been  obtained  (of raised) by      the  members  not  by  milking  the      cattle  owned   by  them   but   by      purchasing it from other farmers or      owners of  cattle. That clause also      shows  that   if  the   legislature      wanted an  exemption  to  be  given      only to a      primary society’  it      specifically said  so. An  indirect      restriction   of    the   exemption      conferred by  clause  (c)  only  to      primary   societies    would   not,      therefore, appear  to be justified.      Again when  one turns to Section 81      (iv) an  exemption is  provided for      in respect of any income derived by      a  cooperative   society  from  the      letting of  godowns or  ware-houses      for    storage,    processing    or      facilitating   the   marketing   of      commodities. This  again goes  does      not limit  the exemption to godowns      or  ware-houses  belonging  to  the

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    members or required for the purpose      of  storage   etc.  of  commodities      belonging   to   them.   The   same      language is  also used  in  Section      83.  On  the  contrary,  where  the      legislature intends restricting the      scope   of    the   exemption    if      specifically says  so. For example,      under    Section    81(1)(a)    the      exemption is restricted in the case      o f  a  credit  society,  to  cases      where  the  credit  facilities  are      extended to the members. Similarly,      where   a    cooperative    society      purchased  agricultural  implements      etc. intended  for agriculture  its      income  from   such  activities  is      exempt only  if the  purpose of the      purchase   is    to   supply    the      commodities to  the members  of the      society. As  contrasted with  these      provisions there  is no restrictive      implication  in   the  language  of      Section    81(1)(a)     and     80-      P(2)(a)(iii)."      We agree with this view. The analysis made by the Delhi High Court  is with  reference to lexicographical meaning of the expression ‘of’ occurring in the relevant provision, the use of  the  expression  in  the  context,  setting  of  the different categories  of societies  in  the  legislation  in comparison with  other provision thereof would indicate that the expression  with other  provision thereof would indicate that the  expression ‘of’ acquires the meaning a s‘belonging to’. Any  expression in  any enactment  will like  chameleon acquire colour  in the  background in  which it  is situate. Trite, to  say, that  a  word  acquires  meaning  only  with reference to text and context.      In C.I.T.  vs. Ryots  Agricultural Produce Co-operative Marketing Society  Ltd. 115  ITR 709,  wherein the  scope of Section 81(1)(c)  as it stood then was considered in respect of income  from marketing  of agricultural  produce  of  its members after processing it.      In C.I.T. vs. Gujarat-IV vs. Karjan Co-operative Cotton Sale, Ginnino  and Pressing  Society Ltd.  159  I.T.R.  821, again an identical question was considered. The Gujarat High Court explained  the expression  used in Section 80-P of the Income Tax  Act. So  long as  the commodity  brought to  the assessee society  was agricultural  produce and  belonged to its members  it was  agricultural produce of its members, be the member  a co-operative  society in  itself or individual member, the  concept was  ownership of agricultural produce. On that basis the said provision was interpreted and it fits in with the view taken by us.      Again in  C.I.T. vs.  Haryana State Co-operative Supply and Marketing  Federation Limited  18 I.T.R 53, an identical view as  taken by  the Gujarat  High Court adverted to by us just now was taken.      In  Meenachil   Rubber  Marketing  and  Processing  Co- operative Society  Limited vs.  C.I.T. 193  I.T.R.  79,  the Kerala  High  Court  had  occasion  to  examine  this  short question and  it took  the view  that the provision had been incorporate bearing  in mind  that the  exemption  had  been granted to  encourage vital  national activity in the nature of rural  economy in  the co-operative sector and therefore, the incorporated  be placed  on the provision should advance

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that intention.  Explaining the  meaning of marketing as was done by  the Karnataka  High Court to which we have adverted to earlier,  the Kerala High Court was of the view that once the co-operative  society buys  the agricultural  produce of the members of the society that buying is the first activity in  the  several  links  of  the  activities  to  constitute marketing  by   the  co-operative  society  is  entitled  to exemption.      Similarly  in  C.I.T.  vs.  Kerala  State  Co-operative Marketing Federation  Ltd. 193 I.T.R. 624, this question was again considered  and the  view taken  by the  Gujarat  High Court to which we have adverted to in the Karjon Cooperative Soeicty Ltd.  case (supra)  was reiterated.  In  C.I.T.  vs. Tamil Nadu Co-operative Marketing Federation Ltd. 144 I.T.R. 74, it  was held  that the expression "co-operative society" occurring in section 80P (1) covers any co-operative society whether it is a primary society or an apex society and hence reference to  members in  clause (iv) of section 80P (2) can be taken  to refer  to the  members of  a primary society or members of an apex society as the case may be.      The attention  of this Court does not seem to have been drawn  to   the  aforesaid  decision  while  deciding  Assam Cooperative Society’s  case. With  respect,  we,  therefore, hold that the view taken therein requires reconsideration as stated earlier  by us.  In the   result,  the order  of  the Kerala High  Court following  the  decision of this Court in Assam Cooperative  Societies is  reversed. We  hold that the society engaged  in the marketing of agricultural produce of its members  would mean  not only  such societies which deal with the  produce raised  by the members who are individuals or  societies   which  are  members  thereof  who  may  have purchased such goods from the agriculturists. Thus, we allow the civil appeal by setting aside the order made by the High Court and  answering the  question referred  to  us  in  the affirmative in  favour of  the assessee  and  against  t  he revenue. There shall be no order as to costs.      Following this  decision, we  dismiss the  Civil Appeal Nos. 15430/96, and 2354-2355/96.