http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 1 of 3  

PETITIONER: THE DEPUTY REGISTRAR, CO-OPERATIVE SOCIETIES, FAIZABAD.

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: SACHINDRA NATH PANDEY & ORS.

DATE OF JUDGMENT21/02/1995

BENCH: JEEVAN REDDY, B.P. (J) BENCH: JEEVAN REDDY, B.P. (J) MANOHAR SUJATA V. (J)

CITATION:  1995 SCC  (3) 134        JT 1995 (2)   407  1995 SCALE  (1)848

ACT:

HEADNOTE:

JUDGMENT: 1.   Leave granted.  Heard counsel for the parties. 2.   This  appeal  is preferred against the  judgment  of  a learned  Single Judge of the Allahabad High  Court  (Lucknow Bench)  allowing  the  writ  petition  filed  by  the  first respondent herein. 3.   The  first respondent was appointed as  a  Co-operative Supervisor in 1961.  In August 1976, he was working as  Seed Store  Incharge-cum-Secretary, Sahkari Sangh,  Raniwan.   On 19th  August, 1976 he was transferred to Gonda, but  he  did not  hand over the charge.  It is alleged that he  took  the records   of  the  society  with  him  and  absconded.’   On inspection  of the Raniwan Seed Store in October  1976,  the irregularities  and misappropriation allegedly committed  by the respondent came to light.  A FIR was lodged against  the first  respondent for criminal breach of trust  in  November 1976  and  on 13.12.1976, the first  respondent  was  placed under suspension pending inquiry into charges against him,  409 and an Inquiry Officer appointed. Memo of charges was issued to  the  first respondent but the case of the  appellant  is that  it  could  not be served  upon  the  first  respondent because he was avoiding service and did not also  co-operate in the conduct of the inquiry.  Ultimately the first respon- dent  was dismissed by an order dated 20th April, 1978  made by the Deputy Registrar.  The respondent filed an appeal but while the appeal was pending he filed a writ petition in the High  Court  and requested for dismissal of  his  appeal  as withdrawn.  The Appellate Authority, however, dismissed  the appeal on merits. 4.   On  15th January, 1992 the High Court allowed the  writ petition  (W.P.No.2990  of 1979) on the only ground  that  a copy  of the Inquiry Officer’s Report was not  furnished  to the first respondent before dismissing him and that it is  a violation of the principle of natural justice.  Reliance was placed upon the decision of this Court in Union of India and

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 2 of 3  

Others  v.  Mohd.  Ramzan Khan (1991 (1) SCC  588).   On  an appeal being preferred by the appellant against that  order, this  Court  set aside the Judgment of the  High  Court  and remitted  the  matter  for disposing of  the  writ  petition afresh  after  considering the other grounds raised  by  the first  respondent.  It is then that the impugned  order  was made on 7th December, 1993 allowing the writ petition again. The only ground on which the High Court has allowed the writ petition on this occasion is that the Inquiry Officer  ought to  have  held an inquiry "by recording  the  statements  of witnesses and send his report to the Disciplinary Authority" even  if the first respondent failed to co-operate with  the Inquiry  Officer.   Since  it was not  done,  the  order  of dismissal has been held to be bad. 5.  The  learned counsel for the appellant submits  that  in this  case  the first respondent adopted a course  of  total noncooperation  and  procrastination  and  that  inspite  of repeated  opportunities  being given he did not  respond  or participate  in the inquiry.  The first respondent  did  not even  care  to file an explanation or reply to the  memo  of charges.   In  the  circumstances, the  authorities  had  no option but to hold that the charges are proved.  Even  after the report of the Inquiry Officer was submitted, a number of opportunities were given which he again failed to avail  of. It  is submitted that though the whole history of  the  case has been set out in the counter affidavit filed in the  High Court,  the learned Judge did not notice any of those  facts and  yet allowed the writ petition on an  untenable  ground. It  is further contended that according to Regulation 68  of the  Cooperative Federal Authority  (Business)  Regulations, 1976,  it  was not obligatory upon the  Inquiry  Officer  to record  the  evidence of the witnesses where the  first  re- spondcnt  did neither submit a reply nor an  explanation  to the memo of charges.  Though he was apprised of the inquiry, he did not care to attend inspite of repeated opportunities. In such a situation, he cannot complain of not recording the evidence of witnesses and other evidence, it is submitted. 6.   On  the  other hand, Shri  Raju  Ramachandran,  learned counsel for the first respondent submitted that it is not  a case where the first respondent refused or failed to  submit his  reply/explanation  to the memo of charges but  that  he could not do so in view of the refusal of the authorities to grant  him  inspection of the relevant  documents.   Learned counsel submitted that the charge of non-co-operation is 410 unsustainable  in the facts and circumstances of  the  case. He  also  impressed  upon us  that  though  the  proceedings against  the first respondent were initiated as far back  as 1978,  proceeding in that behalf arc still  continuing  even after the expiry of about 16 years. 7.   On  a perusal of charges, we find that the charges  are very serious.  We arc, therefore, not inclined to close  the matter  only on the ground that about 16 years have  elapsed since the date of commencement of disciplinary  proceedings, more  particularly when the appellant alone cannot  be  held responsible  for  this  delay.  So far  as  the  merits  are concerned,  we  regret to say that the High  Court  has  not dealt with the submission of the appellant - that inspite of being  given a number of opportunities the first  respondent has,  failed to avail of them.  If the appellant’s  allegta- tions are true then the appellant cannot be fitulted for not holding  a  regular  inquiry  (recording  the  evidence   of witnesses  and  so on).  The High Court  has  assumed,  even without referring to Regulation 68 aforesaid that holding of an  oral  inquiry  was  obligatory.   Indeed,  one  of   the

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 3 of 3  

questions in the writ petition may be the interpretation  of Regulation  68.  On facts, the first respondent has his  own version.  In the circumstances, the writ petition could  not have  been allowed unless it was held that  the  appellant’s version   of  events  is  not  true  and  that   the   first respondent’s version is true.  In the circumstances, we have no  alternative but to set aside the order under appeal  and remit  the matter to the High Court once again for  disposal of the writ petition afresh in the light of the observations made  herein.  Since the matter is a very old one it is  but appropriate  that  the matter is dealt  with  expeditiously. Perhaps, it would be appropriate if the Court looks into the records relating to the disciplinary proceedings also. 8.The   appeal  is  accordingly  allowed  with   the   above directions.  No costs.