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PETITIONER: THE COMMISSIONER OF INCOME-TAX,HYDERABAD

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: DEWAN BAHADUR RAMGOPAL MILLS LTD.

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 08/11/1960

BENCH: DAS, S.K. BENCH: DAS, S.K. HIDAYATULLAH, M. GUPTA, K.C. DAS SHAH, J.C. AYYANGAR, N. RAJAGOPALA

CITATION:  1961 AIR  338            1961 SCR  (2) 318  CITATOR INFO :  MV         1966 SC1026  (2,16)  R          1967 SC 266  (15)  F          1968 SC 162  (18)  E          1968 SC 579  (15)  E          1975 SC 797  (2,3,5,7,30,57,60,62)  F          1989 SC1719  (6,7,10,16,17,18,19,20)  RF         1992 SC1782  (10)

ACT: Income  Tax--Depreciation  allowance--Written  down  value-- Hyderabad Income-tax law--Repeal and extension of Indian In- come-tax  law--Central Government’s  notification  Providing for    removal    of   difficulties   in    such    extended law--Validity--Retrospective  effect--Taxation Laws (Part  B States)  (Removal  of  Difficulties) Order,  1950,  Para  2, Explanation--Finance  Act,  1950 (25 of 1950),  ss.  3,  12, 13--Constitution of India, Art. 14.

HEADNOTE: Prior  to  January  26, 1950, when the  erstwhile  State  of Hyderabad  merged in the Union of India and became a Part  B State  the  respondent company was  assessed  to  income-tax under  the Hyderabad Income-tax Act, by  which  depreciation allowance  was given to it on the basis of the written  down value of its assets,     such   as   buildings,   machinery, plants, etc., in accordance with cl.    (C)  of S. 12(5)  of that Act, which provided that in the case of assets acquired before the previous year and before the commencement of  the Act, the written down value would be the actual cost to  the assessee  less (1) depreciation at the rates  applicable  to the assets calculated on the actual costs for the first year since  acquisition and for the next year on the actual  cost diminished by the depreciation allowance for one year and so on,  for each year upto the commencement of that  Act,  and, (ii)  depreciation actually allowed to the assessee on  such assets for each financial year after the commencement of the Act.  After the merger of Hyderabad with the Union of India, by  ss. 3 and 13 of the Finance Act, 950, the taxation  laws in  force in the State were repealed and the Indian  Income-

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tax Act, 1922, was extended to that area; and in exercise of the powers conferred by S. 12 of the Finance Act, 1950,  the Central  Government issued a notification dated December  2, 1950,  called the Taxation Laws (Part B States) (Removal  of Difficulties)  Order,  1950.   Paragraph  2  of  the   Order provided  that " in making any assessment under  the  Indian Income-tax  A ct,  1922, all depreciation  actually  allowed under  any  laws or rules of a Part B State......  shall  be taken  into account in computing the aggregate  depreciation allowance referred to in proviso (c) to s. 10(2)(vi) and the written down value under s. 10(5)(b) of the said Act ". For the assessment year 1951-52 the respondent was  assessed for  the  first time under the Indian  Income-tax  Act,  and basing its claim on para. 2 of the aforesaid Order it  asked for 319 the value thereof at their inception and deducting therefrom such  depreciation as was allowed for the  three  assessment years  in which it was assessed under the Hyderabad  Income- tax Act. 7 By order dated November 30, 1951, the  Income-tax Officer disallowed the respondent’s claim on the ground that it   was   against  the  principle  inherent   in   granting depreciation  allowance  which must decrease  from  year  to year.   The  matter was taken up to the  Supreme  Court  and while  it  was pending there, on May 8,  1956,  the  Central Government  issued a notification in exercise of its  powers conferred  on it by s. 12 of the Finance Act, 1950,  whereby an  explanation  was  added  to the  aforesaid  para.  2  as follows: "For the purpose of this paragraph, the  expression "all  depreciation actually allowed under any laws or  rules of a Part B State " means and shall be deemed to have always meant  the aggregate allowance for depreciation  taken  into account  in computing the written down value under any  laws or rules of a Part B State or carried forward under the said laws  or rules." The respondent challenged the  validity  of the  notification of 1956 and also its applicability to  the present case on the grounds (1) that it was ultra vires  the powers  conferred on the Central Government by s. 12 of  the Finance  Act, 1950, (2) that it contravened Art. 14  of  the Constitution,  and (3) that, in any case, it could  have  no retrospective effect. Held : (1) that the true scope and effect of s. 12 was  that it  was  for  the Central Government  to  determine  if  any difficulty of the nature indicated in the section had arisen and  then  to make such order, or give  such  direction,  as appeared to it to be necessary to remove the difficulty, the legislature having left the matter to the executive. Pandit Banarsi Das Bhanot v The State of Madhya Pradesh  and Others, [1959] S.C.R. 427, relied on. In  the  present case, a difficulty had arisen,  because  if depreciation actually allowed under the Hyderabad Income-tax Act was taken into account in computing the aggregate depre- ciation  allowance and the written down value, an  anomalous result  would follow, namely, depreciation allowance  to  be allowed  to  the assessee in the accounting year  under  the Indian Income-tax Act would be more than what was allowed in previous   years   under  the  Hyderabad   Income-tax   Act. Consequently,  the Central Government was within  its  power under s. 12 in making the notification dated May 8, 1956. (2)  that  the notification of 1956 applied to all those  to whom  para. 2 of the Taxation Laws (Part B States)  (Removal of Difficulties) Order, 1950, was applicable and created  no unequal   treatment  of  persons  in  the  like   situation. Accordingly, the notification did not contravene Art. 14  of the Constitution.

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(3)  that  the Central Government had the power under S.  12 of  the  Finance  Act,  1950, to make an  order  or  give  a direction  so as to remove difficulties which arose  in  the very beginning 320 and, therefore, the notification, though added in 1956,  was valid and was applicable to the assessment of 1951-52.

JUDGMENT: CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 5 of 1959. Appeal from the judgment and order dated February 16,  1954, of  the former Hyderabad High Court in Reference No.  347/B- 5/2 of 1953-54. C.   K.   Daphtary,  Solicitor-General  of  India,   K.   N. Rajagopala Sastri and D. Gupta, for the appellant. Sanat P. Mehta and J. B. Dadachanji, for the respondent. 1960.   November 8. The Judgment of the Court was  delivered by S.   K. DAS J.-This is an appeal on a certificate of fitness granted  by the High Court of Judicature at Hyderabad  under s.66-A  (2)  of  the  Indian  Income-tax  Act,  1922.    The Commissioner  of  Income-tax, Hyderabad,  is  the  appellant before  us.  The respondent is Dewan Bahadur Ramgopal  Mills Ltd., a public limited company incorporated in the erstwhile State of Hyderabad. The  respondent  company was assessed  under  the  Hyderabad Income-tax  Act in respect of the assessment  years  1357-F, 1358-F  and  1359-F.   In the  assessment  for  those  years depreciation  allowance was given to it on the basis of  the written  down  value  of  its  assets,  such  as  buildings, machinery, plant, etc., in accordance with the provisions of cl.  (c) of s. 12(5) of the Hyderabad Income-tax Act.   That clause  provided that in the case of assets acquired  before the  previous year and before the commencement of  the  Act, the  written  down  value would be the actual  cost  to  the assessee  less (i) depreciation at the rates  applicable  to the assets calculated on the actual cost for the first  year since  acquisition and for the next year on the actual  cost diminished by the depreciation allowance for one year and so on, for each year upto the commencement of the Act, and (ii) depreciation actually allowed to the assessee on such assets for each financial year after the commencement of the 321 Act.   The erstwhile State of Hyderabad merged in the  Union of  India  on January 26, 1950, and became a Part  B  State. The  Finance  Act,  1950,  by s.  13  thereof  repealed  the taxation  laws in force in Part B States except for  certain purposes not relevant to this case, and by s. 3 extended the Indian  Income-tax Act, 1922, to the whole of  India  except the  State of Jammu and Kashmir.  In exercise of the  powers conferred  by  s. 12 of the Finance Act, 1950,  the  Central Government  was  pleased to make the Taxation Laws  (Part  B States)  (Removal of Difficulties) Order, 1950  (hereinafter referred to as the Removal of Difficulties Order, 1950),  by a  notification dated December 2, 1950.  Paragraph 2 of  the said Order, in so far as it is relevant to this case, was in these terms: "  Computation  of  aggregate  depreciation  allowance   and written down value: In  making any assessment under the Indian  Income-tax  Act, 1922,  all depreciation actually allowed under any  laws  or rules  of a Part B State, relating to Income-tax and  Super- tax,  or  any law relating to tax on  profits  of  business,

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shall  be  taken  into account in  computing  the  aggregate depreciation allowance referred to in sub-clause (c) of  the proviso  to clause (vi) of sub-section (2) and  the  written down value under clause (b) of sub-section (5) of sec. 10 of the said Act". For the assessment year 1951-52 which was in respect of  the account  year  ending  June 30,  1950,  the  respondent  was assessed for the first time under the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922,  read with paragraph 5 of the Part B States  (Taxation Concessions)  Order, 1950.  Basing its claim on paragraph  2 of  the Removal of Difficulties Order, 1950, the  respondent asked  for depreciation allowance in respect of  its  assets such  as buildings, machinery, plant, etc., to the  tune  of Rs.8,12,244. It worked out the value of the assets at  their inception  and deducted therefrom such depreciation  as  was allowed  for  the  three  assessment  years  in  which   the respondent  was assessed under the Hyderabad Income-tax  Act and calculating the written down 322 value  in that manner, it claimed depreciation according  to the prescribed rates.  By his order dated November 30, 1951, the Income-tax Officer disallowed this claim.  He held  that the  claim  of  the respondent  was  against  the  principle inherent  in  granting  depreciation  allowance  which  must decrease from year to year, and further held that the word " allowed  "  in paragraph 2 of the  Removal  of  Difficulties Order,  1950, should be construed as meaning " considered  " only.  Accordingly, he took the figures of the written  down value from the income-tax proceedings of 1359-F and  allowed depreciation  at  the  prescribed  rate  on  those  figures. Against the order of the Income-tax Officer, the  respondent went  in  appeal to the  Appellate  Assistant  Commissioner, Hyderabad Division.  That Officer by an order dated May  23, 1952,  upheld  the  view  of  the  Income-tax  Officer   and dismissed  the  appeal.   Then there was an  appeal  to  the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal which was heard by the  Bombay Bench of the said Tribunal.  By its order dated December 12, 1952,  the Appellate Tribunal held that in view of the  pro- visions in paragraph 2 of the Removal of Difficulties Order, 1950, the contention of the respondent must prevail, and  it pointed  out  that  the words used in  paragraph  2  were  " depreciation  actually allowed under any laws or rules of  a Part  B State ", and those words did not mean the  aggregate allowance  for depreciation taken into account in  computing the  written down value under the Hyderabad Act;  therefore, the  respondent was entitled to the  depreciation  allowance which  it  claimed.  It directed the Income-tax  Officer  to compute  the written down value on the basis of  the  actual cost  to  the assessee of the assets in question  minus  the depreciation  allowance  actually allowed  to  the  assessee under  the Hyderabad Income-tax Act.  The  appellant  herein then  moved  the Appellate Tribunal for a reference  to  the High Court under s. 66(1) of the Indian Income-tax Act.   In the  meantime,  that  is,  on March  9,  1953,  the  Central Government purporting to exercise its powers conferred by s. 60-A   of  the  Indian  Income-tax  Act,  1922,   added   an Explanation                             323 to  paragraph 2 of the Removal of Difficulties Order,  1950. Explanation said: "  Explanation  :--For the purpose of  this  paragraph,  the expression  "  all depreciation actually allowed  under  any laws or rules of a Part B State " means and shall be  deemed to   have   always  meant  the   aggregate   allowance   for depreciation  taken  into account in computing  the  written

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down  value  under any laws or rules of a Part  B  State  or carried forward under the said laws or rules ". The Explanation in terms gave effect to the contention urged on  behalf  of the Department and said that what has  to  be allowed  is the aggregate allowance for  depreciation  taken into  account in computing the written down value under  any law  or  rules  of  a  Part B  State.   In  support  of  the application  for  a reference, the appellant relied  on  the aforesaid  Explanation  and contended that in  view  of  the Explanation  the  respondent could  not  claim  depreciation allowance on the basis of actual cost minus the depreciation allowances  actually allowed under the Hyderabad  Income-tax Act.   On this application the Tribunal expressed  the  view that  if the Explanation applied to the case on  hand,  then the  contention  of the Department was correct and  must  be upheld.   It said, however, that it had no power  to  review its  own order and, therefore, considered it unnecessary  to express  any opinion whether the Explanation was  valid  and affected  the  case  before it.  It said  finally  that  the following  question  of law did arise out of its  order  and accordingly stated a case thereon: "  Whether  in making the assessment for  the  year  1951-52 under  the  Indian Income-tax Act is  the  assessee  company entitled to claim depreciation allowance on the basis of the written  down value computed at the time of  the  assessment for  the year 1359-F, or is to be computed on the  basis  of the  actual cost minus the depreciation  allowances  granted under the Hyderabad Income-tax Act". The reference was then heard by the High Court of Judicature at  Hyderabad  which by its order dated February  16,  1954, held that the Explanation added 324 to  paragraph 2 of the Removal of Difficulties Order,  1950, by the notification dated March 9, 1953, was void on certain grounds  one  of which was that the  Explanation  was  ultra vires the powers of the Central Government under s. 60-A  of the  Indian  Income-tax  Act.  Therefore,  it  answered  the question  in favour of the respondent.  The  appellant  then obtained the necessary certificate of fitness and  preferred the present appeal. In the meantime, there was a further change of law.  On  May 8, 1956, the Central Government made a notification (No.  S. R. O. 1139) in exercise of the powers conferred on it by  s. 12  of  the  Finance Act, 1950, whereby  an  Explanation  in identical terms as the earlier Explanation made under s. 60- A of the Indian Income-tax Act, was added to paragraph 2  of the  Removal  of Difficulties Order,  1950.   The  arguments before  us  have proceeded on the basis of  the  Explanation added  by the notification aforesaid and it is not  disputed that if the Explanation is valid and applies to the  present case,  then the appeal must be allowed and the  question  of law  answered  in  favour  of the  appellant.   If,  on  the contrary, the Explanation is not valid or it does not  apply to the present case, then the appeal must be dismissed. We proceed now to a consideration in detail of the different contentions  urged before us on behalf of the appellant  and the respondent.  We may first read s. 12 of the Finance Act, 1950,  under which notification No. S. R. O. 1139 dated  May 8, 1956, was made.  Section 12 reads: "  If  any  difficulty  arises  in  giving  effect  to   the provisions  of any of the Acts, rules or orders extended  by section  3 or section 11 to any State or  merged  territory, the Central Government may by order, make such provision, or give  such direction, as appears to it to be  necessary  for removing the difficulty ".

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On  behalf  of  the appellant it has been  argued  that  the notification  was  validly made in exercise  of  the  powers conferred  on the Central Government under s. 12  aforesaid; that it does not suffer from any of the defects pointed  out by the High Court in regard 325 to  the earlier notification of 1953 made under s.  60-A  of the Income-tax Act; and that it adds an Explanation which in terms  gives effect to the contention of the  appellant  and this Court must consider the change in law made thereby  and give  effect to it in answering the question of law  arising out  of  the  Tribunal’s  order.  On  the  other  hand,  the validity  of  the  notification has  been  very  strenuously contested  before us by learned Counsel for the  respondent. He has challenged its validity and also its applicability to the  present case on the following grounds : (1) that it  is ultra  vires the powers conferred on the Central  Government by s. 12; (2) that it can have no retrospective effect;  and (3) that it contravenes Art. 14 of the Constitution. We  shall consider these arguments in the order in which  we have  stated  them.   The  first  question  is  whether  the notification  is  validly made under s. 12 or  is  it  ultra vires the powers conferred on the Central Government by that section  ?  On behalf of the respondent it is urged  that  a condition  for  the  exercise of the power under  s.  12  is contained  in  the  opening clause, which says :  "  If  any difficulty arises in giving effect to the provisions of  any of  the  Acts,  rules or orders extended  by  section  3  or section  II  to any State etc." The contention  is  that  no difficulty  arose in giving effect to the provisions of  any of  the  Acts, rules or orders referred to  in  the  opening clause, to any State etc. and, therefore, the condition  for the  exercise  of  the power is not fulfilled  and  on  that ground the notification is invalid.  We are unable to accept this argument as correct.  Section 10 of the Income-tax  Act says, in its first subsection, that the tax shall be payable by  an  assessee in respect of the profits or gains  of  any business, profession or vocation carried on by him.   Sub-s. (2)  thereof  says  that  such profits  or  gains  shall  be computed  after making certain allowances, and one of  these allowances  is  in  respect  of  the  depreciation  of  such buildings,  machinery,  plant,  etc. as  are  used  for  the purpose  of the business (cl. vi).  The depreciation  except in  certain cases is calculated on the written  down  value, which expression is explained 326 in  sub-s.  (5)  of s. 10.  Clause (b)  of  the  sub-section states: "S.10(5)--(a)................................................ (b) In the case of assets acquired before the previous  year the  actual  cost  to the  assessee  less  all  depreciation actually allowed to him under this Act, or any Act  repealed thereby  or  under executive orders issued when  the  Indian Income-tax Act, 1886 (11 of 1886), was in force ". It  is obvious that in applying cl. (b) to an assessee in  a Part  B  State there would be an initial difficulty,  in  as much  as prior to 1950 when the Indian Income-tax  Act  came into force in a Part B State no depreciation could have been actually  allowed to such an assessee under  the  Income-tax Act  or  under any Act repealed thereby;  for  example,  the Hyderabad  Income-tax Act was repealed by the  Finance  Act, 1950 and not by the Income-tax Act, and would not  therefore be  covered by cl. (b).  Such and other difficulties led  to the Removal of Difficulties Order, 1950, which has not  been seriously challenged before us.  Indeed, the High Court said

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that  it  was not open to the respondent  to  challenge  the validity of the Removal of Difficulties Order, 1950, because such  a  point was not taken before the  Tribunal.   Learned Counsel  for  the respondent has then submitted  that  what. ever  initial  difficulty there might have  been  in  giving effect  to the Indian Income-tax Act in a Part  State,  that difficulty  was  solved  by paragraph 2 of  the  Removal  of Difficulties  Order,  1950, and, in any view, there  was  no fresh difficulty which could necessitate the addition of  an Explanation  in 1953 or 1956.  Here again we think that  the submission  is not correct.  The basic and normal scheme  of depreciation  under  the Indian Income-tax Act  is  that  it decreases every year, being a percentage of the written down value which in the first year is the actual cost and in suc- ceeding  years  actual cost less all  depreciation  actually allowed under the Income-tax Act or an Act repealed  thereby etc.  The Hyderabad Income-tax Act not having been repealed by  the Income-tax Act but by the Finance Act,  1950,  there was a difficulty in                             327 allowing  depreciation to an assessee in a Part B  State  in the  first  year of assessment under the  Indian  Income-tax Act.  This difficulty was sought to be removed by  paragraph 2 of the Removal of Difficulties Order, 1950.  If,  however, depreciation actually allowed under the Hyderabad Income-tax Act  was  taken  into account  in  computing  the  aggregate depreciation  allowance  and  the  written  down  value,  an anomalous  result  would  follow as  in  the  present  case, namely, depreciation allowance to be allowed to the assessee in the accounting year under the Indian Income-tax Act would be  more than what was allowed in previous years  under  the Hyderabad Income-tax Act.  This would create a disparity and be against the scheme of the Indian Income-tax Act.  It  was therefore necessary to explain paragraph 2 of the Removal of Difficulties  Order,  1950, to assimilate or  harmonise  the position   regarding   depreciation   allowance,   and   the Explanation added in 1953 or 1956 was obviously intended  to remove  the  difficulty  arising out of  that  disparity  or disharmony. Furthermore, the true scope and effect of s. 12 seems to  be that  it is for the Central Government to determine  if  any difficulty of the nature indicated in the section has arisen and  then  to make such order, or give  such  direction,  as appears  to  it to be necessary to  remove  the  difficulty. Parliament  has left the matter to the executive;  but  that does  not  make  the notification of 1956  bad.   In  Pandit Banarsi Das Bhanot v. The State of Madhya Pradesh & Ors. (1) we  said at page 435: " Now, the authorities are clear  that it  is not unconstitutional for the legislature to leave  it to  the  executive  to determine  details  relating  to  the working of taxation laws, such as the selection of  persons on  whom the tax is to be laid, the rates at which it is  to be charged in respect of different classes of goods and  the like ". We are, therefore, of the view that the notification of 1956, was validly made under s. 12 and is not ultra vires the  powers  conferred  on the Central  Government  by  that section. The second question is-does the notification apply (1)  [1959] S.C.R. 427. 328 to  the  assessment  in  the  present  case,  which  is   an assessment for the year 1951-52 ? The notification was  made in  1956 and it added an Explanation to paragraph 2  of  the Removal  of  Difficulties  Order,  1950.   It  says  that  a particular expression occurring in that paragraph means  and

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shall be deemed always to have meant the aggregate allowance for depreciation taken into account in computing the written down  value  etc.,  under any law of a Part  B  State.   The argument  on behalf of the respondent is that the law  which governs an assessment for the assessment year 1951-52 is the law  in force at the time when the Finance Act,  1951,  came into force; accordingly, so the argument proceeds, paragraph 2 of the Removal of Difficulties Order, 1950, as it stood on April 28, 1951, when the Finance Act, 1951, came into force, will  apply in the present case.  We consider this  argument to  be  unsound.   The Explanation, though  added  in  1956, explains  the  meaning  of paragraph 2  of  the  Removal  of Difficulties Order, 1950 and says in express terms that  the paragraph  shall be deemed always to have had that  meaning. Section  12  by the very nature of its  intent  and  purpose confers on the Central Government power to make an order  to remove a difficulty which has already arisen, and the  power to  re.  move the difficulty must  necessarily  include  the power to remove the difficulty from the time it arose.   The Central  Government  has, therefore, the power  to  make  an order  or  give a direction so as to remove  the  difficulty from  the very beginning, and that is what the  notification of  1956  does.   It applies to the  assessment  of  1951-52 indeed  it applies to all assessments made under the  Indian Income-tax  Act  in  which paragraph 2  of  the  Removal  of Difficulties Order, 1950, operates. The  last challenge to the validity of the  notification  of 1956  is  that it contravenes Art. 14 of  the  Constitution, because  it discriminates between different classes  of  tax payers.  Learned Counsel for the respondent has asked us  to consider  the  cases of assessees in three  different  areas which subsequently come in a Part B State:   in   one   area there was no law relating to 329 income-tax;  in,  the  second there was a  law  relating  to income-tax  under which written down value was  computed  on the basis of depreciation actually allowed year after  year, while  in the third the written down value was  computed  in the  manner provided under the Hyderabad Income-tax Act;  it is  pointed out that on the extension of the Indian  Income- tax   Act  (read  with  paragraph  2  of  the   Removal   of Difficulties  Order,  1950  and the  Explanation)  to  those areas, the assessee in the first area will get  depreciation allowance on the actual cost; in the second area he will get such allowance on the basis of actual cost less depreciation actually  allowed;  and in the third area he will  get  such allowance  on the actual cost less depreciation  taken  into account.  It is contended that this resultant discrimination is  arbitrary  and without any  rational  justification,  We think  that learned Counsel for the respondent  has  ignored one  essential  consideration  which  clearly  vitiates  his argument.   In  the matter of  depreciation  allowance,  the assessee  in the three areas in the example given by him  do not  stand on the same footing; they are not situated  alike so  as  to be entitled to be treated alike.  It  is  obvious that an assessee from an area where there was no  income-tax law at all can never say that in the matter of  depreciation allowance  as respects buildings, machinery, plant etc.,  he is  on a par with a person in an area where there was a  law relating   to  income-tax  allowing  depreciation  on   such buildings,  machinery,  plant etc.  The same  would  be  the position  with regard to areas where the previous law as  to depreciation  was  different.  Indeed, to  treat  all  these persons alike would be tantamount to unequal treatment.   In our  view,  the  notification of  1956  creates  no  unequal

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treatment of persons in a like situation ; it applies to all who  are  in  a like situation, namely, all  those  to  whom paragraph  2  of the Removal of  Difficulties  Order,  1950, applies.  We consider that the challenge to the notification based on Art. 14 is wholly unsubstantial. It has not been disputed before us that a change in 42 330 law validly made and applicable to a case pending in  appeal must  be  considered and given effect to  by  the  Appellate Court.    The  conclusion  we  have  reached  is  that   the notification  of  1956 was validly made and applies  to  the present case.  In view of this conclusion we have considered it  unnecessary to examine the notification of 1953  or  the reasons  for which the High Court held that notification  to be bad. For  the reasons given above, we allow this appeal  and  set aside  the  judgment  and  order of  the  High  Court  dated February 16, 1954.  The question referred to the High  Court is  answered in favour of the appellant.  The appellant  has succeeded  by reason of the notification of 1956 and  taking that  circumstance into consideration, we direct that  there will be no order for costs for the hearing in this Court. Appeal allowed.