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PETITIONER: THE BRIHAN MAHARASHTRA SUGARSYNDICATE LTD.

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: JANARDAN RAMCHANDRA KULKARNIAND OTHERS

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 22/02/1960

BENCH: SARKAR, A.K. BENCH: SARKAR, A.K. DAS, S.K. HIDAYATULLAH, M.

CITATION:  1960 AIR  794            1960 SCR  (3)  85  CITATOR INFO :  R          1992 SC 180  (3)

ACT:        Company  Law-Proceedings Pending under the  repealcd  Act-If        and when could be continued-Indian Companies Act, 1913. (VII        of 1913) s. 153-C-Companies Act, 1956, (1 of 956) ss. 10 and        647.

HEADNOTE: The respondent had made an application under s. 53-C Of  the Companies Act, 1913, with an alternative prayer for  winding up  against  the appellant company, to the  District  judge, Poona,  who  had been authorised under the Act  to  exercise jurisdiction.    While  the  application  was  pending   the Companies  Act,  1913, was repealed by  the  Companies  Act, 1956.   The  appellant  company  thereupon  applied  to  the District judge to dismiss the application on the ground that he  had  ceased to have any jurisdiction to  deal  with  the application on the repeal of the Companies Act Of 1913. Held,  that  s. 6 of the General Clauses Act  preserved  the jurisdiction  of  the  District  judge  to  deal  with   the application  under S. 153-C Of the Indian Companies  Act  Of 1913, notwithstanding the repeal of that Act. Section 647 of the Companies Act, 1956 did not indicate  any intention  to affect the rights under the  Indian  Companies Act of 19I3, for s. 658 of the Companies Act of 1956 made s. 6  of  the General Clauses  Act  applicable  notwithstanding anything contained in s. 647 of that Act. 86 Section 24 of the General Clauses Act does not put an end to any   notification.   It  does  not  therefore  cancel   the notification  issued under the Indian Companies Act of  I9I3 in so far as that notification empowered the District  judge to  exercise  jurisdiction  under s.  153-C  of  the  Indian Companies  Act  of  I9I3  even though under  s.  10  of  the Companies  Act  of 1956, a District judge can no  longer  be empowered  to exercise jurisdiction under (a) sections  1397 to  407 of the Companies Act, 1956, which correspond  to  S. I53-C Of the Indian Companies Act, 19I3 or (b) in respect of the winding up of a company with a paid up share capital  of not  less  than Rs. 1,00,000/- which the  appellant  company

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was.

JUDGMENT:        CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 513 of 1958.        Appeal  by special leave from the judgment and  order  dated        November 20, 1957, of the Bombay High Court in First  Appeal        No. 600 of 1956, arising out of the judgment and order dated        October  17,  1956, of the District Judge, Poona,  in  Misc.        Petition No. 2 of 1956.        H.   D.  Banaji, S. N. Andley, J. B.  Dadachanji,  Rameshwar        Nath and P. L. Vohra, for the appellant.        A.   V.  Viswanatha Sastri, Sorab N. Vakil, B. K.  B.  Naidu        and I. N. Shroff, for respondents Nos.  1 and 2.        1960.   February,  22.   The  Judgment  of  the  Court   was        delivered by        SARKAR, J.-Respondents Nos.  I to 4 are shareholders in  the        company  which is the appellant in this case.  They made  an        application against the appellant and its directors under s.        153-C  of  the  Companies  Act, 1913  before  that  Act  was        repealed  on  April 1, 1956, as hereinafter  mentioned,  for        certain  reliefs which it is not necessary to  state.   This        Act  will  be  referred  to  as  the  Act  of  1913.    This        application had been made to the Court of the District Judge        of  Poona  which  Court  had  been  empowered  to   exercise        jurisdiction under the Act of 1913 by a notification  issued        by  the  Government  of Bombay under s. 3(1)  of  that  Act.        Before the application could be disposed of by the  District        Judge, Poona, the Act of 1913 was repealed and re-enacted on        April  1, 1956, by the Companies Act of 1956, which will  be        referred to as the Act of 1956.        On or about June 28, 1956, the appellant made an application        to  the District Judge of Poona for an order dismissing  the        application under s. 153-C of the        87        Act of 1913 on the ground that on the repeal of that Act the        Court had ceased to have jurisdiction to deal with it.   The        District  Judge  of Poona dismissed this  application.   The        appellants  appeal to the High Court of Bombay against  this        dismissal also failed.  Hence the present appeal.        Section  644 of the Act of 1956 repeals the Act of 1913  and        certain  other legislation relating to companies.   Sections        645  to  657  of  the Act of  1956  contain  various  saving        provisions.    Mr.  Banaji  appearing  for   the   appellant        contended  that the proceeding before the District Judge  of        Poona  under s. 153-C of the Act of 1913 had not been  saved        by any of these provisions.  We do not consider it necessary        to pronounce on this question for it seems to us clear  that        that  proceeding can be continued in spite of the repeal  of        the Act of 1913 in view of s. 6 of the General Clauses  Act.        Section 658 of the Act of 1956 expressly provides that, "The        mention  of particular matters in ss. 645 to 657 or  in  any        other provision of this Act shall not prejudice the  general        application  of s.6 of the General Clauses Act, 1897  (X  of        1.897),  with respect to the effect of repeals." Mr.  Banaji        said that s. 658 had been enacted ex abundante cautela.   Be        it  so.  Section 6 of the General Clauses Act none the  less        remains applicable with respect to the effect of the  repeal        of the Act of 1913.        Section 6 of the General Clauses Act provides that where  an        Act is repealed, then, unless a different intention appears,        the repeal shall not affect any right or liability  acquired        or  incurred  under  the repealed  enactment  or  any  legal        proceeding  in  respect of such right or liability  and  the

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      legal  proceeding may be continued as, if the repealing  Act        had  not been passed.  There is no dispute that s. 153-C  of        the Act of 1913 gave certain rights to the shareholders of a        company and put the company as also its directors and manag-        ing agents under certain liabilities.  The application under        that  section  was  for  enforcement  of  these  rights  and        liabilities.   Section  6 of the General Clauses  Act  would        therefore preserve the rights and liabilities created by  s.        153-C of the Act of 1913 and a continuance of the proceeding        in respect thereof would be        88        competent in spite of the repeal of the Act of 1913,  unless        of course a different intention would be gathered.        Now  it  has been held by this Court in State of  Punjab  v.        Mohar  Singh (1) that s. 6 applies even where the  repealing        Act  contains fresh legislation on the same subject  but  in        such a case one would have to look to the provisions of  the        new  Act  for  the  purposes  of  determining  whether  they        indicate  a different intention.  The Act of 1956  not  only        repeals the Act of 1913 but contains other fresh legislation        on  the matters enacted by the Act of 1913.  It was  further        observed  in  State  of Punjab v. Mohar Singh  (1)  that  in        trying to ascertain whether there is a contrary intention in        the  new  legislation, " the line of enquiry  would  be  not        whether  the  new Act expressly keeps &live old  rights  and        liabilities but whether it manifests an intention to destroy        them."        The question then is whether the Act of 1956 indicates  that        it was intended thereby to destroy the rights created by  s.        153-C  of the Act of 1913.  Mr. Banaji said that s.  647  of        the Act of 1956 indicates an intention to destroy the rights        created  by  s. 153-C of the Act of 1913.  We  find  nothing        there  to  support this view.  That section only  says  that        where  the  winding  up of a company  commences  before  the        commencement of the Act of 1956, the company shall be  wound        up as if that Act had not been passed, but s. 555(7) of  the        Act  of 1956 will apply in respect of moneys paid  into  the        Companies  Liquidation Account.  All that this section  does        is to make the provisions of the repealed Act applicable  to        the  winding up notwithstanding the repeal.  The  provisions        of  s. 555(7) need not be referred to as they do not  affect        the  question.   Section 647 of the Act  of  1956  therefore        indicates  no intention that the rights created by s.  153-C        of  the Act of 1913 shall be destroyed.  Nor is an  argument        tenable that since by s. 647 the Act of 1956 expressly makes        the repealed Act applicable to a winding up commenced  under        it,  it  impliedly  indicates  that  in  other  matters  the        repealed  Act cannot be resorted to, for, in view of s.  658        of the Act of 1956,        (1)  [1955] 1 S.C.R. 893        89        the  mention  of  a particular matter in s.  647  would  not        prejudice  the  application of s. 6 of the  General  Clauses        Act;  in other words, nothing in s. 647 is to be  understood        as indicating an intention that s. 6 of the General  Clauses        Act  is  not to apply.  On the other hand, the  parties  are        agreed  that the provisions of s. 153-C of the Act  of  1913        have  been substantially re-enacted by the Act of  1956  and        this  would indicate an intention not to destroy the  rights        created by s. 153-C.        Mr.  Banaji then drew our attention to s. 10 of the  Act  of        1956  and s. 24 of the General Clauses Act.  Section  10  of        the  Act of 1956 corresponds to s. 3 of the Act of 1913  and        deals  with  the jurisdiction of Courts.  Under  s.  10  the        Central Government may empower a District Court to  exercise

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      jurisdiction  under  the  Act, not  being  the  jurisdiction        conferred  among others by ss. 397 to 407 nor in respect  of        the winding up of companies with a paid up share capital  of        not less than Rs. 1,00,000.  Sections 397 to 407 of the  Act        of  1956, it is agreed, contain’ substantially  the  provis-        sions  of  s. 153-C of the Act of 1913.  It has also  to  be        stated  that  the paid up capital of the appellant  is  more        than Rs. 1,00,000 and the application under s. 153-C of  the        Act  of 1913 contained a prayer in the alternative  for  the        winding  up  of the appellant.  Section 24  of  the  General        Clauses Act provides that where any Act is repealed and  re-        enacted  with or without modifications, then, unless  it  is        otherwise expressly provided, any notification issued  under        the  repealed  Act shall, so far as it is  not  inconsistent        with  the  provisions re-enacted, continue in force  and  be        deemed  to  have  been issued under the  provisions  so  re-        enacted unless and until it is superseded by a  notification        issued under those provisions..        Mr.  Banaji points out that in view of s. 10 of the  Act  of        1956  a  District Court can no longer be empowered  to  deal        with  an application of the kind made to the District  Judge        of  Poona, as that application asks for reliefs  similar  to        those contemplated by ss. 397 to 407 of the Act of 1956  and        also  asks  for the winding up of a company  whose  paid  up        capital exceeds Rs. 1,00,000 and power to deal with such an        90        application  cannot now be given to a District  Court.   He,        therefore,  says that the notification issued under the  Act        of 1913 empowering the District Judge of Poona to deal  with        the  application would be inconsistent in this respect  with        the  provisions of the Act of 1956 and could not in view  of        s.  24 of the General Clauses Act be deemed to  continue  in        force  after  the repeal of the Act of 1913.   Hence  it  is        contended that the notification has ceased to have any force        and the District Judge of Poona has no longer any  jurisdic-        tion  to  hear the application.  It is also said  that  this        shows  that  the  Act  of 1956  indicates  that  the  rights        acquired  under the Act of 1913 would come to an end on  its        repeal.        We  are unable to accept these contentions.  Section  10  of        the Act of 1956 deals only with the jurisdiction of  courts.        It shows that the District Courts can no longer be empowered        to  deal with applications under the Act of 1956 in  respect        of  matters  contemplated by s. 153-C of the  Act  of  1913.        This  does not indicate that the rights created by s.  153-C        of  the  Act of 1913 were intended to be destroyed.   As  we        have earlier pointed out from State of Punjab v. Mohar Singh        (1),  the contrary intention in the repealing Act must  show        that  the  rights  under the old Act  were  intended  to  be        destroyed in order to prevent the application of  s.  6   of        the General Clauses Act.  But it is said that s.  24 of  the        General  Clauses Act puts an end to the notification  giving        power  to the District Judge, Poona to hear the  application        under  s. 153-C of the Act of 1913 as that  notification  is        inconsistent with s. 10 of the Act of 1956 and the  District        Judge cannot, therefore, continue to deal with the  applica-        tion.  Section 24 does not however purport to put an end  to        any  notification.   It  is not intended  to  terminate  any        notification;  all it does is to continue a notification  in        force in the stated circumstances after the Act under  which        it  was issued, is repealed.  Section 24 therefore does  not        cancel  the  notification empowering the District  Judge  of        Poona  to exercise jurisdiction under the Act of  l9l3.   It        seems to us that since under s. 6 of the General Clauses Act        the proceeding in respect of the application under s. 153-C

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      (1)  [1955] I S.C.R. 893        91        of the Act of 1913 may be continued after the repeal of that        Act,  it follows that the District Judge of Poona  continues        to  have  jurisdiction to entertain it. If it were  not  so,        then s. 6 would become infructuous.        For these reasons we think that the appeal must fail and  it        is therefore dismissed with costs.        Appeal dismissed.