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PETITIONER: THE BOARD OF TRUSTEES, AYURVEDIC ANDUNANI TIBIA COLLEGE, DEL

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: THE STATE OF DELHI AND ANOTHER

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 23/10/1961

BENCH: DAS, S.K. BENCH: DAS, S.K. SINHA, BHUVNESHWAR P.(CJ) SARKAR, A.K. AYYANGAR, N. RAJAGOPALA MUDHOLKAR, J.R.

CITATION:  1962 AIR  458            1962 SCR  Supl. (1) 156  CITATOR INFO :  R          1966 SC1307  (8)  RF         1970 SC 564  (192)  D          1971 SC 966  (10)  RF         1976 SC 386  (14)  RF         1983 SC   1  (67)  R          1985 SC 973  (5)

ACT:      Registered  Society-Whether   a  corporation- State  enactment   dissolving  such   Society  and setting   up    corporation    in    its    place- Constituitiionality of-Tibbia  College  Act,  1952 (Delhi 5 of 1952). -Registered, Societies Act 1860 (21 of  1860), ss. 5,6,7,13,14- Government of Part C States Act, 1951 (49 of 1951), s.20-Constitution of India,  Arts.  14,  19(1)(f),  31  and  Seventh Schedule, List  I Entry 44, List II Entry 32, List III Entries 10 and 28.

HEADNOTE:      The Board  of Trustees,  Ayurvedic and  Unani Tibbia College,  Delhi was  registered  under  the Societies  Registration  Act,  1860.  It  ran  the Tibbia College,  Delhi and  an attached hostel and managed the  Hindustani Dawakhana. The Delhi State Legislature passed  the Tibbia  College Act, 1952, which dissolved  the  Board,  incorporated  a  new Board and  vested all  the property  and  all  the rights, powers  and privileges of the old Board in the new  Board.  The  petitioners  challenged  the validity of  the Act  on the  grounds that the old Board was  a corporation  whose objects  were  not confined to  Delhi and  legislation with regard to it would  fall under  Entry 44  of List  I of  the Seventh Schedule  to the  Constitution and as such the State  Legislature was  not competent  to pass the impugned  Act, (ii)  that the  setting up of a new Board  as corporation was beyond the powers of the State Legislature, (iii) that the Act violated

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Arts. 14,19  and 31 of the Constitution, (iv) that the  Act   could  not   override   the   Societies Registration Act,  1860 which  was a  Central Act, and (v)  that the  legislature acted  mala fide in passing the impugned Act. ^      Held, (per  Sinha,  C.  J.  Das,  Sarkar  and Ayyangar,JJ.)  that   the  State  Legislature  was competent  to   enact   the   impugned   Act.   On registration under  the Societies Registration Act the old  Board did not become a corporation in the sen e  of being incorporated within the meaning of Entry  44  of  List  I;  it  continued  to  be  an unincorporated society though under the provisions of the  Societies Registration  Act it had certain privileges analogous to those of corporations. The provisions in  the impugned  Act relating  to  the dissolution of  the  old  Board  fell  within  the second part  of Entry 32 of List II which included unincorporated societies.  Though the impugned Act while creating  the new  Board gave it a corporate status, it  confined  its  powers  and  duties  to institutions 157 in  Delhi  and  limited  its  rights,  powers  and privileges  to  the  purposes  for  which  it  was created.  The   provisions  of  the  impugned  Act relating to  the incorporation  of the  new  Board fell within the first part of Entry 32 of List II.      Taff Vale  Railway v.  Amalgamated Society of Railway Servants,  (1900) A.C.  426 and  Bonsor v. Musicians’ Union, L.R. 1956 A.C. 104, referred to.      Krishnan v.  Sundaram, (1940)  43  Bom.  L.R. 562,  Boppana   Rukminiamma  v.   Maganti  Venkata Ramadas, A.I.R.  1940 Mad.  946, and M. A. Nunnier v. Official Assignee, Madras, A.I.R. 1951 Mad. 875 and Satyavart  Sidhantalankar v.  The Arya  Samaj, Bombay, (1945) 48 Bom. L.R. 341, distinguished.      The Servants  of India  Society, Poona v. The Charity Commissioner  of Bombay,  (1960)  63  Bom. L.R. 379, approved.      Held, further,  that the impugned Act did not violate Arts.  14,19 or  31.  The  petitioner  had failed to  show that there were other institutions similarly situated  as the petitioner and that the petitioner  had   been  picked   out  for  unequal treatment. Since  the transfer  of management  was made by  a valid  law there  was  no  question  of violation of  Art. 31  (1); and since the impugned Act did  not provide for compulsory acquisition of property Art.  31(2), as  it stood at the relevant time, had  no application.  Neither the  dissolved Board nor  its member  had any  right to  hold the property of  the dissolved  Board and there was no infringement of  Art. 19(1)(f) involved in the Act vesting the  property in  the new Board. Under the Societies  Registration  Act,  the  members  of  a society did not acquire any beneficial interest on the dissolution  of the  society; the  only  right which they  had was to determine as to which other society the  property  should  be’  given  to  for management. This  was  not  a  right  to  property within the meaning of Art. 19(1)(f) and the taking away of  such a  right by the impugned Act did not violate Art. 19(13(f).

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    (Chiranjit Lal  Chowdhuri  v.  The  Union  of India, [1950] S.C.R. 869, relied on.      State of  West Bengal  v. Subodh  Gopal Bose, [1954] S.C.R.  587 and  Dwarkadas Shrinivas v. The Sholapur Spinning  and Weaving  Co.,  Ltd.  [1954] S.C.R. 674, distinguished.      Held, further,  that there was no question of conflict between  a law  made by  Parliament and a law made by the State Legislature as the Societies Registration Act,  1860, was  not a  law  made  by Parliament. The  State Legislature  had the  power either to  amend the Societies Registration Act in respect of  unincorporated societies, or to make a law  relating   to  a   corporation  provided  its activities were confined to Delhi. The Delhi State Legislature  did   not  transgress   any  of   its limitations in 158 enacting the  impugned Act and no question of mala fides of the legislature arose.      K.C. Gajapati  Narayn Deo  v.  The  State  of Orissa, [1654] S.C.R. 1. relied on.      Per, Mudholkar,  J.,  Though  the  old  Board could not  be   regarded as  a corporation  as the Societies Registration  Act does  not provide  for incorporation it  possessed some of the attributes of a  corporation and  it was a ’near corporation’ or a  ’quasi corporation’.  It was a legal entity. The second  part of  Entry 32  of List  II did not permit a  law to  be made  which took away from an existing legal  entity its  powers such  as  those conferred by  the Societies  Registration Act  and which destroyed the legal entity. The impugned Act could not  be supported  under the  first part  of Entry 32  of List  II as  the objects of the Board were not  limited to  the Delhi State. But Entries 10  and   28  of  List  III  permitted  the  State Legislature to  make a law dissolving a charitable trust and  transferring its  property, rights etc. to another  institution and the impugned Act could be sustained under these Entries.      Servants  of  India  Society,  Poona  v.  The Charity Commissioner  of Bombay, (1950) 63 Bom. L. R.  397,   The  Taff   Vale  Railway  Co.  v.  The Amalgamated Society  of Railway  Servants,  [1901] A.C. 426  and Bonsor  v. Musicians’’ Union, [1956] A.C. 104, referred to.

JUDGMENT:      ORIGINAL JURISDICTION:  Petition  No.  96  of 1955.      Petition under Art. 32 of the Constitution of India for enforcement of Fundamental Rights.      Purushottam  Tricumdas,   J.  B.   Dadachanji Ravindra  Narain   and  O.   C.  Mathur,  for  the petitioner.      C. K.  Daphtary, Solicitor-General  of India, B.  R.   L.  Iyengar   and  T.M.   Sen,  for   the respondents.      1961. October  23. The  Judgment of Sinha, C. J., Das,  Sarkar and  Ayyangar, JJ., was delivered by Das,  J. Mudholkar,  J., delivered  a  separate Judgment.

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    S. K.  DAS, J.-This  is a  writ  petition  on behalf of two petitioners. The first petitioner is the Board  of Trustees, Ayurvedic and Unani Tibbia College, Delhi, through Hakim Mohammed Jamil Khan, stated to  be its  properly elected Secretary. The second petitioner is Hakim 159 Mohammad Jamil Khan himself, who states that he is still one  of the  trustees or members of the said Board. The  petition was initially filed on behalf of  the   first   petitioner.   Subsequently,   an amendment petition  was moved which was allowed by us.  As   a  result   of  the  amendments  allowed petitioner  No.   2  was   added  as  one  of  the petitioners, and  certain new  grounds  of  attack were added  in para.  14 of the petition. To these grounds we shall advert later.      The short  facts giving  rise to the petition are these.  One Hakim  Mohammad Ajmal  Khan was  a physician (of Unani medicine) of all-India repute. He lived  in Delhi  and started  a  pharmaceutical institute  in   the  town   known  as   Hindustani Dawakhana in the year 1903.      He also  established a  medical college known as the  Tibbia College.  He died in the year 1927. But before  his death,  in the year 1911, he along with certain other persons formed a society styled Anjuman-i-Tibbia and  had it  registered under the Societies  Registration  Act,  1860  (Act  XXI  of 1860). The  name of  the society  was  changed  in 1915,  and   it  became  known  as  the  Board  of Trustees,  Ayurvedic  and  Unani  Tibbia  College, Delhi. For convenience we shall refer to it as the Board. The  Board ran  the Tibbia  College’ and an attached hostel.  The pharmaceutical institute was also managed by it, though at one stage petitioner No.  2   claimed  the  institute  as  his  private property. Certain  rules and regulations were made for the  functioning  of  the  Board,  which  were amended from time to time. The main objects of the Board were thus stated in the rules :-           (a)  to   establish  colleges   for  the      purpose of  imparting higher education in the      Unani and  Ayurvedic systems  of medicine  to      the inhabitants of India;           (b) to improve the indigenous systems of      medicine on scientific lines and for that 160      purpose   to    establish   one    or    more      pharmaceutical institutes (dawakhanas); and           (c) to  have medical  books compiled and      translated and  to adopt  other  means  which      might enhance the popularity of those systems      and add  to the  information of the people in      general on hygiene etc.      The  maximum   number  of   members   (called trustees in  the rule)  was 35  to be elected from all the  then Provinces of India. It was stated in r. 5  that one-third  of the  members of the Board should be  Hakims and Vaids. The financial year of the Board  was to  be from  April 1 to March 31 of each year,  and the annual subscription to be paid by a member of the Board was fixed at Rs. 12/- per annum payable  in advance  before April 30 of each year. Rule  6 laid down the circumstances in which

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the office  of a  member should  be deemed  to  be vacant, and  one of  such  circumstances  was  the failure of a member to pay him annual subscription before the date fixed for such payment. There were also rules  regarding (a)  power of  inspection of the college, hostel etc., (b) ordinary meetings of the Board  of Trustees and (c) matters which could be dealt with by the Board and its sub-committees. It is  not  necessary  to  state  these  rules  in detail. Rule  13 provided  for the  formation of a Managing Committee  consisting of nine members and six officials  for a period of three years and the functions of  the  Managing  Committee  were  also prescribed in the rules. The office-bearers of the Board and  the Managing  Committee were  to be the same and  consisted of  (1) a  President,  (ii)  a Senior  Vice-President,   (iii)  a   Junior   Vice President,  (iv)  a  Secretary,  (v)  a  Financial Secretary, and (vi) a Joint Secretary. It was laid down in r. 26 that the office-bearers of the Board were to be elected for three years by the members. The rules  also laid down the powers and duties of the President, 161 Secretary,   Financial    Secretary   and    Joint Secretary. One  of the  rules said that the office of the  Secretary of  the Board  shall, as  far as possible, vest  in the lineal descendants of Hakim Mohammad Ajmal Khan. Hakim Mohammad Jamil Khan son of Hakim  Mohammad Ajmal Khan and petitioner no. 2 before us, was the first Secretary of the Board.      In the  year 1948  Shri Rameshwar  Dayal, the then Collector of Delhi, and Dr. Yudhvir Singh the then President  of the  Delhi Municipal Committee, and certain  other persons were elected as members of  the  Board.  Dr.  Yudhvir  Singh  was  elected President and  one Shri  Mool  Chand  Gagerna  was appointed  Joint   Secretary.   Soon   after   the elections  in  1948,  a  struggle  ensued  between different groups  of members for obtaining control of the  Board and  the college, and for possession of  the  Hindustani  Dawakhana.  Certain  criminal proceedings followed.  On October 18, 1949, a suit was brought in the court of the senior Subordinate Judge, Delhi  under H.  92 of  the Code  of  Civil Procedure against  the Secretary and 31 members of the Board.  In that  suit an  application was made for the  appointment of  a receiver and on October 19, 1949,  the  Subordinate  Judge  appointed  two local advocate  as joint  receivers  with  plenary powers. These  receivers took  possession  of  the Dawakhana and  the college  between October 19 and 23, 1949.  When the  suit was  still pending,  the Delhi State  Legislature passed  an Act called the Tibbia College  Act, 1952  (Delhi  Act  No.  5  of 1952), hereinafter  referred to  as  the  impugned Act. This Act same into fore on October 10, 1952. The constitutional  validity of  the  Act  is  the principal  question  for  decision  on  this  writ petition and  we  shall  presently  refer  to  the provisions thereof. We may only state here that by s.  9   of  the  impugned  Act,  the  Board  stood dissolved and all property, movable and immovable, and all rights, powers and privileges 162

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of the  Board vested  in a  new Board  constituted under the  Act. This new Board is called the Tibia Delhi College  Board and  we shall  Refer to it as the new  Board. After  the passing of the impugned Act, the  suit instituted  before the  Subordinate Judge, the  Delhi was withdrawn. On the withdrawal of the  suit, an  application was  made for making over possession  of  the  properties  to  the  new Board. That  application was  allowed in  spite of the objection  of petitioner no. 1. Petitioner no. 1 unsuccessfully  moved the  High Court  of Punjab against that order.      Thereafter, petitioner no. 1 moved this Court under Art. 32 of the Constitution for the issue of a writ  restraining the  State of  Delhi  and  the newly constituted  Board under  the impugned  Act, the State  from enforcing  the provisions  of  the impugned Act and the new Board from exercising any functions  thereunder.   The  respondents  to  the petition   raised    a   number   of   preliminary objections, and  on December  13, 1954,  the  writ petition was  withdrawn. This was followed by some amendments of  the rules  of the  Board and  it is stated on  behalf of  the petitioners that a fresh election was  held in  accordance with the amended rules on January 6, 1955. On January 11, 1955, the Managing Committee passed a resolution authorising the Secretary  to institute  a proceeding  in this Court  to   enforce  the   fundamental  rights  of petitioner no.  1. The  present petition  was then filed on  March 14,  1955, in  pursuance  of  that resolution. The  petition was subsequently amended in the  manner already  indicated by us. The State of Delhi  and the new Board are the respondents to the present petition.      The learned  Advocate for the petitioners has challenged the  validity of  the Act  on two  main grounds. His  first ground  that the  Delhi  State Legislature had no legislative power or competence to enact  the impugned  Act, which  must  on  that ground be  declared invalid  and inoperative.  The second  ground   proceeds  on   the  footing  that assuming 163 the Delhi State Legislature had power to enact the impugned Act,  the Act  is bad because its several provisions   violate    the   fundamental   rights guaranteed to  the petitioners  under Art.  14, 19 and 31  of the Constitution. Two subsidiary points have also  been urged before us, one to the effect that the  Delhi State Legislature could not by the impugned  Act  over-ride  the  provisions  of  the Societies  Registration   Act,  1860  which  is  a Central Act,  and the other to the effect that the Delhi State Legislature acted mala fide in passing the impugned Act.      We shall  presently deal with these arguments in the  order in  which we have stated them. It is necessary  to   state  here,   however,   that   a preliminary objection  similar to  the  one  urged against the  previous petition  was also  urged in respect  of  the  present  petition.  The  learned Solicitor  General  appearing  on  behalf  of  the respondents  has  urged  that  by  reason  of  the failure  of   the  members   to  pay   the  annual

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subscription in  time, all  of them  ceased to  be members in  1950-1951;  therefore,  the  elections held in  1955 were of no effect there being no one competent to  elect; and  the  Board  as  a  Board ceased to exist before 1955 and neither petitioner no. 1  nor petitioner  no. 2  could  maintain  the present writ petition. Some of the affidavits made on behalf of the parties containing averments with regard  to   the   payment   or   non-payment   of subscription particularly in the years 1949-50 and 1950-51 were  read, and  Ex. B.  series which were the cash books of the years 1951 to 1954 were also placed  before  us.  On  one  side  there  is  the averment on  behalf of  the  respondents  that  no subscriptions were  paid before  the due  date for the years  1949-50  and  1950-51  by  any  of  the members. As  against this,  it is stated on behalf of the  petitioners that petitioner no. 2 and some of the  other members  paid their  subscription to the Financial  Secretary for the years 1949-50 and 1950-51. An  affidavit made  by the then Financial Secretary was  also placed  before us. From appeal of the affidavits 164 and the documents filed it appeared to us that the . question  being one  of disputed facts could not be  satisfactorily decided on the materials placed before us.  us. We,  therefore, thought  it proper and convenient  to consider the legal points urged as regards  the  constitutional  validity  of  the impugned Act and of the action taken thereon.      Now, we  take up  the first argument advanced on behalf  of the  petitioners. This  argument has been put  in the following way. The State of Delhi became a  Part State  on the  coming into force of the Constitution  of India.  Under Art. 239 of the Constitution as it then stood, a Part State was to be administered  by the  President acting, to such extent  as   he  thought   fit,  through  a  Chief Commissioner  or   a  Lieutenant-Governor   to  be appointed by him or throughout the Government of a neighbouring   State.    Article   240    of   the constitution enabled  Parliament by  law to create or continue  for any  Part State  a body,  whether nominated, elected  or partly nominated and partly elected, to  function as  a  Legislature  for  the State. By  virtue of  the power  conferred by Art. 240, Parliament  enacted the  Government of Part a States Act,  1951 (Central  Act 49  of  1951),  by which a  Legislative Assembly  was constituted for some of the Part C States including one for Delhi. Section 21 of the said Act laid down the extent of legislative power  of  the  Legislative  Assembly. This section  said inter alia that the Legislative Assembly of  a Part  a State may make laws for the whole or any part of the State with respect to any of the  matters enumerated in the State List (List II) or  in the  Concurrent List  (List III). There was an  exception  provided  with  regard  to  the Legislative Assembly  of the  State  of  Delhi  in respect of public order, police etc., which is not relevant for  our purpose. Section 22 said that if any provision  of a  law made  by the  Legislative Assembly of  0, Part  State was  repugnant to  any provision of a law made by Parliament, then the

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165 law made  by Parliament,  whether passed before or after the  law made by the Legislative Assembly of the State,  shall prevail  and the law made by the Legislative Assembly  of the  State shall,  to the extent of  the repugnancy,  be void.  There is  an Explanation to  the section which is not ’relevant for our  purpose and  need not  be read. The point which the learned Advocate for the petitioners has emphasised is  that under  s.  21  aforesaid,  the extent of the legislative power of the Delhi State Legislature was  limited to the making of laws for the whole  or any  part of  the Delhi  State  with respect to  any of  the matters  enumerated in the State List  or  in  the  Concurrent  List  of  the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution. Now, item 32 of the State List (List II) is in these terms:           "32.  In   corporation,  regulation  and      winding up  of corporations, other than those      specified  in   List  I.   and  universities,      unincorporated trading, literary, scientific,      religious    and    other    societies    and      associations; co-operative societies." Items 43  and 44 of the Union List (List I) are in these terms:           43.   Incorporation,    regulation   and      winding   up   of   corporations,   including      banking, insurance and financial corporations      but not including co-operative societies           44.   Incorporation,    regulation   and      winding up  of corporations,  whether trading      or not,  with objects  not  confined  to  one      State, but not including universities."      The argument  of the learned Advocate for the petitioners is  this.  The  old  Board  which  was registered under  the Societies  Registration Act, 1860 and  is petitioner  no. 1  before us,  was  a corporation, whose  objects were  not confined  to the State  of Delhi.  Therefore,  any  legislation with regard to it could fall under item 44 of List 1 and not under 166 item 32  of List II. This argument consists of two parts-first, that the old Board was a corporation, and, secondly,  that its objects were not confined to one State. The learned Advocate urge that being the position,  the Delhi  State Legislature had no legislative  competence   to  make   the  impugned legislation which  went beyond  the extent  of its legislative power  under 8.  21 of Act 49 of 1951. It is  worthy of  note here that if the Board were not a  corporation, then  the impugned legislation would  not   fall  under   item  44   of  List  I; alternatively,  if   the     Board  were   not   a corporation but  its objects were confined to only one State,  viz. the  State of  Delhi, then  again item 44  would not  be attracted. On behalf of the respondent there  is  a  threefold  reply  to  the argument stated above: firstly, that the Board was not a  corporation; secondly,  its objects did not extend beyond the State of Delhi; and thirdly, the impugned legislation  is supportable under item 11 of List  II relating to "Education" and item 28 of the  Concurrent   List  (List   III)  relating  to "Charities and charitable institution".

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    The first  and foremost  question is  whether the old  Board   was a  corporation in  the  legal sense  of   that  word.  What  is  a  Corporation? Corporations may be divided into two main classes, namely, corporations  aggregate  and  corporations sole. We  are not  concerned in  the present  case with Corporation sole. A corporation aggregate has been defined as a collection of individuals united into one body under a special denomination, having perpetual succession under an artificial form, and vested by  the policy of the law with the capacity of acting  in several  respects as  an individual, particularly of  taking and  granting property, of contracting obligations  and of  suing  and  being sued, of  enjoying privileges  and  immunities  in common, and  of exercising  a variety of political rights, more  or less  extensive, according to the design of its institution, or the powers conferred upon it,  either at the time of its creation or at any subsequent 167 period of  its  existence".  (Halsbury’s  Laws  of England, 3rd  Edn. Vol.  9, page 4.) A corporation aggregate has therefore only one capacity, namely, its corporate  capacity. A  corporation  aggregate may  be  a  trading  corporation  ora  non-trading corporation.  The  usual  examples  of  a  trading corporation  are   (1)  charter   companies,   (2) companies  incorporated   by   special   acts   of parliament, (3)  companies  registered  under  the Companies Act,  etc. Non-trading  corporations are illustrated by  (1)  municipal  corporations,  (2) district boards,  (3) benevolent institutions, (4) universities etc.  An  essential  element  in  the legal conception  of a  corporation  is  that  its identity is continuous, that is, that the original member or  members and his or their successors are once  In   law  the   individual  corporators,  or members, of  which it  is composed  are  something wholly different  from the corporation itself; for a corporation  is a  legal persona just as much as an individual.  Thus, it has been held that a name is essential  to a corporation; that a corporation aggregate can,  as a  general rule,  only  act  or express its  will by  deed under  its common seal; that at  the present  day in England a corporation is created by one or other of two methods, namely, by Royal  charter of  incorporation from the Crown or by  the authority of Parliament that is to say, by or  by virtue of statute. There is authority of long standing  for saying  that the  essence of  a corporation consists  in (1)  lawful authority  of incorporation, (2) the persons to be incorporated, (3) a  name by which tho persons are incorporated, (4) a  place, and  (5) words  sufficient in law to show  incorporation.   No  particular   words  are necessary for  the creation  of a corporation; any expression showing  an  intention  to  incorporate will be sufficient.      The learned  Advocate for the petitioners has referred us to various provisions of the Societies Registration Act, 1860 and has contended that the 168 result of these provisions was to make the Board a corporation on  registration. It  is necessary now

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to read  some of  the provisions  of that Act. The Act is  entitled an  Act for  the registration  of literary, scientific  and charitable societies and the  preamble  states  that  it  was  enacted  for improving  the   legal  condition   of   societies established  for   the  promotion  of  literature, science, or the fine arts, or for the diffusion of useful knowledge etc., or for charitable purposes. Section 1 of the Act states that any seven or more persons associated  for any  literary, scientific, or charitable  purpose, or for any such purpose as is  described   in    s.20  of  the  Act  may,  by subscribing  their   names  to   a  memorandum  of association and filing the same with the Registrar of Joint-stock  Companies form  themselves into  a society under  the Act.  Section 2  lays down that the memorandum  of association  shall contain  and one of  the particulars  it must  contain is  "the objects of  the society".  Section  3  deals  with registration  and   the  fees   payable  therefor. Sections 5 and 6 are important for our purpose and should be read in full.           5. The  property, movable and immovable,      belonging to  a society registered under this      Act, if  not vested  in  trustees,  shall  be      deemed to  be vested,  for the time being, in      the governing  body of  such society,  and in      all proceedings,  civil and  criminal, may be      described as  the property  of the  governing      body of such society by their proper title.           "6. Every  society registered under this      Act may  sue or  be sued  in the  name of the      president, chairman,  or principal secretary,      or trustee,  as shall  be determined  by  the      rules and regulations of the society, and, in      default of such determination, in the name of      Such person  as shall  be  appointed  by  the      governing body for the occasion: 169           Provided that  it shall be competent for      any person  having a  claim or demand against      the  society,   to  sue   the  president   or      chairman,  or   principal  secretary  of  the      trustees thereof, if on an application to the      governing body  some other  officer or person      be not nominated to be the defendant." Section 7  provides for  non-abatement of suits or proceedings and  the continuance  of such suite or proceedings  in   the  name   of  or  against  the successor of  the person  by or  against whom  the suit  was  brought.  Section  8  says  that  if  a judgment is  recovered against a person or officer named on behalf of the society such judgment shall not be  put in force against the property, movable or immovable,  or against  the body of such person or  officer,  but  against  the  property  of  the society.  Section  10  provides  that  in  certain circumstances mentioned  therein a  member of  the society may  be sued  by the  society; but  if the defendant shall  be successful  in any  such  suit brought at  the instance  of the society and shall be adjudged  to recover his costs, he may elect to proceed to  recover the  same from  the officer in whose name  the suit  was  brought,  or  from  the society.  Sections   13   and   14   provide   for

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dissolution of  societies and  the consequences of such dissolution.  These provisions  have also  an important bearing  on the  questions before us and are quoted in full.           13. Any  number  not  less  than  three-      fifths of  the members  of  any  society  may      determine that  it shall  be  dissolved,  and      thereupon it shall be dissolved forthwith, or      at  the   time  then  agreed  upon,  and  all      necessary  steps   shall  be  taken  for  the      disposal and  settlement of  the property  of      the  society,  its  claims  and  liabilities,      according to  the rules  o the  said society      applicable thereto,  if any, and, if not then      as the  governing body  shall find expedient,      provided that, in the event of any 170      dispute arising among tho said governing body      or the members of the society, the adjustment      of its  affairs  shall  be  referred  to  the      principal    court    of    original    civil      jurisdiction of  the district  in  which  the      chief building of the society is situate, and      the Court shall make such order in the matter      as it shall deem requisite:           Provided  that   no  society   shall  be      dissolved unless  three-fifths of the members      shall  have   expressed  a   wish  for   such      dissolution  by   their  votes  delivered  in      person, or  by proxy,  at a  general  meeting      convened for the purpose:           Provided that whenever any Government is      a  member   of,  or   a  contributor  to,  or      otherwise   interested    in   any    society      registered under this Act, such society shall      not be  dissolved, without the consent of the      Government of the state of registration.           14.  If  upon  the  dissolution  of  any      society registered under this Act there shall      remain, after  the satisfaction  of  all  its      debts   and    liabilities,   any    property      whatsoever, the  same shall not be paid to or      distributed among  the members  of  the  said      society or any of them, but shall be given to      some other  society, to  be determined by the      votes of  not less  than three-fifths  of the      members present personally or by proxy at the      time  of  the  dissolution,  or,  in  default      thereof, by such Court as aforesaid:           Provided,  however,   that  this  clause      Shall not  apply to  any society  which shall      have  been  founded  or  established  by  the      contributions of  shareholders in  the nature      of a Joint Stock Company."      Now, the  question before  us is regard being had to  the aforesaid  provisions-was the  Board a corporation? Our  conclusion is  that it  was not. The most  important point  to be  noticed in  this connection is  that in  the various  provisions of the 171 Societies Registration  Act, 1860,  there  are  no sufficient  words  to  indicate  an  intention  to incorporate, on  the contrary, the Provisions show that there      all  absence  of  such  intention.

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Section   2 no  doubt provides  for a name as also for the objects of the society. Section 5, however states that the property belonging to the society, if not  vested in  trustees, shall be deemed to be vested in the governing body of the society and in all proceedings,  civil and criminal, the property will be described as the property of the governing body. The  section talks  of property belonging to the society;  but the  property is  vested in  the trustees or  in the  governing body  for the  time being. The  expression property  belonging to  the society" does  not give  the society  a  corporate status in  the  matter  of  holding  or  acquiring property, it  merely describes  the property which vests in  the trustees  or governing  body for the time being.  Section 6 gives the society the right to sue  or be  sued in  the Name of the president, chairman etc.  and 8.  7 provides  that no suit or proceeding in  a civil court shall abate by reason of the  death etc of the person by or against whom the suit  has been  brought. Section  8 again says that any judgment obtained in a suit brought by or against the  society shall be enforced against it. It has  been submitted  before that 88. 6, 7 and 8 clothe the  society with a legal personality and a perpetual  succession;   and  s.  10  enables  the members of  the society  to be  sued as  strangers certain circumstances,  by the  society,  and  the Costs awarded  to the  defendant in  such   a suit may  be  recovered,  at  his  election,  from  the officer  in  whose  name  the  suit  was  brought. Dealing with  very similar  provisions (ss.  7.  8 and) of  the English Trade Union Act, 1871 (34 and 35  Vict,     .  31)  Lord  Lindley  said  in  the celebrated  case   of   Taff   Vale   Railway   v. Amalgamated Society of Railway Servants (1).      (1) [1901] A. C. 426. 172           The Act  does not  in express  terms say      what use  is to  be made  of the  name  under      which the  trade union  is registered  and by      which it is known. But a trade union which is      registered under  the Act  must have  a  name      ...... It  may  acquire  property,  but,  not      being incorporated,  recourse is  had to  the      old  well-known  machinery  of  trustees  for      acquiring and  holding such property, and for      suing and  being sued in respect of it (ss.7,      8,9). The  property so  held is, however, the      property of  the  union;  the  union  is  the      beneficial owner.  ...... The  Act appears to      me to indicate with sufficient clearness that      the registered  name is one which may be used      to denote  the  union  as  an  unincorporated      society in  legal proceedings  as well as for      business and other purposes." In Trade  Union Law’  by N. A. Citrine (1950 edn.) to which  the learned Advocate for the petitioners has referred, it is stated at p. 143:           The object of this section (s. 9) was to      provide   a    method   of   enabling   legal      proceedings to  be brought  in respect of the      property of  a registered  trade union. Since      the legislature  had no  intention of  giving      such unions  corporate status  with power  to

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    hold property and to sue and be sued in their      registered names, it was necessary to provide      for the vesting of their property in trustees      and to  permit them  to bring or defend legal      proceedings in  respect of  that property  on      the unions  behalf. section  8 of  this  Act,      having  provided   for  the  vesting  of  the      union’s property in its trustees, the present      section   supplements    that   section    by      empowering the  trustees to  bring or defend,      on the  union’s  behalf,  civil  or  criminal      proceedings concerning its property."      In Bonsor v. Musicians’ Union(1) the position (1) (L. R.) 1956 A. C. 104. 173 Of a registered trade union in England came  under consideration of  the House  of Lords in an appeal from the  Court of  Appeal. On a review of earlier decision  including  the  decision  in  Tuff  Vale Railway    v.  Amalgamated  Society    of  Railway Servants(1),  Lord   Macdermott,  Lord   Keith  of Avenholm and  Lord Somervell of Harrow held that a registered trade  union was  not   juristic person distinguishable at  any at any moment of time from the  members  of  which  it  was  composed.  After referring to  the various  provisions of the Trade Union Act  1871 and   some of the earlier decision bearing   on the question Lord MacDermott said: ’           "I base  this opinion  primarily on  the      statutes. The more closely  they are examined      the  clearer   it  seems   to  be   that  the      legislature, though  minded  to  bestow  upon      registered  unions  some  of  the  gifts  and      attributes  of   legal  personality,  had  no      intention of  doing  more  and  was,  indeed,      adverse to the idea of going the whole length      and  making   those  unions   new  creatures,      distinct in  law from  their membership,  and      fundamentally different  from the combination      of persons  which the definition requires all      trade unions to be." Lord Morton  of  Henryton  and  Lord  Porter,  who expressed  the   minority  view,   held   that   a registered trade  union though not an incorporated body, was  yet capable  of entering into contracts and of being sued as a legal entity, distinct from its individual members.      It is clear from the aforesaid decisions that provisions similar  to the previsions of ss. 5, 6, 7 and  8 of  the Societies  Registration Act, 1860 were  held   not  to   show   any   intention   to incorporate; on  the contrary,  the very resort to the machinery   of  trustees or the governing body for the  time  being  acquiring  and  holding  the property showed  that there  was no  intention  to incorporate the society or      (1) [1901] A. C. 426. 174 union of  as to  give it  a corporate capacity for the    purpose  of holding and acquiring property. It   , appears  to us  that the  legal position is exactly the     same with regard to the provisions in  ss.   6,  6,   7  and    8  of  the  Societies Registration Act,  1860. They  do J  not show  any intention  to   incorporate,  though  they  confer

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certain privileges  on a registered society, which would be  wholly  unnecessary  if  the  registered society were  a corporation. Sections 13 and 14 do not carry  the matter any further in favour of the petitioners. Section  13 provides  for dissolution of societies  and adjustment  of their affairs. It says in  effect that  on dissolution  of a society necessary steps  shall be  taken for  the disposal and settlement of the property of the society, its claims and  liabilities, according to the rules of the society;  if there  be no  rules, then  as the governing body  shall find  it expedient  provided that in the event of any dispute arising among the said governing  body or  the members  of the  said society, the  adjustment of  the affairs  shall be referred to  the Court.  Here again  the governing body is given a legal power somewhat distinct from that of the society itself; because under s.16 the governing body  shall be  the governors,  council, directors, committee,  trustees or  other body  to whom by  the rules  and regulations of the society the management of its affairs is entrusted.      We have,  therefore, come  to the  conclusion that the provisions aforesaid do not establish the main essential  characteristic  of  a  corporation aggregate,  namely,   that  of   an  intention  to incorporate the  society. We  may further  observe that the  scheme and  provisions of  the Societies Registration Act,1860 are very similar to those of the Friendly  Societies Act, 1986 (59 and 69 Vict. 0.25),  as   amended  in   certain   respects   by subsequent enactments.  It is appropriate to quote here what  Dennis  Lloyd  has  said  in  his  ’Law relating  to   Unincorporated  Association’  (1938 edn.) at page 59 in respect of the 175 provisions of  the Friendly Societies Act, 1896 as modified by subsequent enactments. He has said:           The modern  legislation still  maintains      the policy  of the  older Acts in withholding      corporate  status  from  friendly  societies.      Registration    does     not    result     in      incorporation,  but   merely   entitles   the      society so registered to enjoy the privileges      conferred by the Act. These privileges are of      considerable importance  and certain  of them      go  a   long  way  toward  giving  registered      societies..  a   status  in   many   respects      analogous  to   a  corporation  strictly  so-      called,   but   without   being   technically      incorporated. Thus something in the nature of      perpetual  succession   is  conceded  by  the      provision that  the society’s  property is to      vest in  the trustees  for the  time being of      the society  for the  use and  benefit of the      societies and  its members and of all persons      claiming through the members according to the      society’s rules, and further (and this is the      most noteworthy  provision) that the property      shall pass  to  succeeding  trustees  without      assignment or  transfer.  In  the  same  way,      though the  society, being unincorporated, is      unable to sue and be sued in its own name, it      is given the statutory privilege of suing and      being sued in the name of  its trustees."

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We think  that these observations made with regard to similar  provisions of  the Friendly  Societies Act, correctly  and succinctly summarise the legal position in  respect of  the several provisions of the  Societies   Registration  Act,   1860.  Those provisions undoubtedly  give certain privileges to a  society  registered  under  that  Act  and  the privileges are of considerable importance and some of  those   privileges  are   analogous   to   the privileges enjoyed  by a corporation, but there is really no incorporation in the sense in which that word is legally understood. 176      On behalf  of the  petitioners  reliance  has been  placed   on  the  decision  in  Krishnan  v. Sundaram (1)     where Kania, J., (as he then was) said:           The position  of  a  society  registered      under the Societies Registration Act, 1860 is      like  that   of  a  club  or  a  joint  stock      company." There  was   no  discussion  of  the  question  of incorporation, and the decision cannot be accepted as authoritatively  laying  down  that  a  society registered under  the Societies  Registration, Act is a  corporation. There was a similar observation without any  discussion in  Boppana Rukminamma  v. Maganti Venkata  Ramadas(2) and  N. A.  Nannier v. Official Assignee,  Madras (3). There is how-ever, a fairly  full discussion     of the  question  in Satyavart Sidhantalankar v. The Arya Samaj, Bombay (4)  where  Bhagwati,  J.,  held  that  a  Society registered under  the Societies, Registration Act, 1860 was  a legal  entity apart  from the  members constituting it, and it can sue and be sued in its own name.  The question which fell for decision in that case  was not  whether a  society  registered under   the   Societies   Registration   Act   was ’incorporated’ as that term is legally understood. The question  there was  whether  such  a  society could sue or be sued accept in the manner provided by      6 and 7. It was held that it could and the reason given  was thus  expressed by  the  learned Judge: "           I am  of  opinion  that  the  provisions      contained in  ss. 6, 7 and 8 of the Societies      Registration Act  are not  inconsistent  with      the  user  of  the  registered  name  of  the      society in connection with legal proceedings.      As  Lord   Lindley  observed  in  Taffy  Vale      Railway Company‘s case (supra), "I do not say      that the use of the name is compulsory but it      is at least permissive."           If this  is the true legal position of a      society  registered   under   the   Societies      Registration      (1) (140)43 Bom L.R. 56       (2) A.I.R. 1940                                          Mad. 949.      (3) A. I. R.1951 Mad.875.       (4) (1945) 48                                    Bom. L. R. 941. 177       Act,  the objection  .. that  the plaintiffs      and the  defendants are  one and the same and      that the  suit as  framed is not maintainable      by reason of the society being the plaintiffs

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    as well  as the  defendants  disappears.  The      plaintiffs are  suing on behalf of themselves      and all the members of the society. The First      defendant is the president of the society and      represents the  society. As  I  have  already      observed the society on its registration with      the  Registrar   of  Joint   Stock  Companies      becomes  a   legal  entity   apart  from  its      members;  it   would  be  therefore  idle  to      contend that  the society  arc the plaintiffs      as  well  as  the  first  defendant  in  this      action’ It  is  unnecessary  for  use    to  consider  the correctness or  otherwise of  the reason given; it is sufficient  for use  to state  that we  do  not think that  the decision  proceeds on  the footing that a  society  registered  under  the  Societies Registration Act  is a corporation in the sense of being  incorporated   as  that   term  is  legally understood, but  if it  does,  we  are  unable  to accept it as correct."      The precise  question which has arisen before US arose  in Servants  of India  Society, Poona v. The Charity Commissioner of Bombay ). The facts of that case  were  these.  The  "Servants  of  India Society" was  an institution  which was registered under the  Societies Registration  Act,  1860.  It owned considerable  movable and immovable property both in  the State  of Bombay  as well as in other parts of  India. The  State  of  Bombay  issued  a notification under  a 1(4)  of the  Bombay  Public Trusts Act,  1950 (Bom.  Act XXIX  of 1950)  which applied the  provisions of  that Act  to a society formed for  religious or  charitable purposes  and registered under  the Societies  Registration Act. An application  was  made  under  8.18(1)  of  the Bombay Public trusts Act  1950 for registration of the Servants  of India  Society. During an enquiry into      (1) (1960) 63 Bom. L. R. 379; 178 that application  an objection  was taken that the Servants of  India Society  having been registered under  the   Societies  Registration   Act  was  a corporation   and had  objects  also  outside  the Bombay  State      and  therefore,  a  legislation purporting to  regulate the  activities of  such a society  fell   in  entry   44  of   List  I   and consequently the State Legislature had no power to make any  law to  regulate the  affairs of  such a society. This  objection was  dealt with  first by the Assistant  Charity Commissioner  and then  the Charity Commissioner;  thereafter, an  application Was made  under 8.  72 of the Bombay Public Trusts Act, 1950  to the  Court of  the  District  Judge, Poona. Then the matter was taken to the High Court on appeal from the decision of the District Judge. The appeal  came up for hearing before our learned brother Mudholkar, J. (who was then a Judge of the Bombay High  Court) and  Patel, J. After referring to several  decision  including  the  decision  of Bhagwati, J.  in Satyavart   Sidhantalankar v. The Arya Samaj,  Bombay (1)  our learned  brother held that the Servant of India Society registered under the Societies  Registration Act was a legal entity

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and a  quasi-corporation.  He  further  held  that entry 44  in List I and the first part of entry 32 in List  II relating  to incorporation, regulation and winding  up of  corporations’ must  be given a liberal construction  and quasi-corporations would come under  those entries.  Basing  himself  on  a parity of  reasoning relating  to entry  7 in List III which  related to ’Contracts’, he said that if quasi. contracts  would come under entry 7, quasi- corporation must also come under entries 43 and 44 of List  I and  the first part of entry 32 of List II. mr..  Justice Patel  took a different view. He said:           A reference  to entry  32 of  the  State      List shows that, incorporation regulation and      winding up  of corporation,  other than those      specified in  List I  (Union List, entries 43      regulation and      (1) (1945) 48 Bom. L. R. 341. 179      44), and universities are expected from Union      List.   Further    "unincorporated   trading,      literary,  Scientific,  religious  and  other      Societies and associations" and "co-operative      societies" are  also excepted  from the Union      List. The  emphasis would appear to be on the      word unincorporated ’ used in connection with      "trading, literary, scientific, religious and      other  societies  and  associations".  If  an      association  or  society  is  unincorporated,      then it  may not  fall within the Union List.      The question, therefore, that is pertinent to      be  decided   is  not   whether  or   not  an      association    or a society is a legal entity      or a  quasi-corporation, but  whether  it  is      incorporated or  unincorporated. If  this  is      borne in  mind, then  it is  amply clear that      entries 43  and 44  of the  Union List  would      cover only  those societies  and associations      which are  incorporated; and  those which may      have  legal   entity  but   which   are   not      incorporated will  not fall  within the Union      List." The matter  was then  referred to  a  third  Judge (Gokhale, J.) who thus expressed his view:           In  my  judgment,  societies  registered      under  the  societies  Registration  Act  are      neither corporations  nor quasi-corporations,      but are unincorporated societies contemplated      under the  second part  of entry  32  of  the      State List." Mr. Justice  Gokhale also  expressed the view that when  Considering   the  ambit   of   an   express legislative power  in relation  to an  unspecified residuary power,  abroad  interpretation  must  be given  to   the  former;  the  case,  however,  is different where  under the  Constitution there are two complementary powers each expressed in precise and definite  terms and in such a case there is no justification for  giving a broader interpretation one power  rather  than  to  the  other.  We  find ourselves in agreement with 180 this view.  It seems  clear to use that entries 43 and 44  of list I when they talk of incorporation,

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regulation         and winding  up of corporations relate to  such      legal entities  as have  been incorporated and  are    corporations  in the full sense of  the term.  Similarly,the first  part  of entry  32   of  List   II   when   it   talks   of "incorporation,  regulation   and  winding  up  of corporation’‘ relates  to such  legal entities  as are incorporated. This is further clarified by the second  part   of  entry   32   which   talks   of "unincorporated  trading.   literary,  scientific, religious and other societies and association". In entry 32  there is  a dichotomy  in the  two parts thereof: the  first part  relates to  incorporated societies which are corporations in the true sense of that  term, and  the  second  part  relates  to unincorporated societies.  The justification    is between incorporated  societies and unincorporated societies and there can be no doubt as to which of the two  parts in which a society registered under the Societies Registration Act, 1860 will fall, be it called  a quasi-corporation  or  by  any  other name. A  society registered  under  the  Societies Registration Act  may have  characteristics  which are analogies  to some of the characteristics   of a corporation;  yet it  is  not  incorporated  and remains an  unincorporated society.  AS soon as it is held  that it  is an unincorporated society, it must come  under the  second Part  of entry  32 of List II.      In this  view of the matter it is unnecessary to decide  the further questions as to (1) whether the objects  of the  old Board extended beyond the State of  Delhi, and  (2) if other entries such as entry 11  of List  II and entry 28 of List III can support the impugned legislation. We may, however, observe  that  if  we  had  come  to  a  different conclusion on  the question  whether the old Board was a  corporation or  not and it became necessary to decide  question no.  (1) above,  we might have held that  in view  of the rules governing the old Board, its objects  were not confined to the State of Delhi only in the sense 181 that it would not have been ultra vires of the old Board to  have started  colleges etc., outside the State of  Delhi. We  should however,  add that the activities of  the old  Board did not, as a matter of fact,  extend beyond  the State of Delhi on the (late when the impugned Act was enacted.      There is another aspect of the question which has to  be  considered  here.  Section  3  of  the impugned Act is in these terms:           3. (1) With effect from such date as the      Chief Commissioner  may, by  notification  in      the official  Gazette,  appoint  (hereinafter      referred to  in this  Act as  "the  appointed      day"), the  entire management  and control of      the Ayurvedic  and Unani Tibbi College, Delhi      now vested  in the  Board of  Trustee of  the      Ayurvedic and  Unani  Tibbi  College,  Delhi,      shall be  vested in  a Board to be called the      Tibbia College Board".           (2) The  Board shall be a body corporate      having perpetual succession and a common seal      and shall by the said name sue and be sued."

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Sub-section (2) of 8. 3 says in express terms that the new  Board constituted  under the impugned Act is given  a corporate  status; in other words, the new Board  is a  corporation in  the full sense of the term  Does the impugned legislation still come within entry  32 of List II . We think it does and for these reasons. We have held that the old Board was  not   a  corporation,   even  though  it  was registered under  the Societies  Registration Act. When,  therefore,   the  Delhi  State  Legislature passed a  law dissolving  the old  Board,  it  was really dealing  with an  unincorporated society or association By  the impugned legislation, however, it gave  the new  Board a corporate status, but at the same  time so  delimited the powers and duties of the  new Board  as to confine them to the State of Delhi 182 only. The  impugned Act  is  entitled  an  Act  to provide for  transfer of  the  management  of  the Ayurvedic and  Unani Tibbi College, Delhi, founded by the  late Hakim  Ajmal Khan  from  its  present trustees to  a Board."  In other  words,  the  Act deals only  with the  college  in  Delhi  and  the pharmaceutical institute attached to it. Section 7 which gives the powers and duties of the new Board is in these terms:           7.  The   Board   shall   exercise   the      following powers  and perform  the  following      duties, namely:-           (a) to  maintain the Ayurvedic and Unani      Tibbi College,  Delhi with  a view  to impart      higher eduction  to  men  and  women  in  the      Ayurvedic and  Unani Systems  of Medicine and      to promote and conduct research in the same:           (b)  to   maintain   and   improve   the      Hindustani   Dawa Khana and Rasayanashala;           (c) to  provide for  studies  to  enable      incorporation,   where   necessary   of   the      principle of  the modern  system of  Medicine      and surgery  in order  to help  the scheme of      studies for  the Ayurvedic  and Unani systems      according to the exigencies of time;           (d) to help produce and publish books in      order to  facilitate the  carrying out of the      objects specified in the clauses (a) to (c);           (e)  to   receive  gifts,  donations  or      benefactions from  Government and  to receive      bequests, donations  and transfer  of movable      or immovable properties from trustees, donors      or transferors, as the case may be;           (f) to  deal with any property belonging      to or  vested in  the Board in such manner as      the Board  may deem  fit  for  advancing  the      objects specified in clauses (a) to (d); 183           (g) to  do all  such things  as  may  be      necessary incidental  or  conductive  to  the      attainment of  all or  any  of  the  subjects      specified in clauses (a) to (d) Unlike the  rules governing  the old  Board  which enabled it to establish colleges outside Delhi for the purpose  of imparting higher education ill the Unani and  Ayurvedic systems  of  medicine,  s.  7 gives the  new Board powers and duties with regard

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to the  Ayurvedic and Unani Tibbi College at Delhi and the  pharmaceutical institute  and  laboratory attached to  it. This is made further clear by the definition  of   the  word   Board’   in   8.   2, incorporation section,  namely, 8. 3, constitution of the  Board as  laid  down  in  8.  4,  and  the sections  relating  to  the  power  of  the  chief commissioner to supersede the Board, to make rules to carry  out the objects of the Act and the power of the  Board to make regulations not inconsistent with  the   Act  for  carrying  out  the  purposes thereof. None  of the  provisions of  the impugned legislation accepting  8.  9  to  which  we  shall presently refer  give the  new Board any powers or duties  other   than  those   connected  with  the college,  attached  pharmaceutical  institute  and laboratory, all  situate in the State of Delhi. We now come to 8. 9 which is in these terms:           "9.(1) As  from the  appointed  day, the      Board of  Trustees of the Ayurvedic and Unani      Tibbi College,  Delhi, a  society  registered      under the  provisions of  the Registration of      Societies Act,  1860,  on  the  12th  day  of      August, 1911,  by the  name Anjuman-i -Tibbia      whose  purpose,  Constitution  and  name  was      amended on  25th November, 1915), shall stand      dissolved  and   all  property,  movable  and      immovable,  and   all  rights,   powers   and      privileges  of   the   said   society   which      immediately before the appointed day belonged      to or  were vested  in the said society shall      vest in the 184      Board and  shall be  applied for the purposes      for which the  Board is constituted.           (2) As  from the appointed day all debts      and   liabilities of  the said  society shall      stand transferred  and attached  to the Board      and    thereafter     be    discharged    and      satisfied by the Board.           (3)Any  will   deed  or  other  document      whether          made  or executed  before or      after the  commencement of  this  Act,  which      contains any  bequests  gifts,  or  trust  in      favour of  the  society  shall  as  from  the      appointed day,  be construed  as if the Board      were therein named instead of the Society." It no  doubt   says that  all rights,  powers  and privileges         which  immediately  before  the appointed day belonged    to or were vested in the old Board shall vest in the new Board; but it adds that those  rights, powers and privileges shall be applicable for  the purposes  for  which  the  new Board is  constituted. We must, therefore, read B. 9 as  being subject  to the  provisions of    7 of the Act.  In terms         9 says that the rights, powers and  privileges of  the old  Board shall be available to  the new  Board and  shall be applied for the  purposes    for  which the  new Board  is constituted  . The words underlined are important, and show clearly enough that the right, powers and privileges of  tho old  board are available to the new for  a limited  purpose only,  namely, for the purposes for  which the  new Board is constituted. If the  purposes for  which  the  now  Board    is

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constituted are  confined to  the institutions  in Delhi, then  obviously the objects for which   the new Board is incorporated do not extend beyond the State of Delhi.      The conclusions  at which we have arrived may now be summarised as follows:      (1)  On   registration  under  tho  Societies Registration Act, the old Board did not 185 become  a   corporation  is  the  sense  of  being incorporated within  the meaning  entry 44 of List I;  it   remained  and   hoodwinked   to   be   an unincorporated society  though under  the  several provisions of the Societies Registration Act, 1860 it had  certain privileges, some of the privileges being analogous to those of corporation;      (2) the  impugned legislation  while creating the new Board has given it a corporate statue, but has confined its powers and duties to the college, pharmaceutical institute  and laboratory  in Delhi and while  giving the new Board rights, powers and privileges of  the old  Board has  limited them to such  purposes   for  which   the  new   Board  is constituted;      (3) the  impugned legislation      therefore, falls under  entry 32  of List  II; so  far as the dissolution of  the old  Board is concerned, under the second  part  of  the  entry  and  so  far  as incorporation of the new Board is concerned, under its first part.      That  being   the  position,   the   impugned legislation  was   well  within   the  legislative competence  and   power   of   the   Delhi   State Legislature.  We  must,  therefore,  overrule  the first ground  of attack  urged on  behalf  of  the petitioners.      We now  proceed to  a  consideration  of  the second ground  of attack.  So far  as the  alleged violation of Art. 14 is concerned, The petitioners have stated in their petition:           "There are  various  other  institutions      where there  have been  actual allegations of      mismanagement but  the State  has picked  out      the petitioner.  Assuming, without admitting,      that there  has  been  mismanagement  by  the      petitioner of  its affairs,  there is not the      slightest suggestion in the whole Act that it      is  promulgated   on  the   ground   of   any      mismanagement on  the part of the petitioner.      ............ The  said Act  is  an  arbitrary      piece  of   legislation  and   There  is   no      reasonable 186      Classification whatsoever  on which it can be      supported." To this  the reply  of the respondents is that the old Board  was  grossly  mismanaging  its  affairs they said.           "Before the  said Act  was passed, there      was a  great deal  of  discontent  among  the      students of the said institution and also the      general public and there was strong agitation      against cross  mismanagement by  the trustees      of the  said Board.  That owing  to the gross      mismanagement of  the Board’s  affairs by the

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    trustees the  situation had  so  deteriorated      that  early   in  1949  there  were  constant      students’ strikes,  defalcation of  funds and      frequent interruption  in work and studies of      the institution." In our  view the petitioners have not made out any basis for the contention that (1) there were other institutions   similarly    situated,   and    (2) petitioner  No.  1  was  picked  out  for  unequal treatment. The  names  of  no  other  institutions similarly situated  have been   disclosed.  In the first Sholapur  case Chiranjit  Lal Chowdhuri,  v. The Union  of India  (1) it was held by a majority of Judges of this court that even one corporation, (in our  case one  society) or  a group of persons can be  taken as a class by itself for the purpose of  legislation,   provided     it  exhibits  some exceptional features  which are  not possessed  by others.           The courts  should prima  facie lean  in      favour  .  Of  constitutionality  and  should      support the  legislation if it is possible to      do so on any reasonable ground, and it is for      the party  who attacks  the validity  of  the      legislation to place all materials before the      court  which   would  go  to  show  that  the      selection  is  arbitrary  and  unsupportable.      Throwing out of vague hints that there may be      other      (1) [1950] S. C. R. 869, 915, 914. 187      Instances of similar nature is not enough for      this purpose".      (per Mukherjea,  J. at  pp.  913-914  of  the report. These observations  apply with equal force to the  present case  and we are unable to sustain the contention  of the  petitioners that any right under  Art.   14  of  the  Constitution  has  been violated.      As to  Art. 31  of the  Constitution it seems clear to us that cl. (2) of the said Article as it stood at the relevant time has no application. The impugned legislation  does not  relate to nor does it provide for, compulsory acquisition of property for a  public purpose.  The  impugned  legislation provided for the transfer of the management of the Ayurvedic and Unani Tibbi College, Delhi, from the old Board  to a new Board and for that purpose the old Board  was  dissolved  and  a  new  Board  was created with certain rights, powers and privileges to be  applied for  the  exercise  of  powers  and performance of  duties as laid down in 8. 7 of the Act. Such  legislation does  not fall  under  Art. 31(2) and  cannot be judged by the tests laid down there in.      As to cl. (1) of Art. 31 there is no question of any  violation of  that clause  if the  law  by which the transference of management has been made is valid  law.  We  have  already  held  that  the impugned   legislation   was   well   within   the legislative  competence   of   the   Delhi   State Legislature. Now  the  question  is  the  impugned legislation bad   on  the ground  that it violates the right  of the petitioners under Art. 19(l)(f)? The property  for the  protection  of  which  Art.

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19(l)(f) is  invoked belonged  either to the Board or to  the members composing the Board at the date of the  dissolution. In either event, on the terms of 8.  5 of  the Societies Registration Act, 1960, the property  was to be deemed to be vested in the governing body  of the  Board. There  could be  no doubt that if the Board was dissolved by 188 competent legislative  action, and in  view of our conclusions on  the first  point raised it must be held that  this had  taken place  the Board  would cease to  exist and  having ceased to exist cannot obviously lay  any claim  to  the  property.  This however may  not be  sufficient  to  negative  the contention urged  before us by the petitioners. If the legal  ownership of the property by  the Board or the  vesting of  it in  the governing  body was merely a  method or mechanism permitted by the law whereby the  members exercised  their rights quoad the property,  the dissolution  of the  Board  and with it of the governing body thereof would merely result in  the  emergence  of  the  right  of  the members  to   that  property.  It  is,  therefore, necessary to  ascertain  the  precise  rights  the members of  the Board possessed to see whether the changes effected  by the impugned Act amount to on infringement of their rights within the meaning of Art.  19(l)(f).  During  the  subsistence  of  the society, the  right of  the members  was to ensure that the  property was utilised for the charitable objects set  out in  the memorandum  and these did not include  any beneficial  enjoyment Nor did the members of  the  Society  acquire  any  beneficial interest on the dissolution of the society; for 8. 14 of the Act, quoted earlier, expressly negatived the right  of the  members to  any distribution of the assets of the dissolved body. In such an event the property  had to  be given  over to some other society, i.e.,  for being  managed by  some  other charitable organisation  and to  be  utilised  for like purposes,  and the  only right of the members was to  determine the society to whom the funds or property might  be transferred  and this had to be done by  not less than three-fifths of the members present at  the meeting  for the  purpose and,  in default of such determination, by the civil court. The effect  of the impugned legislation is to vary or affect  this privilege  of the  members and  to vest the  property in  a new  body created  by  it enjoined to  administer it  so to  serve the  same purposes as the dissolved 189 Society. The only question is whether the right to determine the  body  which  shall  administer  the funds or  property of  the dissolved society which they had  under the pre-existing law is a right to ’acquire, hold and dispose of property’ within the meaning of  Art. 19(l)(f),  and if  so whether the legislation is  not saved  by Art.  19(5). We  are clearly of  the opinion  that right is not a right of property  within the  meaning of Art. 19(l)(f). In the  context in which the words ’to dispose of’ occur in  Art. 19(l)(f),  they denote that kind of property which a citizen has a right to hold   the right  to  dispose  of  being  part  of  or  being

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incidental to  the right to hold Where however the citizen has  no right to hold the property, for on the terms  of 8.  14 of the Societies Registration Act  the  members  have  no  right  to  hold’  the property of  the dissolved  society, there  is, in our opinion,  no  infringement  of  any  right  to property within  the meaning  of Art. 19(l)(f). In this view, the question as to whether the impugned enactment satisfies the requirements of Art. 19(5) does not fall to be determined.      The  two   decisions  on  which  the  learned Advocate.   for the petitionary has relied are the State of  West Bengal v. Subodh Gopal Bose (1) and Dwarkadas Srinivas  v. The  Sholapur  Spinning,  & Weaving Co.  Ltd.(2). We  do not  think that these decisions have  any  application  in  the  present case. In  the State of West Bengal v. Subodh Gopal Bose(1) this  Court was  considering  a  piece  of legislation which  affected the right of the first respondent therein  who had purchased a particular touzi at  a revenue  sale. As  such  purchaser  he acquired under  8. 37  of the Bengal Revenue Sales Act, 1859, the right to avoid and annul all under- tenures and  forthwith to  eject all under-tenant" with certain exceptions. In exercise of that right the respondent  gave notices  of       . ejectment and brought  a  suit  in  1946  to  evict  certain tenants. The suit was decreed. When the appeal      (1) [1954] S.C.R. 587.    (2) [1954] S. C. R.                                               674. 190 was pending, a new legislation was made which took away the  right of  the first  respondent which he had obtained  by a  decree of  a court  of law. In these circumstances  it was held that the right of the  first  respondent  under  Art.  19(l)(f)  was violated.    The   facts  of that case were wholly dissimilar and  the respondent‘s  right there  did not depend  on his being a member of a society. In the second Sholapur case Dwarkadas Srinivas v. The Sholapur  Spinning   &  Weaving  Co.  Ltd  .(1)  a Controller  was   appointed   by   Government   to supervise the  affairs of  the mills  of a certain company under  the  Essential  Supplies  Emergency Powers Act,  1946.  The  controller  made  certain requisitions which the Directors refused to comply with. The  Governor-General then made an ordinance which was followed by an Act. Under the provisions of the  ordinance the Central Government delegated all its  powers to  the Government  of Bombay. The Government  of   Bombay  then   appointed  certain Directors to  take over  the assets and management of  the   mills.  These  new  Directors  passed  a resolution making  a call  of Rs.  50/- on each of the preference  Shares payable  at the time stated in the  resolution. The appellant in that case was a preference  shareholder who  was called  upon to pay Rs.  1,62,000/- in pursuance of the resolution aforesaid on  the preference shares where which he held.  The   appellant   then   brought   a   suit challenging the  validity of the ordinance and out of that  suit appeal  to this  Court arose. It was held by this Court that the impugned ordinance and the  act  replacing  it  authorised  in  effect  a deprivation of  the property of the company within

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the meaning  of Art.  31 without  compensation and violated the  fundamental right  of the  appellant therein  as  a  preference  shareholder,  who  was called upon  to  pay  the  moneys  unpaid  on  his shares. The  point to be noticed as distinguishing that case from the case under our consideration is this      (1) [1954] S. C. R. 674. 191 the Sholapur  Spinning and  Weaving Co. Ltd, which was  the  company  in  that  case,  had  not  been dissolved or  brought to  an end  by the  impugned ordinance  or   the  Act   replacing  it  and  the appellant  in   that  case   continued  to   be  a preference shareholder;  not only  did he continue to be  a preference share holder but he was called upon to pay the moneys unpaid on his shares. It is obvious,  therefore,   that  the   appellant   was entitled  to   complain  that   by  the   impugned ordinance he  was being  deprived of  his property without fulfilling  the requirements of Art. 31 of the Constitution.  The position  in the case under our consideration  is,  as  pointed  out  already, entirely different.      In our  view the  impugned legislation   does not  violate   any  fundamental   right   of   the petitioners under  Arts.  14,  19  or  31  of  the Constitution.      This disposes  of the  two  main  grounds  on which  the   legislation  in   question  has  been impugned.  We  now  turn  to  the  two  subsidiary points. It  has  been  argued  that  some  of  the provisions of  the impugned  Act are  in  conflict with the  provisions of the Societies Registration Act 1860;  therefore under s. 22 to the Government of part  a States  Act, 1951 the provisions of the impugned Act,  in so  far as they are repugnant to the provisions  of the Societies Registration Act, 1860, must  be held  to be void. The simple answer to this  argument is  that 8.  22, to which we had earlier referred  in the  course of this judgment, has  no  application    Section  22  provides  for inconsistency between  laws made by Parliament (in the sense in which the word Parliament’ is used in the Constitution  of India)  and laws  made by the Legislative  assembly   of  a   Part  State.   The Societies Registration  Act, 1860  was not  a  law made  by   Parliament;  therefore   a  22  has  no application in   the present case. We have already held, for  reasons earlier  given, that  the Delhi State Legislature  had legislative  competence  or power either to amend the 192 Societies Registration  Act, 1860  in  respect  of unincorporated societies,  or to make a law for  a particular unincorporated  society,  and  even  to create a  new corporate  body provided its objects were confined  to the  State of Delhi of Delhi. In effect the  impugned legislation  provides  for  a disolution  of   the  old   Board  which   was  an unincorporated society  and for  the creation of a new corporate  body  for  the  management  of  the Ayurvedic and  Unani Tibbi College, Delhi. In this view of  the matter,  no question  of any conflict with the  Societies Registration  Act, 1860 arises

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in this case.      It has  also been  argued that  the  impugned legislation is  a piece  of colourable legislation because the  Delhi State  Legislature  acted  mala fide in  enacting it.  This argument is completely answered  by   what  this  Court  said  in  K.  C. Gajapathi Narayan  Deo v. The State of Orissa (1). This court  said:           It may  be made clear at the outset that      the dotrine  of colourable  legislation does      not involve any question of bona fide or male      fides on  the part  of the  legislature.  The      whole  doctrine   resolves  itself  into  the      question  of   competency  of   a  particular      Legislature to enact a particular law. If the      legislature is competent to pass a particular      law, the motives which impelled it to act are      really irrelevant.  On the other hand. if the      legislature lacks  competence,  the  question      motives  does   not  arise   at  all  If  the      constitution  of   a  State  distributes  the      legislative powers  amongst different bodies,      which have  to act  within  their  respective      spheres marked  out by  specific  legislative      entries, or  if there  are limitations on the      legislative  authority   in  the   shape   of      fundamental rights,  questioned do  aries  to      whether the  legislature in a particular case      has or has not   in      (1) S.C.R. 1, 10, 11. 193      respect to  the subject-matter  of the status      or in the method of enacting it, transgressed      the limits of its constitutional powers. Such      7 transgression  may be  patent, manifest  or      direct, but  it may also be disguised, covert      and indirect  and it  is to this latter class      of 7  cases that  the expression  "colourable      legislation"  has  been  applied  in  certain      judicial pronouncements. The idea conveyed by      the expression  is that although apparently a      legislature in passing a statute purported to      act within  the limits  of its powers, yet in      substance  and  in  reality  it  transgressed      these powers,  the transgression being veiled      by what appears, on proper examination, to be      a mere pretence or disguise." From what  we  have  said  earlier  it  should  be manifestly clear  that the Delhi State Legislature did not  transgress any  of the limitations placed on it,  when it  enacted the impugned legislation. There being  no transgress whatsoever, the further question of  the transgression  being veiled  by a disguise or pretence does not really arise. Nor is it necessary  for us  to enquire  into the motives which led the Delhi State Legislature to enact the impugned legislation.  In the  affidavits filed on behalf of  the respondents  enough materials  have been  placed   to  show   why  the   Delhi   State Legislature considered  it necessary  to  dissolve the old  Board and  transfer the management of the college to  a new Board. This was a matter for the Legislature to  consider and not for this Court to investigate.      In the  result we hold that there is no merit

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in the  petition which  is  accordingly  dismissed with costs      MUDHOLKAR, J.-While  I agree  with my brother Das J.,  that the  petition be  dismissed I  would like to  say a few words. This petition under Art. 32 of the Constitution has been preferred by 194 the Board  of Trustees,  Ayurvedic and Unani Tibia College, through  its  Secretary,  Hakim  Mohammad Jamil Khan      By Act  5 of 1952 called the Tibia College hi Act, 1952  the erstwhile  Delhi State  Legislative Assembly dissolved  the Board  of Trustees  of the Ayurvedic and Unani Tibia (College, incorporated a Board called ’Tibia College Board’ and transferred to that Board all the property, rights, powers and privileges  of   the  Board  of  Trustees  of  the Ayurvedic and  Unani Tibia  College      also  the management and  control of the Ayurvedic and Unani Tibia College  to the  aforesaid Board. The reason for doing  so would  appear from  the Statement of objects and Reasons appended to the Bill which are as follows:      This  Bill   seeks   to   take   powers   for transferring the  management of  the Ayurvedic and Unani  Tibia  College,  Delhi,  from  its  present trustees to a Board under the control of the Delhi State Government.  The College  has  been  grossly mismanaged for some time past with the result that its reputation  is very  low today. In early 1949, the situation  deteriorated to such an extent that there were  students strikes, defalcation of funds and frequent interruptions in scholastic work. The Collector, Delhi  made an  interim prayer  to  the Civil Court for the appointment of receivers. This prayer was  granted and  three receivers appointed by the Civil Court are at present in charge of the properties and management of the institution. This arrangement, which  is good  so far as it goes, is inevitably temporary  and inadequate, and it seems desirable  to   provide  by  legislation  for  the control and  management of  the  College  and  the properties  attached   thereto."   (Statement   of objects and  Reasons published  in the  Gazette of India, Extraordinary,  Part II,  s.  2,  July  18, 1952).      The  petitioner’s   complaint  is   that  its property has  been taken  may without compensation and 195 handed over to a Board in contravention of Art. 31 of the  Constitution and  that this  has been done under a  law which  the Delhi  legislature was not competent to make.      The following four contentions were raised by Mr.  Purshottam   Trikamdas  on   behalf  of   the petitioner.           (1) That  the Delhi Legislative Assembly      was not competent to pass the impugned Act.           (2)   Even    assuming   that   it   had      legislative competence  the Act offends Arts.      14, 19 and 31.           (3) The Societies Registration Act under      which the  Board of  Trustees were registered      being a  Central Act  the  Delhi  legislative

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    assembly had no power to over-ride it.           (4)  The   law  was   enacted   by   the      legislature mala fide.      I will  confine my observations mainly to the first and  third points  because, it  is only with regard to  them that my view is somewhat different from that taken by my learned brother.      The respondents point out that the petitioner Board having  been registered  under the Societies Registration Act,  1860 is  nothing more  than  an unincorporated society  and that  the Delhi  State legislature was competent to enact a     affecting it under  the latter  part of  Entry 32 of List II which runs thus:           "...........   unincorporated   trading,      literary,  Scientific,  religious  and  other      societies.    and assassination; co-operative      societies". According, however,  to Mr.  Purshottam, after the Board of  Trustees was  registered  as  a  Society under the  Societies Registration Act it blossomed into  a   corporation  and  since  admittedly  its objects extend  beyond the  limits  of  the  Delhi State the  State Assembly  could not  make any law affecting 196 it. This  contention  has  been  negatived  by  my learned         brother. An alternative contention was also     raised on behalf of the petitioner on the basis      of certain decisions and my opinion in Servants  of  India    Society,  Poona  v.  The Charity   Commissioner of Bombay (1) to the effect that upon  registration J.  the  Board  became  at least a  quasi-corporation.  This  contention  has also been negatived by my learned brother.      If, as  the petitioner  says the Board, after registration   under  the  Societies  Registration Act, 1860   was transformed into a corporation the Delhi Legislative  assembly could  not make  a LAW with respect  to it  under Entry 32 because though under the  first part  thereof it  can make  a law affecting corporation,  its powers  cannot reach a corporation, the  objects of  which extend  beyond the limit    of the Delhi State. But as my learned brother  has   pointed  out   and  with   which  I respectfully agree,  the essence  of a corporation is  its   incorporation’  and   as  the  Societies Registration   Act    does   not    provide    for incorporation the petitioner cannot be recorded as a corporation.  It is  true that  even  though  it possesses some  of the attributes of a corporation it ii  not a  corporation but  in my  view it is a near corporation’  or a  quasi-corporation’.  This is what  I have  held in  the  Servants  of  India Society’s case  (1) and  I adhere  to  that  view. There, relying  on some  Indian decision  and  the decision in  The Taff  Vale  Railway  Co.  v.  The Amalgamated Society of Railway Servants(2), I held that such  a society  is a legal entity and that a State legislature cannot make any law affecting it under the  second part of Entry 32 of List II. The question  whether   a  registered   society  which enjoyed more  or less  the same  powers  as  those under the  Societies Registration  Act is  a legal entity fell  for consideration  by  the  House  of

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Lords in  Bonsor v.  Medicines’ Union(3) and there Lords Morton and Parker held that      (1) (1960) 63 Bom L.R. 379; 381    (2) [1901]                                          A.C. 426.                 (3) [1956] A.C.104 197 such a  society is  a legal  entity though  not  a corporation and  thus accepted  the position  that there is  an intermediate semi-corporation status. Lord Keith  held that  such a  society is  both  a legal entity  and association of individuals, that is,  it  is  a  quasi-corporation  to  the  extent recognized  by   the  governing   statute  and   a voluntary association  for  other  purpose.  Lords McDermott and  Somervell, however,  did not accept the position  that there is any intermediate semi- corporate status  at all.  With respect,  I  think that the  view taken  by the  majority has much to commend itself.  That this  is the  better view is the opinion of Prof. Dennis Lloyd (vide 1956 M. L. R. at  p. 360)  and of Dr. Glanville William (vide Salmond’s Jurisprudence,  1957 ed. p. 356). I have not come  across a  contrary opinion in any recent treatise or article.      Now, under  the Societies  Registration  Act, 1860, which was enacted by the Governor General in Council upon registration a society is entitled to sue and  can be sued in the name of its President, Secretary etc.,  as shall  be  determined  by  its rules or  by its  governing body.  A  suit  by  or against the  society would  not abate by reason of the death  of the  person through  whom or against whom  the  suit  had  been  brought.  A  judgement obtained against  a person  sued as representing a society shall  not be  enforced  against  him  but against the  property of  the society. The society can  sue   any  of   its  members  for  arrear  of subscription, damages  etc. It can also enter into contracts as  an  entity.  Upon  dissolution,  its property cannot be distributed amongst its members but must go to some other society.      All  these   are  the  characteristics  of  a separate legal  entity such  as a  corporation. If the law confers on a body all the normal powers of a legal person it will be a corporation in all but name. A  registered society,  however, cannot hold property and  to that  extent it must be treated a a voluntary 198 association,  made   up   of   its   constituents. Therefore,  it   can  be   regarded  as  a  quasi- corporation or,  in the  words of Lords Morton and Porter,  a   near-corporation".  Now,   a   quasi- corporation or  a near corporation-whatever we may call it-being  a legal  entity at  least for  some purposes is  not a  mere society  made up  of  its constituents.      The question,  therefore, must  be considered whether the  latter part of Entry 32 confers power on the  State legislator  to legislate about legal entities.’ Let US consider the scope of the latter part of  Entry 32.  It permits  the making of laws concerning societies  and associations  which  are not incorporated. This would imply that thereunder the   legislature    cannot   provide    for   the

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incorporation’ of a society or association. One of the main  results of  incorporation is  to  confer upon  the  thing  incorporated  the  status  of  a separate legal  entity. Even  so, under this Entry the legislator has a wide discretion in the matter of conferral  of powers upon a society. But can it confer such  powers  on  it  as  would  alter  its character as a society and convert it into a legal entity, may be only for  certain  purposes? By its very  definition   a  society   is   a   voluntary association and  can have  no existence   separate from its  constituents. It  is thus not a separate legal entity  ill any  sense and  for any purpose. That Entry  makes  it  clear  by  using  the  word unincorporated’, that the power conferred by it is confined to  such societies and associations only. Therefore, in  my  judgment  the  Entry  does  not permit of  any law  being made  which confers on a society such  powers as would constitute it into a legal entity.  A fortiorari,  it does not permit a law to  be made  which takes  away from    society already existing  and which  is a legal entity any of the  powers of that legal entity, such as those conferred by the Societies Registration Act, 1860, much less  can it destroy that entity For doing so it will  have to take the aid of other entries, if any, which  permit  legislation  concerning  Legal entities  . 199      The Board,  as already stated, was registered under the  Societies Registration  Act, 1860. That was a  law made by the Indian legislature under 24 & 25  Vict. ch.  67 passed  in the year 1860. That law conferred the power to make laws for the whole of  British   India  on  the  Governor-General-in- Council the  ambit of whose power is set out in 8. 22 which runs thus:           The Governor  General in  Council  shall      have Power  at Meetings  for the  Purpose  of      making Laws and Regulations a  aforesaid, and      subject to  the Provisions  herein contained,      to make  Laws and  Regulations for repealing,      amending, or altering any Laws or Regulations      whatever now  in force  or hereafter to be in      force the  Indian Territories  now under  the      Dominion of Her Majesty, and to make Laws and      Regulations for  all Persons, Whether British      or Native,  Foreigners or others, and for all      Courts  of  Justice  whatever,  and  for  all      Places and  Things whatever  within the  said      Territories, and  for  all  Servants  of  the      Government of  India within the dominions  of      Princes  and  States  in  Alliance  with  Her      majesty; and  the Laws  and Regulations so to      be made  by the  Governor general  in Council      shall control  and  supersede  and  Laws  and      Regulations  in   anywise  repugnant  thereto      which shall  have been  made prior thereto by      the Governors  of the  Presidencies  of  Fort      Saint  George   and  Bombay  respectively  in      Council,  or   the  Governor   or  Lieutenant      Governor in  Council    of  any Presidency or      other territory  for which  a council  may be      appointed,  with   Power  to   make  law  and      Regulations, under  and by  virtue  of  these

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    Act: Provided  always, that the said Governor      General in  Council shall  not have the power      of making any Laws or Regulations which shall      repeal or  in  any  way  affect  any  of  the      Provisions of this Act. 200           Or any  of the  Provisions of the   Acts      of the  Third and  Fourth Years      of  King      William the Fourth, Chapter   Eighty-five and      the Sixteenth  and Seventeenth   Years of Her      Majesty,  Chapter  Ninety-five,  and  of  the      Seventeenth and  Eighteenth Years     of  Her      Majesty, Chapter  Seventy-Seven, which  after      the pacing of this Act shall remain in force:      or any  Provisions of  the Act of the Twenty-      first and Twenty-second Years of Her Majesty,      Chapter one  Hundred and  Six entitled     an      Act for the better Government of India; or of      the Act of the Twenty-second and Twenty-third      years of  Her Majesty,  Chapter Forty-one, to      amend the  same: or  of any  Act enabling the      Secretary of  State in Council to raise Money      in the  United Kingdom  for the Government of      India: or  of the  Acts for  punishing Mutiny      and Desertion in Her Majesty’s Army or in Her      Majesty‘s  Indian  Forces  reflectively;  but      subject to the Provision contained in the Act      of the Third and Fourth Years of King William      the  Fourth,   Chapter  Eighty-five,  Section      Seventy-three, respecting the Indian Articles      of War:           Or any  Provisions of  any Act passed in      this present  session of  Parliament, or here      after to  be passed, in anywise affecting Her      Majesty‘s   Indian    Territories,   or   the      Inhabitants thereof:           Or which  may affect  the  Authority  of      Parliament, or the Constitution and rights of      the East  India Company,  or any  Part of the      unwritten Laws  or constitution of the United      Kingdom of  Great Britain  and Ireland, where      on may depend in any Degree the Allegiance of      any  Person   to  the  Crown  of  the  United      Kingdom, or  the Sovereignty  or Dominion  of      the  Crown   over  any   Part  of   the  said      Territories   " 201      This clearly  shows that the Governor General in Council  was unhampered in the matter of making laws by  any legislative  lists and  thus  enjoyed plenary powers  to make  any kind  of law on every conceivable topic  which did  not fall  within the excepted Categories.  Within  the  sphere  of  his powers the  Governor General  in Council  was  and could consequently  make a  law conferring  upon a society such  powers as  could transform  it  into legal entity either for all purposes or only some. If  he  chose  to  confer  all  the  powers  of  a corporation  upon   a  registered   society,  that society would  become a  corporation in  all but a name.      The position  of the State Legislature in the matter of  making laws  is not the same as that of the Governor  General in Council under the statute of 1860.  For, though  it enjoys  no less  plenary

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powers than  the Governor  General in Council, its spheres  of  legislation  are  restricted  by  the legislative lists  and it  cannot overstep them by doing something directly which is patently outside Lists      The only  entry in  List II on which reliance was  placed   on  behalf  of  the  respondents  as conferring power  on the Delhi legislature to make the impugned  law is  the latter part of Entry 32, List II.  That entry  speak of societies, that is, of associations  of individuals as distinct from a legal entity, from that which has a separate legal existence. An  association has  no  such  separate existence, that  is, none  apart from its members. That entry  therefore, could not furnish the Delhi legislature with the power to make a law affecting a separate  legal entity  such as  the petitioner. Section  of   the  impugned   Act  dissolved   the petitioner,  a  legal  entity  and  transfers  its property, rights etc., to a corporation created by it. Thus  it deals  with a  legal entity  and  the rights of  that entity. This is wholly outside the ambit of  the latter  part of  Entry 32.  It would have been 202 possible for  the State  legislature to  resort to the first     part of that Entry had the object of the society  been limited  to the Delhi state but, as already’’ stated, the objects extent beyond the Delhi State.  The reason why I think it would have been possible is that the entry is  not restricted to   incorporation of a corporation but deals also with  the   regulation     or  winding   up  of  a corporation   which   would   include   a   quasi- corporation or  any other fictitious legal person, and further  because the essence of winding up can be no different from that of dissolution.      No doubt, ours is a federal  constitution and the legislative  fields of  Parliament and  of the state legislatures  are demarcated, In addition we have  a  concurrent  field  in  which  Parliaments legislative power  is exercisable  and, subject to certain  conditions,   also  that   of  the  state legislatures. But  even so,  there  is  a  certain amount of  overlapping in the entries in the three lists  pertaining   to  these   three  legislative fields. Therefore  when a law is challenged on the ground of  legislative competence  what one has to ascertain is  its pith  and substance.  It is well settled that  if in pith and substance it is found that the  legislature could  make that law under a particular  entry,   the   mere   fact   that   it incidentally trenches  upou some  other entry, not pertaining to the legislation, it cannot be struck down  as   being  beyond  the  competence  of  the legislature which made it.      For finding  out its  pith and substance, let us  examine   the  Act.  It  is  comprised  of  16 sections. Section  3 deals  with the incorporation of the  Tibia college Board and transferring to it the management  and control  of the  Tibia College vested in  the petitioner-board.  Section 9  deals with the  dissolution and  transfer of property of the Board  of Trustee  of the  Ayurvedic and Unani Tibia College Delhi to the Tibia College Board and

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the  remaining   sections  deal   with  incidental matters such as 203 definitions, constitution  of the Board, powers of the Board and so on.      One of  the conclusion  reached by my learned brother is  that Ho  far as the dissolution of the old Board  is concerned  the  impugned  law  falls under the  second part  of Entry 32 and so far the incorporation of  the new Board is concerned under its first  part. It  may be that a legislature may seek  to   derive  its   powers  to  enact  a  law concerning different  topics from  various entries in  legislative   List.  But   this  aspect  of  a legislatures power  has no significance when, in a divided jurisdiction  its law is challenged on the ground of  encrouchment on a field not open to it. Tho  question   which   would   then   arise   for consideration  would  be  what  is  the  pith  and substance of  the law?  The degree of encroachment made by  it on  another field would be a guide for ascertaining its  pith and  substance   . Here the impugned  Act   is   aimed   at   dissolving   the petitioner,  Board   and  transferring   all   its property, rights etc. No doubt, the transfer is to be in  favour of a corporation created be the At. No doubt  also, that most of the provisions of the act, apart  from 3  and 9,  deal exclusively  with matters pertaining  to the  newly created  entity. But looking  to the  preamble as well as ss. 3 and of the  act the  creation of  new  Board  and  its incorporation is not the pith and substance of the Act. The  sole  reason  for  its  creation  is  to transfer to  it what  was,  till  then,  with  the petitioner-Board. The  new Board was thus to serve only a consequential purpose and its incorporation cannot be said to be the pith and substance of the impugned Act.  The activities  of  the  petitioner were not  confined to the state of Delhi. That Act cannot there  fore, be  sustained by  reference to the first part of Entry  2. The pith and substance of the law being the dissolution of the petitioner Board, a  legal entity,  and transference  of  its property and  rights to someone else, it cannot be sustained by  reference to  the power conferred by the latter part of Entry 32. 204 For  sustaining  the  law  the  learned  Solicitor General had played reliance also on Entries 10 and 28 of  List II. What we have to See, therefore, is whether the  impugned law  could be  made  by  the Delhi Legislature under these entries .      It is  not disputed that the Petitioner-Board is a  trustee. It  is also  clear from the objects with which  the trust was established, (which have been  set  out  in  the  judgment  of  my  learned brother) that it was for a charitable purpose. The petitioner is,  therefore, a  charitable trust and the object  of the  law  is  to  dissolve  it  and transfer its  property etc.  Entries 10  and 28 of List III run thus:      Entry 10: Trust and Trustees".      Entry   28:    "Charities   and    charitable      institutions,   charitable    and   religious      endowments and religious legislatures".

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The  entries   are  not   limited  to   trusts  or charitable institutions  which are ’unincorporated societies’ as  is the,  latter part of Entry 32 of List II. Entry 10 clearly permits a law being made with regard  to a  trust or  trustee  which  is  a separate legal  entity. Similarly Entry 32 permits a  law   to  be   made  affecting   charities  and charitable institutions  of  every  kind,  whether consisting   of    voluntary    associations    of individuals  or   having  a   corporate  or  semi- corporate character.  For, institutions may have a corporate or  a semi-corporate  character  as  for instance Hindu  religious endowments and these are plainly included  in the  later Entry.  The  Delhi legislature had,  therefore, competence  to make a law dissolving a charitable trust and transferring its property,  right etc., to another institution. The aforesaid  two entries  permit making a law of this kind.  No doubt  these  entries  are  in  the concurrent field  but sine  the impugned  Act was reserved for  the assent  of the President and was assented to by him on September 12, 1952, it 205 cannot be  called in  question on  the  ground  of repugnancy with an ’existing law’ or a law made by Parliament.      I agree  with the  view taken  by my  learned brother on  the second and the fourth points urged by Mr. Purshottam and have nothing to add.      As regards  the third  point the  argument on behalf of  the petitioner  is that   s.  22 of the Government of Part States Act, 1951 (which created a legislature  for the  Delhi State,  then a  Part State)  precluded   the  Delhi   legislature  from enacting a  law repugnant  to an Act of Parliament and that  as the  impugned Act contains provisions which are  repugnant to  those  of  the  Societies Registration Act  1860, it  is ultra  vires. Apart from the  fact that  what a   22  prohibits  is  a repugnancy with  a law  made by  Parliament itself the Societies  Registration Act is not one of such law the  argument does  not really  arise upon the view  I  have  taken.  The  petitioner-Board  upon Registration  under  that  Act  becomes  a  quasi- corporation and thus a separate legal entity. Even though it  owed its existence to the provisions of the  Societies   Registration   Act,   the   Delhi legislature was  free to  deal with  it under  its powers under  List III  because by doing so it did not enact a law repugnant to the provisions of the Societies Registration Act. That Act still retains its full force and rigour and is unaffected by the impugned  Act.  The  petitioner    Board  may,  by operation of  the impugned  law, not  be  able  to exercise any  of its  powers under  the  Societies Registration Act but that would be not because the provisions of  that law are abrogated in any sense but because  the petitioner-Board  has  ceased  to exist a   a  legal  entity.  The  argument-  must, therefore, be rejected.      The petition  is, therefore,  dismissed  with costs.                                Petition dismissed. 206

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