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PETITIONER: THE AUTHORISED OFFICER, THANJAVUR & ANR.

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: S. NAGANATHA AYYAR

DATE OF JUDGMENT04/05/1979

BENCH: KRISHNAIYER, V.R. BENCH: KRISHNAIYER, V.R. SEN, A.P. (J)

CITATION:  1979 AIR 1487            1979 SCR  (3)1121  1979 SCC  (3) 466

ACT:      The Tamil  Nadu Land  Reforms (Fixation  of Ceiling  on Land) Act,  1961-Ss. 7  and 22-Scope of-sale, gift, Transfer etc. Of  land made  between  certain  dates  void-Bona  fide transfer if exempt by s.22.

HEADNOTE:      Section 7  of the  Tamil Nadu Land Reforms (Fixation of Ceiling on  Land) Act  1961, provides  that on  and from the date of  commencement of  the Act no person shall, except as otherwise provided in the Act, but subject to the provisions of Chapter  VIII, be  entitled to hold land in excess of the ceiling area. Section 22 provides that where on or after the date of commencement of the Act (6th April, 1960) but before the  notified  date  (2nd  October,  1962)  any  person  has transferred any  land held  by him  by sale,  gift etc.  the Authorised  officer  within  whose  jurisdiction  such  land holding of  the major  part thereof  is situated  may, after notice to  such person  and other  persons affected  by such transfer or  partition and  after such  inquiry as he thinks fit to make, declare tho transfer or partition to be void if he finds that the transfer or the partition, as the case may be, defeats any of tho provisions of the Act.      Tho alienations  in  all  the  cases  took  many  forms ranging from  stridhana to  bona fide  sale  and  they  were executed between  the date  of commencement  of the  Act and notified date.  The Land  Tribunal held that the alienations were void  because but for the alienations the holders would have had  the lands  in excess  of the ceiling prescribed by the Act.      On the  interpretation of  s. 22  of the  Act, the High Court was  of the  view that  the section covered only those sham, nominal  and bogus  transfers which  are  intended  to defeat the  provisions of the Act and which are inconsistent with the  object provided  in s.  7. It  was also  held that transactions entered into in anticipation of the Ceiling Act would not be hit by the provisions preventing such transfers except where they were mala fide or colourable; and that tho the word  "defeat" in  s. 22  should be taken as having been used to import a sinister motive. It was therefore held that under s. 22 the Authorised officer is entitled to declare as void only those transfers which are sham and nominal entered

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into with  the avowed  object of defeating the provisions of the Act without any bona fide intention to transfer title. ^      HELD: (1) If any transfer defeats the provisions of the Act by  reducing the extent of surplus land in excess of the ceiling available  from any  person such  transaction,  bona fide or  not, is  void in  the matter  of computation of the permissible  area  and  the  surplus  area.  The  Authorised officer is  within his  power if  he ignores  it as void for purposes  of   s.  22,   s.  7  and  other  ceiling  related provisions. [1132C] 1122      (2) Looking  at the  words of s. 22 in the light of the scheme of  prohibition of  transfers to preserve the surplus land  for   distribution  there   is  no  justification  for importing into s. 22 more than its words convey. The section says what  it means.  A simple scan of the provision reveals that any  transfer, gift,  surrender,  settlement  or  other alienations may  be declared void by the Authorized Officer, if he  finds that  the transfer or the partition defeats any of the  provision of  this Act.  The trichotomy  is obvious: There must be a transfer or other n alienation; it must have taken place  during the  period mentioned in the section; it must have  the effect  of defeating any of the provisions of the Act. if these three elements are present, the Authorised officer must  void  the  transfer.  There  is  no  rule  for importing a  fourth principle  that the  transfer should  be sham,  nominal   or  bogus   nor  is  there  any  additional consideration that  if the  transfer is bona fide for family necessity or  other urgency  then it  is good even though it defeats the  provisions of  the Act.  The provision seeks to provide social  justice for  the landless and it defeats the purpose if,  by the  interpretative process, soft justice to large land holders is brought about. [1130B-D]      (3) The  literal meaning  of the  section is  that  any transfer or  other alienation  mentioned in it which reduces or impairs  the otherwise  available extent  of surplus land beyond the  ceiling defeats  the provisions of the Act. This is the  plain meaning of the section which gives no room for doubt  or  justification  for  importation  of  any  further condition like sham, bogus etc.      (4) The  High Court  was wrong in its view that the Act being confiscatory  one, the public authority "invested with the power  to enquire  into and  to  invalidate  a  transfer should act  reasonably, and  that such  a  power  should  be construed beneficially  in favour  of  the  subject  who  is affected by  the statute." The approach of the High Court is inept and  inapplicable when  once considers agrarian reform legislation whose  avowed purpose  is to  take away  as much extent of  land as  policy  dictates  so  that  distribution thereof among  the landless  may be  achieved. When  a whole legislation is  geared to  deprivation  of  property,  rules which have  frowned  upon  confiscatory  legislation  cannot apply at  all. The  jurisprudential  principles  in  such  a situation cannot  be the  same as have been inherited from a culture which postulates the State v. the subject.                                                    [1126E-G]      (5)  While  dealing  with  welfare  legislation  of  so fundamental 3  character as  agrarian reform, the Court must constantly  remember   that  the   statutory  pilgrimage  to destination social  justice should  be helped, not hampered, by judicial  interpretation. It  is  true  that  Judges  are constitutional invigilators  and statutory interpreters; but they are  also responsive  and responsible to Part IV of the Constitution. The  judiciary,  in  its  sphere,  shares  the

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revolutionary purpose  of the  constitutional order and when called upon to decode social legislation it must be animated by the goal oriented approach. [1123E-H]

JUDGMENT:      CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal Nos. 2542 to 2544 of 1972.      Appeals by  Special Leave  from the  Judgment and order dated 11-12-1970  of the Madras High Court in Civil Revision Petitions Nos. 1824 and 1825/65.      V. P.  Raman, Adv.  Genl. and  A.  V.  Rangam  for  the Appellant. 1123      A. T. M. Sampath for Respondent in C.A. 2542/72.      K.  S.   Ramamurthi,  Mrs.   Saroja  Gopalkrishnan  for Respondent in C.A. 2542/72.      K. Jayaram and K. Ram Kumar for R. 1 in CA 2544/72.      K. Rajendra Choudhry for R. 2 in C.A. 2544/72.      The Judgment of. the Court was delivered by      KRISHNA IYER  J. The  short point of law decided in the long judgment under appeal may justly be given short shrift. But the  batch of  Civil Revision  Petitions allowed  by the High Court  involves a  legal issue  of deep import from the angle of  agrarian reform  and surplus  land  available  for distribution under  its scheme  that we  deem it  proper  to discuss the  core question  at some length. If the statutory construction which  found favour  with  the  High  Court  be correct the  risk of  reform legislation  being condemned to functional futility  is great,  and so the State has come up in appeal  by Special  Leave challenging  the  High  Court’s interpretation of  s. 22  of the  Tamil  Nadu  Land  Reforms (Fixation of  Ceiling on  land) Act,  1961 (for  short,  the Ceiling Act).  Presently, we will set out the skeletal facts relating to  the civil  appeals and  the scheme  of the  Act designed  for   distributive  justice   in  the   field   of agricultural land  ownership,  sufficient  to  disclose  the purpose of  the legislation,  the  mischief  it  intends  to suppress, the  reverse effect of the construction put on the key section  (s. 22)  in the  judgment under  appeal and the consequent stultification  of the  objective of  the Ceiling Act.  While   dealing  with   welfare  legislation   of   so fundamental a  character as  agrarian reform, the court must constantly  remember   that  the   statutory  pilgrimage  to ’destination social  justice’  should  be  helped,  and  not hampered, by  judicial interpretation.  For,  the  story  of agrarian re-distribution  in Tamil  Nadu, as  elsewhere, has been  tardy   and  zigzag,  what  with  legislative  delays, judicial  stays   and  invalidations,   followed  by   fresh constitutional amendments  and new constitutional challenges and statutory constructions, holding up, for decades, urgent measures of  rural economic  justice which  was part  of the pledges of  the Freedom struggle. It is true that judges are constitutional invigilators  and statutory interpreters; but they are  also responsive  and responsible to Part IV of the Constitution being  one  of  the  trinity  of  the  nation’s appointed instrumentalities  in the  transformation  of  the socio-economic order.  The judiciary  in its  sphere, shares the revolutionary  purpose of  the Constitutional order, and when called  upon  to  decode  social  legislation  must  be animated by  a goal-oriented  approach. This  is part of the dynamic of statutory intretation in the developing countries so that  courts are  not converted  into rescue shelters for those who seek to defeat agrarian justice by cute transac-

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1124 tions of  many manifestations  now so similar in the country and illustrated  by the  several cases  under  appeal.  This caveat has  become necessary  because the judiciary is not a mere umpire, as some assume, but an activist catalyst in the constitutional scheme.      The Ceiling  Act, in its structure and process, follows the common  pattern. The object is equitable distribution of land to  the landless  by relieving those who hold more than the optimum  extent fixed  by the  law. The  success of  the scheme depends  on maximisation  of surplus land to be taken over by  the State  from large  landholders. The strategy of fixing a  severe ceiling on land holdings was expected to be paralysed by  anticipatory strategems  by landholders and so the legislature  sought to outwit them and clamped down pre- emptive  restrictions   on  transfer   whereby  the  surplus takeover would  be  sabotaged,  Chapter  II  prescribes  the ceiling on  land holdings and Chapter III proscribes certain types of  deleterious transfers and future acquisitions. One such  provision   is  s.   22  which   falls  for  immediate dissection.  The   machinery  for  working  out  the  scheme includes ’authorised  officers’ defined  in s.  3(5) of  the Ceiling  Act.   The   rest   of   the   infrastructure   for implementation of  the statutory  scheme is not material for our case  nor the  other chapters  relating to compensation, exemptions and  the like Chapter XI provides for appeals and revisions and  the High  Court, by virtue of s. 83 read with s. 115  of the  Code of Civil Procedure, has jurisdiction to entertain revisions  against orders  of Land Tribunals which enjoy appellate powers over orders of authorised officers in the manner  provided. The  present  appeals  are  against  a common order  of the  High Court  allowing several  revision petitions under s. 115 C.P.C.      Now, the  respondents before  us in the several appeals are persons  whose transfers  have been  held  void  by  the authorised officer  and the  land Tribunal but upheld by the High Court  on a narrow construction of s. 22 of the Ceiling Act. The  alienations took many forms ranging from stridhana to bona  fide sale but shared one common attribute that they were executed  during the  suspect spell, if one may say so, between the date of commencement of the Act and the notified date.  The   legislature,  in   its  realistic  anxiety  and pragmatic wisdom,  demarcated a lethal zone viz., the period between the two dates stated above when all landholders with lands in  excess of  the ceiling  would desperately  salvage their surplus  by resort  to devices,  some bona  fide, some not,  but   all  having   the  effect   of  frustrating  the legislative objective of freezing holdings as on the date of commencement of  the Act and seizing the surplus in terms cf the Act  for eventual  equitable distribution, after payment of statutory compensation. 1125      Before embarking  on  any  further  discussion  of  the project of interdicting transfers, as spelt out in s. 22, we may read the provision:           "Where on  or after  tho date  of commencement  of      this Act,  but before the notified date, any person has      transferred any  land held  by him by sale, gift (other      than gift  made in  contemplation of  death), exchange,      surrender, settlement  or in any other manner except by      request or,  has effected a partition of his holding or      part  thereof,  the  Authorised  officer  within  whose      jurisdiction such  land,  holding  of  the  major  part      thereof is  situated may,  after notice  to such person      and  other   persons  affected   by  such  transfer  on

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    partition and  after such  enquiry as  he thinks fit to      make declare the transfer or partition to be void if he      finds that  the transfer  or the  partition as the case      may be, defeats any of the provisions of this Act."      Three  semantic   alternatives  compete   for  judicial acceptance. The  first, which  appealed to the Land Tribunal is  that   all  alienations   during  the   dubious   period specificated in  s. 22, if executed by a holder who, but for such shedding  operation or alienation, would have had lands in excess  of the  ceiling prescribed  by the  Act, are void because they  are sure to defeat the ’surplus’ provisions of the Act.  The second  alternative, which swings to the other extreme  but   has  met  with  the  High  Court’s  approval, virtually salvages  all such  transfers save  sham and  mala fide ones,  for only if they are obnoxious in that sense can they be  caught in  the coils  of s.  22. The third possible construction, which  is in  between the two extremes and has been forcefully  pressed before us by Shri K. S. Ramamurthy, validates bona  fide transfers  even  during  the  offending period, the  reason being that regardless of their impact on the scheme  of the Act or its provisions, the primary object is bona  fide fulfilment  of the  alienor’s purposes such as discharge  of   pressing  debts   or  borrowing  to  perform necessitous obligations  and not  to defeat  or  thwart  the purposes or provisions of the Act.      The judicial  choice from among  these triple possibles depends on  the rules  of statutory  interpretation. In  the present  case  the  basic  facts  are  beyond  dispute.  The legislature had a defined plan of providing for a ceiling on land holding,  taking over  the balance  and distributing it among  the   landless  according   to  priorities.  In  this perspective it defined the "date of the commencement of this Act in  s. 3(11)  as meaning the 15th day of February, 1970. It also  defined in  s. 3(31)  the notified  date. As stated earlier, the Ceiling Act had 1126      a chequered - career in court and, indeed, at one stage the whole  Act was struck down as unconstitutional. However, now it is immune to attack having been included in the Ninth Schedule and  there is no challenge to its vires before, us. On account  of extensive  mischief done  by alienations on a considerable scale  calculated to  undo  the  public  policy behind agrarian reform the legislature felt the necessity to provide in s. 22 that transfers made between 6-4-1960 and 2- 10-1962 would be void if they defeated the provisions of the Act. In  all the  cases before  us the  transfers which have been ignored  by the  Authorised officer  fall  within  this interregnum. That  being  admitted,  the  only  question  is whether the lethal effect of s. 22 operates only in the case of transfers  which are  sham and  specifically intended  to defeat the  Act or  does  not  affect  transfers  which  are otherwise bona fide or is so pervasive that if the effect of the transfer  is  to  defeat  the  provisions  of  the  Act, whatever the intent of the parties, the transfer is void and can be  ignored vis-a-vis the Ceiling Act and the Authorised officer may legitimately proceed to compute the surplus area on this basis.      The learned  judge adverted to an argument that the Act being a  confiscatory one,  the public  authority  "invested with the  power to enquire into and to invalidate a transfer should act  reasonably, and  that such  a  power  should  be construed beneficently  in favour  of  the  subject  who  is affected by  the statue  (emphasis  added).  This  approach, sanctified by  tradition and vintage jurisprudence, is inept and  inapplicable   when   we   consider   agrarian   reform

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legislation whose  avowed purpose  is to  take away  as much extent of  land as  policy  dictates  so  that  distribution thereof among  the landless  may be  achieved. When  a whole legislation is geared to deprivation of property, subject to payment of  compensation,  rules  which  have  frowned  upon confiscatory  legislation   cannot  apply  at  all.  We  are concerned with  a Re  public created by the people of India, with  a   social  transformation  where  the  State  is  hot antagonistic  to   the  citizen  but  harmonises  individual interest with community good. The jurisprudential principles in such  a  situation  cannot  be  the  same  as  have  been inherited from  a culture  which postulates the State versus the subject. We do not explore the aspect of the law further as we are satisfied that the answer to the specific question raised before  us flows  directly  from  a  reading  of  the Section  in   the  light   of  well   established  rules  of interpretation.      Section 7 is a key provision and runs as follows:           "on and from the date of commencement of this Act,      no person  shall, except  as otherwise provided in this      Act but 1127      subject to  the provisions  of Chapter VIII be entitled      to hold land in excess of the ceiling area;           Provided that  in calculating  the total  of  land      held by any person, any extent in excess of the ceiling      area and  not exceeding half an acre in the case of wet      land and  one acre  in the  case  of  dry  land  shall,      irrespective  of   the  assessment  of  such  land,  be      excluded."      Section 8 directs every person who holds land in excess of 30  standard acres  to submit  a  return  with  specified particulars. Section  18 is the culmination and provides for the publication  of a  notification to  the effect. that the surplus land  with each  landholder is required for a public purpose. Thereupon  such land  shall be  deemed to have been acquired  for  a  public  purpose  and  shall  vest  in  the Government.      Chapter III  is a  protective  armour  created  by  the statute with  prohibitions and proscriptions. In particular, s. 22,  which we have quoted earlier, contains an interdict. If any transfer, contrary to its tenor, is created it can be voided by  the Authorised  officer. The  whole purpose is to make  available  land  with  Government  for  its  equitable dispensation according  to the statutory plan. Section 94 is relevant in this context.      6-4-1960 is  the date of commencement of the Act. 2-10- 62 is  the notified  date. Transfers  in between  these  two dates have  been executed  by the respondents in the various appeals before us. The concrete question is wether s. 22 has the effect of rendering such transfers invalid ipso facto or whether there  is need for further proof that such transfers are "sham,  nominal and  bogus". The  view taken by the High Court is that:           " . . . Section 22 seems to cover only those sham,      nominal and  bogus transfers which are only intended to      defeat the  provisions of  the Act.  If the Legislative      intention  is   also  to   invalidate  all   bona  fide      transactions during  the relevant period, it would have      made certain  consequential provisions  as to  what are      the rights  of the  transferor and  the  transferee  in      relation  to   the  property   conveyed,  and  how  the      resultant  equities  between  the  transferee  and  the      transferor have  to  be  worked  out.  This  view  that      section  22  will  cover  only  transactions  of  sham,

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    nominal and  bogus character which are intended only to      defeat  the   provisions  of   the  Act   will  not  be      inconsistent with the object provided in section 7." 1128      The learned  judge seems  to take  a liberal  view that transactions entered into in anticipation of the Ceiling Act will not  be hit by the provisions preventing such transfers except where  they are  mala fide  or oolourable. The reason partly turns  on semantics  and the court argue with logical support:           "The  word   "defeat"  normally   means  overcome,      thwart,   evade,    frustrate,   circumvent,    bypass,      disappoint, prevent,  the accomplishment  of  the  word      "defeat" in  Section 22  is one  to be  taken as having      been used  to import sinister, motive. I Maxwell on the      interpretation  of  statutes,  twelfth  edition,  after      stating that  the Courts  will not  be astute to narrow      the language of a statute so as to allow persons within      its purview  to escape its net, that the statute has to      be applied  to the  substance rather than the mere from      of  transactions   thus  _  defeating  any  shifts  and      contrivances which parties may have devised in the hope      of falling outside the Act."      The conclusion  categorically reached by the High Court virtually emasculates  s. 22 as we understand its object and import. The learned judge winds up with these words:           "on a due consideration of the matter, I hold that      under section  22 of  the Act the authorised officer is      entitled to  declare as void only those transfers which      are sham  and nominal  entered  into  with  the  avowed      object of  defeating the provisions of the Act, without      any bona  fide intention  to transfer  title. So in the      light of  the view  expressed above  the facts  of each      case have to be considered."      Section  22,   literally  read   leads  only   to   one conclusion, that any transfer, bona fide executed or not, is liable to  be declared void by the Authorised Officer "if he finds that  the transfer  defeats any  of the  provisions of this Act."  There is  not the slightest doubt that severally and cumulatively  the provisions  of the  Act seek  to  make available the  maximum extent  of land,  in  excess  of  the ceiling, to  be vested  in Government  for fulfilment of its purposes. Chapter  II contains a fasciculus of provisions in this behalf  and if  any transfer  carves out of the surplus area some  land, pro  tanto, the  provisions of  the Act are defeated. Indeed,  it is  not seriously  disputed that  such will be the conclusion if we do not read into the provisions either the  condition that  it does  not apply  to bona fide transfers, as  Shri Ramamurthy   would  have it, or does not apply to  any transfers  other than  sham, nominal  or bogus transfers, as  the High  Court  would  have  it.  A  policy- oriented   interpretation    tallies   with    the   literal construction in the 1129 present case.  The mischief  rule in  Heydon’s case  and the grammatical construction  which is  the Golden Rule converge to the same conclusion in the present case.      The policy of the law of land reform with drastic limit on  holdings   often  drives   large  holders  to  evade  by manouvres.  They   make  r   .  gifts,   execute  sales   or settlements,  enter   into  other  dealings  to  save  their properties from  being taken  by the  State. May be in a few cases, the  owner has  real necessity.  But why sell only on The eve  of land  legislation? Why execute deeds, though for good purposes,  only where the bill fixing ceilings is round

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the corner?  By and  large, the strategies of extrication of holdings from  the arm  of the  law is  the  t  reason  that prompts  sudden   affection   for   making   gifts,   sudden realisation of  debts due  and sudden  awareness  of  family necessity.  The   legislature,  astute   enough  not  to  be outwitted in  its objective, puts a blanket ban on transfers which, in  effect, defeat  its provisions.  This  may  cause hardship to  some but every cause claims martyrs. Individual trauma is inevitable while ushering in a new economic order. This is  the rationale of s. 22 of the Ceiling Act. To alloy the sense  of the text and to mi alien concepts is to debase the statutory  metal. Likewise,  laws are not value-free and so he  reads the  symbols of  words best who projects in the process the  values of the legislation as distinguished from his own.  Reading other values into the legislators’ - words may judicially  demonetize the  statute and  break me comity between constitutional instrumentalities.      The current  and correct  view  of  the  interpretative process is  that words  must be  given  their  ’literal’  or ’ordinary’ meaning  unless  there  are  compelling  reasons, recognised by  canons of  construction, to  the contrary. It must be  remembered  that  the  judicial  rule  of  law  for interpreting  statutes  applies  the  grammatical  approach, thereby to  bring out the value judgment incorporated in the statute itself.  Some times  it is called the ’equity of the statute’. As  Prof. R. B. Stevens of the Yale University has pointed out:           "Whenever the  judges support  to depart  from the      literal or  ordinary meaning,  and apply  the  mischief      rule or  the golden rule, there is danger that in place      of   those   irrelevant   criteria,   the   canons   of      construction,  they  have  more  obviously  substituted      their own  (perhaps more  harmful) impressions,  views,      prejudices or  predispositions. Such  conflicts between      what Parliament  intended and  what the  judges assumed      Parliament   to    have   intended   have   long   been      appreciated."(1) (I)      Modern Law Review, Vol. 28,1965 p 525 16-409 SCI/79 1130      Those who have reflected on the meaning of meaning have said that words.... "mean" nothing by themselves.. (1). They convey policy  and the  judge who  interprets must  seek the intent of  the legislature  by gaining  an insight into this policy  and  making  it  manifest  through  the  process  of construction. Looking  at the words of s. 22 in the light of the scheme,  of prohibition  of transfers  to  preserve  the surplus lands for distribution, we find no justification for importing into s. 22 more than its words convey. The Section says what  it means,  nothing more,  nothing else.  A simple scan of  the provision  reveals  that  any  transfer,  gift, surrender, settlement or other alienation referred to in the Section may  be declared  void by the Authorised officer "if he finds  that the  transfer or the partition....defeats any of the  provisions of this Act.". The trichotomy is obvious. There must  be a  transfer or other alienation. It must have taken place  during the  period mentioned in the Section. It must have  the effect of defeating any of the provisions, of the Act. If these three elements are present, the Authorised officer must  void  the  transfer.  There  is  no  room  for importing a  fourth principal  that the  transfer should  be ’sham, nominal or bogus’. Nor indeed is there any additional consideration that  if the transfer is bona, fide for family necessity or  other urgency  then it is good, even though it defeats the  provisions of  the Act.  We  cannot  amend  the

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Section  or   dilute  its   imperatives,   scared   by   the consequences  or   moved  by   extraneous  sympathies.  Sub- conscious forces and individual prepossessions have a subtle way of  entering the interpretative verdict of the judge. We have to  be constantly  careful to  exclude such intrusions. Moreover, when  the whole  purpose of  the  Section  is,  to prevent any  alienation which  defeats any of the purpose if visions of  the Act,  it is  impermissible to  introduce any requirement, other  than is  mentioned in  the Section, as a condition for  its operation. Obviously, the provision seeks to provide  social justice  for the  landless and it defeats the purpose  if, by the interpretative process, soft Justice to large  landholders is  brought  about.  We  consider  the ’literal’ meaning  of the Section to be that any transfer or other alienation  mentioned in  the Section which reduces or impairs the  otherwise  available  extent  of  surplus  land beyond the  ceiling "defeats..  the provisions of this Act." This is the plain meaning of the Section which gives no room for doubt  or justification  for importation  of any further condition like sham, bogus etc.      A return  to the rules of strict construction, when the purpose of      (I) C.  Ogden and I. Richards, The Meaning of Meaning 9 (10th Edn. 1956) 1131 the statute  needs it,  is desirable, especially with a view to give effect A to the intention of the legislature. We are reminded of Lord Denning’s interesting remarks in his recent book "The  Discipline of  Law" under  heading "I am a Portia Man".           In justification  of his  view Russell LJ quoted a      passage from Shakespeare. It is worth recording because      there are  lessons to  be drawn  from it-as there often      are from Shakes peare.           ’I may  perhaps be  forgiven for  saying  that  it      appears to  me that  Lord Denning MR has acceded to the      appeal of Bessanio in the Merchant of Venice. Bessanio           "And, I beseech you,           Wrest once the law to your authority:           To do a great right, do a little wrong.           But Portia retorted:           "It must not be; there is no power in Venice           Can alter a decree established:           It will be recorded for a precedent,           And many an error, by the same example,           Will rush into the State: it cannot be."      Then said Russell LJ.           ’I am a Portia man’.      I cannot  believe that  Russell LJ  would be  a ’Portia man’ if it meant aligning himself with Shylock-in support of a strict  law of  penalties which  could not  be relieved by equity.      To be  truly a  ’Portia marl’  The lawyer should follow the way  ill which  Portia avoided  an unjust decree. Not to let the  words of  the deed  be the masters: but so construe them-adapt them  as the  occasion demands-so  as to  do what justice and  equity require.  This is  how  she  turned  the tables on Shylock:           It is  in this  denouement that I would follow the      example of Portia-I too am a Portia man      In the  interpretation of  s. 22 we too are Portia men. For this  reason we  reverse the view of the High Court that s. 22  will not apply to nullify any transaction of transfer or partition unless it is further

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1132 shown that  it is  sham, nominal  or bogus.  Nor do we agree with Shri  Ramamurthy that even if a Transaction defeats the ceiling provisions,  it may  still be  valid if the transfer is, from  an individual  point of view, bona fide. The short reply is  that from  the community’s  angle, especially  the landless community’s  angle  hungering  for  allotment,  the alienation, however  necessary for  the individual,  is  not bona fide visa-vis the community.      Therefore, we  allow the  appeal in  the light  of  the interpretation  we  have  adopted,  restore  the  tribunal’s holding and rule that if any transfer defeats the provisions of the  Act by reducing the extent of surplus land in excess of the  ceiling available  from any  person such transaction bona fide  or not,  is void  in the matter of computation of the permissible  area and the surplus area. May be, that the transaction may  be good  for other  purposes or may not be. The Authorised  officer is within his power if he ignores it as void  for purposes  of s.  22, s.  7 and  other  ceiling- related provisions.      The detailed discussion of the High Court on many other aspects of  the Act do not affect the core of the matter and cannot deflect  us from  the conclusion  we have arrived at. The appeals  are allowed  but in  the light  of the  earlier direction of  the Court  the State will pay the costs of the respondent. P.B.R.                     Appeal allowed. 1133